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Abstract	
The	 construction	 of	 megaprojects	 –	 large,	 landscape	 transforming	 infrastructure	
projects	 –	 is	 booming.	 	 Megaprojects	 are	 becoming	 more	 immense	 and	 more	
environmentally	 damaging.	 	 Requiring	 vast,	 often	 transnational	 investment,	
megaprojects	have	escaped	the	boundaries	of	the	nation	state,	and	are	often	enacted	in	
transnational	contexts.	Research	has	shown	that	megaprojects	almost	always	rely	on	a	
combination	of	overstated	benefits	and	underestimated	environmental	impacts	in	order	
to	be	approved,	attract	 investment,	and	be	built.	Megaprojects	 therefore	 typically	rely	
on	highly	targeted	strategic	communications	and	attempts	to	steer	public	discourse,	in	
order	to	emphasize	their	advantages	and	downplay	risks.	This	leads	to	accusations	that	
they	 are	 insufficiently	 transparent,	 even	 deceptive.	 However,	 in	 a	 hyper-connected	
world,	 megaprojects	 and	 their	 risks	 are	 now	 more	 visible	 than	 ever,	 and	 are	
increasingly	 contested	 in	 local,	 national	 and	 global	 public	 arenas.	 Megaprojects	 are	
constructed	 in	 discourse	 both	 by	 project	 developers	 and	 their	 supporters,	 and	 by	
protest	 groups,	 as	 well	 as	 through	 their	 representation	 in	 the	 media.	 During	 the	
protracted	 communicational	 sparring	 that	 often	 accompanies	 them,	megaprojects	 can	
become	conferred	with	symbolic	meaning.	
This	 case	 study	 reveals	 the	mediatized	 construction	 of	 a	 Chilean	 energy	megaproject	
over	 eleven	 years	 from	 the	 project’s	 inception,	 to	 its	 final	 dissolution.	 The	 proposed	
HidroAysén	hydroelectric	scheme	for	Patagonia	was	at	 first	a	 largely	 invisible	project,	
unknown	outside	the	potentially	affected	region,	until	protest	made	the	project	visible.	
Presented	by	the	developing	company	and	by	authorities	as	a	nation	building	project	to	
bring	Chile	energy	independence,	over	time	it	garnered	such	vehement	opposition	that	
it	 sparked	 the	 largest	 protests	 that	 Chile	 had	 seen	 since	 its	 return	 to	 democracy.	 By	
analysing	 discourse	 in	 influential	 print	 and	 social	 media	 during	 the	 debate,	 using	
interviews	with	key	actors,	and	strategic	communications	material	from	both	sides,	this	
study	 traces	 the	discourse	over	 the	megaproject	 through	 several	 key	 stages.	 It	 shows	
what	 the	 symbolic	 communication	 of	 HidroAysén	 led	 the	 megaproject	 to	 represent,	
arguing	 that	 when	 a	megaproject	 becomes	 layered	 with	multiple	 symbolic	 meanings	
over	 time,	 it	 can	 become	 emblematic:	 a	 situation	which	 is	 hard	 to	 shift.	 Though	 this	
study	 focuses	 on	 the	 case	 of	 one	 megaproject	 in	 Chile	 –	 and	 indeed	 shows	 how	 the	
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nation	was	changed	by	 the	HidroAysén	debate	–	 it	also	draws	wider	 lessons	 from	the	
emblematic	 case	 of	 HidroAysén,	 enabling	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	
communicational	 unfolding	 of	 transnational	 megaprojects,	 and	 the	 frequently	
transnational	protests	that	oppose	them.		
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
1.1	The	emblematic	case	of	HidroAysén	
“If	it	had	been	a	person,	HidroAysén	would	have	been	70	years	old,	and	it	would	have	
died	this	Friday”.	This	is	how	Chile’s	leading	national	newspaper,	El	Mercurio,	opened	its	
weekend	feature	report	at	the	end	of	2017	on	the	“death”	of	the	country’s	largest	ever	
megaproject.	It	continued:	
Forty-eight	hours	ago,	the	directorship	of	this	company	–	held	by	Enel	Chile	
and	Colbún,	of	the	Matte	group	–	approved	a	halt	to	the	company’s	activities,	
the	 resignation	 of	 its	 directorship,	 and	 the	 decision	 to	 renounce	 the	water	
rights	 for	 the	 HidroAysén	 project:	 five	 dams	 in	 the	 country’s	 XIth	 1	 region,	
producing	2700	megawatts	(MW)	of	power,	flooding	5,910	hectares	and	with	
a	 cost	 of	 around	 US	 $8	 billion,	 dams	 and	 transmission	 line	 considered	
together.	It	was	the	largest	project	ever	designed	in	Chile,	an	old	dream	of	the	
engineers	of	Corfo2,	first	conceived	in	1947	to	bring	electricity	and	progress	
to	the	country.	 It	cost	 its	shareholders	US$300	million,	without	producing	a	
single	megawatt…	
			(Ibarra,	El	Mercurio	19/11/2017)	
The	 project	 had	 not	 just	 been	 the	 “old	 dream”	 of	 engineers.	 For	much	 of	 the	 decade	
proceeding	 its	 final	 dissolution,	 HidroAysén	 had	 been	 planned	 and	 scheduled	 to	 be	
built,	 was	 projected	 to	 be	 generating	 power	 from	 2020.	 Since	 2006,	 HidroAysén	 had	
been	 a	 constant	 feature	 of	 public	 discourse.	 It	 had	 engendered	 a	 powerful	 social	
movement	and	provoked	the	largest	street	protests	that	Chile	had	seen	since	its	return	
to	democracy	after	the	end	of	Pinochet’s	dictatorship.	It	also	produced	an	extraordinary	
amount	 of	media	 coverage.	 	 Over	 11	 years,	 the	megaproject	 was	 debated,	 protested,	
approved,	 challenged,	 became	 highly	 politically	 charged	 and	 the	 subject	 of	 vehement	
public	opinion,	weathered	two	elections	–	as	a	key	issue	in	each	–	until	finally,	politically	
and	socially	unpalatable,	the	project’s	environmental	approvals	were	revoked	in	2014.	
Even	 then,	 HidroAysén	 did	 not	 “die”.	 	 Three	more	 years	 of	 litigation	 followed.	Media	
discourse	 on	 the	 project	 continued	 right	 up	 until	 2018,	 when,	 for	 example,	 Energy	
Minister	 Susana	 Jiménez	 was	 interviewed	 in	 newspaper	 La	 Tercera,	 citing	 the	
1	Chile	is	divided	into	16	regions,	with	the	Aysén	Region	(full	name:	Región	Aysén	del	General	Carlos	
Ibáñez	del	Campo)	known	as	the	XI	Region.	Region	numbers	are	always	expressed	in	Roman	numerals.	
2	Corporación	de	Fomento	de	la	Producción,	the	Chilean	state	development	agency.	
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HidroAysén	debate	and	noting	“how	important	this	discussion	has	been	for	the	country”	
(Orellana	&	Santa	María,	La	Tercera	18/03/2018).		
	
HidroAysén	was	certainly	a	large	project:	a	feat	of	engineering	to	build	five	dams	on	two	
remote	rivers	in	Chile’s	far	south,	and	to	transport	that	energy	by	means	of	the	world’s	
then-longest	planned	 transmission	 line	of	 some	2300kms,	 to	 the	central	 region	of	 the	
country,	home	to	90%	of	Chile’s	population	and	industry.	The	environmental	and	social	
impacts	would	have	been	significant,	as	this	thesis	makes	clear.	However,	compared	to	
many	other	mega-hydro	projects	concurrently	being	planned	and	constructed,	in	what	
has	 recently	 been	 called	 a	 “global	 boom”	 (Zarfl	 2014;	 BBC	 News	 6/08/18)	 in	
hydroelectric	 dam	 construction,	 HidroAysén	 was	 not	 the	 largest	 of	 hydroelectricity	
megaprojects.	In	Latin	America	alone,	Brazil’s	also	much	contested	Belo	Monte	dam	–	in	
2018,	 already	 mostly	 operational	 –	 has	 a	 total	 reservoir	 area	 of	 66,800	 hectares	
projected	generation	of	11,233	MW	of	power,	at	a	cost	of	$US22	billion	(Gautam	et	al.	
2018).	 The	 planned	 Garabí-Panambi	 complex,	 between	 Brazil	 and	 Argentina	 would	
flood	 73,000	 hectares	 to	 create	 2200	MW	 (Garabí-Panambi	 2014)	 and	 the	 proposed	
Pongo	de	Manseriche	dam	in	the	Peruvian	Amazon,	if	ever	built,	could	flood	a	colossal	
547,000	 hectares,	 for	 7550	 MW	 of	 generating	 capacity	 (The	 Guardian	 27/05/2015).	
Planning	to	inundate	5910	hectares	to	generate	2750	MW	of	power	(HidroAysén	2011),	
HidroAysén	was	not	on	the	scale	of	these	other	hydroelectric	dams.	Communicationally,	
however,	it	was	vast.		
	
I	 argue	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 the	 most	 significant	 aspect	 of	 this	 ultimately	 failed	
megaproject	was	the	way	in	which	it	was	communicated	and	deliberated	in	the	public	
sphere.	In	this	study	I	therefore	follow	and	analyse	the	mediatized	conflict	around	the	
HidroAysén	 megaproject	 for	 Chilean	 Patagonia	 from	 the	 time	 that	 the	 HidroAysén	
company	was	 first	established,	 in	2006,	 to	 the	moment	 the	company,	and	 the	project,	
were	finally	terminated,	in	2017.	I	trace	and	analyse	discourse	in	three	national	Chilean	
media	outlets	during	 the	most	 crucial	years	of	 the	debate,	 and	 I	 analyse	key	 strategic	
communications	outputs,	including	imagery,	around	the	dams	from	both	the	anti-dams	
protest	movement,	and	the	developing	company.	I	additionally	use	social	media	output	
and	interviews	with	key	actors	from	both	sides	of	the	dams	debate	to	gain	insights	into	
tactics	 and	 strategies	 employed	 in	 the	 extended	 mediatized	 sparring	 over	 the	
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megaproject.	I	argue	that,	in	the	course	of	mediatized	deliberation	over	HidroAysén,	as	
the	project	was	constructed	communicationally,	 it	became	 layered	with	distinct	strata	
of	 symbolic	 meaning3	 so	 that	 ultimately,	 the	 project	 became	 emblematic,	 that	 is,	
constituted	by	a	composite	of	meanings	 that	signified	much	more	 than	a	 large	energy	
infrastructure	 project.	 I	 argue	 here	 that	 HidroAysén	 and	 the	 anti-dams	 protest	
movement	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 (Patagonia	 without	 Dams)	 became	 emblematic	 of	
different	 and	 fundamentally	 opposed	world	 views.	 I	 argue	 also	 that	 the	 conflict	 over	
HidroAysén	became	a	point	of	 inflection	 in	decision-making	about	 the	 future	mode	of	
Chile’s	 development.	 In	 this	way,	 strategic	 symbolic	 communication,	 and	 the	ways	 in	
which	 symbols	 became	 attached	 to	 the	 project	 (and	 protest	 against	 it)	 over	 time,	
affected	 not	 only	 the	 course	 and	 the	 ultimate	 outcome	 of	 the	 megaproject,	 but	
profoundly	 influenced	 the	 country’s	 socio-political,	 economic	 and	 energy	 destiny.	 I	
argue	 that	 this	 case	 offers	 lessons	 for	 understanding	 the	 discursive	 construction	 of	
other	highly	contested,	emblematic	megaprojects,	for	project	developers,	as	well	as	for	
groups	 that	 protest	 such	 projects,	 and	 seek	 to	 highlight	 alternative	 modes	 of	
development.	 It	 also	 offers	 empirical	 detail	 to	 broader	 debates	 about	 development,	
extractivism	and	social	movements	in	Latin	America	in	particular.		
	
Drawing	on	the	work	of	Bourdieu	(1979,	1991,	1998)	and	Thompson	(1995,	2005)	on	
symbolic	power,	and	Foucault	(1972,	1977,	1980)	on	the	power	of	discursive	practices,	
this	 study	 considers	 language	and	discourse	as	 constitutive	of	power	 (Couldry	2000).	
Focusing	as	 it	does,	on	 the	 role	of	 the	media	as	a	 site	 for	discursive	 construction	and	
power	 struggle	 (Cottle	 2004,	 2006;	 Lester	 2010;	 Cottle	&	 Lester	 2011)	 it	 argues	 that	
those	groups	that	gain	the	power	of	risk	definition	(Beck	1986/1992;	Adam,	Beck	&	van	
Loon	 2000)	 have	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 influence	 in	 mediatized	 sparring.	 Although	
symbolic	 power	 has	 begun	 to	 receive	 some	 recent	 recognition	 in	 the	 literature	 on	
megaprojects	 (Klein	 &	 Aubry	 2017;	 Lopez	 Rego,	 Reis	 Irigaray	 &	 Lago	 Chaves	 2017;	
Söderlund,	 Sankara	 &	 Biesenthal	 2017;	 van	 Marrewijk	 2017)	 very	 little	 scholarly	
attention	has	been	paid	to	how	the	symbolic	power	of	megaprojects	is	derived	through	
																																																						
3	Clifford	Geertz’	 (1973)	definition	of	symbols	serves	as	a	working	definition	of	symbols	 for	 this	 thesis.	
For	 Geertz	 symbols	 are	 “tangible	 formulations	 of	 notions,	 abstractions	 from	 experience	 fixed	 in	
perceptible	forms,	concrete	embodiments	of	ideas,	attitudes,	judgments,	longing,	or	beliefs”	(p.	91).		
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their	 media	 representation	 and	 the	 discourse	 that	 surrounds	 them,	 in	 all	 its	
contemporary	forms.	This	thesis	aims	to	address	that	gap.		
	
	
1.2	Megaprojects	as	symbols	
	
The	 phenomenon	 of	 megaprojects,	 is	 a	 conflicted	 one.	 Large-scale,	 complex	
infrastructure	 investment	 projects,	 costing	 over	 US$1	 billion,	 (Flyvbjerg	 2012,	 p.	 98,	
Flyvbjerg	2017),	they	include	nation-linking	bridges,	ocean-crossing	tunnels,	oil	and	gas	
pipelines,	 country-spanning	 power	 lines,	 airports,	 highways	 and	 large	 dams.		
Megaprojects	 “transform	 landscapes	 rapidly,	 intentionally	 and	 profoundly	 in	 very	
visible	ways”	(Gellert	&	Lynch	2003,	pp.	15-16),	affecting	whole	regions	and	the	lives	of	
millions.	 Megaprojects	 involve	 “creative	 destruction”,	 to	 extend	 Schumpeter’s	 (1947)	
term,	 and	 by	 this	 process,	 they	 irrevocably	 alter	 landscapes	 and	 “socionatural	
conditions”	(Swyngedouw	1999,	p.	445).			
	
More	than	simply	large	planning	projects,	megaprojects	are	a	sociological	phenomenon.	
Megaprojects	(the	internet	arguably	the	greatest	of	them)	are	both	a	cause	and	effect	of	
globalisation.	 Whether	 transport,	 energy	 or	 telecommunications	 infrastructure,	
international	 health	 or	 science	 projects,	 or	 vast	 networks	 of	 supply	 chain	 logistics,	
megaprojects	 arise	 from	 a	 human	 tendency	 towards	 the	 shrinking	 of	 distance	
(Flyvbjerg,	Rothengatter	&	Bruzelius	2003,	p.	3).	Dams	are	an	integral	part	of	this	space-
shrinking	 imperative:	 dam	megaprojects	 typically	 supply	 electricity,	 freeing	 industry	
from	 localised	 power	 sources.	 Sociologist	 Zygmunt	 Bauman	 has	 termed	 the	 distance-
shrinking	urge	“The	Great	War	of	 Independence	 from	Space”	(Bauman	1998,	pp.	2-3),	
while	 others	 have	 spoken	 of	 “the	 end	 of	 geography”	 (O'Brien	 1992)	 or	 the	 advent	 of	
“frictionless	 capitalism”	 (Gates,	 Myrvhold	 &	 Rinearson	 1995).	 	 Infrastructure,	 argue	
others,	has	moved	from	being	the	prerequisite	for	production	and	consumption	to	being	
“the	very	core	of	these	activities”	so	that	“power,	wealth	and	status	increasingly	belong	
to	 those	 who	 know	 how	 to	 shrink	 space	 or	 know	 how	 to	 benefit	 from	 space	 being	
shrunk”	 (Flyvbjerg,	 Rothengatter	&	 Bruzelius	 2003,	 p.	 2).	Megaprojects	 are	 therefore	
central	to	the	“new	world	order”	(Castells	2004b)	of	the	globalised	world	and	the	new	
politics	of	defying	distance.	
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Megaprojects	are	also	inherently	unequal.	They	create	primary	displacements	–	of	soil	
and	rocks,	landscapes	and	ecosystems	–	and	secondary	displacements	of	people:	those	
who	are	moved	to	make	way	for	 them,	 those	whose	 livelihoods	are	altered	by	altered	
landscapes,	 and	 those	who	move	 to	work	 on	 the	 projects.	 The	 effects	 and	benefits	 of	
megaprojects	have	been	conceptualised	as	 spreading	 like	 ripples	over	 time	and	space	
(Gellert	&	Lynch	2003,	p.	19)	so	that	those	whose	interests	reside	within	the	landscapes	
that	megaprojects	transform	and	displace	benefit	least,	and	that	those	who	promote	and	
develop	megaprojects	 (invariably	 distant)	 benefit	most.	Megaprojects	 therefore	 serve	
the	material	interests	of	powerful	actors.	In	this	way,	megaprojects	–	particularly	dams	
–	commonly	increase	poverty	and	underscore	inequality,	particularly	in	the	developing	
world	where	their	stated	mission	 is	often	to	do	the	opposite	(Khagram	2004;	McCully	
1996).	
	
In	a	globalised	world,	the	rate	of	megaproject	development	has	quickened.	More,	larger	
and	 more	 expensive,	 megaprojects	 are	 being	 built	 (Altshuler	 &	 Luberoff	 2004;	
Flyvbjerg,	Rothengatter	&	Bruzelius	2003).	An	estimated	8%	of	global	GDP	was	spent	on	
megaproject	infrastructure	in	2013	(Flyvbjerg	2017)	as	part	of	what	The	Economist	has	
called	 “the	 biggest	 investment	 boom	 in	 history”	 (Economist	 7/06/2008,	 p.	 8).	
Hydroelectric	 dam	 megaproject	 development	 has	 particularly	 been	 experiencing	 a	
boom,	especially	in	the	Global	South	where	energy	from	hydroelectric	megaprojects	is	
often	 characterised	 as	 being	 ‘needed	 for	 development’	 (Ansar	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Waisbord	
2013a,4	Zarfl	 et	 al.	2014,).	The	development	of	 such	projects	has	become	 intrinsically	
intertwined	 with	 the	 globalisation	 of	 capital.	 Research	 indicates	 that	 transnational	
capital	uses	major	infrastructure	investments	to	widen	its	financial	networks	“reflecting	
more	its	own	interests	than	those	of	the	territories	it	traverses	and	serves”	(Dimitriou	
2005,	p.	6).	To	achieve	this,	it	has	been	argued,	“elements	of	corporate	global	business	
pressurise	the	similarly	globally-oriented	elites	within	each	national	polity	to	subsidise	
this	 process”	 (ibid.)	 International	 lending	 structures	 also	 encourage	 “Big	 Fix”,	 global-
sized	projects	(Douglass	2005,	p.	1).	In	a	globalised	world,	megaprojects	have	therefore	
become	larger,	more	expensive,	more	political,	and	more	environmentally	and	socially	
damaging.	
	
																																																						
4	Waisbord	(2013a,	p.	106)	calls	this	an	“extraction-as-development”	model.	
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Megaprojects	are	also	 inherently	paradoxical.	Research	of	hundreds	of	projects	across	
twenty	nations,	across	seventy	years	(Flyvbjerg,	Rothengatter	&	Bruzelius	2003,	pp.	1-
10;	Flyvbjerg	2005)	and	more	recent	research	of	dam	megaprojects	specifically	(Ansar	
et	 al.	 2014)	 has	 shown	 that	 in	 order	 to	 get	 projects	 approved	 and	 built,	megaproject	
developers	 typically	 rely	 on	 a	 formula	 of	 “underestimated	 costs,	 overestimated	
revenues,	undervalued	environmental	 impacts	and	overvalued	economic	development	
effects”	(Flyvbjerg	2005,	p.	18)	–	a	notion	that	Flyvbjerg	updated	in	2014	and	called	“the	
iron	 law	of	megaprojects”	 (Flyvbjerg	2014,	p.	6)5.	 	At	best,	 research	has	characterized	
this	 tendency	 as	 an	 “optimism	 bias”	 (Mott	 MacDonald	 2002),	 at	 worst,	
“misrepresentation”	 (Kain	 1990),	 “strategic	 deception”	 (Flyvbjerg,	 Garbuio	 &	 Lovallo	
2009),	 “manipulation”	 (Whitworth	 &	 Cheatham	 1988)	 and	 “lies”	 (Wachs	 1989).	
Megaprojects	are	therefore	usually	planned	and	built	in	a	conflicted	space	where	often	
only	 lack	 of	 transparency	 and	 a	 “democracy	 deficit”	 (Flyvbjerg,	 Rothengatter	 &	
Bruzelius	 2003,	 p.	 5)	 ensure	 their	 completion.	 This	 widespread	 equation	 for	
megaproject	 establishment	 requires	 a	 downplaying	 of	 risks	 and	 uncertainties:	 best	
achieved	 by	 communicational	 construction,	 and	 attempts	 to	 steer	 public	 discourse	
surrounding	such	projects.	Because	they	are	so	large,	complex,	expensive,	take	so	much	
time,	 are	 therefore	 vulnerable	 to	 change,	 and	 embody	 such	 a	 high	degree	 of	 risk	 and	
uncertainty,	 megaprojects,	 it	 seems,	 intrinsically	 need	 intensive	 communicational	
construction	 in	 order	 to	 be	 approved	 and	 built.	 Developers	 of	megaprojects	 in	many	
national	 contexts	 have	 therefore	 typically	 begun	 to	 recognize	 the	 importance	 of	 their	
projects’	 media	 representation	 and	 develop	 sophisticated	 persuasive	 strategies	 to	
ensure	 such	 representation	 is	 favourable	 to	 the	 project’s	 success	 (Fischhendler	 et	 al.	
2015;	Lefsrud	&	Meyer	2012).	I	argue	in	this	thesis	that	because	megaprojects	become	
endowed	with	meanings	 through	 the	 discourse	 that	 surrounds	 them	 in	 the	 course	 of	
their	 development,	 they	 are	 inherently	 symbolic	 undertakings.	 Because	 of	 the	 power	
and	 often,	 the	 prestige,	 that	 can	 become	 attached	 to	 megaprojects	 in	 their	 symbolic	
communication,	they	can	also	exert	“a	powerful	magnetic	spell	on	ambitious	politicians”	
(Priemus	2010,	p.	1023).	Megaprojects	are	therefore	also	inherently	political.	
																																																						
5	Flyvbjerg	(2012,	2014)	has	also	conceptualised	four	“megaproject	sublimes”:	the	political,	technological,	
economic,	and	aesthetic	sublimes.	Together	these	help	harness	the	conviction	of	megaproject	developers,	
funders,	 government	 decision-makers,	 the	media	 and	 the	 public	 to	 accept,	 and	 support,	megaprojects.	
Flyvbjerg	 considers	 these	 four	 sublimes	 to	 be	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 the	 scale	 and	 frequency	 of	
megaprojects.	
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Although	megaprojects	have	always	been	symbolic	–	the	Panama	Canal	as	a	symbol	of	
US	geopolitical	power,	the	US	Space	Program	as	a	symbol	of	the	struggle	for	domination	
between	the	US	and	the	Soviet	Union,	the	Channel	Tunnel	as	a	symbolic	linkage	of	the	
UK	 to	 Europe,	 or	 the	 Belt	 and	 Road	 Initiative	 as	 symbolic	 of	 Chinese	 geopolitical	
ambitions	 –	 the	 literature	 on	megaprojects	 has	 only	 recently	 begun	 to	 recognize	 the	
importance	 of	 symbolism,	 and	 the	 primacy	 of	 communication,	 in	 relation	 to	
megaprojects.	 In	 the	 field	 of	 organisational	 management	 and	 planning,	 Syn	 &	
Ramaprasad	 (2018)	published	an	ontological	 review	of	 the	 “symbolic	and	sublime”	 in	
megaproject	management,	and	proposed	a	framework	for	use	by	megaproject	decision-
makers.	The	Project	Management	Journal	recently	ran	a	special	issue	on	the	symbolic	in	
relation	 to	megaprojects.	 This	 edition	 notes	megaprojects’	 “symbolic	 roles	 in	 society”	
(Klein	 &	 Aubry	 2017	 p.	 3),	 explains	 how	 megaprojects	 are	 filled	 with	 “symbol	
manipulation	and	rhetoric”	(Lopez	Rego,	Reis	Irigaray	&	Lago	Chaves	2017,	p.	19),	and	
tells	us	that	“megaprojects	can	be	understood	as	modern	symbols	of	prestige,	progress	
and	 political	 power”	 (van	Marrewijk	 2017,	 p.	 48).	 In	 his	 contribution,	 van	Marrewijk	
takes	an	anthropological	perspective	on	symbolism	in	megaprojects,	 telling	us	that,	as	
this	study	finds,	“symbols	can	be	used	strategically	in	megaprojects	for	decision-making	
purposes”,	 “for	 the	 legitimation	of	power”,	 and	 for	 the	enactment	of	 “power	 struggles	
among	 stakeholders”	 (p.	 49).	 He	 also	 tells	 us,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 for	 HidroAysén,	 that	 the	
symbolic	meaning	of	 a	megaproject	 is	 “not	 stable,	 and	 can	 change	over	 time”	 (p.	 49).	
Although	this	collection	of	research	on	meaning-making	 in	relation	to	megaprojects	 is	
enlightening	 from	 an	 organisational	 management	 perspective,	 none	 of	 these	 papers	
include	any	in-depth	exploration	of	discourse	in	the	media	in	relation	to	megaprojects,	
neither	 do	 they	 undertake	 any	 analysis	 of	 megaproject	 developers’	 or	 megaproject	
opponents’	 own	 strategic	 communications	 surrounding	 such	 projects,	 as	 this	 study	
does.	
	
1.3	Gaps	in	the	research	
	
Although	 the	 planning	 and	 project	 management	 literature	 has	 begun	 to	 discuss	
megaprojects	 as	 symbolic,	 communicationally	 constructed	 endeavours,	 studies	 of	
meaning-making	 and	 symbolism	 in	 the	 development	 of	 large	 infrastructure	 projects	
from	a	media	and	communications	perspective	are	not	abundant.	One	seminal	study	of	
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an	 early	 conflict	 over	 a	 large	 infrastructure	 project	 is	 Christine	 Oravec’s	 (1984)	
publication	on	 the	Hetch	Hetchy	dam	controversy	 (1908-1913).	Anderson	 (1997)	has	
also	 written	 on	 the	 mediatized	 protest	 against	 the	 sinking	 of	 the	 Brent	 Spar	 oil	 rig.	
Lester	 and	 Hutchins	 (2006)	 have	 documented	 media/protest	 interaction	 in	 an	
important	 Australian	 anti-dam	 protest	 campaign.	 Of	 particular	 interest	 to	 this	 thesis,	
given	 the	 Latin	 American	 context,	 is	 Waisbord’s	 (2013a)	 work	 on	 contesting	
extractivism	 and	 Waisbord	 and	 Peruzzotti’s	 (2009)	 study	 of	 protest	 and	 media	
representation	 in	 the	process	of	pulp	mill	building	on	the	Uruguay	River.	The	authors	
find	 here,	 as	 the	 present	 study	 does,	 that	 an	 issue	 that	 is	 an	 environmental	 one	 can	
become	 transformed	 into	 a	 political	 issue	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 protest	 tactics	 and	media	
coverage.	 The	 present	 study	 builds	 on	 Waisbord	 and	 Peruzzotti’s	 2009	 work	 by	
additionally	 exploring	 the	 symbolic	 dimensions	 of	 discourse	 surrounding	 a	 contested	
megaproject,	and	analysing	the	communicational	sparring	in	this	debate	with	in-depth	
thick	 description	 (Geertz	 1973).	 Most	 recently,	 Fischhendler	et	 al.	(2015)	 have	
researched	the	media	treatment	of	the	Dead	Sea	Water	Canal	megaproject,	tracing	the	
strategies	used	to	promote	the	project	in	one	Israeli	newspaper.	Using	synchronic	and	
diachronic	content	analysis	(van	Dijk,	T	1988;	Fairclough	1995)	Fischhendler	et	al.	seek	
to	understand	 “how	megaprojects	are	 communicated	 to	 the	public	 through	 the	use	of	
the	media”	(p.	795),	by	examining	“uncertainties”	related	to	the	project,	which	changed	
over	time.	The	authors	confirm	that	such	projects	can	become	symbols	(in	the	case	of	
the	Dead	Sea	Water	project,	symbolic	of	national	peace)	and	they	acknowledge	the	role	
of	media	representational	practices	both	in	“quelling	public	concern	regarding	risk	and	
uncertainties	 and	 in	building	public	 support”	 (p.	795)	 for	 such	projects.	As	 this	 study	
does,	the	authors	also	examine	the	role	of	resistance	by	non-nation-state	actors	 in	the	
communications	 surrounding	a	megaproject.	This	 thesis	 concurs	with	Fischhendler	et	
al.	 in	the	argument	that	the	success	of	any	given	megaproject	and	the	 likelihood	of	 its	
eventual	 implementation	now	depends	on	 the	 success	of	 a	project’s	 communicational	
construction	in	public	arenas.	Fischhendler	et	al.	(p.	807)	call	for	future	research	to	use	
“additional	 media	 sources	 (e.g	 newspapers)	 to	 test	 potential	 differences	 in…strategy	
representations	 according	 to	 underlying	 ideologies	 or	 political	 inclinations	 of	 the	
media.”	 In	surveying	 three	slightly	differently	politically	orientated	media	outlets,	and	
noting	how	their	stance	on	HidroAysén	changed	–	or	remained	stable	–	over	time,	this	
study	does	exactly	that.		
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Though	Waisbord	and	Peruzzotti	(2009)	and	Fischhendler	et	al.	(2015)	add	much	to	our	
understanding	 of	 the	 way	 mediatized	 discourse	 over	 large,	 controversial	 and	
environmentally	 damaging	 projects	 unfolds	 over	 time,	 neither	 of	 these	 studies	 is	
designed	 to	 present	 a	 broader	 view	 of	 mediatized	 discourse	 which	 includes	 the	 key	
actors’	self-representation	through	advertising	and	strategic	communications,	as	well	as	
intensive	 analysis	 of	 media	 coverage	 of	 a	 megaproject	 over	 time,	 including	 the	
contribution	 of	 social	 media	 to	 such	 discourse.	 Although	 these	 two	 studies	 do	
acknowledge	the	dynamic	way	in	which	meaning	becomes	attached	to	projects,	neither	
aimed	 to	present	a	detailed	anatomy	of	how	symbolic	meanings	are	derived	 from	the	
prevailing	social	context,	shaped	through	discourse	in	diverse	forms	of	media,	and	can	
become	 layered	upon	each	other,	 until	 a	megaproject	 comes	 to	 represent	much	more	
than	 an	 infrastructure-building	 endeavour.	 Likewise,	 though	 Fischhendler	 et	 al.	 do	
acknowledge	 strategies	 to	 “hide	 uncertainty”	 (“by	 telling	 the	 truth…but	 not	 ALL	 the	
truth”,	p.	797)	about	megaprojects,	neither	these	authors’	study	or	any	others	on	media	
and	megaprojects	 have	 focused	 on	 strategies	 to	 avoid	 mediatized	 visibility	 (Lester	 &	
Hutchins	 2012a;	 2012b)	 on	 the	 part	 of	 megaproject	 developers,	 as	 this	 study	 does.	
Likewise,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 studies	 to	 follow	 the	 mediatized	 discourse	 surrounding	 a	
megaproject,	 within	 its	 social	 context,	 over	 the	 whole	 period	 of	 the	 megaproject’s	
trajectory,	 from	 establishment	 to	 completion,	 cancellation	 of	 otherwise,	 as	 this	 study	
does.	
	
In	the	case	of	environmental	conflicts	in	Chile	specifically,	some	previous	research	has	
examined	 protest	 against	 earlier	 hydropower	 megaprojects	 in	 this	 national	 context	
(Carruthers	&	Rodriguez	2009),	however,	the	media’s	role	here	was	not	addressed.	The	
case	of	HidroAysén	has	attracted	some	specific	 research	attention.	Cuadra	 (2013)	has	
examined	 protest	 against	 HidroAysén	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 a	 citizens’	 democratising	
drive	 –	 a	 notion	 which	 this	 thesis	 supports,	 and	 which	 is	 discussed	 in	 the	 thesis	
conclusion.	 Latta	 has	 written	 on	 “socio-environmental	 traumas”	 in	 relation	 to	
HidroAysén	in	its	early	stages	(2011)	and	also	on	the	company’s	attempts	to	“generate	
consent”	 (2010)	 for	 its	 project,	 from	 the	 points	 of	 view	 of	 water	 and	 environmental	
politics	and	policies	in	Chile.	Romero	(2014)	has	written	on	the	political	ecology	of	dam	
decision-making	 in	 Chile,	 in	 relation	 to	 HidroAysén,	 with	 brief	 reference	 to	 media	
	 16	
discourse	on	the	dams.	Schaeffer	(2015)	wrote	her	PhD	study	on	the	protest	movement	
against	HidroAysén,	Patagonia	sin	Represas,	from	an	anthropological	and	socio-political	
perspective.	 Shaeffer’s	 study	 does	 make	 some	 mention	 of	 media	 framing	 (p.70)	 but	
media	 discourse	 is	 not	 explored	 in	 any	 depth	 this	 study.	 Finally,	 Merino	 and	 Bello	
(2014)	have	examined	“discourse	coalitions”	in	the	controversy	around	HidroAysén,	by	
studying	discourse	allocutions	from	leaders	and	social	actors	in	the	debate.	This	study	
does	 examine	 the	 way	 that	 meaning	 is	 made	 through	 discourse	 in	 the	 HidroAysén	
debate,	using	Hajer’s	(1995,	2005)	argumentative	analysis.	It	finds	meanings	solidified	
around	certain	“nodal	concepts”,	which	might	be	compared	to	the	symbolic	meanings	of	
HidroAysén,	and	the	protest	against	 it	 that	 this	study	 identifies.	However,	Merino	and	
Bello’s	study	does	not	set	out	to	examine	media	coverage	in-depth	(it	only	uses	media	
coverage,	media	 releases	 and	websites	 to	 identify	 allocutions	 by	 key	 actors).	 Also,	 its	
scope	is	only	a	brief	period	of	the	HidroAysén	debate,	during	2011/2012.	
	
This	 study	 is	 able	 to	 bring	 together	 scholarship	 on	 the	 symbolic	 dimensions	 of	
communications	 surrounding	 megaprojects	 and	 studies	 of	 mediatized	 discourse	 in	
environmental	 conflicts.	 It	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 scholarship	 on	 media	 and	
megaprojects	by	offering	a	detailed	case	study	of	the	whole	trajectory	of	a	debate	over	a	
contested	megaproject,	examining	the	strategic	self-representation	and	the	mediatized	
sparring	 of	 pro-	 and	 anti-dams	 positions,	 and	 noting	 changes	 in	 discourse	 over	 time.	
Additionally,	this	study	sets	HidroAysén	extensively	within	its	socio-political	context	in	
Chile,	 and	 provides	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 the	 Chilean	 media	 ecology,	 to	 further	
understanding	 of	 the	 kinds	 of	 positions	 that	 key	 Chilean	media	 outlets	 took	 in	 their	
discourse	on	HidroAysén.	 In	 its	 conclusion,	 this	 thesis	 offers	 lessons	 from	 the	 case	of	
this	 ultimately	 failed	 megaproject,	 which	 may	 be	 of	 use	 both	 to	 the	 promoters	 of	
megaprojects,	and	to	those	who	protest	such	projects,	and	seek	to	have	them	cancelled.	
	
1.4	Thesis	structure	
	
After	 this	 introductory	 chapter,	 I	 undertake	 a	 literature	 review	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 This	
chapter	 builds	 on	my	 arguments	 around	 the	 symbolic	 nature	 of	megaprojects	 above,	
and	situates	media	and	megaprojects	within	the	literature	on	the	constructed	notion	of	
the	 environment,	 mediatized	 environmental	 conflict	 (particularly	 in	 transnational	
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contexts),	 the	 significance	 of	 visibility	 (Thompson	 2005)	 and	 invisibility	 (Lester	 and	
Hutchins	 2012a,	 2012b),	 public	 spheres,	 and	 strategic	 communications	 in	 relation	 to	
environmental	controversies.	
	
In	Chapter	 3	 I	 examine	 the	 country-specific	 background	 to	 the	HidroAysén	 debate.	 I	
introduce	the	energy	 landscape	 in	Chile	when	HidroAysén	was	being	planned,	discuss	
hydroelectricity	development	 in	Chile,	and	explain	ownership	of	electricity	generation	
and	water	rights,	as	rationale	for	the	development	of	HidroAysén.	I	also	discuss	in	detail	
development	and	 inequality	 in	Chile,	 laying	 the	basis	 for	how	HidroAysén	was	able	 to	
come	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 the	manifestation	 of	 an	 extremely	 unequal	 society.	 Next,	 I	
discuss	 environmental	 awareness	 and	 protest	 in	 Chile.	 As	 media	 construction	 was	
crucial	 to	the	trajectory	and	outcomes	of	 the	HidroAysén	debate,	 for	the	remainder	of	
Chapter	3	I	discuss	Chile’s	media	landscape,	from	its	historical	roots	to	its	contemporary	
dimensions.	I	argue	here	that	many	of	the	characteristics	of	Chile’s	media	that	became	
entrenched	through	the	Pinochet	era,	and	the	democratisation	that	followed,	did	indeed	
have	 a	 bearing	 on	 discursive	 representations	 of	HidroAysén.	 Finally	 in	 this	 chapter,	 I	
discuss	 the	unique	characteristics	of	 strategic	 communications	and	public	 relations	 in	
Chile	and	explain	how	these	may	have	influenced	organisational	communication	in	the	
case	of	HidroAysén.		
	
Chapter	 4	 presents	 the	methodological	 framework	 for	 this	 study.	 It	 gives	 a	 detailed	
account	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 and	 the	 rationale	 for	 case	 study	 research,	 and	 then	
discusses	data	collection,	research	design,	and	the	research	questions	of	this	study.	This	
section	addresses	the	media	corpus	that	was	analysed	in	this	study,	and	also	includes	a	
discussion	of	 language,	given	this	 is	a	cross-language	study,	working	between	Spanish	
and	English.		
	
In	 Chapter	 5,	 I	 begin	 my	 account	 of	 the	 mediatized	 enactment	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	
debate,	starting	with	a	discussion	of	the	megaproject’s	 initial	 invisibility,	and	protest’s	
attempts	 to	make	 it	 visible,	 from	2006.	 I	 discuss	 the	 funding	 and	 the	branding	of	 the	
Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign,	and	examine	some	of	the	symbolic	communication	on	
the	dams	that	began	to	emerge	in	the	discourse	in	public	arenas	around	this	period.	
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Chapter	6	coincides	with	the	period	 in	which	HidroAysén	was	first	widely	covered	in	
the	 media.	 Here,	 I	 begin	 to	 map	 key	 events	 in	 the	 debate	 against	 media	 coverage,	
explaining	 how	 HidroAysén	 often	 emerged	 and	 then	 disappeared	 from	 view	 in	
mediatized	discourse.	I	make	a	detailed	survey	of	media	discourse	on	HidroAysén	here	
from	2008-mid	2010,	 showing	how	HidroAysén	became	a	 “political	project”,	 and	how	
other	 new	 layers	 of	 symbolic	 meaning,	 including	 climate	 change	 and	 national	
sovereignty,	began	to	be	attached	to	the	megaproject.	
	
Chapter	7	 covers	 the	 period	 from	mid-2010	 to	 late-2011,	when	HidroAysén	 began	 a	
strongly	reactive	communications	campaign,	followed	by	the	project’s	approval,	and	the	
two-month	period	of	vehement	street	protests	over	the	project.	In	this	period,	I	analyse	
in	 particular	 the	 vast	 amount	 of	 media	 coverage	 surrounding	 the	 protests,	 showing	
differences	across	publications,	and	changes	in	one	newspaper’s	stance	on	the	project	at	
this	time.	I	show	here	how	for	the	first	time,	anti-dams	discourse	was	able	to	enter	and	
shape	public	debate	on	the	megaproject.	
	
In	 Chapter	 8	 I	 trace	 the	 attempted	 withdrawal	 of	 HidroAysén	 from	 national	 level	
communications	 once	 again,	 and	 its	 renewed	 concentration	 on	 communication	 with	
stakeholders	 in	 the	 potentially	 dams-affected	 region.	 I	 discuss	 a	 communicational	
strategy	that	was	used	to	discredit	the	dams’	opponents,	and	analyse	media	discourse	
around	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 project’s	 environmental	 permits,	 Finally,	 I	 trace	
mediatized	discourse	on	HidroAysén	to	the	very	end	of	the	megaproject	in	2017.	
	
In	Chapter	9,	I	present	my	conclusion.	
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Chapter	2:	Literature	Review	
	
2.1	Introduction		
	
To	 provide	 a	 framework	 for	 the	 case	 study	 presented	 here,	 this	 chapter	 examines	
theories	 that	 contribute	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 mediatized	 construction	 and	
contestation.	 I	 survey	 literature	 journalism	 practices,	 institutional	 structures;	 media,	
environment	 and	 risk;	 mediatization;	 communication	 power	 and	 protest	 in	 the	
contemporary	 media	 landscape.	 I	 aim	 with	 this	 literature	 survey	 to	 establish	 a	
theoretical	 foundation	 for	 my	 argument	 that	 the	 HidroAysén	 megaproject	 was	 a	
communicational	 construction.	 I	 also	 consider	 here	 how	 the	 ‘space	 shrinking’	
imperative	 of	 megaprojects	 arises	 out	 of	 the	 same	 ‘space	 shrinking’	 tendency	 as	
networked	global	communications.	I	therefore	provide	a	framework	in	this	chapter	for	
conceptualising	both	the	enabling	of	megaprojects	and	their	contestation	as	emanating	
from	 the	 same	 global	 and	 macro-sociological	 trends.	 I	 additionally	 discuss	 two	
overarching	 paradigms	 –	 a	media	 contest	 paradigm	 and	 a	media	 culture	 paradigm	 –	
aspects	 of	 both	 of	which	 serve	 as	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 the	multi-perspectival	
study	 undertaken	 here.	 In	 this	 review,	 I	 move	 (and	 I	 sometimes	 move	 back	 and	
forward)	from	older	perspectives	on	how	the	media	have	constructed	reality,	 to	more	
contemporary	 explanations	 of	 a	 media-saturated	 world,	 bearing	 in	 mind	 that	 the	
timeframe	of	 the	megaproject	being	discussed	here	was	 just	 at	 the	 cusp	of	 the	digital	
revolution,	 in	 Chile	 at	 least,	 making	 theoretical	 perspectives	 both	 from	 older	 media	
landscapes	and	contemporary	ones	relevant	to	the	understanding	media	at	the	time	of	
HidroAysén.	Also,	this	study	analyses	content	from	legacy	media	and	from	digital	media,	
making	a	theoretical	 framework	for	understanding	both	“old	media”	and	“new	media”	
crucial.	
	
2.2		Journalists,	institutions	and	constructing	the	news	
	
2.2.1	Journalistic	practice	and	constructing	reality	
	
Media	research	has	long	acknowledged	that	the	information	the	media	present	as	news	
is	not	a	neutral	reflection	of	reality	(Hall	et	al.	1978.).	A	complex	media	matrix	rather	
constructs	the	social	worlds	in	which	we	live	(Angus	2000;	Benkler	2006;	Castells	2000,	
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2011;	 Couldry	 &	 Hepp	 2018;	 Hansen	 1991).	 Media	 messages	 are	 therefore	 “a	 re-
presentation,	 rather	 than	 a	 transparent	 window	 onto	 the	 real”	 (Branston	 &	 Stafford	
2006,	p.	141).	As	purveyors	of	socially	constructed	products,	the	media	can	perpetuate	
ideologies	 on	 how	 the	world	 is	 –	 or	 how	 it	 should	 be	 (Dyer	 1993;	 O'Shaughnessy	 &	
Stadler	2002).	Representations	of	the	‘real’	in	traditional	media	reporting	are	subjected	
to	 both	 the	 processes	 of	 routine	 journalistic	 practice	 and	 the	 dictates	 of	 news	media	
business	which	 shape,	 and	may	distort,	 information	which	 is	 presented	 as	 reality.	 To	
conceptualise	mediatized	communication	of	megaproject	development,	beginning	with	
a	recognition	that	media	“realities”	are	constructed,	is	an	essential	starting	place.	
	
Journalists’	 professional	 practice	 relies	 on	 a	 number	 of	 methods	 for	 uncovering	
information	 and	 for	 selecting	 and	packaging	 it	 as	 news.	 In	 the	 interests	 of	 speed	 and	
credibility,	 journalists	 have	 traditionally	 relied	 on	 elite	 sources:	 politicians,	 police,	
heads	of	business	 (Fishman	1980;	Hall	et	al.	1978;	Schlesinger	1990;	Tuchman	1972)	
and,	as	the	empirical	section	of	this	thesis	demonstrates,	the	promoters	and	supporters	
of	 megaprojects.	 Elite	 sources	 may	 lend	 the	 appearance	 of	 authority	 to	 reporting	
(McLeod	&	Hertog	1999)	but	when	such	sources	become	“primary	definers”	of	 issues	
(Hall	 et	 al.	 1978.	 p.	 58)	 journalists	 often	 become	 secondary	 reproducers	 of	 elite	
standpoints,	 cementing	 prevailing	 power	 structures.	 Though	 research	 has	 now	
indicated	 some	 disruption	 of	 this	 tendency	 through	 journalists’	 recourse	 to	 online	
sources	 (Broersma	 &	 Graham	 2013,	 Hermida	 et	 al.	 2014)	 a	 recent	 meta-analysis	
(Lecheler	 &	 Kruikemeier	 2016)	 found	 that	 journalists	 still	 gravitate	 to	 elite	 sources	
online.		
	
Traditional	 news	media	 have	 historically	 had	 limited	 carrying	 capacity	 (Hilgartner	 &	
Bosk	2008),	and	restricted	space	and	time	require	journalists	to	use	practices	including	
selection	 of	 stories	 for	 their	 news	 values	 (Allern	 2002;	 Bell,	 A	 1991;	 Galtung	&	Ruge	
1965;	 Harcup	&	O'Neill	 2001;	 Hetherington	 1985;	Masterton	 2005;	 O'Sullivan	 1983),	
likewise	 contributing	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 news.	 Many	 of	 the	 criteria	 for	
newsworthiness	 promote	 a	 kind	 of	 “drama-philia”	 (Iyengar	 1994):	 a	 predilection	 for	
reporting	violence,	conflicts	or	crises	and	a	tendency	to	prefer	single,	sensational	events	
over	 complex,	 nuanced,	 ongoing	 issues,	 making	 it	 difficult	 for	 news	 like	 social	 and	
environmental	 conflicts	 to	 gain	 longevity	 in	 reporting.	 More	 recently,	 scholars	 have	
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provided	 some	 valuable	 new	 taxonomies	 of	 news	 values	 (Strömbäck	 et	 al.	 2012;	
Wendelin	 et	 al.	 2017),	 and	 have	 shown	 that	 in	 the	 current	 hybrid	 news	 system	
(Chadwick	 2013)	 the	 news	 events	 that	 public	 find	 most	 relevant	 on	 social	 media	
networks	influence	journalists’	selection	of	stories	to	cover	in	their	reporting	(Araujo	&	
van	der	Meer	2018).	The	ability	of	social	media	content	to	influence	stories	covered	in	
mainstream	media	is	observed	in	the	Chilean	context	of	this	case	study.		
	
Journalists	also	use	framing	to	make	sense	of	complex	social	phenomena	(Entman	1993,	
2007;	 Gamson	&	Modigliani	 1987;	 Gitlin	 1980;	 Hannigan	 2006;	 Hansen	 2010;	 Lakoff	
2004;	Scheufele	1999;).	Frames	are	“principles	of	selection,	emphasis,	and	presentation	
composed	 of	 little	 tacit	 theories	 about	what	 exists,	what	 happens,	 and	what	matters”	
(Gitlin	1980,	p.	6).	With	the	media’s	 inclination	to	cover	the	dramatic,	 the	current	and	
the	 novel,	 event-orientated	 episodic	 frames	 (Iyengar	 1994,	 p.	 3)	 dominate	 over	more	
abstract	 thematic	 frames.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 megaproject	 development,	 environment	 and	
protest,	 this	may	mean	 that	 complicated	multi-stranded	 debates	 are	 covered	 only	 in	
association	with	an	event	–	and	that	ongoing	struggles	otherwise	fall	off	media	agendas	
(Anderson,	A	1997).	Once	frames	are	established,	they	can	endure	and	when	journalists	
reproduce	the	frames	proffered	by	sources,	they	may	replicate	those	sources’	hegemony	
(Lewis	&	Reese	2009).	Ultimately,	framing	constitutes	a	sociocognitive	process	through	
which	public	 life	 is	 constructed	 (Pan	&	Kosicki	2005).	Historically,	when	 frames	have	
become	persistent	over	time,	they	have	become	politically	influential:	“tools	of	power”	
which	could	act	symbolically	“to	meaningfully	structure	the	social	world”	(Reese	2001,	
p.	11).	Recent	research	on	framing	theory,	however,	has	discussed	the	“end	of	framing	
as	we	know	it”,	citing	dysfunction	of	earlier	theories	in	the	new	media	environment	of	
filter	bubbles	and	tailored	information	(Cacciatore,	Scheufele	&	Iyengar	2016).		
	
2.2.2	Media	institutional	structures	
	
Media	 institutional	 structures	 have	 also	 historically	 influenced	 the	 ways	 that	 media	
content	has	been	constructed.	Many	scholars	(Bagdikian	2004;	Baker	2006;	Golding	&	
Murdock	1997b,	1997a;	Herman	&	Chomsky	1988;	Herman	&	McChesney	2000,	2001;	
McChesney	 1999,	 2003,	 2008)	 have	 written	 on	 the	 ways	 in	 which	media	 ownership	
structures	 influence	 news	 content.	 To	 diminish	 costs	 and	 control	 markets,	 media	
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corporations	 merge	 and	 enact	 takeovers,	 becoming	 conglomerates	 with	 increased	
market	advantage,	able	to	marginalize	competition.	Concentration	of	ownership	and	the	
forces	of	the	market	have	been	shown	to	have	direct	 impact	on	the	diversity	of	news-
producing	organisations	–	and	therefore	the	range	of	news	which	is	available	(Curran	&	
Seaton	1997).	Though	many	scholars	were	earlier	celebratory	about	the	democratizing	
potential	 of	 peer-to-peer	 digital	 communications	 for	 increasing	 the	 diversity	 of	 news	
(Benkler	20066;	Leadbeater	2009;	Tapscott	&	Williams	2006)	such	techno-utopianism	
is	 difficult	 to	 sustain	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 increasing	 convergence	 (Cottle	 2006;	 Jenkins	
2006;	McChesney	&	Schiller	2003)	and	concentration	of	ownership	which	is	now	being	
played	out	in	both	legacy	and	digital	media	on	a	global	scale	(Arsenault	&	Castells	2008;	
Noam	2016).	This	 trend	 is	certainly	evident	 in	Latin	America,	and	 in	Chile	specifically	
(Godoy	 2016)7.	 Hardy	 (2017)	 shows	 that	 convergence	 and	 media	 ownership	
concentration	 limits	 the	 range	 of	 news	 content,	 even	 in	 the	 digital	 environment.	 (I	
discuss	 the	 present	media	 landscape	 in	more	 detail	 later	 in	 section	 2.4.5	 of	 this	 this	
chapter).	
Though	 the	 earlier	 Marxist-radical	 “propaganda	 model”	 of	 media	 political	 economy		
(Herman	 &	 Chomsky	 1988)	was	much	 criticised	 (Corner	 2003;	 Klaehn	 2002;	Mullen	
2010;	 Schudson	 2003)	 for	 its	 reductive	 determinism,	 for	 characterising	 audiences	 as	
passive	receivers,	for	paying	scant	attention	to	the	social	constructionist	nature	of	news	
production,	 and	 for	 neglecting	 notions	 of	 conflict	 in	 source-media	 interactions	
(Robinson	2002;	Schlesinger	1990;	Thompson,	 J	1995;	Wolfsfeld	1997);	 in	the	 light	of	
media	convergence	and	ownership	concentration	–	even	 in	 the	digital	domain	–	 there	
has	 been	 some	 recent	 resurgence	 in	 studies	 from	 a	 critical	 political	 economy	
perspective	 (Hardy	 2014,	 2017).	 I	 draw	 on	 aspects	 of	 a	 critical	 political	 economy	
approach	 in	 this	 study,	particularly	 in	 relationship	 to	media	ownership	 in	Chile,	 but	 I	
also	 make	 use	 of	 additional	 paradigms,	 further	 discussed	 later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 for	
understanding	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 highly	 contested	megaproject	 under	 discussion	
here	played	out	in	the	concentrated	Chilean	media.	
																																																						
6	Even	such	communitarian	optimists	as	Benkler	have	gone	from	celebrating	the	democratising	potential	
of	 the	 internet	 to	 describing	 its	 current	 potential	 for	misinformation	 and	 radicalisation	 (Benkler,	 Faris	
and	Roberts	2018).	
7	 Concentration	 of	 media	 ownership	 here	 also	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 Chile’s	 Pinochet	 era,	 and	 the	 post-
dictatorship	mode	of	development,	as	described	in	detail	in	Chapter	3.		
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Advertising	 is	 another	 influence	 on	 news	 production.	 Though	 journalism’s	 normative	
commitment	 to	 autonomy	 has	 traditionally	 dictated	 separation	 of	 advertising	 from	
editorial	functions,	several	scholars	have	identified	how	media’s	reliance	on	advertising	
revenue	 can	place	 restrictions	 on	news	 content	 that	 is	 critical	 of	 business	 (Bagdikian	
2004;	 Baldasty	 1992;	 Barnhurst	 &	 Nerone	 2001;	 McChesney	 1999,	 2004;	 McManus	
1994).	 Baker	 (2002)	warned	 that	 “the	 boundary	 between	 acceptable	 advertising	 and	
corruption	 is	 subject	 to	 constant	 cultural	 negotiation,	 with	 commercial	 pressures	
obviously	pushing	to	expand	the	realm	of	the	acceptable”	(p.	54).	Diamond	earlier	made	
the	 observation	 that	 “there’s	 a	 gray	 area	 at	 many	 publications	 where	 ‘advertiser	
friendliness’	 mixes	 and	 mingles	 with	 the	 editorial	 process”	 (Diamond	 1996,	 p.	 31).	
Other	surveys	of	journalists	(Craig	2004;	Soley	&	Craig	1992)	have	likewise	found	that	
businesses	 have	 used	 advertising	 revenues	 to	 threaten	 media	 and	 have	 withdrawn	
advertising	to	respond	to	content	they	viewed	as	unfavourable.	Soley	and	Craig	(1992)	
found	 that	 this	 led	 to	 journalists’	 self-censorship.	 Emergent	 practices	 such	 as	 online	
native	advertising	now	complicate	this	landscape	further	(Carlson	2015).	Advertising	is	
a	key	element	of	megaproject	publicity	campaigns	(Flyvbjerg,	Rothengatter	&	Bruzelius	
2003)	–	more	so	perhaps,	where	public	opinion	 is	pitted	against	a	project.	This	 thesis	
pays	particular	attention	to	advertising,	and	shows	how	newspapers’	editorial	stances	
sometimes	dictated	the	content	of	advertisements	in	the	HidroAysén	campaign.	
	
Interdependence	between	advertisers	and	media	outlets	has	also	created	“promotional	
journalism”	(Erjavec	2004,	p.	554).	Such	‘tabloidisation’,	‘newszak’	and	‘dumbing	down’	
(Dahlgren	2009;	Sparks	2000;	Street	2011)	is	often	cheap	to	produce	and	formulaic,	but	
when	it	is	prioritized	over	reports	on	more	serious	issues,	leads	to	a	degradation	of	the	
democratic,	 Fourth	 Estate	 role	 of	 the	 media.	 To	 reduce	 costs	 and	 maximize	 profits,	
media	 outlets	 have	 also	 reduced	 funding	 for	 expensive	 content	 such	 as	 foreign	news,	
investigative	reporting,	and	current	affairs	programming.	 Investigative	 journalism	has	
been	 found	 to	be	 in	peril	 in	many	 contexts	 (Carson	2014)	 including	 in	Latin	America	
(Requejo-Alemán	 &	 Lugo-Ocando	 2014),	 despite	 its	 demonstrated	 particular	
importance	 here	 (Waisbord	 2000).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 debates	 over	megaprojects,	 this	
may	mean	space	for	serious,	nuanced	debate	may	lose	out	to	“lighter”	content	that	sells	
–	 this	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 megaprojects	 have	 become	 larger,	 more	 environmentally	
damaging,	 often	 more	 controversial	 and	 therefore	 more	 demanding	 of	 media	
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investigation	and	public	debate.	
The	 drive	 to	 produce	 news	 at	 low	 cost	 and	 under	 time	 pressure	 has	 also	 led	 to	
increasing	reproduction	of	public	relations	content	as	news	(Davies	2008;	Davis	2002;	
Moloney	 2006;	Moloney,	 Jackson	&	McQueen	 2013).	 Jackson	&	Moloney	 (2015)	 have	
written	 of	 the	 “PR-isation”	 of	 news,	 and	 of	 “the	 growing	 colonisation	 of	 PR	mindsets	
amongst	journalists”	(p.	764).	Davis	(2002)	has	argued	that	corporate	elites	and	interest	
groups	use	PR	to	position	 their	arguments	against	one	another	 in	 the	media	 to	gain	a	
competitive	 advantage	 over	 rivals,	 especially	 in	 public	 policy	 debates	 (Davis	 2002,	 p.	
11).	Like	megaproject	developers’	reliance	on	advertising,	PR	is	a	crucial	aspect	of	their	
mediatized	 self-representation.	 For	 the	 corporations	 that	 plan,	 promote	 and	 build	
megaprojects,	creating	 favourable	self-representation	to	elites	matters	 first	(Dimitriou	
2009),	 national	 public	 opinion	 also	 matters	 in	 some	 stages	 of	 megaproject	 planning	
(Flyvbjerg	2012,	p.	99)	and	as	Latta	(2010)	has	shown	in	relation	to	the	case	examined	
in	 this	 thesis,	megaproject	developers	deploy	a	raft	of	strategies	 in	order	 to	“generate	
consent”	on	 the	ground	amongst	people	who	their	planned	developments	most	affect.	
The	case	study	presented	here	examines	the	PR	campaigns	of	a	megaproject	developer	
and	 a	 protest	 group	 in	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 role	 of	 PR	 in	 constructing	
sparring	rivals	in	mediatized	environmental	conflict.		
	
2.2.3	Setting	agendas,	constructing	“pictures	in	our	heads”	
The	sections	above	discuss	some	of	the	chief	determinants	of	what	becomes	news,	and	
what	kind	 of	 news	 it	 becomes.	An	 additional	 crucial	 factor	 that	 influences	what	news	
dominates	in	the	public	mind	is	quantity	of	coverage.	The	cumulation	of	media	coverage	
on	a	particular	issue	(and	with	a	particular	frame)	makes	that	issue	more	accessible	in	
people’s	minds	and	therefore	attributed	with	more	importance	than	issues	that	receive	
less	 coverage	 (Iyengar	 1990;	 Gauntlett	 2005;	 Scheufele	 &	 Tewksbury	 2007).	 Media	
agenda-setting	 occurs	 in	 this	way.	McCoombs,	 Shaw	&	Weaver	 (2014)	 regard	 agenda	
setting	at	the	most	basic	level	as	“the	transfer	of	issue	salience	from	the	news	media	to	
the	 public	 agenda”	 (p.	 787).	 Agenda	 setting	 theory	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 Lippman’s	
early	work	which	examined	public	opinion,	media	representation	and	“the	pictures	 in	
our	heads”	 (Lippmann	1922/1997	p.	2).	McCoombs	&	Shaw	(1972)	 then	showed	 that	
news	 coverage	 quantity	 had	 a	 powerful	 agenda-setting	 function,	 significantly	 guiding	
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public	 opinion.	 Later	 research	 (McCoombs	&	Ghanem	2001;	McCombs	&	 Shaw	2006)	
has	 questioned	 whether	 framing	 and	 agenda	 setting	 are	 indeed	 separate.	 Several	
scholars	have	also	noted	that	agenda	(and	frame)	setting	can	be	reversed	in	the	hybrid	
mediascape	 (Meraz	 2009,	 2011;	 Neuman	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Zhou	 and	 Moy	 2007)	 so	 that	
“online	public	agendas	dictate	media	agendas,	with	with	online	attention	by	the	public	
preceding	the	media	agenda”	(Araujo	&	van	den	Meer	2018,	p.	8).	As	mentioned	above,	
this	trend	can	be	observed	in	the	case	study	that	is	the	focus	here.	By	agenda	setting	and	
framing,	the	media	also	prime	their	audiences	to	think	about	the	world	in	certain	ways.	
A	 concept	 from	 cognitive	 psychology,	 priming	 refers	 to	 the	 way	 media	 audiences	
respond	 to	 an	 issue	 in	 terms	 of	 prior	 context,	 and	 then	 use	 those	 perspectives	 to	
interpret	 subsequent	 information	 on	 an	 issue	 (Domke,	 Shah	 &	 Wackman	 1998;	
Scheufele	 2000;	 Arendt	 2013).	 Agenda	 setting,	 framing	 and	 priming	 together	 have	
traditionally	acted	powerfully	not	just	to	tell	media	consumers	what	to	think	about,	to	
paraphrase	 Cohen’s	 classic	 summation	 (Cohen,	 B	 1963)	 but	 also	 how	 to	 think	 about	
those	issues.		
	
For	the	promoters	of	megaprojects,	as	well	as	for	those	that	oppose	them,	to	be	able	to	
influence	legacy	media	agendas	by	affecting	the	amount	of	coverage	on	a	project;	to	be	
able	to	control	frames	and	therefore	prime	publics	on	how	to	think	in	these	debates,	are	
crucial	 goals.	 Together	 with	 journalistic	 practices,	 institutional	 factors	 and	 the	 news	
media’s	interaction	with	PR,	advertising,	agenda-setting	and	priming	have	traditionally	
underscored	 the	 social	 construction	 of	 news.	 The	 representation	 of	 reality	 that	 the	
media	 offer	 as	 news	 is	 therefore	 a	 filtered	 and	 constructed	 reality.	 	 In	 unpacking	 the	
ways	 that	 the	 media	 cover	 megaprojects,	 and	 covered	 the	 HidroAysén	 project	 in	
particular,	 the	 contingent	 nature	 of	media	 representation	must	 therefore	 be	 borne	 in	
mind.	In	the	current	age	of	horizontal	media,	in	which	social	reality	is	now	the	product	
of	 “deep	mediatization”	 (Couldry	&	Hepp	 2018)	 this	 picture	 is	 further	 complicated.	 I	
discuss	 in	 more	 detail	 below	 the	 ways	 that	 news	 related	 to	 the	 environment,	 and	
concept	of	“the	environment”	 itself	have	become	constructed,	and	then	return	 later	 in	
the	 chapter	 to	 a	 survey	 of	 the	 current	 media	 landscape	 and	 the	 new	 ways	 that	
information	is	constructed	here.	
	
2.3	Constructing	the	environment,	conveying	risk	
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2.3.1	The	origins	of	‘the	environment’	
	
The	social	construct	of	‘environment’	first	entered	the	media	in	the	later	decades	of	the	
20th	Century.	Nuclear	 testing,	 toxic	 smogs	and	mercury	poisoning	were	reported	with	
growing	 alarm	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 and	 in	 1962,	 Rachel	 Carson’s	 Silent	 Spring	
presented	the	dangers	of	DDT,	making	an	early	influential	connection	between	science,	
nature,	and	human	activity	(Carson	1962).	Then,	in	1968,	in	images	taken	on	the	Apollo	
8	mission,	 Earth	was	 first	 seen	 rising	 above	 the	 desolate	 lunar	 landscape	 as	 a	 small,	
luminous	 globe	 set	 in	 the	 black	 abyss	 of	 space.	Earthrise	 from	 the	Moon,	 as	 the	most	
published	 of	 these	 images	 became	 known,	was	 described	 by	US	 nature	 photographer	
Galen	 Rowell	 as	 “the	 most	 influential	 environmental	 photograph	 ever	 taken”	 (ABC	
2009)	 –	 an	 eloquent	 portrait	 of	 the	 finiteness	 of	 our	 planet’s	 environment.	 Widely	
reproduced	in	the	US	and	global	media,	Earthrise	galvanized	public	debate	on	sustaining	
ecosystems	and	the	diversity	of	life	in	our	fragile	biosphere	(Henry	2009).	In	the	1970s	
and	1980s,	 a	 series	 of	manmade	environmental	 disasters	 –	 the	Ozone	Hole	 (reported	
since	the	 late	1970s),	Three	Mile	 Island	(1979),	Bhopal	(1984),	Chernobyl	(1986)	and	
the	Exxon	 Valdez	 (1989),	 brought	 environmental	 degradation	 and	 its	 toxic	 effects	 on	
humans	 under	 the	 global	 media	 spotlight	 (Anderson,	 A	 1997).	 In	 Australia	 in	 1972,	
protest	against	the	Lake	Pedder	hydroelectric	megaproject	 led	to	the	establishment	of	
the	world’s	first	green	party	(Lohrey	2002)	and	in	1983,	watched	by	the	world	(Pybus	&	
Flanagan	1990),	protest	brought	down	a	government	and	halted	a	mega-hydro	project	
(Lester	&	Hutchins	2006).	 In	1988,	climate	change	entered	the	media	arena	when	the	
New	York	Times	 reported	NASA	 scientist	 James	E.	Hansen’s	 statement	 that	 it	was	 “99	
per	cent	certain	that	the	warming	trend	was	not	a	natural	variation	but	was	caused	by	
an	 accumulation	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 and	 other	 artificial	 gases	 in	 the	 atmosphere”	
(Shabecoff	 1988).	 From	 this	 critical	 moment	 the	 environment,	 and	 the	 risks	
environmental	 degradation	 posed	 for	 humans,	 including	 climate	 change	 (Boykoff	 M	
2013;	 Boykoff,	 M	 &	 Boykoff	 2004;	 Boykoff,	 M,	 Maldonado	 &	 Nacu-Schmidt	 2018;	
Carvalho	2005;	O’Neill	&	Boykoff	2011)	assumed	a	permanent	place	in	media	reporting.	
			
Of	course,	 the	concepts	of	 “nature”	and	“environment”	 long	predate	 their	 first	 regular	
appearance	 in	 the	 media.	 Throughout	 history,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 spectrum	 of	 (often	
competing)	 understandings	 on	 the	 interconnection	 of	 humans	 with	 nature.	 Torrance	
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(1998)	 traces	 a	 trajectory	 of	 representations	 of	 the	 “natural”	 across	 time	 and	 space	
from	concepts	of	nature	described	in	the	19th	century	writings	of	John	Muir	and	Henry	
Thoreau,	 to	 medieval	 European	 epic	 poems,	 to	 Zen	 poetry	 and	 Classical	 Greece.	 As	
Murphy	(2017)	notes,	imagining	of	human	relationships	with	nature	can	also	be	traced	
back	 to	Bible.	More	currently,	 and	 important	 to	 this	 thesis,	 are	neoliberal,	 extractivist	
discourses	of	nature	as	a	 resource	 to	be	dominated	and	benefitted	 from,	and	coupled	
with	this,	Promethean	discourses	of	endless	growth	(Dryzek	2005;	Murphy	2017).	What	
is	 important	 here	 is	 not	 to	 enumerate	 a	 list	 of	 historical	 and	 cultural	 narratives	 on	
nature	and	the	environment,	but	 to	 identify	 that	 these	concepts	are	contingent	on	the	
societies	 in	 which	 they	 are	 embedded.	 	 Ideas	 on	 the	 meanings	 of	 “nature”	 and	
“environment”	and	human	beings’	 relationship	 to	 it	 (Anderson,	A	1997;	Dryzek	2005;	
Eder	1996;	Macnaughton	&	Urry	1998)	–	including		climate	change	(Pettenger	2007)	–	
are	 socially	 constructed,	 with	 the	 parameters	 of	 each	 determined	 by	 the	 prevailing	
values,	 ideologies	 and	 politics	 of	 the	 societies	 from	 which	 they	 emerge,	 and	 filtered	
through	the	lenses	of	the	media	in	which	they	are	reported.	The	construction	of	nature	
and	the	environment	through	discourse	is	further	discussed	in	section	2.6.5	below.	
	
2.3.2	From	a	risk	society	to	emancipatory	catastrophism	
	
Just	 as	 ‘nature’	 and	 ‘environment’	 are	 socially	 constructed,	 the	 concept	 of	 risks	
associated	 with	 anthropogenic	 environmental	 damage	 depends	 strongly	 on	 social	
perceptions	of	such	risks.	Scholars	in	the	social	sciences	have	proposed	a	rich	variety	of	
conceptions	of	risk	(Renn	1992).	Douglas	and	Wildavsky	(1982)	and	Dake	(1991,	1992)	
saw	 cultural	 biases	 and	 social	 hierarchy	 as	 individuals’	 sources	 of	 constructed	
understandings	 about	 nature	 and	 risk,	 but	 Beck’s	 (1992)	 Risk	 Society	 concept	 has	
become	the	most	enduring	theory	on	risk.	In	Risikogesellschaft,	(1986,	translated	as	The	
Risk	Society	in	1992),	Beck	defined	risk	as	“a	systematic	way	of	dealing	with	hazards	and	
insecurities	induced	and	introduced	by	modernisation	itself”	(Beck	1992,	p.	21,	emphasis	
in	 the	 original).	 Beck	 argued	 that	 environmental	 risks	 had	 become	 the	 predominant	
product	of	 industrial	society	–	no	 longer	 just	a	manageable	unpleasant	side	effect.	For	
Beck,	modernity	 is	an	era	 in	which	technology-induced	hazards	force	reflexivity	on	all	
risks	 produced	 by	 human	 agency.	 “Reflexive	 modernisation”,	 wrote	 Beck,	 is	 the	
“inescapable	 ‘self-confrontation’	 that	accompanies	the	contemporary	 industrial	way	of	
	 28	
life”	 (Beck,	Giddens	&	Lash	1994,	p.	5)8.	For	Giddens	also,	modernity	 is	 inherent	with	
external	 and	 manufactured	 risk.	 Building	 on	 Beck’s	 theory,	 Giddens	 characterised	
modernity	as	a	time	in	which	society	is	“increasingly	preoccupied	with	the	future	(and	
also	with	 safety),	which	generates	 the	notion	of	 risk”	 (Giddens	1999,	p.	5).	 Such	 risk-
induced	 reflexive	 introspection	 can	 alter	 planned	 activities,	 so	 that	 perceived	 risk	
becomes	 the	 foundation	 for	 decision-making.	 In	 the	 risk	 society,	 therefore,	 any	
deliberation	on	social,	economic	and	environmental	issues	that	neglects	to	take	risk	into	
account	 is	 bound	 to	 fail.	 In	 the	 risk-laden	 business	 of	 megaproject	 development	
particularly,	 it	 is	 therefore	 “untenable…to	 act	 as	 if	 risk	 does	 not	 exist	 or	 to	
underestimate	risk	in	a	field	as	costly	and	as	consequential”	(Flyvbjerg,	Rothengatter	&	
Bruzelius	2003,	p.	6).			
	
Unlike	 the	 risks	 from	 megaprojects	 which	 can	 more	 accurately	 be	 quantified	 –	 or	
deliberately	mis-quantified	(Flyvbjerg,	Garbuio,	&	Lovallo	2009;	Flyvbjerg,	Rothengatter	
&	Bruzelius	2003)	–	many	 risks,	 like	 radiation,	 chemical	 toxicity,	 genetically	modified	
organisms,	 even	 global	 warming,	 escape	 detection	 by	 the	 senses	 and	 may	 elude	
calculation.	This	immateriality,	invisibility	or	illusiveness	to	quantification	of	some	risks	
means	 that	 knowledge	 about	 risk	 becomes	 a	 construction:	 mediated,	 and	 therefore	
inherently	contingent	on	interpretation	(Adam,	Beck	&	Van	Loon	2000,	p.	3).	For	Beck,	
the	 link	between	mediatized	construction	and	contestation	 is	clear.	Beck	(1999,	2006,	
2009)	attributes	the	media	with	a	central	role	in	shaping	public	risk	perceptions	(Lester	
2010b,	 p.	 54).	 He	 repeatedly	 acknowledges	 the	 media’s	 centrality	 in	 conveying,	
contesting	and	evaluating	environmental	risk,	so	that	for	him,	the	risk	society	is	always	
inherently	“a	knowledge,	media	and	information	society	at	the	same	time”	(Beck	2000,	
p.	xiv).		
	
Media	 construction	 of	 meaning	 is	 now	 enacted	 in	 global	 forums	 and	 across	 global	
networks,	creating	a	complicated	web	of	claims	and	counter-claims	on	risk.	In	reporting	
environmental	stories,	competing	claims	are	always	significant.	Claims	that	gain	more	
coverage	 can	 set	media	 agendas,	 determining	 how	 publics	 are	 primed	 to	 understand	
issues	 and	how	policy	makers	 act,	 or	 fail	 to	 act,	 on	 risk	mitigation.	The	 large	body	of	
																																																						
8	 There	 have	 been	 several	 critiques	 of	 Beck’s	 Risk	 Society	 including	 by	 Mythen	 (2007)	 for	 its	 lack	 of	
empirical	 detail,	 and	 on	 Beck’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 media’s	 role	 in	 the	 risk	 society	 (Cottle	 1998;	
Murdock	et	al.	2003;	Anderson,	A	1997).	
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literature	 on	 media	 coverage	 of	 anthropogenic	 climate	 change	 (Anderson,	 A	 2009;	
Boykoff,	 J	 &	 Boykoff	M	 2007;	 Boykoff,	M	 2007,	 2016;	 2008;	 Boykoff,	M,	Maldondo	&	
Nacu-Schmidt	2018;	Boykoff,	M	&	Rajan	2007;	Carvalho	2005,	2007;	Doyle	2011,	2016;	
McGaurr	 &	 Lester	 2009;	 O’Neill	 &	 Boykoff	 2011;	 Schäfer	 &	 Schlichting	 2014),	
particularly	 the	 “balance	 as	 bias”	 issue	 in	 climate	 change	 reporting	 (Boykoff,	 M	 &	
Boykoff,	 J	 2004),	 confirms	 the	 importance	 of	 who	 defines	 risks	 and	 how	 they	 are	
defined.		Studies	of	media	representations	of	the	climate	change	risk,	including	in	Chile	
(Dotson	 et	 al.	 2012),	 show	 that	media	 discourse	 on	 environmental	 risks	 does	 have	 a	
strong	 impact	 on	 public	 risk	 perceptions,	 and	 can	 shift	 the	 direction	 of	 public	 policy	
making.	 	The	politics	of	who	defines	risks	(Beck	calls	these	“relations	of	definition”,	 in	
deliberate	contrast	to	earlier	Marxist	notions	of	“relations	of	production”)	are	therefore	
of	 great	 political	 significance,	 and	 potentially	 transformative,	 to	 issues	 and	 societies.	
Discourse	on	 risk	has	become	an	arena	where	power	balances	can	be	altered,	 so	 that	
that	 “it	 is	 no	 longer	 “interests”	 that	 dominate	 the	 political	 horizon	 but	 rather	 claims	
about	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 particular	 forms	 of	 expertise	 and	 knowledge”	 (Adam,	 Beck	&	
Van	Loon	2000,	p.	4).	This	 is	a	 landscape	where	 it	 is	difficult	 for	 institutional	sources,	
like	the	multinational	company	that	proposed	to	develop	the	HidroAysén	megaproject,	
to	have	ultimate	control	over	risk	definition.		
	
Since	 the	 Risk	 Society	was	 conceptualised,	 the	 gravity	 and	 far-reaching	 effects	 of	 the	
global	environmental	crisis	have	become	clear.	In	response,	Beck	(2015)	has	written	of	
a	 risk-induced	“metamorphosis	of	 the	world”	 (p.	76)	which	he	regards	as	 “an	epochal	
change	 of	 horizons”,	 a	 “transfiguration	 of	 the	 social	 and	 political	 order”	 (p.	 77).	 This	
change	 he	 calls	 “emancipatory	 catastrophism”	 because	 of	 hidden	 emancipatory	
possibilities	which	derive	not	from	the	negative	side	effects	of	“goods”,	but	the	positive	
side	 effects	 of	 the	 risks	 or	 “bads”	 of	 modernisation.	 Such	 side	 effects	 (like	 climate	
change)	 can	 result	 in	 “anthropological	 shocks”	 (p.	 79)	 which	 are	 opportunities	 to	
transform	ways	of	seeing	the	world,	to	change	politics,	and	which	may	ultimately	lead	to	
“social	 catharsis”	 (p.	 79)	 and	 improved	 environmental	 and	 socioal	 justice.	 Using	 the	
example	of	flooding	post-Hurricane	Katrina	and	the	issues	of	race	and	inequality	in	the	
US,	Beck	 shows	how	environmental	 issues	and	debates	 can	be	effective	 in	 connecting	
the	seemingly	disconnected,	so	that	risk	that	appeared	“natural”	was	uncovered	as	risk	
that	was	also	“social	and	political”	(p.	80).	Though	the	risk	that	Beck	discusses	here	is	
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climate	change	derived,	 I	build	on	Beck’s	conceptualisation	 in	 this	 thesis,	arguing	 that	
risk	from	a	megaproject	like	HidroAysén	(even	perceived	risk,	not	actualised)	can	also	
result	 in	 the	 connection	 of	 the	 seemingly	 disconnected	 (in	 this	 case,	 dams	 and	
inequality),	generating	social	catharsis	and	ultimately,	greater	environmental	and	social	
justice9.	Crucially,	Beck	tells	us	that	a	such	emancipatory,	cosmopolitan,	social	catharsis	
does	 not	 happen	 automatically,	 and	 instead	 relies	 on	 “carrier	 groups	 engaging	
sucesssfully	in	‘cultural	work”,	in	‘meaning	work’,	in	‘transformative	work’	of	activists	in	
witnessing	 the	 distant	 suffering	 of	 others”	 (p.	 80,	 also	 see	 Kurasawa	 2004,	 2007).	 In	
section	2.6	below,	I	discuss	literature	in	relation	to	media	protest	and	activism	in	detail,	
but	 first	 I	 delve	 deeper	 into	 the	 antecedents	 to,	 and	 then	 the	 current,	 global	 media	
landscape	in	which	the	kind	of	activism	that	surrounded	HidroAysén	played	out.		
	
2.4	Mediatization	and	power	in	a	global	network	society	
	
	
2.4.1	From	public	sphere	to	Network	Society	and	mass	self-communication	
	
In	this	section	and	the	sections	below,	I	move	briefly	through	earlier	theorisation	on	the	
the	 public	 sphere	 and	 the	 Network	 Society,	 and	 I	 discuss	 conceptualisations	 of	 the	
location	of	power	 in	such	a	society.	 I	 then	arrive	at	a	discussion	of	 the	contemporary,	
globalised,	communications	landscape	of	“deep	mediatization”	(Couldry	&	Hepp	2018)	
which	is	the	setting	for	the	latter	part	of	the	megaproject	debate	being	examined	in	this	
thesis.	 Because	 the	 HidroAysén	 controversy	was	 situated	 both	 before	 and	 during	 the	
advent	of	mass	digital	era	in	Chile,	historical	antecedents	are	important	in	this	debate,	
so	I	begin	with	these.	
	
Habermas	 (1989	 [1962])	 defined	 the	 public	 sphere	 as:	 “a	 realm	 of	 our	 social	 life	 in	
which	 something	 approaching	 public	 opinion	 can	 be	 formed.”	 Following	 Habermas,	
Dahlgren	 (2005)	 conceptualised	 such	 a	 sphere	 as	 “a	 constellation	 of	 communicative	
spaces	in	society	that	permit	the	circulation	of	information,	ideas,	debates,	ideally	in	an	
unfettered	manner,	and	also	 the	 formation	of	political	will”	 (p.	148).	 In	a	pre-internet	
																																																						
9	 Vara	 (2015)	 has	 also	 written	 on	 a	 South	 American	 approach	 to	 Beck’s	 “metamorphosis”	 using	 the	
empirical	example	of	lithium	mining	and	protest	against	it	in	Bolivia,	Chile	and	Argentina.	Vara	describes	
the	current	“unprecedented	conditions	that	help	traditionally	disenfranchised	peoples	gain	visibility	and	
have	a	voice”	(p.	103)	in	these	countries	in	the	lithium	debate.		
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age,	 Habermas	 identified	 “newspapers	 and	 magazines	 radio	 and	 television”	 as	 “the	
media	of	the	public	sphere”	(Habermas	1989	[1962],	p.	49).	This	conception	did	not	go	
unchallenged,	 garnering	much	 discussion	 and	 critique	 (Curran	 1991;	 Dahlgren	 1995;	
Elliot	 1986;	 Gitlin	 1998;	 McKee	 2005;	 Thompson,	 J	 1995),	 including	 from	 Habermas	
himself	who	also	wrote	of	 the	 “refeudalisation”	of	 the	public	 sphere	 (Habermas	1989	
[1962]).	 Despite	 this,	 many	 media	 scholars	 have	 accepted,	 with	 some	 contemporary	
caveats,	 the	 continuing	 importance	 of	 a	 public	 sphere10	 as	 a	 normative	 ideal	 for	
interrogating	 the	 contemporary	 media	 (Cottle	 2006;	 Hepp	 &	 Couldry	 2018;	 Kellner	
2014;	 Shirky	 2011).	 If	 a	 Habermasian	 public	 sphere	 required	 “inclusive,	 sincere	 and	
respectful	reasoning”	(Dahlberg	2007,	p.	49)	 in	debates	between	publically-orientated	
citizens	who	 acted	 to	 scrutinise	 power	 and	 uphold	 democracy,	 then	 legacy	 print	 and	
broadcast	media	 have	 long	 largely	 failed	 in	 this	 role,	 as	 a	 variety	 of	 scholars	 (Boggs	
2001;	Curran	1990,	2000;	Gandy	2002;	Kellner	2004;	McChesney	1999;	Savigny	2002;	
Thompson,	 J	 1995)	 have	 shown.	 Habermas	 also	 pointed	 this	 out	 in	 his	 later	writing,	
referring	to	the	“colonization	of	the	public	sphere	by	market	imperatives”	and	its	effect	
of	“polarization”,	“dramatization”	and	“simplification”	(2006	p.	422)	of	news.		
	
In	 contrast,	 the	 internet	was	 earlier	 seen	 as	 offering	 a	 forum	 for	 limitless	 freedom	of	
opinion,	and	as	a	space	for	citizens	to	encounter	and	engage	with	a	near-infinite	range	
of	 views.	 Several	 theorists	 (Blumler	 &	 Gurevitch	 2001;	 Gimmler	 2001;	 Kellner	 2004;	
Papacharissi	 2002;	 Volkmer	 2003)	 argued	 at	 this	 time	 that	 the	 new	 public	 arenas	
provided	 by	 the	 digital	 landscape	 of	 the	 internet	 constituted	 an	 effective	 space	 for	
democratic	 debate,	 and	 therefore	 represented	 a	 new,	 broadened	 public	 sphere11.		
Celebratory	conceptualisations	of	the	ways	that	digital	technologies	impacted	the	media	
and	communications	 landscape	variously	regarded	it	as	a	“communication	revolution”	
(Mansell	 2002;	 McChesney	 2007),	 creating	 a	 “cyberpublic”	 (Dahlberg,	 Lincoln	 2007)	
and	 a	 “participatory	 culture”	 (Jenkins	 et	 al.	 2006),	 enabling	 a	 real	 voice	 for	 “counter	
																																																						
10	Fraser	(2007)	argues	for	a	transnationalization	of	the	public	sphere	–	a	notion	supported	by		he	
transnational	conflict	being	examined	here.		
11	Consideration	should	be	given	to	the	digital	divide.	Currently	48%	of	the	world’s	population	has	access	
to	 the	 internet	 (International	 Telecommunications	 Union	 2017),	 leaving	 just	 over	 half	 of	 the	 global	
population	on	the	non-connected	side	of	the	“digital	divide”	(Chinn	&	Fairlie	2004).	The	digital	divide	in	
terms	of	access,	however,	has	been	shrinking:	the	ratio	between	internet	access	in	OECD	and	developing	
countries	 fell	 from	 80.6:1	 in	 1997	 to	 5.8:1	 in	 2007	 (Castells	 2009,	 p.	 62).	Wireless	 communication	 is	
leading	the	growth	of	 internet	access,	particularly	in	the	developing	world.	In	2017,	70%	of	the	world’s	
15-24	year-olds	were	using	the	internet	(International	Telecommunications	Union	2017).	
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publics”	and	“digital	democracy”	(Dahlberg	2011).		This	conceptualisation	regarded	the	
internet	 as	 among	 the	 “technologies	 of	 freedom”	 (Castells	 2009,	 p.	 61),	 enabling	 a	
democratisation	 of	 communication	 so	 that	 the	 internet	 indeed	 resembled	 the	
Habermasian	public	 sphere.	Other	 scholarship	 at	 this	 time	 (Dean,	Anderson	&	Lovink	
2006;	Keen	2007;	Lovink	2011)	considered	amateur	cultural	production	to	impoverish,	
rather	 than	 to	 enrich	 culture,	 and	 to	 threaten	 mainstream	media	 institutions.	 These	
scholars	regarded	the	then	relatively	new	landscape	of	digital	communication	as	a	place	
permeated	 by	 a	 “nihilist	 impulse”	 (Lovink	 2007)	 towards	 a	 culture	 of	 “meaningless	
comment”	(Lovink	2011)	rendering	new	communication	networks	“networks	without	a	
cause”	 (Lovink	 2011).	 McNair	 (2006)	 has	 referred	 to	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 voices	
competing	for	online	attention	as	a	“chaos	paradigm”.		
	
These	kinds	of	contradictory	tendencies	are	at	the	heart	of	Castells’	conceptualisation	of	
the	Network	Society	(Castells	1996c,	2000,	2004a,	2007,	2008,	2009):	“a	society	whose	
structure	 is	 made	 around	 networks	 activated	 by	 micro-electronics	 based,	 digitally	
processed	communication	technologies”	(Castells	2009,	p.	23),	and	intrinsically	a	global	
society.	 This	 society’s	 networked	 organisation	 and	 modes	 of	 communication	 have	
therefore	also	been	subject	to	the	paradoxes	of	globalisation:	where	the	global	“space	of	
flows”	is	at	odds	with	the	local	“space	of	places”	(Castells	1996b,	1996c,	2000;	Castells	&	
Ince	 2003).	 The	 is	 a	 society	 once	 connected	 and	 fragmented,	 cosmopolitan	 and	
communitarian,	autonomous	and	individuated,	and	whose	structures	have	the	capacity	
both	to	enhance	democracy	and	perpetuate	prevailing	hegemony	(See	section	2.4.5	for	
greater	detail	on	the	paradoxes	in	“deep	mediatization”.)		
	
In	this	context	of	globalising,	converging	media,	where	information	is	the	new	currency,	
what	 Castells	 (2007)	 terms	 “mass	 self-communication”	 has	 arisen.	 The	 landscape	 of	
mass	 self-communication	 is	 one	 of	 horizontal,	 interactive	 communication	 networks,	
facilitated	 by	 digital	 and	 wireless	 technologies.	 Castells	 defined	 this	 peer-produced	
media	landscape	as	constituting	a	new	medium,	characterised	by	the	fact	that	it	is	“self-
generated	in	content,	self-directed	in	emission,	and	self-selected	in	reception	by	many	who	
communicate	with	many”	 (Castells	 2009,	 p.	 70,	 italics	 in	 original).	 In	 challenge	 to	 the	
traditional,	 institutional	 purveyors	 of	 information,	 mass	 self-communication	 has	 also	
offered	access	to	the	communication	flows	that	construct	meaning	 in	the	public	mind.	
	 33	
The	 advent	 of	 this	 “social”	 form	 of	 communication,	 then,	 should	 have	 been	
revolutionising,	 particularly	 where	 contested	 claims-making	 in	 public	 debate	 is	
concerned.	Now,	 a	mouse	 click	 connects	 the	 infinitely	 globally	networked	 to	 the	 local	
self.	The	media	 “produser”	 (Bruns	2006)	now	acts	as	his	or	her	own	 filter	of	 content.	
The	 role	 of	 the	 journalist	 has	 also	 changed	 in	 this	 context.	 No	 longer	 gatekeepers,	
practitioners	of	the	traditional	media	are	now	increasingly	“curators”	(O'Sullivan	2012),	
“harvesters”	 and	 “managers”	 (Bakker	 2014)	 of	 citizen-produced	 content.	 Instead	 of	
being	 creators	 and	 purveyors	 of	 news,	 they	 instead	 offer	 a	 guiding	 path	 through	 the	
fray.		
	
Scholarly	 research	 has	 interrogated	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 social	 media	 spaces	 on	 the	
internet	constituting	a	new	deliberative	public	sphere	to	enhance	democracy	(Benkler	
2006;	 Castells	 2008;	 Shirky	 2011),	 and	 particularly	 their	 role	 in	 protest	 and	 social	
movements	 (Alexanyan	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Buechler	 2016;	 Castells	 2007,	 2012;	 Mattoni	 &	
Treré	 2014;	 Rahimi	 2011;	 Segerberg	 &	 Bennett	 2011;	 Valenzuela,	 Arriagada	 &	
Scherman	 2012).	 Certainly,	 the	 autonomy	 and	 connectedness	 of	 mass	 self-
communication	 in	 the	network	 society	 appear	 to	 approach	Habermas’	 ideal	 realm	 for	
freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 formation	 of	 public	 opinion.	 If	 anyone	 on	 the	 internet-
connected	 side	 of	 the	 digital	 divide	 can	 generate,	 transmit,	 receive	 and	 transform	
information	 almost	 instantly	 and	 almost	 infinitely,	 if	 collectively,	 “produsers”	 can	
promote	issues	so	that	they	“go	viral”,	thereby	defining	the	issues	of	the	day	(Goodman	
&	Preston	2012);	and	if	a	great	variety	of	actors	can	engage	with	a	diverse	spectrum	of	
opinion	and	political	 standpoints,	does	 this	not	 constitute	 something	approaching	 the	
discursive	contestation	of	“deliberative	digital	democracy”	(Dahlberg	2011)?	Mass	self-
communication	is	a	manifestation	of	the	network	society,	however,	and	the	paradoxical	
features	of	this	global	society	–	which	permeate	this	medium	as	well	–	appear	to	limit	its	
democratic	potential.	
Although	 internet-based	 communications	 connect,	 they	 also	 fragment	 (Anderson,	 C	
2006;	 Iyengar	 &	 Hahn	 2009;	 Katz	 1996;	 Spohr	 2017;	 Sunstein	 2001,	 2009,	 2018),	
thereby	limiting	this	medium’s	potential	to	constitute	a	public	sphere.	Because	internet	
users	 and	 search	 engines’	 algorithms	 tailor	 online	media	 experiences	 to	 fit	 particular	
world	 views,	 consuming	 information	 online	 often	 means	 consuming	 ideologically	
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similar	 information,	 resulting	 in	 a	 fragmented	 public	 sphere	 of	 multiple	 separate	
enclaves.	In	this	landscape	of	“sphericules”	(1998b),	“echo	chambers”	(Colleoni,	Rozza	&	
Arvidsson	 2014)	 “filter	 bubbles”	 (Spohr	 2017)	 	 and	 “fake	 news”	 (Allcott	&	Gentzkow	
2017;	 McNair	 2017),	 group	 positions	 are	 reinforced	 rather	 than	 critiqued	 so	 that	
instead	of	facilitating	a	deliberative	public	sphere,	the	internet	provides	for	a	profusion	
of	 ideologically	 polarised	media	 environments	 that	 never	 connect.	 The	 possibility	 for	
isolated	filter	bubbles	to	counter	more	cohesive	institutional	power	in	debates	over	the	
environment	and	development	may	therefore	be	diminished.		
Castells	 regarded	 this	 synchronous	 connection	 and	 disconnection	 in	 all	 aspects	 of	
networks	 as	 emblematic	 of	 the	 network	 society.	 This	 “double	 logic	 of	 inclusion	 and	
exclusion”	 (Castells	 2009,	 p.	 29)	 he	 considered	 a	 structural	 feature	 of	 the	 network	
society	itself.	And	the	network	society,	of	course,	processes	more	than	just	information.	
Global	capital	and	space-shrinking	infrastructure	are	integral	to	this	society,	so	that	the	
logics	that	apply	in	this	global	society	apply	also	to	 its	material	emblems	built	 in	steel	
and	 concrete	 –	 megaprojects.	 By	 this	 explanation,	 it	 is	 clear	 how	 globally-conceived	
megaprojects	 can	 run	 on	 a	 formula	 that	 consistently	 ignores	 or	 underestimates	 risk:	
actors	 that	 create	 the	 worst	 environmental	 risks	 are	 disconnected	 from	 it.	 By	 those	
same	laws	and	logics,	people	whose	lives	megaprojects	disrupt	and	displace	are	now,	by	
the	 “death	 of	 distance”	 able	 to	 attract	 global	 attention	 to	 their	 protests,	 and	 perhaps	
galvanise	 transnational	pressure	against	developing	 corporations	who	deny	or	 ignore	
risk.	
Because	 networks	 fragment	 and	 converge,	 connect	 and	 disconnect,	 incorporate	 and	
discard;	power	 in	networks	 is	derived	 from	the	ability	 to	control	by	what	criteria	 the	
network	 conducts	 these	 functions	 (Castells	2009).	This,	 crucially,	 is	 the	power	within	
networks.	 This	 is	 ultimately	what	 decides	which	 nodes	 remain	 in	 a	 network	 –	 in	 the	
case	 of	 communication	 networks,	 what	 information	 is	 valued	 as	 a	 commodity	 and	
whose	 voices	 are	 heard.	 Understanding	 with	 which	 actors	 this	 power	 lies	 is	
fundamental	to	understanding	the	power	in	the	networked	communications	landscape	
that	 is	 the	 setting	 for	 battles	 over	 ‘the	 environment’.	 The	 following	 section	 turns	 to	
theories	on	where	this	now	power	lies.	
2.4.2	Communication	Power	
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Castells’	 network	 society	 conceptualisation	 builds	 on	 Touraine’s	 ideas	 on	 social	
movements	 and	 identity	 (Touraine	 1973),	 and	Bell’s	 conception	 of	 post-industrialism	
(Bell,	 D	 1973,	 1978).	 What	 Castells	 (2007,	 2009)	 particularly	 offers,	 though,	 is	 a	
systematic	 appraisal	 of	 where	 power	 lies	 in	 networked	 organisation.	 So	 although	
Castells’	theorisation	on	the	network	society	has	been	variously	criticised	for	being	one-
dimensional	(Van	Dijk	1999),	for	lacking	a	critical	standpoint	to	evaluate	social	change	
(Stevenson	2002),	 and	 for	 offering	no	 guidelines	 for	 future	 action	 (Lester	&	Hutchins	
2006),	 this	grounded	 theory	of	power	 in	networks	 is	 still	 relevant,	 and	 important	 the	
study	presented	here.	For	Castells,	power	in	the	network	society	has	four	distinct	forms.	
The	 last	 of	 these	 he	 calls	 “network	 making	 power”,	 which	 he	 defines	 as	 having	 two	
functions:	
a)	 the	 ability	 to	 form	 networks	 and	 program	 the	 goals	 assigned	 to	 those	
networks;	 and	 b)	 the	 ability	 to	 connect	 networks	 so	 that	 they	 share	
common	 goals	 and	 resources,	 and	 can	 overcome	 competition	 from	 other	
networks.	
	 	 	 	 	 												 	 											(Castells	2009,	p.	45)	
Castells	 calls	 the	 holders	 of	 the	 first	 position	 “programmers”	 and	 the	 holders	 of	 the	
second	 “switchers”	 (Castells	 2009,	 p.	 45).	 For	 him,	 the	 programmers	 and	 switchers	
amongst	 the	 networks	 of	 the	 global	 network	 society	 are	 the	 fundamental	 holders	 of	
communication	power.	Who,	or	what,	then,	are	these	power	holders?	
In	 Castells’	 interpretation,	 the	 power	 holders	 in	 the	 network	 society	 are	 no	 longer	
nation	 states	 –	 networks	 traverse	 boundaries,	 undermining	 sovereignty.	 Neither	 are	
these	 power	 holders	 a	 power	 elite	 –	 this	 is	 a	 “simplified	 image	 of	 power	 in	 society	
whose	 analytical	 value	 is	 limited	 to	 some	 extreme	 cases”	 (Castells	 2009,	 p.	 47).	 The	
network	society,	founded	on	paradoxes,	relies	on	more	subtle,	complex	and	negotiated	
systems	 of	 power.	 In	 the	 network	 society,	 programmers	 and	 switchers	 can	 be	 either	
single	actors	or	networks	of	 actors.	These	 can	either	act	 in	 the	 interests	of	prevailing	
power,	or	they	can	act	for	counter	power	–	both	operate	through	the	same	mechanisms.	
A	social	movement	therefore,	may	attempt	to	“re-program”	the	operation	of	established	
networks	 by	 using	 communication	 networks	 to	 campaign	 for	 and	 effect	 change:	 for	
example,	 mobilising	 the	 campaign	 for	 the	 cancellation	 of	 Third	 World	 debt.	 Or	 a	
politician,	by	investing	in	an	election	campaign,	may	operate	the	“switches”	that	connect	
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the	 dynamic	 interfaces	 between	 networks.	 Protest,	 even	 terrorism,	 may	 also	 have	
“switching”	 power,	 altering	 established	 connections	 between	 networks	 to	 disrupt	 the	
material	infrastructure	of	“opposing”	networks	and	achieve	widespread	media	coverage	
–	 in	Castells’	parlance	 “switching	with	 the	media”.	 Switching	power	 can	be	bought	by	
money,	 or	 at	 least	 the	 ability	 to	 generate	 value	 through	 a	 medium	 of	 exchange,	 for	
example:	creating	dramatic	media	events	that	increase	audiences,	therefore	profits.		
Lester	 and	 Hutchins	 (2015)	 have	 extended	 Castells’	 (2009,	 2012)	 and	 Arsenault	 &	
Castells’	(2008)	ideas	on	switching	points	and	switching	power	and	have	conceptualised	
“switching	points”	in	environmental	conflicts	specifically	as	the	locations	where	activism	
campaigns,	journalism	practices,	politics	and	decision-making,	and	industry	interact	and	
intersect.	 These	 are	 sites	 in	 which	 both	 resistance	 and	 domination	 rely	 on	 the	 same	
network	 strategies	 –	 and	 both	 can	 hold	 power.	However,	 Foxwell-Norton	 and	Konkes	
(2018)	 found	 in	 their	 recent	 research	 on	 newspaper	 coverage	 of	 protection	 of	
Australia’s	Great	Barrier	Reef	that	the	voices	of	industry	and	formal	politics	have	come,	
over	 time,	 to	 dominate	 discourses	 on	 environmental	 protection.	 For	 these	 authors,	
Lester	and	Hutchins’	four	sites	for	switching	therefore	look	more	like	“twin	towers”	(p.	
19)	with	industrial	and	political	discourses	and	definitions	dominating	these	sites.				
It	 is	 therefore	 those	 social	 actors	 who	 are	 best	 able	 to	 access	 networked	 flows	 of	
communication	–	who	hold	the	keys	to	switching	and	programming	the	most	networks	
–	who	ultimately	dominate	in	such	conflicts.	Power	lies,	then,	in	the	ability	to	construct	
discourses,	frame	meaning	and	to	determine	the	content,	direction	and	interconnection	
of	 more	 of	 the	 flows	 of	 information	 that	 construct	 the	 images	 in	 people’s	 minds.	
Whichever	 entity	 dominates	 those	 aspects	 of	 communication	 in	 the	 network	 society	
holds	“communication	power”	(Castells	2007,	2009).	 	
2.4.3	Media	ownership	concentration	and	communication	power	
Even	 though	 non-elite	 actors	 can	 now	 influence	 the	 content	 and	 connectedness	 of	
information	 flows,	 the	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	 counter	 power	 has	 not	 been	
entirely	 re-set.	 Much	 of	 the	 time	 it	 remains,	 as	 previously,	 a	 relationship	 of	 unequal	
power	 (Gamson	 &	 Wolfsfeld	 1993).	 The	 media	 ownership	 trends	 outlined	 above	 –	
consolidation,	convergence,	commercialization	have	substantial	bearing	on	this.	Media	
concentration	in	the	US	is	highly	illustrative	of	this	tendency.	In	the	first	edition	of	The	
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Media	Monopoly	(1983),	Bagdikian	identified	50	media	companies	that	dominated	that	
country’s	media	market:	in	1987	there	were	29,	23	in	1990,	10	in	1997,	six	in	2000	and	
five	 in	 2004	 (Hesmondhalgh	 2007,	 p.	 170).	 As	 discussed	 above,	 analysts	 including	
Arsenault	 and	 Castells	 (2008),	 Baker	 (2006),	 Campo	 Vidal	 (2008),	 McChesney	
(particularly	2008),	Noam	(2016),	Rice	(2008)	and	Thussu	(2006),	have	documented	a	
trend	 towards	 concentration	 of	media	 ownership	 on	 a	 global	 scale,	 and	 as	 discussed	
above,	digital	media	are	also	subject	to	conglomeration.	Media	in	Latin	America	(Fox	&	
Waisbord	2002;	Mastrini	&	Becerra	2011)	and	specifically	in	Chile	(Mönckeberg	2011;	
Godoy	2016)	likewise	demonstrate	this	trend	towards	conglomeration.	Because	actors	
that	 control	 the	 media	 also	 control	 the	 information	 flows	 that	 construct	 meaning	 in	
people’s	 minds,	 the	 issue	 of	 media	 ownership	 concentration	 is	 fundamental	 to	 the	
power/counter	 power	 balance	 in	 the	 case	 study	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis.	 The	 media	
ownership	landscape	specific	to	Chile	is	addressed	in	detail	in	Chapter	3.	
Network	 theory	 gives	 insights	 into	 why	 concentration	 of	 media	 ownership	 impacts	
plurality	 of	 information	 online.	 According	 to	 network	 theory,	 in	 large,	 scale-free	
networks,	those	nodes	which	already	have	many	links	acquire	more,	while	nodes	with	
fewer	 links	gain	fewer	(van	Dijk	2012).	Search	engine	hits	run	on	this	principle	–	that	
the	most	popular	nodes	become	even	more	popular.	Castells	calls	this	a	“domino	effect”	
(Castells	 2009,	 p.	 97).	 By	 this	 “power	 law	 in	 networks”	 (van	 Dijk	 2012,	 p.	 41),	 with	
larger	 networks	 controlling	 more	 of	 the	 flows	 of	 information	 online,	 communication	
inequality	may	be	 intensified,	relegating	alternative	voices	 to	 the	 less	 influential	 “long	
tail”	(Anderson,	C	2006),	in	the	myriad	sphericules	at	the	shallow	end	of	the	bitstream.	
When	media	conglomerates	become	larger,	they	therefore	also	gain	enhanced	ability	to	
“switch”	 or	 create	 business	 partnerships	 with	 other	 non-media	 business,	 magnifying	
their	financial,	and	ultimately	their	communication	power.	
	
2.4.4	Social	content	as	commodity	
	
The	bottom	line	governing	what	information	becomes	most	visible	in	global	information	
networks	 –	 online	 and	 offline	 –	 depends	 on	what	 sells	 to	 consumers,	 and	what	 sells	
advertising.	 The	 value	 of	 advertising	 on	 the	 internet	 surpassed	 that	 in	 radio	 or	
magazines	 in	 2008	 (Castells	 2009)	 and	 social	 media	 networks	 provide	 global	 media	
conglomerates	 new	 platforms	 and	 new	 audiences	 for	 this	 advertising.	 Major	 media	
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players	have	therefore	sought	to	commodify	internet-based	mass	self-communication	in	
order	to	be	able	to	harness	autonomous	user-produced	content	into	markets	(Arvidsson	
&	 Colleoni	 2012,	 Flew	 2008,	 Fuchs	 2010,	 Zajk	 2015).	 In	 the	 social	 media	 landscape,	
therefore,	 transmission	 of	 data	 is	 economised	 so	 that	 increasingly	 on	 the	 internet,	
“there	 is	 no	 ‘debating	 and	 deliberating’	 that	 is	 not	 also	 ‘buying	 and	
selling’…participation	 is	 a	 commercial	 act.”	 (Goldberg,	 G	 2010,	 p.	 747).	 By	 such	
processes	of	dispossession	of	personal	data	for	corporate	exploitation,	digital	platforms	
such	 as	 social	 networking	 sites	 have	 therefore	 been	 conceived	 to	 “entrap	 individual	
creativity	within	 private	 platforms”	 and	 “subject	 it	 to	 corporate	 control,	 surveillance,	
and	the	exploitation	of	users'	immaterial	labor”	(Fenton	&	Barassi	2011).	Social	media	
and	 networked	 digital	 communication	 are	 thus	 not	 only	 channels	 through	 which	
citizens	can	exercise	counter	power,	but	constitute	“a	form	of	channeling	or	submitting	
to	power”	(Goldberg	2010,	p.	749).	Every	instance	of	participation	involves	transfer	of	
economised	data,	driving	profitability	for	media	companies.	Therefore,	as	Couldry	and	
Hepp	 (2018,	 p.	 34)	 tell	 us,	 when	 they	write	 about	 “datafication”,	 “data	 production	 is	
inherently	 asymmetrical…it	 is	 orientated	 to	 the	 purposes	 of	 institutions,	 private	 or	
governmental”.	(For	more	on	datafication	see	section	2.4.5	below.)	
	
In	the	ways	described	above,	then,	the	potential	for	the	internet	to	act	as	a	public	sphere	
or	 spheres	 for	 discursive	 contestation	 is	 curtailed	 by	 growing	 media	 ownership	
concentration	 and	 the	 “switching”	 or	 interlocking	 of	 global	 corporate	 media	 and	
financial	 networks,	 even	 in	 the	 “autonomous”	 spheres	 of	 the	 internet.	 Global	 media	
companies	have	profited	 from	convergence,	deregulation	and	market	 liberalisation	so	
that	 a	 decreasing	 number	 of	 multi-layered,	 multi-platform	 networked	 organisations	
now	 have	 potentially	 vast	 control	 over	 the	 information	 commodity.	 Despite	 this,	 the	
present	 global	 media	 landscape	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 one-way,	 vertically	 controlled	
landscape	 of	 older	 media	 paradigms.	 This	 is	 a	 diverse,	 interactive,	 global,	 above	 all	
contested	media	landscape.	This	is	a	landscape	in	which	occasionally,	counter	power	is	
able	to	“switch”	and	“reprogram”	–	often	using	the	same	mechanisms	to	communicate	
and	 influence	as	 those	 that	hold	power.	 In	section	2.5	below,	 I	 turn	 to	a	discussion	of	
overarching	media	 paradigms	 for	 understanding	 this	 contested	media	 landscape,	 but	
first	I	examine	further	the	current,	paradoxical	global	landscape	of	deep	mediatization.		
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2.4.5	Globalisation	and	deep	mediatization		
	
Globalisation,	as	Giddens	(1990)	influentially	wrote,	is	the	“intensification	of	worldwide	
social	 relations	 which	 link	 distant	 localities	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 local	 happenings	 are	
shaped	by	 events	 occurring	many	miles	 away	 and	vice	 versa”	 (p.	 64).	 This	process	 is	
primarily	 led	by	media	 connectedness,	as	 I	discuss	above.	 Indeed,	many	scholars	have	
argued	 that	 the	 globalisation	 of	 capitalism	 and	 a	 global	 social	 system	have	 only	 been	
possible	 because	 of	 the	 networking	 capacity	 of	 digital	 communication	 technologies	
(Flew	 &	 McElhinney	 2002;	 Grewal	 2008;	 Kiyoshi,	 Lakhsmanan	 &	 Anderson	 2006;	
Waisbord	 2013b).	 But,	 as	 I	 have	 already	 argued,	 the	 current	 global	 landscape	 is	 a	
paradoxical	place.	We	are	experiencing	 “the	death	of	distance”	 (Cairncross	1997),	but	
connectivity	does	not	 	necessarily	 translate	 to	 social	 connectedness	 (van	Dijck	2013).	
Globalisation,	 liberalisation,	 deregulation	 and	 digitisation	 both	 include	 and	 exclude;	
they	 both	 underscore	 inequalities	 (Ukpere	 &	 Slabbert	 2009;	 Atkinson	 2015)	 and	
undermine	traditional	systems	of	class.	This	is	a	society	where	an	increased	global	flow	
of	 finance,	 people	 and	 communications	 (Lash	 &	 Urry	 1994;	 Urry	 2003)	 leads	 to	 an	
intensification	of	transnational	social	relations,	undermining	nation	states;	while	at	the	
same	time	emphasising	human	heterogeneity	(Waisbord	2013b).	 	It	is	a	society	where	
class	 and	 party-political	 allegiances	 have	 become	 weakened,	 and	 also	 a	 place	 where	
identity	politics,	social	movements	and	“subpolitics”	thrive	(Alvarez,	Dagnino	&	Escobar	
2018;	 Castells	 2012;	 Fominaya	 2014).	 This	 vibrant,	 antagonistic	 landscape	 has	 both	
presented	 some	 opportunities	 for	 democratisation,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 and	 has	
increased	 fragmentation	 and	 internal	 contestation	 (Cottle	 2006;	 Dahlberg	 2007;	
Howard	2010).	Such	fragmentation	has	been	linked	to	reassertions	of	nationalism	and	
the	 rise	 of	 populism	 (Gerbaudo	2018;	Groshek	&	Koc-Michalska	 2017),	 and	 has	 been	
seen	 to	 threaten	 democracy	 itself	 (McChesney	 2013;	 Morozov	 2011;	 Persily	 2017;	
Sunstein	 2018).	 This	 is	 a	 landscape	 where	 elites	 no	 longer	 have	 a	 monopoly	 on	
knowledge	claims	(Cottle	2006)	so	that	elite	authority	in	terms	of	knowledge	and	class	
is	 diminished,	 and	 publics	 question	 more	 about	 the	 administration	 of	 risks	 and	 the	
future	 of	 the	 planet,	 fuelling	 an	 “ontological	 insecurity”	 (Giddens	 1990,	 1999)	 and	 a	
“cosmopolitan	 vision”	 (Beck	 2006)	 that	 may	 promote	 environmental	 concern	 and	
protest.		
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In	 discussing	 the	 possibility	 for	 a	 metatheory	 of	 mediatization	 and	 globalisation,	
Waisbord	(2013b;	see	also	Gunaratne	2013)	underscores	that	media	are	at	the	heart	of	
this	 process	 of	 simultaneous	 connectedness	 and	 fragmentation.	 He	 writes	 that	 “the	
media	are	not	 simply	 just	 another	 system,	 industry	or	 activity,	but	 they	have	become	
the	dominant	system	of	contemporary	societies”,	and	“the	vortex	of	public	attention,	the	
über-system	 that	 defines	 public	 life	 and	 connects	 everyone”	 (p.	 183)12.	 Other	
conceptualisations	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 mediatization	 (Hepp	 2012;	 Hjarvard	 2013;	
Lundby	2009)	also	point	to	the	fundamental	interconnection	and	mutually	constitutive	
nature	 of	 media	 and	 social	 life,	 and	 indeed,	 therefore,	 media’s	 essential	 role	 in	
constructing	 social	 reality	 (Couldry	 &	 Hepp	 2018).	 In	 this	 digitally-saturated	 world,	
scholars	have	written	of	 “panmediation”	 in	which	 there	 is	no	discernible	demarcation	
between	the	mediated	and	the	real	(DeLuca,	Lawson	&	Sun	2012);	“mediatized	worlds”	
(Hepp	 &	 Krotz	 2014);	 a	 “mediatized	 way	 of	 life”	 (Vorderer	 at	 al.	 2015)	 and	 the	
“mediatization	 of	 society”	 (Hjarvard	 2013;	 Strömbäck	 &	Esser	2014).	 More	 recently,	
Couldry	 and	 Hepp	 (2018)	 have	 described	 a	 protracted	 “continuous	 and	 cumulative	
enfolding	 of	 communications	 within	 the	 social	 world”,	 which	 has	 culminated	 in	 the	
current	phase	of	“deep	mediatization”	(p.	34),	associated	with	an	unprecedented	level	of	
embedding	 of	 media	 in	 social	 processes.	 This	 process	 has	 fundamentally	 intensified	
over	 the	 last	 decade.	 	 These	 authors	 use	 the	 term	 “media	 manifold”	 to	 describe	 the	
plurality	 and	 the	 multiply	 interlinked	 nature	 of	 contemporary	 media	 channels	 and	
interfaces	(see	also	Hepp	&	Hasebrink	2018),	and	they	see	much	of	the	present	media	
manifold	as	being	subsumed	within	the	current	phase	of	datafication	so	that	media	are	
no	longer	just	a	means	of	communication,	but	are	also	a	means	of	collecting	data	about	
their	users	 in	real	 time	(Hepp	&	Hasebrink	2018,	p.	16).	This	means	 that	social	 life	 is	
also	 therefore	 represented	 “in	 computerised	 data	 via	 media	 devices	 and	 their	
underlying	software	and	infrastructure”	(p.	19).		
	
																																																						
12	Couldry	and	Hepp	note	a	danger	 in	 framing	mediatization	 in	a	way	that	 is	 too	Eurocentric,	and	point	
out	 that	some	countries	 in	Latin	America	may	have	some	differences	 in	 their	modes	of	mediatization.	 I	
argue	that	in	Chile’s	case,	such	differences	come	mainly	from	the	legacy	of	dictatorship	and	the	mode	of	
post-dictatorship	media	development.	This	is	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	3.	For	more	on	mediatization	
and	 Latin	 America,	 see	Martín-Barbero	 (2006)	 and	Waisbord	 (2013d).	Waisbord	 (2013d)	 notes	many	
“blind	spots”	and	“myths”	(p.	112)	in	relation	to	the	media	globalisation	paradigm.	This	thesis	contributes	
empirical	detail	which	can	shed	light	on	these	kinds	of	blind	spots.			
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The	 results	 of	 this	 fundamental	 entanglement	 in	 deep	 mediatization	 of	 our	 material	
systems	 of	 interdependence	 on	 normative	 principles	 such	 as	 freedom	 and	 autonomy	
have	not	yet	been	adequately	theorised.	However,	empirical	examples,	like	this	study	of	
the	 protracted	mediatized	 conflict	 in	 Chile	 over	 HidroAysén	 can	 help	 contribute	 fine	
detail	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 mediatized	 debates,	 and	 therefore	 also	 contribute	 to	
understandings	of	other	inter-related	metaprocesses	of	change,	including	globalisation.		
	
In	 this	 literature	review	to	date,	 I	have	endeavoured	 to	detail	many	of	 the	 trends	and	
influences	 both	 historical	 and	 contemporary,	 that	 constitute	 the	 media	 landscape	 in	
which	the	debate	over	HidroAysén	megaproject	debate	played	out.	In	the	next	section,	
bearing	 in	mind	 the	 conditions	 of	 this	 landscape,	 I	 detail	 two	 overarching	 paradigms	
within	which	the	HidroAysén	debate	can	be	conceptualised.	
	
2.5	Two	paradigms	for	conceptualising	HidroAysén	
2.5.1	A	media	contest	paradigm	
The	 above	 discussion	 makes	 clear	 that	 the	 media	 are	 both	 “the	 social	 space	 where	
contemporary	power	is	decided”	(Arsenault	&	Castells	2008,	p.	328),	and	indeed,	more	
fundamentally,	 a	 place	 where	 reality	 is	 constituted	 (Couldry	 &	 Hepp	 2018).	 In	 the	
contemporary	age	of	ubiquitous	digital	connectedness	(the	caveat	of	 the	digital	divide	
considered)	 digitally-mediated	 actions	 are	 able	 to	 contest	 power,	 and	 sometimes	 to	
hold	 power.	 To	 recap,	 this	 unsettles	 previously	 established	 theoretical	 viewpoints,	
necessitating	 at	 least	 a	 partial	 shift	 away	 from	 earlier	 political	 economy	 and	 public	
sphere	conceptualisations	of	the	media	(in	Habermas’	sense),	and	necessitating	also	an	
understanding	of	the	caveats	on	communication	power	in	an	age	of	deep	mediatization	
and	 datafication.	 As	 a	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	 conflicted,	 paradoxical	
landscape	of	the	hybrid	media	space,	Cottle	(2006)	described	a	“media	contest	model”,	
many	 aspects	 of	 which	 remain	 an	 appropriate	 paradigm	 for	 conceptualising	 a	
mediatized	debate,	 like	 the	HidroAysén	 controversy,	which	 is	permeated	by	 struggles	
for	media	access	and	message	control.	
Studies	that	examine	media	reporting	in	periods	of	national	(and	international)	disunity	
on	 policy	making,	 those	 that	 examine	 how	 the	media	 act	 (and	 can	 become	actors)	 in	
such	circumstances,	and	studies	examining	who	participates	in	media	representation	of	
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conflict	(for	example,	Cottle	2002,	2006;	Elliot	1986;	Entman	2004;	Gilboa	et	al.	2016;	
Hallin	1986;	Lester	2010;	Livingstone	&	Lunt	1994;	Robinson	2001;	Rucht	2004)	belong	
to	what	Cottle	(2006)	calls	an	overarching	“media	contest	paradigm”.	A	key	theorist	of	
the	media	contest	paradigm	is	Gadi	Wolfsfeld,	whose	work	on	the	role	of	media	in	the	
Middle	East	conflict	and	 the	Arab	Spring	 (1997,	2004,	2011,	2018,	also	see	Wolfsfeld,	
Segev	 &	 Shaefer	 2013)	 outlines	 a	 “political	 contest	 model”	 that	 theoretically	 and	
empirically	grounds	the	notion	of	both	legacy	and	social	media	as	sites	for	contest	and	
competition.	In	his	earlier	writing,	Wolfsfeld	considered	“the	competition	over	the	news	
media”	 as	 a	 “major	 element	 in	 modern	 political	 conflicts”	 so	 that	 national	 and	
international	 polities,	 and	 activist	 or	 terrorist	 groups	 and	 their	 issues	 or	 causes	 all	
“compete	for	media	attention	as	a	means	to	achieve	political	influence”	(Wolfsfeld	1997,	
p.	2).			
Wolfsfeld’s	work,	and	 the	media	conflict	paradigm	 in	general,	have	garnered	criticism	
for	lacking	thorough	explanation	of	how	the	forces	of	the	market	shape	the	operation	of	
the	media.	This	paradigm	also	pays	scant	regard	to	the	economic,	including	only	passing	
reference	to	media	ownership	structures	and	to	the	persistent	frames	of	media	genres	
developed	 to	appeal	 to	 target	audiences	(Cottle	2006;	Cottle	&	Rai	2006).	 In	addition,	
this	model	in	its	earlier	iterations	attributes	politics	with	more	power	to	influence	the	
media	 than	 vice	 versa	 –	 although	 much	 scholarship	 (Cohen,	 Tsfati	 &	 Sheafer	 2008;	
Lester	 &	 Hutchins	 2006;	 Meyer	 &	 Hinchman	 2002;	 Neumann	 1996;	 Robinson	 2001)	
shows	 that	 this	 equation	 is	 not	 so	 clear.	 More	 recent	 work	 in	 the	 media	 conflict	
paradigm	including	studies	that	unpack	the	interaction	of	social	movements	with	both	
legacy	 and	 social	 media	 (McCurdy	 2012;	 Uldam	 and	 Askanius	 2013),	 and	 such	
interactions	 in	 the	Arab	Spring	conflicts	 in	particular	 (Cottle	2011	a	&	b;	Hänska	Ahy	
2016;	Rane	&	Salem	2012;	Wolfsfeld,	Segev	&	Shaefer	2013)	show	how	an	inextricably	
hybrid	media	ecology	is	now	the	location	for	the	enactment	of	mediatized	conflicts.		
For	 the	 research	 presented	 here	 –	 a	 detailed	 case	 study	 of	 a	 mediatized	 symbolic	
struggle	 between	 unequal	 partners	 –	 the	 media	 contest	 model’s	 methodological	
approach	of	analytical	empiricism	is	well	suited.	Appropriately	for	this	study,	this	model	
can	 illuminate	 the	 complexities	 of	 media	 access	 and	 exclusion,	 and	 the	 politics,	
opportunities	 and	 risks	 of	media	 participation.	 As	 this	 study	 does,	 the	media	 contest	
paradigm	 also	 regards	 the	 media	 as	 public	 arena(s)	 for	 the	 waging	 of	 strategic	 and	
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symbolic	 contests.	What	Wolfsfeld’s	 political	 contest	model	 particularly	 lacks,	 for	 the	
purposes	of	this	study,	is	sensitivity	to	signs	and	symbols	in	texts,	and	their	role	in	the	
representation	of	meaning.	It	also	confines	itself	mostly	to	media	reporting,	neglecting	
analysis	 of	 visual	 and	 audiovisual	 texts,	which	 are	 central	 to	 the	 both	 sides’	 strategic	
communications	in	the	conflict	studied	here.	The	media	culture	paradigm	I	now	discuss	
below	offers	ideas	that	can	address	these	shortcomings.	
2.5.2	A	media	culture	paradigm	
Arising	 out	 of	 the	 neo-Marxist	 theorisation	 of	 Gramsci,	 Williams,	 Thompson	 and	
Althusser,	the	European	structuralism	of	Saussure,	Barthes	and	Strauss,	and	the	critical	
cultural	theory	of	Hall	(Hall	1974/1980)	this	conceptualisation	of	the	media	–	for	Cottle	
(2006)	 a	 “media	 culture	 paradigm”	 –	 understands	 struggles	 for	 hegemony	 as	 being	
played	out	 through	mediatized	popular	culture.	The	media	culture	paradigm	concerns	
itself	with	how	culture	is	mediated	and	how	ethnic,	gender,	class	and	national	identities	
are	 represented	 and	 contested	 in	 the	 media	 (Hall	 1982;	 Turner	 1996).	 Subsequent	
studies	(Lehmann-Wilzig	&	Cohen-Avigdor	2004;	Stober	2004)	have	also	acknowledged	
the	 role	 that	 evolving	 new	media	 technologies	 played	 in	 the	 cultural	 construction	 of	
identities	and	contesting	power.		
A	key	early	theorist	of	this	paradigm	was	Douglas	Kellner	(Kellner	1995,	2003),	whose	
views	 on	 media	 culture	 and	 media	 spectacle	 also	 extended	 a	 theoretical	 space	 for	
interrogating	 contest	 within	 the	 media.	 Kellner	 conceptualised	 a	 culture	 in	 which	
mediatized	 image,	 sound	 and	 spectacle	 produced	 the	 fabric	 of	 everyday	 life,	
“dominating	 leisure	 time,	 sharing	 political	 views	 and	 social	 behaviour,	 providing	 the	
materials	out	of	which	people	 forge	 their	very	 identities”	 (Kellner	1995,	p.	1).	Kellner	
wrote	 of	 this	media	 culture	 as	 shaping	 people’s	worldview	 and	 their	 deepest	 values,	
defining	 a	 sense	 of	 “us”	 and	 “them”,	 and	 “what	 is	 good	 or	 bad,	 positive	 or	 negative,	
moral	or	evil”.	It	is	these	kinds	of	oppositions	that	led	Kellner	to	argue	for	media	culture	
as:	
a	 contested	 terrain	 across	 which	 key	 social	 groups	 and	 competing	
political	ideologies	struggle	for	dominance	and	that	individuals	live	these	
struggles	 through	 images,	 discourses,	 myths	 and	 spectacles	 of	 media	
culture.	
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			 	 	 	 	 	 	 																							(Kellner	1995,	p.	2)	
Kellner	has	also	situated	his	media	culture	theory	within	the	trajectory	of	globalisation,	
acknowledging	its	democratising,	as	well	as	its	democracy-limiting	possibilities.	For	this	
theorist,	 “technocapitalism”,	 which	 synthesises	 capital	 and	 technology	 in	 the	 media	
industries	 is	 a	 key	 territory	 for	 the	 cultural	 embodiment	 of	 social	 struggles.	 Here,	
“media	spectacle”	(Kellner	2003,	p.	11)	–	media	representations	of	the	sensational,	the	
scandalous,	 the	 violent,	 unusual	 or	 bizarre	 –	 is	 a	 key	 aspect	 in	 the	 contestation	 of	
mediatized	conflict.	In	this	model,	instead	of	public	spheres	or	arenas,	there	are	“public	
screens”	 (DeLuca	 &	 Peeples	 2002;	 DeLuca,	 Lawson	 &	 Sun	 2012)	 and	 “image	 events”	
used	as	a	rhetorical	tactic	(DeLuca	2006).	Images	are	therefore	a	form	of	argumentation	
through	which	meaning	 is	 contested	 and	 created.	 	 Brunner	 and	 DeLuca	 (2016)	 have	
written	most	 recently	of	 the	ways	 that	 images,	particularly	 in	environmental	debates,	
flow	 through	 the	 new	datascape	 of	 “panmediated	networks”	 on	 “wild	 public	 screens”	
(where	 images	 collide,	 overlap	 are	 reformed	 and	 “run	 wild	 between	 platforms	 and	
users”,	p.	284).	These	authors	also	propose	the	notion	of	“affective	winds”,	the	force	of	
rhetorical	 power	 of	 images	 that	 moves	 viewers	 to	 engage	 and	 interact	 with	 visual	
arguments;	 and	 “image	events”:	performances	designed	 to	be	 captured	 in	 images	and	
spread	across	digital	platforms.		
	
The	media	culture	paradigm	was	earlier	criticised	for	being	overly	media	centric,	even	
media	determinist,	for	giving	only	cursory	treatment	to	media	political	economy,	media	
production	 dynamics,	 social	 contexts	 and	 the	 broader	 trajectories	 of	 conflicts	 played	
out	in	the	media	(Cottle	2006).	Being	concerned	primarily	with	the	meanings	that	can	
be	 read	 in	 media	 texts,	 a	 study	 employing	 a	 purely	media	 culture	 perspective	 could	
neglect	important	phenomena	in	mediatized	conflicts	–	like	those	aspects	of	a	story	that	
frames	exclude	(Gitlin	1980),	those	details	that	sources	prefer	to	keep	out	of	the	media	
by	the	kinds	of	strategies	that	Ericson	calls	“enclosure”	(Ericson,	Baranek	&	Chan	1989)	
and	Thompson	calls	“invisibility”	(Thompson,	J	1995,	2000,	2005,	2011).	
Several	 aspects	 of	 the	 media	 culture	 approach,	 however,	 offer	 a	 suitable	 theoretical	
framework	 for	 the	 study	 presented	 here.	 The	 interpretavist	 and	 structuralist	
epistemology	 of	 the	media	 culture	 paradigm	makes	 it	 suitable	 for	 enquiring	 into	 the	
semiotics	 and	 spectacle	 of	 image-based	 media	 texts,	 like	 the	 visual	 and	 audiovisual	
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campaign	 and	 advertising	 material	 that	 proliferated	 in	 the	 HidroAysén	 debate.	 This	
multiperspectival	study	therefore	uses	this	strand	of	the	media	culture	approach	in	its	
analysis	of	such	material	in	the	discourse	around	the	megaproject.		
2.6	Media	and	protest	in	the	digital	age	
	
2.6.1	Technology	and	autonomy:	result	and	cause		
	
In	a	deeply	mediatized	world,	user	generated	content	provides	opportunities	 to	reach	
beyond	the	hyper-local	of	one’s	own	online	identity	to	the	infinitely	linked	hyper-global	
of	networked	communication13.	It	is	in	this	context	that	protest	is	now	enacted.	Before	
continuing	to	a	survey	of	literature	on	digitally-mediated	protest,	however,	I	address	an	
important	point.	While	this	study	does	regard	the	advent	of	the	digital	communication	
landscape	 as	 transformative,	 it	 does	 not	 attempt	 to	 advance	 an	 argument	 that	 is	
technologically	 determinist	 (McLuhan	1962).	 In	 considering	digital	media	 as	 a	means	
for	 contesting	 power,	 it	 should	 be	 acknowledged	 that	 reasons	 for	 protest	 and	
contestation	 must	 pre-exist	 in	 order	 for	 publics	 to	 seek	 to	 exercise	 counter-power.	
Mobilisation	 of	 public	 opinion	 and	 the	 collective	 action	 of	 social	 movements	 cannot	
exist	 without	 the	 precursor	 of	 perceived	 injustices	 or	 abuses	 by	 power	 holders.	 To	
suggest	 otherwise	 undermines	 human	 agency	 –	 and	 the	 actions	 of	 those	 who	 put	
themselves	in	danger	to	advance	their	struggles.	As	Castells	puts	it,	“neither	the	media,	
nor	any	other	technology,	for	that	matter,	can	be	a	source	of	social	causation”	(2012,	p.	
228-229).	 As	 Wolfsfeld,	 Segev	 and	 Sheafer	 (2013)	 note,	 “politics	 comes	 first”.	
Technology	itself	does	not	drive	human	action	–	rather,	technology	is	a	tool.		
	
However,	 the	 networks	 of	 the	 internet	 go	 beyond	 instrumentality.	 While	 avoiding	 a	
technologically	 deterministic	 argument,	 the	 discussion	 here	 makes	 clear	 that	 the	
internet	 and	 instant,	 global	 communications	 have	 both	 revealed	 the	 juxtaposed	
inequalities	of	a	globalised	world,	and	created	many	of	the	conditions	that	facilitate	and	
perpetuate	 movements	 of	 protest	 against	 such	 injustices.	 The	 internet	 has	 spurred	
individuation	 (Beck	 1992;	 Castells	 2009;	 Giddens	 1991;	 Stiegler	 2009)	 and	 it	 also	
creates	 a	 “culture	 of	 autonomy”	 (Castells	 2012,	 p.	 230)	 in	 which	 individuals	 tend	 to	
																																																						
13	This	is,	as	Hepp	(2013)	puts	it	“deterritorialized	translocal	communication”	because	in	mediatized	
worlds,	“territoriality	is	not	constitutive”	(p.	97).	
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structure	 their	 actions	 independently	 of	 societal	 institutions.	 But	 the	 technology	 of	
social	networks,	by	providing	platforms	for	the	aggregation	of	individual	experiences	or	
grievances,	 now	 takes	 individual	 actors	 beyond	 the	 individual	 autonomy	 of	
individuation	to	an	environment	of	shared	experiences,	thus	fostering	group	autonomy.	
Group	 autonomy	 in	 internet-based	 networks	 is	 fundamental	 to	 digitally-mediated	
protest.	 It	 allows	 leaderless,	 networked	 movements	 to	 establish,	 to	 share	 ideas,	 to	
coordinate	protest,	to	avoid	repression,	and	to	thrive.	The	circular	connection	between	
the	internet	and	autonomy	is	borne	out	by	research.	Earlier	survey	work	conducted	in	
Spain	suggests	that	the	more	autonomous	people	feel	 in	their	 lives,	the	more	they	use	
the	internet,	and	that,	over	time,	the	more	internet	use	increased,	the	more	feelings	of	
autonomy	increased	(Castells	&	Tubella	2005).	Similarly,	 internet	use	has	been	shown	
to	 increase	 feelings	 of	 empowerment,	 personal	 freedom	 and	 influence14	 –	 an	 effect	
noted	to	a	greater	degree	in	groups	with	lower	socio-economic	means,	as	well	as	in	the	
developing	world	 (Breuer	 &	 Grosher	 2014;	 Kelly	 2010;	 Sasaki	 2017).	 Autonomy	 and	
empowerment	 therefore	 seem	 closely	 connected	 to	 frequent	 engagement	 with	 the	
networks	of	the	internet15	–	and	these	transformative	effects	seem	more	important	for	
the	previously	disempowered.		
The	 emergence	 of	 protest	 in	 the	 digital	 landscape	 –	made	 instant	 and	 ubiquitous	 by	
wireless	 technologies	 –	 can	 therefore	 be	 regarded	 as	 both	 the	 result	 of	 autonomy	
building,	and	 its	cause.	 In	these	networks,	a	culture	of	sharing	has	emerged	out	of	 the	
culture	of	autonomy,	so	that	where	people	have	shared	their	mediated	sociality	(Sassen	
2004)	 it	 is	natural	 for	 them	also	 to	share	 their	outrage,	 their	hope,	and	 their	 struggle	
(Castells	 2012).	 It	 is	 here,	 then,	 that	 socially	 networked	 protest	 and	 digitally-enabled	
social	movements	have	been	born.	
2.6.2	Media-protest	hybridity	and	reflexivity		
The	 possibilities	 that	 mobile	 and	 social	 media	 have	 offered	 for	 facilitating	 and	
organising	 protest	 	 –	 evident,	 to	 give	 some	 disparate	 examples,	 in	 a	 host	 of	 social	
movements	from	the	Arab	Spring	uprisings,	to	the	transnational	Occupy	movement,	to	
																																																						
14	 Social	media	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 boost	 citizens’	 participation	 in	 election	 campaigns	 and	 voting,	 for	
example,	by	Castells	(2009),	Erkul	and	Kes-Erkul	(2009)	and	Metzgar	and	Maruggi	(2009).	
15	 It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 correlation	 between	 the	 level	 of	 social	 media	
penetration	and	the	amount	of	protest	in	a	country	has	been	complicated,	as	Wolfsfeld,	Segev	and	Shaefer	
(2013)	show	in	the	case	of	the	Arab	Spring	uprisings.		
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#MeToo,	to	struggles	against	mining	in	El	Salvador	culminating	in	2017,	to	the	current	
(2018)	gilets	jaunes	movement	in	France16,	and	of	course	of	most	interest	to	this	study,	
in	 2011’s	 widespread	 student	 and	 environmental	 protests	 in	 Chile	 –	 has	 led	 to	 such	
events	being	labelled	‘social	media	movements,’	even	Facebook	or	Twitter	‘Revolutions’.	
Such	dramatic	claims	for	the	democratising	capabilities	of	social	media	have	met	with	
scepticism	 in	many	analyses	of	 the	Arab	Spring,	 at	 least	 (Aouragh	&	Alexander	2011;	
Cottle	2011;	Ghannam	2011;	Krarroub	&	Bas	2016;	Morozov	2009)17.	Certainly,	though,	
an	 important	 point	 around	media	 use	 in	 such	 uprisings	 and	 social	movements	 is	 the	
hybridity	of	the	media	environment	that	surrounded	(or	surrounds)	their	organisation,	
spread	 and	 reporting.	 Though	 social	 media	 have	 been	 crucial	 to	 these	 movements,	
socially	networked	protest	must	still	work	in	tandem	with	traditional	media	to	spread	
its	 message	 and	 become	 “creatively	 infused”	 (Cottle	 &	 Lester	 2011,	 p.	 298)	 inside	
existing	transnational	media	networks.			
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 protest	 around	HidroAysén	 in	 particular,	 it	 should	 be	 remembered	
that	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	 megaproject	 began	 before	 social	 media	 platforms	 were	
ubiquitous	 in	 Chile,	 and	 unfolded	 just	 at	 a	 time	 that	 social	 media	 use	 was	 gaining	
momentum	in	this	setting.	By	the	time	street	protests	over	the	megaproject	erupted	in	
mid-2011,	social	media	use	was	indeed	widespread	(see	detailed	discussion	in	Chapter	
3,	 section	 3.13).	 A	 framework	 for	 understanding	 mediatized	 protest	 and	 activism	
surrounding	HidroAysén	therefore	needs	to	take	into	account	legacy	media	and	protest	
interaction,	as	well	as	the	later	intersection	of	social	media	and	protest,	when	the	media	
arenas	 in	which	HidroAysén	was	constructed	became	a	 “bifurcated	 theoretical	object”	
(ibid.,	 pp.	 29-30),	 a	 hybrid	 space	 of	 old	 media,	 interpenetrated	 with	 peer-produced	
social	media.		
Earlier	 seminal	 studies	 of	media/protest	 interactions	 (Gitlin	 1980;	Halloran,	 Elliott	&	
Murdock	1970;	McLeod	&	Hertog	1992;	Murdock	1981;	 Shoemaker	1984)	 show	 that,	
historically,	the	media	have	almost	invariably	reported	protest	through	a	delegitimising	
framework	of	law	and	order,	habitually	focusing	on	violence,	drama	and	spectacle	and	
																																																						
16	 Here,	 misinformation	 and	 fake	 news	 have	 also	 been	 a	 prominent	 factor	 in	 promoting	 the	 uprising	
(Henley,	The	Guardian	9/12/2018).	
17	 Kharroub	 and	 Bas	 (2016,	 p.	 1976)	 have	 noted	 that	 discussing	 the	 of	 the	 role	 of	 social	 media	 in	
revolutions	 from	either	utopian	or	dystopian	perspectives	 is	an	over-simplification,	and	that	we	should	
now	ask	“how”	rather	than	“whether”	social	media	play	a	key	role	in	such	uprisings.	
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most	 often	 privileging	 or	 “indexing”	 (Bennett	 1990)	 elite	 voices.	 Media	 framing	 of	
protest	has	long	representationally	denigrated	or	even	demonised	protesters	and	their	
actions	–	and	emphasised	violence	 (Gitlin	1980)	–	 so	 that	 the	causes	of	protests	have	
tended	to	become	trivialised	and	marginalised,	obscured	by	the	reporting	of	the	protest	
actions	themselves.	Despite	the	intervention	of	the	peer-produced	digital	landscape,	the	
trends	above	remain	a	framework	for	which	there	has	been	much	continuing	empirical	
support	(Archibald	2011;	Bowers	2011;	Cammaerts	2013;	Cottle	2008;	Guzman	2015;	
Juris	2011;	Lan	&	Meng	2016;	Lynn	&	Williams	2016;	Power,	Haynes	&	Devereux	2016;	
Murray	et	al.	2011;	Rosie	&	Gorringe	2009).	Waisbord	(2013a)	shows,	however,	that	in	
the	 Latin	 America	 context,	mainstream	media	 is	 not	 uniformly	 opposed	 to	mobilised	
citizens,	 and	 can	 sometimes	 be	 sympathetic	 to	 citizens’	 demands.	 This	 is	 a	 trend	
observed	 during	 the	 height	 of	 protests	 over	 HidroAysén	 in	 at	 least	 one	 conservative	
newspaper,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	718.		
Researchers	 have	 also,	 however,	 pointed	 to	 the	 now	 changed	 relationships	 between	
protest,	media,	publics	 and	power,	noting	 trends	 in	 the	global	news	arena	 such	as	 an	
occasionally	more	hospitable	media	climate	 for	protests	 (Bowers	2011;	Rojecki	2002;	
Elmasry	 and	 el-Nawawy	 2017),	 and	 the	 difficulty,	 in	 a	 globalised	 communications	
environment,	 for	 states	 to	 contain	 media	 messages	 –	 both	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	
(Hayes	&	Guardino	2010).	In	this	context	transnational	public	opinion	has	been	shown	
to	matter	increasingly	in	elite	decision	making	(Shaw	2005;	Tumber	&	Webster	2006)	
so	that	authorities	must	recognise	“how	integrated	global	media,	institutions	and	public	
opinion	 have	 become”	 (Shaw	 2005,	 p.	 75).	 And	 because	 there	 is	 now	 more	 mutual	
reflexivity	 (Davis,	A	2009;	Lester	2006)	between	media,	publics	 and	decision	makers,	
reporting	 on	 global	 issues	 is	 also	 felt	 locally.	 This	 reflexivity	 and	 perceived	
interconnectedness	 even	 has	 the	 potential,	 according	 to	 some	 theorists,	 to	 generate	
“enforced	 enlightenment”	 (Beck	 2009)	 or	 “mediated	 cosmopolitanism”	 (Robertson	
2010)	 based	 on	 a	 “transnationalising	 ethics	 of	 care”	 (Cottle	 &	 Lester	 2011,	 p.	 24).	
Journalism	 itself	 is	 also	 influenced	 by	 this	 reflexive	 trend.	 The	 transnational	 flows	 of	
user-generated	 ideas	 and	 images	which	 penetrate	 contemporary	 journalistic	 practice,	
can	bring	a	degree	of	social	media’s	reflexivity	to	traditional	media’s	repertoire.		
																																																						
18	For	a	particularly	interesting	case	study	of	media,	protest	and	extractivism	in	Latin	America	(in	this	
case,	oil	drilling	in	the	Ecuadorian	Amazon)	see	Coryat	(2015).	
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This	 notion	 of	 a	 symbiotic	 relationship	 between	media	 and	 protest	 –	 not	 only	 in	 the	
present	 media	 landscape,	 but	 notable	 across	 several	 decades	 –	 has	 historically	 been	
conceptualised	as	a	“tug-of-war”	(Gans	1980)	and	also,	perhaps	more	appropriately,	as	
a	 as	 a	 “tap	 dance”	 (Castells	 2004b,	 p.	 168),	 which	 Lester	 (2010b,	 p.	 114)	 has	
conceptualised	as	“occurring	within	agreed	arenas	and	involving	known	steps”	and	yet	
still	 being	 “open	 to	 some	 improvisation”.	 Even	 in	 the	 current	 landscape	 of	 deep	
mediatization,	 this	 dance	 of	move,	 response	 and	 counter	move	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	
relationship	between	media,	 protest	 and	power,	 and	defines	 the	 strategies	 protesters	
use	to	attract	 legacy	media	attention.	Before	I	proceed	to	an	analysis	of	some	of	these	
strategies,	 though,	 an	 additional	 important	 factor	 in	 the	 media/protest	 landscape	
should	be	identified.	
2.6.3	A	dance	for	three	
Protest	 invariably	 has	 an	 object	 –	 and	 an	 objective.	 The	 objects	 of	 protests	 are	most	
often	authorities:	governments	who	persecute	their	citizens,	institutions	that	reinforce	
global	 inequity,	 corporations	 that	 spill	 oil,	 cut	 trees,	 fish	 whales	 under	 the	 guise	 of	
scientific	 research,	 or	plan	 environment-altering,	 community-displacing	megaprojects.	
The	objectives	of	protest	may	be	 to	highlight	 injustices,	depose	 leaders,	 stop	or	delay	
operations	 –	 and	 they	 are	 also	 almost	 always	 to	 get	noticed	by	 the	media.	 Protest,	 of	
course,	 is	also	keenly	noted	by	authorities	against	which	 it	 is	directed,	and	 invariably	
induces	a	mediatized	response	–	or	pre-emptive	campaign	–	on	their	part.	Such	strategic	
communications	 responses	 have	 increasingly	 become	 a	 third	 partner	 in	 the	 dance	 of	
media	 and	 protest,	 so	 that	 public	 relations	 is	 now	 vital	 to	 the	 power	 balance	 in	
mediatized	protests.		
Public	 relations	 (PR)	 has	 been	 conceptualised,	 as	 touched	 on	 above,	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	
source-media	 relations.	 The	 use	 of	 media	 managers,	 public	 relations	 consultants,	
carefully	framed	media	releases	and	stage-managed	media	events	has	become	crucial	to	
institutions	who	 seek	 to	 have	 their	messages	 “representationally	 legitimated”	 (Cottle	
2003,	 p.	 5)	 and	 are	 a	 means	 to	 gain	 “definitional	 advantage”	 (ibid.,	 p.	 7)	 over	 the	
promoters	 of	 opposing	messages	 in	 media	 arenas.	 PR	 has	 also	 long	 had	 a	 conflicted	
relationship	 with	 journalism,	 with	 one	 prominent	 UK	 journalist	 describing	 his	
profession’s	 reliance	 on	 public	 relations	 information	 subsidy	 as	 “hideous	 and	
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degrading”	 (Peston	 2014)	 and	 another	 decribing	 the	 relationship	 as	 “an	 assault	 on	
democracy”	(Greenslade	2012).	Davis	(2000,	p.	40)	characterised	the	influence	of	PR	on	
access	 to	 the	 media	 as,	 at	 its	 simplest,	 a	 constriction	 or	 amplification	 of	 the	 public	
sphere.	But	 other	 research	has	 shown	 (Cottle	2003)	 that	 the	 “dance”	between	media,	
protest	 and	 PR	 encompasses	 most	 of	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 making	 news.	 Strategic	
communications	 professionals	 (many	 of	 them	 ex-journalists)	 produce	 information	
subsidy	 that	 coincides	 with	 news	 values,	 they	 provide	 journalists	 with	 ready-made	
frames,	and	their	work,	filled	with	legitimising	quotes	from	elite	sources,	is	readily	used	
by	 journalists	 in	 the	 pressurised	 24/7	 news	 cycle.	 The	 historical	 logic	 has	 been	 that,	
with	 greater	 resources	 to	 buy	 greater	 strategic	 communications	 influence,	 better	
resourced	 institutions	 have	 greater	 agenda	 setting	 potential	 and,	 ultimately,	 greater	
communication	 power.	 For	 some	 theorists,	 this	 has	 amounted	 to	 a	 “crisis	 in	 public	
communication”	(Blumler	&	Gurevitch	1995)	which	has	fundamentally	undermined	any	
notion	of	an	independent	Fourth	Estate	(Davis,	A.	2000b).	
Corporations’	efforts	at	“generating	consent”	(Latta	2010)	through	establishing	a	social	
licence	 to	 operate	 can	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 an	 additional	 aspect	 of	 corporate	 PR	 and	
corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	communications.	(For	a	discussion	of	CSR	in	Chile,	
see	section	3.14).	This	notion	of	creating	consent	 for	a	project,	has	emerged	both	as	a	
practice	and	a	discourse	in	institutional	decision	making,	and	has	become	a	key	concept	
in	relation	to	the	study	of	mediatized	environmental	conflict	(Bice	2014;	Boutilier	2014;	
Lester	 2016;	 Parsons	 and	 Moffat	 2014).	 Boutilier	 notes,	 however,	 that	 institutions’	
definitions	of	social	licence	often	blur	meaning	to	such	a	degree	that	they	lose	value	as	a	
tool	 for	 promoting	 collaboration	 (2014,	 p.	 271).	 Companies	 also	 tend	 to	 “obfuscate	
processes	 of	 acquiring	 a	 social	 licence	 by	 making	 irrefutable	 assertions	 that	 present	
contestable	 claims	 as	 established	 facts”	 (Parsons	 and	 Moffat,	 2014,	 p.	 353).	 Such	
“strategic	 manipulation”	 (Flyvbjerg,	 Garbuio	 &	 Lovallo	 2009,	 p.	 175)	 in	 relation	 to	
attempts	to	generate	social	licence	certainly	occurred	in	the	case	of	HidroAysén,	as	the	
discussion	in	the	following	chapters	demonstrates.			
Despite	 this	 kind	 of	 PR-led	 obfuscation,	 however,	 by	 using	 PR	 to	 engage	 in	 the	
“mediatised	rituals”	(Cottle	2004,	p.	43)	that	have	previously	been	the	domain	of	official	
institutions	 and	 authorities,	 resource-poor	 organisations	 are	 currently	 able	 to	 make	
significant	interventions	in	mediatized	discourses.		Legitimacy	and	authority,	then,	are	a	
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form	 of	 “cultural	 capital”	 (Bourdieu	 1979,	 1993)	 which	 is	 not	 purely	 determined	 by	
economic	capital.	As	Davis	(2000,	p.	50)	put	it:	
In	 theory,	 non-official	 sources	 can	 use	 professional	 public	 relations	 to	
accumulate	 such	 capital	 and,	 in	 effect,	 simulate	 the	 authority	 and	
legitimacy	 of	 institutional	 sources.	 By	 providing	 a	 constant	 supply	 of	
information	 subsidies	 (news	 stories	 and	 research)	 to	 journalists,	 non-
official	 sources	 can	 establish	 themselves	 in	 media	 discourses	 as	
legitimate	 sources.	 This	 process,	 in	 itself,	 encourages	 a	 larger	 media	
profile	 and	 usually	 results	 in	 a	 further	 accumulation	 of	 institutional	
legitimacy.	
Several	 earlier	 studies	 have	 documented	 the	 work	 of	 environmental	 groups	 in	 this	
context	(Anderson,	A	1993;	Hansen	1993),	and	have	determined	that	PR	has	been	able	
to	 confer	 some	 degree	 of	 definitional	 advantage	 in	 the	 context	 of	 environmental	
conflict,	 	 If	PR	can	aid	 lesser-resourced	organisations	in	 influencing	media	discourses,	
this	can	contribute	 to	a	more	“dynamic	process	of	contestation”	(Davis,	A.	2000b)	 for	
environmental	 claims-makers	 too.	 In	 a	 media	 landscape	 where	 PR’s	 strategic	
interventions	are	so	prevalent,	however,	‘non-official	sources’	are	increasingly	expected	
by	 the	media	 to	contest	 their	claims	 in	 the	same	way	as	 ‘official	 sources’.	This	means	
using	 strategic	 communication	 strategies	 that	 align	more	 closely	 with	 the	 privileged	
formation	of	the	space	of	flows,	than	the	space	of	places	where	protest	action	(and	the	
reasons	 for	protest)	are	often	 located	(Lester	&	Hutchins	2006).	As	these	researchers	
demonstrate,	this	requires	activists	to	be	“part	of	the	game”	(ibid.	p.	446)	–	that	is,	to	be	
relentlessly	reflexive	and	responsive	 in	their	communication	strategies.	As	Lester	and	
Hutchins	 also	 note,	 if	 protest	 fails	 to	 achieve	 this	 standard	 of	 communication,	 this	
“provides	journalists	with	the	leverage	to	ignore	environmentalists	or	dismiss	them	as	
representing	 sectional	 interests	 more	 interested	 in	 environmental	 ‘marketing’	 and	
‘stunts’	than	credible	threats	to	wilderness”	(ibid,	p.	447).	
For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 study,	 which	 examines	 the	 move-and-response	 strategic	
communications	 campaigns	 of	 a	 megaproject’s	 promoters	 (these	 aligned	 with	 the	
interests	 of	 government	 and	 capital,	 located	 in	 the	 space	 of	 flows);	 against	 an	
environment	movement	campaign	(rooted	locally,	in	the	space	of	places,	but	obliged	to	
conduct	 publicity	 and	 attract	 attention	 in	 the	 same	media	 arena	 as	 its	 opponents),	 a	
clear	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 understanding	 PR	 is	 essential.	 The	 next	 chapter	
examines	 in	more	detail	 the	Chile-specific	media/PR	 landscape	as	 further	 context	 for	
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this	research.	
2.6.4	Visibility	and	invisibility	
The	 overriding	 aim	 of	 protest,	 no	matter	 its	 object,	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 and	 heard,	 both	 in	
digital	networks	and	 in	 legacy	media.	This	relationship	between	media	and	protest	 is	
mutually	 beneficial:	 protests	 can	 provide	 journalists	 with	 good	 copy	 and	 compelling	
images	 (Lester	 &	 Hutchins	 2006),	 and	 these	 in	 turn	 attract	 audiences,	 increasing	
profitability.	 Being	 noticed	 by	 the	 media	 achieves	 visibility	 for	 non-elite	 actors	 and	
mediated	visibility	can	help	to	call	attention	to	one’s	situation	or	to	advance	one’s	cause	
and	enhance	credibility.	As	John.	B.	Thompson,	author	of	extensive	analyses	of	visibility	
and	 publicness	 (Thompson,	 J	 1995,	 2000,	 2005,	 2011b)	 writes,	 achieving	 visibility	
through	the	media	“is	to	gain	a	kind	of	presence	or	recognition	in	the	public	space”.	But	
equally,	the	inability	to	achieve	such	mediated	visibility	can	confine	a	protest	group	to	
obscurity	 –	 which,	 in	 the	 worst	 cases,	 “can	 lead	 to	 a	 kind	 of	 death	 by	 neglect”	
(Thompson,	 J	 2005,	 p.	 49).	 Ultimately,	 an	 actor’s	 (or	 a	 network	 of	 actors’)	 degree	 of	
visibility	has	a	strong	correlation	with	the	extent	of	their	political	power	(ibid.,	p.	36).	
But,	as	 I	discuss	below,	 the	ability	 to	be	 invisible	 is	also	an	 important	attribute	of	 the	
powerful	(Lester	&	Hutchins	2012).		
Thompson’s	work	on	mediated	visibility	and	invisibility	draws	on	the	work	of	Foucault	
which	 examined	 the	 changing	 relations	 between	 visibility	 and	 power	 in	 Western	
societies.	 Foucault	 used	 the	 example	 of	 an	 18th	 Century	 prison	 architecture	 ideal,	 a	
Panopticon	 (in	 which	 inmates	 were	 always	 visible	 to	 invisible	 prison	 guards)	 to	
conceptualise	a	model	for	the	organisation	of	power	relations	in	modern	societies.	This	
model	 of	 ‘panopticonism’,	 like	 the	 physical	 structure,	 conceived	 of	 individuals	 being	
increasingly	part	of	a	system	where	surveillance	of	them	was	a	means	of	control	(this	in	
contrast	 to	 earlier	models	of	power	where	 citizens	were	observers,	 not	 the	observed,	
and	where	for	the	powerful	to	maintain	power	required	that	citizens	be	the	witnesses	
of	 power-infused	 spectacle.)	 Thompson	 points	 out,	 however,	 that	 in	 Foucault’s	
Panopticon	 analogy	 of	 power	 through	 surveillance,	 he	 has	 neglected	 the	 role	 of	 the	
media.	As	Thompson	puts	it:		
Whereas	the	Panopticon	renders	many	people	visible	 to	a	 few,	 the	media	
enable	 a	 few	 people	 to	 be	 visible	 to	 many:	 thanks	 to	 the	 media	 it	 is	
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primarily	 those	 who	 exercise	 power,	 rather	 those	 over	 whom	 power	 is	
exercised,	who	are	subjected	to	a	new	kind	of	visibility.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 							(Thompson	2005,	pp.	40-41)	
This	 kind	 of	 visibility	 does	 not	 require	 that	 the	 observers	 share	 a	 common	 locale	 –	
which	this	is	the	crux	of	the	importance	of	mediatized	visibility	in	protest.	By	becoming	
visible	in	the	“despatialized	space”	(Thompson,	J	2011a,	p.	63)	of	contemporary	media	–	
Hepp’s	 (2013)	“deterritorialized	 translocal	communication”	(p.	97)	–	protesters	bring	
the	actions	of	the	few	to	the	scrutiny	of	the	many,	and	in	the	digital	age,	this	can	be	the	
transnational	 or	 global	many.	 Peer	 production	 of	 protest	material	 now	 arguably	 also	
brings	visibility	of	the	many	to	the	many	–	a	“participatory	panopticon”	(Cascio	2005)	–	
fostering	the	kind	of	group	autonomy	and	solidarity	that	Castells	(2012)	has	described	
as	a	necessary	pre-cursor	for	digitally	enabled	protest.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 environmental	 protest,	 creating	 “visibility”	 is	 often	 a	 case	 of	 bringing	
images	and	news	from	remote,	threatened,	unseen	places	to	television	sets,	newspaper	
front	 pages,	 smartphone	 news	 apps,	 Facebook	 sites	 or	 Twitter	 feeds.	 But	 creating	
visibility	can	also	be	a	case	of	bringing	to	light	information	that	industry	or	government	
would	 rather	 keep	 invisible.	 Indeed,	 disclosing	 to	 individuals	 affected	 or	 potentially	
affected	 by	 contamination,	 by	 global	warming	 or	 by	 a	megaproject	 development,	 for	
example,	facts	that	industry	or	government	would	rather	keep	hidden,	has	been	one	of	
the	defining	roles	of	the	environmental	movement	to	date	(Anderson,	A	1997;	Hansen	
2010;	 Lester	 &	 Hutchins	 2012).	 The	 struggle	 for	 visibility	 is	 therefore	 above	 all	 a	
struggle	 for	 control	 of	 information,	 (Lester	 &	 Hutchins	 2012)	 waged	 in	 behind-the-
scenes	 media	 and	 PR	 practices,	 in	 contested	 media	 arenas,	 and	 also	 at	 the	 private-
public	interface	where	the	power	to	keep	information	invisible	or	to	force	its	revelation	
can	 a	 decisive	 power	 in	mediatized	 battles.	 This	 struggle	 can	 the	 sometimes	 lead	 to	
“unexpected	outcomes”	(ibid.,	p.	20),	even	a	“fair	fight”	(Wolfsfeld	1997).			
Although	 in	 the	 age	 of	 deep	 mediatization,	 the	 social	 movements	 are	 perhaps	 more	
visible	 than	 at	 any	 time	 previously,	 environmental	 protest	 still	 struggles	 to	 access	
legacy	 media	 and	 maintain	 legacy	 media	 attention	 (Hutchins	 &	 Lester	 2009,	 2011;	
Rucht	2013).	And	there	is	a	persistent	dependence	on	mainstream	media	to	reinforce	
the	frames	of	such	movements	to	the	public,	so	that,	despite	the	internet,	“to	reach	the	
public	 at	 large,	 the	 key	 channel	 was	 and	 is	 getting	 access	 to	 and	 coverage	 by	 the	
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established	 media”	 (Rucht	 2013,	 p.	 262).	 Environmental	 battles	 –	 so	 complex	 and	
protracted,	and	so	misaligned	with	media’s	predilection	for	event-orientated	news	can	
achieve	some	moments	of	success	in	terms	of	mediatized	visibility,	but	they	often	lack	
sustained	visibility	or	switching	power.	Social	movements	must	therefore	rely	heavily	
on	 their	 own	 “movement	 media”	 and	 “self-mediation”	 (Cammaerts	 2015,	 see	 also	
Cammaerts	 2012,	 2013;	 Downing	 2008).	 Although	 the	 internet	 potentially	 allows	
protest	 to	 reach	substantial,	 even	 transnational	audiences,	 this	 is	not	easily	achieved,	
and	much	of	the	communications	activity	of	social	movements	may	be	limited	to	those	
who	“tune	in”,	which	may	produce	an	“echo	chamber”	effect	(Boutyline	&	Willer	2017).	
Occasionally,	 however,	 in	 the	 struggle	 for	 visibility	 and	 control	 of	 information	 in	
protest,	 there	 arise	 events	 or	 images	 –	 not	 always	 orchestrated	 media	 spectacles	 –	
which	 become	 iconic	 images,	 symbolic	 of	 a	 protest	 or	 a	 cause.	When	 such	 attention-
attracting,	 meaning-creating	 symbols	 arise	 in	 mediatized	 conflict,	 they	 can	 hold	
enormous,	even	decisive	symbolic	power.		
2.6.5	Symbolic	power	and	discourse	
Montgomery,	Alabama,	1955:	Rosa	Parks	refuses	to	give	up	her	seat	on	a	bus.	Bangkok,	
Thailand	 2008:	 Red-shirt	 protesters	 splash	 their	 own	 blood	 under	 the	 gates	 of	 a	
besieged	 Government	 House.	Wall	 Street,	 New	 York,	 2011:	 Protesters’	 placards	 read	
“We	are	the	99%”.	Forestry	coupe	TN044B,	Southwest	Tasmania,	2013,	Miranda	Gibson	
spends	her	second	year	of	internet-connected	anti-forestry	protest	in	a	tree.	Coyhaique,	
Chile,	2007:	a	hundred-strong	horseback	cavalcade,	banners	and	flags	flying,	enters	the	
regional	capital	after	a	9-day	protest	journey	through	dam-threatened	Patagonia19.		
All	 these	acts	and	 images	are	products	of	 the	struggle	of	protest	 for	visibility,	 and	all	
share	symbolic	power.	Arising	out	of	 theorisation	of	Bourdieu	 (Bourdieu	1977,	1991,	
1998)	 which	 conceives	 of	 human	 “fields”	 of	 action	 and	 the	 “habitus”	 that	 creates	
cultural,	social	and	symbolic	capital,	symbolic	power	can	be	defined	as	“the	capacity	to	
intervene	 in	 the	course	of	events	and	 influence	 the	actions	of	others	by	means	of	 the	
production	 and	 transmission	 of	 symbolic	 forms”	 (Thompson	 2005,	 p.	 50;	 see	 also	
Bourdieu	1991).	Bourdieu	conceptualises	the	exercise	of	symbolic	power	as	“symbolic	
																																																						
19	For	an	interesting	piece	on	symbols	and	symbolic	power	from	a	different	cultural	perspective,	see	Tang	
&	Yang	(2011);	and	for	a	perspective	on	the	symbolic	power	of	the	transnational	visibility	of	suffering,	see	
Chouliaraki	(2008).	
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violence”	 -	 the	domination	of	 the	holder	of	greater	cultural	 capital	over	 the	holder	of	
less	 (Bourdieu	 2004;	 Topper	 2002).	 Symbolic	 power	may	 therefore	 even,	 as	 a	more	
pervading	 power,	 structure	 society	 and	 construct	 reality	 (Bourdieu	 1991,	 p.	 166;	
Couldry	2000,	2003,	2014).	It	is	therefore:	
a	 power	of	 constituting	 the	 given	 through	utterances,	 of	making	people	
see	 and	 believe,	 of	 confirming	 or	 transforming	 the	 vision	 of	 the	 world	
and,	 thereby,	 action	 on	 the	 world	 and	 thus	 the	 world	 itself,	 an	 almost	
magical	 power	 which	 enables	 one	 to	 obtain	 the	 equivalent	 of	 what	 is	
obtained	through	force.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Bourdieu	1991,	p.	170)	
The	 exercising	 of	 symbolic	 power	 is	 never	 explicit.	 In	 fact,	 Bourdieu	 characterises	
symbolic	 power	 as	 “misrecognised”	 power,	 whose	 efficacy	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 those	
who	 benefit	 least	 from	 the	 exercise	 of	 it	 participate,	 to	 some	 extent,	 in	 its	 wielding	
(Thompson,	 J	 2004).	 Symbolic	 power	 is	 usually	 exercised	 by	 those	 that	 dominate	
established	social	hierarchies,	so	that	when	it	is	achieved	by	those	that	seek	to	exercise	
counter-power,	it	can	upset	these	established	hierarchies.		
For	 Bourdieu	 it	 is	 language	 that	 above	 all	 creates	 the	world:	 the	 power	 of	 language	
determines	 the	 social	 structures	 through	 which	 meaning	 and	 symbolic	 power	 are	
created	–	and	also	contested.	This	is	a	notion	allied	to	Foucault’s	conceptualisation	of	
the	power	of	discourse:	
a	group	of	statements	which	provide	a	language	for	talking	about	–	a	
way	 of	 representing	 the	 knowledge	 about	 –	 a	 particular	 topic	 at	 a	
particular	historical	moment.	…Discourse	 is	about	 the	production	of	
knowledge	 through	 language.	 But…since	 all	 social	 practices	 entail	
meaning,	 and	 meanings	 shape	 and	 influence	 what	 we	 do	 –	 our	
conduct	–	all	practices	have	a	discursive	aspect.	
	
											(cited	by	Hall	1997,	p.	44)	
	
For	 Foucault,	 therefore,	 it	 is	 discourse,	 and	 discursive	 practices,	 that	 embody	 and	
legitimise	power.	Indeed	“power/knowledge”	are	fundamentally	linked	(Foucault	1977,	
1980).	Those	that	wield	power	determine	which	“objects”	can	be	spoken	of;	the	“ritual”	
of	where	 and	 how	 actors	may	 speak;	 and	 also	 “who”	 can	 speak	 or	whose	 voices	 are	
heard	 (Foucault	 1972).	 This	 “disciplinary	power”	 that	 Foucault	 understands	 as	 being	
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inherent	in	discourse	–	like	Bourdieu’s	“symbolic	violence”	–	can	therefore	enhance	or	
constrain	truth	(Strega	2005).	Contesting	the	knowledge/power	binary	by	controlling	
discourse	 through	 the	 creation	 of	 symbolic	 power	must,	 then,	 be	 the	 aim	 of	 protest.	
When	symbolic	power	in	discourse	 is	achieved	by	protesters	(though	it	may	not	be	as	
effective	as	Castells’	switching	power)	it	can	–	more	than	mere	visibility	–	“temporarily	
destabilize	 or	 optimally,	 disrupt	 the	 smooth	 functioning	 of	 capital	 and	 government”	
(Hutchins	&	Lester	2011,	p.	161).	
For	 protest	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 network	 society,	 attaining	 discursive	 and	 symbolic	
power	occurs	particularly	in	the	production	of,	and	facilitating	the	transmission	via	the	
media	of,	symbolic	forms	in	image	as	well	as	text.	If	a	protest	can	gain	visibility	in	the	
media,	 the	 imagery,	 the	 rhetoric	 and	 the	 symbolic	 acts	 (for	 Foucault,	 practices)	 that	
become	 associated	 with	 it	 in	 the	 public	 mind	 may	 be	 able	 to	 achieve	 moments	 of	
symbolic	 power.	 Symbolic	 power	 only	 ever	 constitutes	 the	 symbols	 of	 resistance,	 not	
the	actuality	of	resistance.	Because	symbolic	power	is	only	representational,	not	actual;	
the	action,	 rhetoric	and	spectacle	 that	can	create	 it	are	not	exclusive	 to	 resource-rich	
institutions.	 Resource-poor	 groups	 may	 be	 pitted	 against	 official	 institutions	 whose	
economic	power	is	substantial,	yet	a	“carefully	targeted	strategy	aimed	at	mobilising	an	
issue	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 wider	 concerns	 can	 be	 very	 successful	 in	 the	 realm	 of	
symbolic	 politics”	 (Anderson,	 A	 1997,	 p.	 209).	 Challenging	 the	 “strategic	 power	 and	
routinized	media	interventions	of	dominant	institutions”	(Cottle	2004,	p.	41)	can	allow	
resource-poor	groups	to	effectively	influence	their	own	discursive	representation	in	the	
media.		
As	 Jeffrey	Alexander	 lays	out	 in	his	analysis	of	 the	American	civil	rights	movement	 in	
The	 Civil	 Sphere	 (Alexander	 2006),	 successful	 protests	 and	 struggles	 must	 therefore	
work	 above	 all	 to	 ensure	 their	 favourable	 discursive	 representation.	 Their	 primary	
concern,	 must	 not	 be	 “connected	 with	 force”,	 but	 rather	 with	 symbolic	 “efforts	 at	
persuasion”	(ibid.,	p.	419).	However,	 in	contested	media	arenas,	the	objects	of	protest	
(for	 example:	 government,	 corporations,	 megaproject	 developers)	 may	 also	
strategically	attempt	to	construct	protesting	activists	negatively	(Goldberg,	C	2007)	in	
an	 attempt	 to	discredit	 them.	Because	of	 this,	 being	 able	 to	 achieve	 greater	 symbolic	
power	than	one’s	opponent	in	a	conflict	is	fundamental.	“Power	conflicts”,	as	Alexander	
puts	 it,	 are	 therefore	 “not	 simply	 about	 who	 gets	 what	 and	 how	much”	 in	 terms	 of	
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mediatized	visibility,	they	depend	above	all	on	discursive	and	symbolic	representation.		
They	 are	 about	 who	 will	 be	 what	 and	 for	 how	 long.	 Representation	 is	
critical.	 In	 the	 interplay	 between	 communicative	 institutions	 and	 their	
public	 audiences,	 will	 a	 group	 be	 represented	 in	 terms	 of	 one	 set	 of	
symbolic	categories	rather	than	another?	This	is	the	critical	question.		
	 	 	 	 																												(Alexander	2006,	pp.	233-234)	
In	 the	 creation	 and	 exercising	 of	 symbolic	 power	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 mediatized	
conflicts,	actors	need	therefore	to	be	concerned	with	maintaining	and	controlling	their	
representation	on	 two	 levels.	 The	 first	 is	 to	 attempt	 to	 steer	how	 the	media	portrays	
them	and	 the	second	 is	 to	attempt	 to	counter	or	contain	what	Lester	 terms	 “strategic	
interventions”	(Lester	2010a,	p.	590)	against	symbolic	power	by	their	opponents	in	the	
conflict.	 In	 relation	 to	 environmental	 conflict,	 Lester	 (ibid.)	 has	 shown	 how	 such	
interventions	 can	 be	made	 by	 all	 players	 in	 contested	 politics:	 by	 protest	 groups,	 by	
those	against	which	protest	is	directed,	and	indeed	by	the	media	themselves.	The	media	
can	thus	become	actors	 in	the	discourse	that	surrounds	mediatized	conflicts:	as	Cottle	
puts	 it,	 they	become	 “implicated	within	 conflicts	while	disseminating	 images	or	 ideas	
about	them”	(Cottle	2006,	p.	9).		
	
For	this	study,	which	examines	a	mediatized	environmental	conflict	which	is	redolent	
both	with	 attempts	 to	 create	 symbolic	 power,	 and	 strategic	 interventions	 to	 contain	
that	 power,	 a	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	 power	 of	 symbols	 in	 the	 discursive	
contestation	of	power	 is	essential.	This	 study	understands,	 therefore,	 that	mediatized	
conflicts,	 as	well	 as	 being	 a	 competition	 for	 visibility,	 are	 a	 contest	 for	 the	 control	of	
symbolic	 power	 in	 discourse.	 A	 recognition	 that	 the	 media	 can	 become	 important	
actors	in	mediatized	conflict	is	also	fundamental	to	this	case	study.		
2.7	Conclusion	
In	surveying	the	literature	on	media	production,	the	construction	of	“the	environment”,	
new	media	landscapes	and	mediatization,	and	also	on	power	and	protest;	this	chapter	
has	drawn	on	a	multiperspectival	theoretical	framework	for	understanding	this	thesis’	
argument	on	the	mediatized	representation	of	a	contested	megaproject.	Building	on	the	
discussion	 of	 symbolic	megaprojects	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 this	 chapter	 has	 also	 surveyed	 the	
globalised	media	 landscape	and	the	transnationalisation	of	protest	which	I	show	have	
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arisen	from	the	same	roots	as	transnational	megaprojects	themselves.	I	also	show	that	
the	 power	 to	 control	 symbols	 in	 discourse,	 and	 ultimately	 the	 power	 over	
communication,	is	the	definitive	power	in	this	landscape.	
In	 the	 development	 of	 megaprojects,	 this	 contemporary	 location	 of	 power	 is	 highly	
significant.	While	historically,	authorities,	governments	and	official	institutions	claimed	
ascendency	in	“relations	of	definition”	of	risk,	and	were	routinely	the	holders	of	greater	
symbolic	 power,	 in	 a	 deeply	mediatized	world,	 such	 institutions	 increasingly	 have	 to	
counter	symbolic	power	exercised	by	non-elite	actors.	In	this	environment,	authorities	
frequently	 find	 themselves	 unable	 to	 lead	 mediatized	 discourses	 with	 their	 own	
strategic	 power,	 and	 increasingly,	 as	 this	 case	 study	 will	 illustrate,	 are	 required	 to	
occupy	 defensive	 discursive	 positions.	 The	 developers	 of	 large	 infrastructure	 projects	
like	HidroAysén	 therefore	attempt	 to	 “sanitize”	or	 “greenwash”	 (Greer	&	Bruno	1996;	
Tokar	1999)	 their	 projects	with	public	 relations	 “spin”,	 “manipulation”	 (Whitworth	&	
Cheatham	1988)	and	“strategic	deception”	(Flyvbjerg,	Garbuio	&	Lovallo	2009).	These	
communicational	 actions,	 I	 argue	 through	 this	 thesis,	 and	 the	 actions	 of	 protesters	 to	
demask	such	“deception”,	are	the	basis	for	megaprojects’	symbolic	construction	
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Chapter	3:	Country	context	
	
3.1	Introduction	
	
This	 chapter	 serves	 as	 background	 to	 the	 contentious	 HidroAysén	 megaproject.	 It	
provides	country	context	for	Chile	at	the	time	when	HidroAysén	was	first	established	to	
enable	an	understanding	of	why	 the	 controversy	over	HidroAysén	between	2006	and	
2014	 unfolded	 as	 it	 did.	 I	 begin	with	 a	 summary	 of	 Chile’s	 energy	 sector	 at	 the	 time	
HidroAysén	 was	 being	 contemplated.	 The	 discussion	 then	 turns	 to	 Chile’s	 economic	
development,	 showing	 that	 although	 some	 figures	 attest	 to	 a	 highly	 successful	
development	trajectory,	by	other	measures	Chile’s	style	of	development	has	entrenched	
inequality,	 reinforced	 elite	 closure,	 and	 stymied	 intergenerational	 social	 mobility.	
Although	 social	 inequality	 may	 seem	 to	 have	 little	 connection	 with	 a	 hydroelectric	
megaproject,	 this	chapter	builds	on	understandings	from	chapter	1,	which	argues	that	
megaproject	 developments	 do	 indeed	 have	 much	 to	 do	 with	 inequality.	 I	 therefore	
provide	further	background	here	on	unequal	development	and	social	unrest	in	Chile.	By	
discussing	 this	 background,	 the	 chapter	 starts	 to	 show	 how	 the	 protest	 discourse	
surrounding	 HidroAysén	 –	 analysed	 in	 detail	 in	 subsequent	 chapters	 –	 was	 able	
construct	the	megaproject	in	such	a	way	that	it	became	emblematic,	symbolising	above	
all	 the	 social	 unfairness	 experienced	 by	 many	 Chileans.	 As	 the	 discussion	 unfolds	 in	
subsequent	 chapters,	 I	 also	 show	 how	 HidroAysén	 came	 to	 be	 equated	 with	 other	
apprehensions	Chileans	felt	about	their	country’s	mode	of	development,	environmental	
damage,	 and	 its	 national	 sovereignty	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 transnational	 megaproject	 in	 a	
globalised	world.	
		
The	 final	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 an	 examination	 of	 Chile’s	 media	 landscape.	 Here,	
historical	 background	 as	 well	 as	 a	 survey	 of	 contemporary	 ownership	 and	 political	
orientation	of	the	most	influential	media	outlets	supports	the	notion	of	elite	closure	in	
the	media	sector	also.	Although	the	limitations	of	political	economy	media	analysis	are	
borne	 in	 mind	 in	 this	 study,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 the	 research	 presented	 here	
indicates	 that	media	 ownership	 in	 contemporary	 Chile	 is	 significant	 and	would	 have	
important	 implications	 for	 the	 reporting	 of	 HidroAysén.	 This	 section	 also	 examines	
social	 media	 use	 in	 Chile,	 discussing	 how	 Chileans	 use	 online	 and	 social	 media.	 	As	
strategic	 communications	 output	 by	 HidroAysén	 as	 well	 as	 by	 anti-dams	 protest	
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organisations	 played	 such	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 discourse	 over	 the	megaproject,	 the	 final	
section	of	Chapter	3	examines	strategic	public	relations	in	the	Chilean	context.	
	
3.2	Chile’s	energy	landscape	
	
Chile	has	a	sinuous	geography,	running	4300kms	from	north	to	south,	and	on	average	
less	 than	 200kms	 east	 to	 west.	 It	 spans	 diverse	 climatic	 zones	 including	 the	 driest	
desert	 on	 Earth	 –	 the	 Atacama	 Desert	 –	 temperate	 rainforests	 and	 vast	 southern	 ice	
caps.	For	all	its	metallurgical	richness	as	the	world’s	largest	copper	supplier	and	a	key	
miner	 of	 gold,	 silver,	 lead	 and	 lithium,	 Chile	 has	 few	 of	 its	 own	 fossil	 fuel	 reserves:	
domestic	 production	 provides	 less	 than	 5%	 of	 total	 coal	 demand	 (OECD	 2013,	 p.	 1).	
Domestic	 oil	 and	 gas	 production,	 most	 prominently	 in	 the	 Magellanes	 Region	 in	 the	
country’s	 far	 south	 is	 limited,	 though	 recent	 exploration	 and	 new	 extraction	
technologies	 are	 expanding	 future	 extraction	potential	 here	 (Mercopress	 2016).	 Chile	
does	 have	 significant	 hydroelectric	 resources.	With	 great	 rivers	 flowing	 east	 to	 west	
over	 the	 relatively	 short,	 often	 precipitous	 distance	 between	 the	 high,	 snow-capped	
Andes	 and	 the	 Pacific	 Coast,	 the	 potential	 for	 strongly	 flowing	water	 to	 turn	 electric	
turbines	 is	 great.	Chile’s	 geography	and	 climatic	 conditions	also	endow	 it	with	 strong	
potential	 for	 generation	 of	 non-conventional	 renewable	 energy	 (in	 Spanish	 “energías	
renovables	 no	 convencionales”	 –	 henceforth,	 ERNCs)	 especially	 solar,	 wind	 and	
geothermal	energy.20	
	 	 	
Chile’s	unique	geography	has	a	strong	bearing	on	 its	contemporary	energy	 landscape.	
The	country	has	four	separate	energy	grids.	The	arid	and	sparsely	populated	far	north	is	
supplied	 by	 the	 Sistema	 Interconectada	 Norte	 Grande	 (SING).	 Here	 demand	 is	
dominated	by	mining,	and	energy	generation	is	almost	entirely	fossil	fuel,	or	thermally,	
generated.	 The	 central	 region,	 home	 to	 90%	of	 Chile’s	 population,	 is	 powered	 by	 the	
Sistema	 Interconectada	 Central	 (SIC),	 where	 energy	 is	 roughly	 half	 thermal	 and	 half	
hydroelectric-generated	 (Chile	 Sustentable	 2013).	 This	 grid	 supplies	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	
country’s	energy	demand	including	that	of	the	capital,	Santiago,	with	a	population	of	7	
million	people.	Chile’s	 southernmost	 region	 is	encompassed	by	 two	 further	electricity	
																																																						
20	Though	hydroelectricity	is	elsewhere	often	considered	to	be	“renewable”,	in	the	Chilean	context,	ERNCs	
include	 only	 small-scale	 hydroelectric	 installations,	 excluding	 large	 installations	 with	 over	 20MW	
generation	capacity.		
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grids,	 the	Sistema	de	Aysén	 (56%	thermal,	40%	hydro,	4%	wind)	and	 the	Sistema	de	
Magellanes	(100%	thermal)	(Ministerio	de	Energía	 	2016).	A	major	new	infrastructure	
project	to	connect	the	SIC	and	the	SING	grids,	the	Transmisora	Eléctrica	del	Norte	(TEN)	
was	completed	in	2017	(El	Mercurio	22/11/2017).	Importantly,	this	project	now	allows	
energy	from	Chile’s	far	south,	potentially	from	a	project	like	HidroAysén,	to	be	injected	
into	the	SIC	and	therefore	the	SING	grids.	Critics	of	the	HidroAysén	project	have	pointed	
out	that	this	would	mean	HidroAysén’s	energy	could	be	used	to	power	mining,	and	was	
not	intended	for	households	–	a	notion	that	would	come	to	have	symbolic	importance	in	
the	HidroAysén	debate.	
	
	
	
Figure	1:	A	 snapshot	of	 the	Chilean	electricity	matrix	 in	2013,	during	 the	HidroAysén	
timeframe.	With	the	growth	of	ERNCs,	the	grid	looks	quite	different	today.	(Ministerio	
de	 Energía,	 Chile,	 Centro	 de	 Despacho	 Economico	 de	 Carga,	 Sistema	 Interconectado	
Central	2013)	
	
Although	Chile	has	so	 few	of	 its	own	fossil	 fuel	sources,	 in	 the	HidroAysén	timeframe,	
the	 country	 relied	 on	 fossil	 fuel	 based	 thermal	 generation	 for	 62%	 of	 its	 electricity	
supply	 (CCTP	2013,	 p.	 4).	 Furthermore,	 the	 country’s	Total	 Primary	Energy	 Supply,	 a	
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measure	which	includes	fuels	like	petrol	and	diesel	primarily	used	for	transport,	relies	
on	75%	imported	fossil	fuels	(International	Energy	Agency,	IEA	2012,	p.	2).	
	
Historically,	Chile	generated	much	of	its	energy	from	hydropower.	In	the	1980s,	the	SIC	
grid	(then	75%	of	the	national	energy	total)	was	made	up	of	70%	hydroelectric	power	
and	30%	thermal	(Bauer	2009,	p.	613).		By	the	late	1990s,	when	Chile	suffered	its	worst	
drought	 in	 a	 century,	 greatly	 reducing	 hydroelectric	 generation	 capacity	 and	 causing	
energy	blackouts	 in	Santiago,	 it	was	clear	other	means	of	energy	generation	had	to	be	
considered.	Due	 to	 the	 availability	 and	 favourable	 cost	 of	natural	 gas	 from	Argentina,	
significant	 investment	 was	 made	 in	 building	 four	 gas	 pipelines	 through	 the	 Andes.	
Imported	Argentine	gas	quickly	became	a	staple	of	electricity	generation,	accounting	for	
26%	of	Chile’s	total	energy	consumption	by	2004	(Nasirov	&	Silva	2014,	p.	27).	In	the	
winter	of	2004,	however,	Argentina	reneged	on	supply	contracts	and	cut	gas	exports	to	
its	neighbour,	in	order	to	cover	domestic	demand	(IEA	2012,	p.	15;	Jarroud	2014).		
	
To	make	up	the	resulting	energy	deficits,	expensive	diesel	oil	imports	were	required.	As	
well	as	causing	immediate	energy	shortages,	the	cut	in	gas	supply,	and	the	uncertainly	
about	future	gas	availability	from	Argentina	had	longer-term	ramifications.	Investment	
in	gas-fuelled	power	plants	was	halted	–	but	investors	were	also	reluctant	to	invest	in	
alternative	 coal	 fired	 power	 stations,	 because	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 future	 return	 of	
Argentine	gas	(Arellano	2008,	p.15).	As	it	became	clear	that	gas	imports	from	Argentina	
would	 not	 return,	 Chile	 had	 to	 find	 reliable	 alternative	 energy	 sources.	 While	
neighbouring	Bolivia	produces	gas	and	could	form	an	alternative	gas	export	partnership	
with	Chile,	 export	 to	Chile	 is	 stymied	by	 a	 historical	 border	dispute	between	 the	 two	
countries.	
	
When	HidroAysén	was	being	planned,	therefore,	Chile’s	thermal	energy	generation	was	
made	up	of	almost	entirely	imported	fuel	sources:	coal	(28%	of	total	energy	generation)	
oil	 (14%)	 and	 natural	 gas,	 including	 liquid	 natural	 gas	 or	 LNG	 (18%)	 (CCTP	 2013).	
Liquid	natural	gas	now	filled	much	of	the	deficit	created	by	the	2004	Argentine	cut,	with	
imports	 by	 sea	 from	 Equatorial	 Guinea,	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 Qatar	 and	 Yemen	 (IEA	
2012,	p.	20).	LNG	could	use	existing	gas	infrastructure	put	in	place	for	gas	imports	from	
Argentina,	and	due	to	the	increasing	number	of	shale	gas	developments	internationally,	
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imported	LNG	is	currently	becoming	a	cheaper	energy	source	(Rogers	2015)	making	it	
an	important	part	of	Chile’s	future	enery	matrix.	
	
Chile’s	most	significant	native	energy	source	is	hydroelectricity.	This	provided	34%	of	
the	 country’s	 electricity	 needs	by	2012,	 (Chile	 Sustentable	 2012)	but	 Chile	was	using	
only	25%	of	its	calculated	hydroelectric	potential	by	2013	(Nelson	2013).	Production	of	
electricity	from	water	in	Chile	is,	however,	increasingly	affected	by	drought	and	climate	
change.	 Since	 the	 catastrophic	 drought	 of	 1998,	 electricity	 generation	 from	 many	
hydroelectric	 dams	 in	 Chile	 has	 been	 variable.	 In	 2007,	 the	 Fourth	 Report	 of	 the	
Intergovernmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 predicted	 a	 15-20%	 drop	 in	 rainfall	 in	
central	and	south-central	Chile	within	75	years	(IPCC	2007).	A	2012	report	by	the	OECD	
and	the	Climate	Change	Division	of	the	Chilean	Ministry	of	the	Environment	projected,	
by	 century’s	 end,	 a	 1-4	 degree	 centigrade	 temperature	 rise	 for	 the	 whole	 country,	
dramatic	glacial	retreat	and	decreased	snowpack	in	high	alpine	areas	(Muck	2012).	As	
Chile’s	rivers	rely	on	melting	snow	and	ice	from	the	high	Andes	for	much	of	their	flow,	
such	predictions	make	the	long-term	potential	for	hydroelectricity	in	Chile	problematic.	
Indeed,	 a	 United	 Nations	 report	 on	 the	 issue	 estimated	 the	 country’s	 overall	
hydroelectric	generation	would	decline	10-20%	over	the	next	century,	at	cost	of	US$100	
million	 per	 year	 (Espinoza	 2009).	 Importantly,	 however,	 the	 most	 severe	 effects	 of	
climate	 change	were	 predicted	 for	 central	 and	 south-central	 Chile,	with	 lesser	 effects	
predicted	for	the	country’s	far	south,	including	some	projections	of	increased	rainfall	in	
this	region	(Venegas	2007).	Hydropower	from	Chile’s	far	southern	Patagonia,	as	in	the	
planned	 HidroAysén	 megaproject,	 could	 therefore	 potentially	 become	 especially	
attractive.			
	
When	HidroAysén	was	being	considered	as	a	key	new	energy	source	for	Chile,	energy	
costs	both	 for	 industry	and	 for	households	were	high	–	among	 the	most	expensive	 in	
Latin	 America,	 with	 the	mean	 household	 energy	 price	 per	megawatt	 hour	 (MWh)	 in	
Chile	being	30%	higher	than	the	OECD	average	(IEA	2012).	Household	energy	costs	had	
increased	 sharply,	 with	 a	 30%	 increase	 between	 2010	 and	 2014	 (Jarroud	 2015).		
Energy	prices	are	overseen	by	 in	Chile	by	the	Comisión	Nacional	de	Energía	(National	
Energy	Commission	or	CNE),	 a	public	 institution	which	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 energy	
policy	and	 for	conflict	resolution.	The	CNE	 is,	however,	 largely	advisory	 in	nature	and	
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plays	a	subsidiary	role	 to	 the	market	 in	 terms	of	pricing	and	policy	direction	(Latta	&	
Williams	2011,	p.	12).	
Chile’s	 energy	matrix	by	 the	end	of	 the	 first	decade	of	 the	21st	 century	was	 therefore	
heavily	reliant	on	imports,	making	it	vulnerable	to	market	trends,	while	also	vulnerable	
to	 unpredictable	 climate	 events.	 Its	 hydropower	 installations	were	 subject	 to	 climate	
change-induced	drought.	Being	fossil-fuel	dominated,	Chile’s	energy	portfolio	was	also	
greenhouse	gas	producing	and	air	polluting,	contributing	to	the	country’s	figure	of	more	
than	double	 the	OECD	average	 for	 lung	damaging	PM10	air	pollutant	particles	 (OECD	
2015b).	For	industry	and	for	households,	the	cost	of	energy	was	also	high.	And	yet	with	
energy	demand	forecast	to	keep	rising	to	2020,	better	energy	solutions	were	needed.	
	
3.3	Energy	demand	and	energy	security	in	Chile	
	
Chile’s	consistent	economic	growth	over	the	past	quarter	century	has	made	it	one	of	the	
strongest	economies	in	Latin	America.	Market-driven	economic	policy	established	in	the	
Pinochet	 era	 (1973-1990)	 continued	 under	 the	 centre-left	 Concertación	 governments	
that	 governed	 the	 country	 from	 1990-2010.	 Between	 2003	 and	 2013,	 Chile	 had	 an	
average	growth	rate	of	5%	(World	Bank	2015;	Nelson	2013).	Growth	slowed	slightly	in	
2008	–	2010	due	 to	 the	Global	Financial	Crisis	and	 the	2010	Chilean	earthquake,	 and	
was	 affected	 by	 sharply	 lower	 copper	 prices	 in	 2014.	 But	 the	 Chilean	 economy	 was	
considered	“resilient”	by	2015	(OECD	2015c,	p.1)	and	growth	was	projected	to	gather	
pace	and	remain	at	around	3%	until	2020	(OECD	2015a).	
	
Electricity	demand	in	Chile	has	expanded	in	tandem	with	economic	growth.	As	Chileans	
have	 moved	 to	 urban	 centres	 where	 electricity,	 not	 wood,	 is	 used	 for	 heating	 and	
cooking,	 and	 have	 acquired	 more	 electricity-hungry	 appliances,	 domestic	 energy	
demand	has	risen.	In	the	HidroAysén	timeframe,	use	by	industry	still	exceeded	domestic	
use	substantially,	with	 industrial	users	(including	mining)	accounting	 for	68%	of	 total	
electricity	demand	and	domestic	use	31%	(IEA	2012,	p.	24).	With	Chile’s	robust	mining	
sector	 the	 single	 largest	 consumer	 of	 energy,	 relative	 market	 shares	 of	 electricity	
consumption	have	been	forecast	to	remain	stable,	with	the	industrial	sector	continuing	
to	 represent	 two	 thirds	 of	 demand	 by	 2020	 (IEA	 2012,	 p.	 24).	 In	 line	with	 economic	
growth,	Chile’s	 total	annual	electricity	demand	–	domestic	and	 industrial	–	grew	from	
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40	Terrawatt-hours	(TWh)	in	2000	to	nearly	65TWh	in	2012.	Demand	was	expected	to	
reach	100TWh	by	2020	(Nasirov	&	Silva	2014,	p.	27).	
	
By	the	early	years	of	the	21st	century,	it	became	clear	that	a	lack	of	strategic	planning	in	
the	energy	 sector	by	a	 series	of	 governments	had	 led	 to	a	 failure	 to	 spur	appropriate	
development	in	the	sector.	Chile	was	lagging	on	critical	investment	in	energy,	and	with	
growing	 demand	 forecast,	 lack	 of	 supply	 threatened	 energy	 security	 and	 long-term	
development	goals.	The	country	now	had	to	find	new	ways	to	make	energy	more	secure,	
more	affordable,	and	also	cleaner.	In	order	to	stimulate	this,	in	2008,	the	first	Bachelet	
government	 introduced	Law	20,527	to	oblige	energy	companies	 to	obtain	5%	of	 their	
energy	supply	from	ERNCs	by	2010.	This	increased	by	0.5%	annually	after	2014,	so	that	
by	2024	energy	generators	would	have	to	produce	10%	of	their	power	from	ERNCs	(IEA	
2015).	 	In	2013,	Law	20,698	modified	the	previous	legislation	to	set	new	standards	so	
that	 energy	 utilities	 with	 over	 200MW	 operation	 capacity	 (effectively	 all	 commercial	
energy	generators)	would	be	obliged	to	generate	20%	of	their	capacity	from	ERNCs	by	
2025	(IEA	2015).		
	
Such	policy	settings	have	enabled	a	significant	 turn	 towards	ERNCs	 in	Chile.	By	2014,	
Chile	was	being	described	as	“the	world’s	top	renewable	energy	market”	(Ayre	2014),	in	
2017,	 the	 New	 York	 Times	 described	 it	 as	 being	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 an	 “energy	
transformation”	(Londoño,	New	York	Times	12/08/17)	and	in	2018,	the	IEA	called	Chile	
“a	world-class	destination	for	solar	and	wind	energy	developers”	with	“vast	renewable	
energy	potential”	(IEA	2018).	Importantly,	Chile’s	mining	industry	has	begun	to	turn	to	
large-scale	solar	energy	to	reduce	dependence	on	fossil	fuels	and	reduce	operating	costs	
(Vorrath	 2015).	 With	 the	 Chinese	 production	 dominating	 the	 world	 in	 renewable	
energy	infrastructure,	costs	of	generating	solar	energy	are	falling	and	the	challenges	of	
intermittent	 supply	 are	 being	 overcome	 by	 new	 technologies	 (Matthews	 2015).	 So	
although	 renewable	 energy	 development	 historically	 faced	 barriers	 (Nasirov	 &	 Silva	
2014,	p.	28),	these	barriers	are	now	being	overcome.	These	developments	are,	though,	
very	recent.	Because	energy	planning	has	historically	been	an	exercise	 in	 longer-term	
forecasting	 and	 construction	 of	 large,	 expensive	 infrastructure,	 developments	 such	 as	
the	 surge	 in	 ERNCs	 in	 Chile	 were	 not	 necessarily	 evident	 when	 planning	 for	 the	
HidroAysén	megaproject	began.	
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Several	 large	 coal	 fired	 power	 plants	 had	 been	 established	 in	 the	 decade	 before	
HidroAysén	 energed.	 By	 2014,	 the	 SIC	 and	 the	 SING	 combined	 had	 2040MW	 of	 coal	
powered	generation,	and	several	new	plants	were	under	construction	in	2014.	Despite	
the	 rise	 in	ERNCs,	 installed	 coal	 capacity	was	expected	 to	 rise	 to	26%	of	 total	 energy	
production	 by	 2020	 (Nasirov	 &	 Silva	 2014,	 p.	 30)	 with	 accompanying	 increased	
greenhouse	gas	and	small	particle	pollutant	emissions.	As	environmental	awareness	in	
post-materialist	 (Inglehart	 1977,	 1997)21	 Chile	 has	 grown,	 however,	 coal	 fired	 power	
plants	have	become	increasingly	contested,	with	several	such	projects	being	cancelled,	
suspended	 or	 moved	 largely	 due	 to	 public	 pressure	 since	 2010,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	
introduction	to	this	study.	The	cancellation	or	suspension	of	projects	like	Punta	Alcalde,	
Castilla	and	Barrancones	coal	 fired	power	stations	 largely	due	to	public	pressure	over	
these	 projects’	 projected	 environmental	 damage	 demonstrates	 how,	 at	 the	 time	 of	
HidroAysén,	increasing	coal-based	power	generation	was	also	inviable.		
	
Chile	 considered	 nuclear	 energy	 in	 the	 early	 2000s,	 and	 a	 Chilean	 Nuclear	 Energy	
Commission	was	 set	 up	 under	 the	Ministry	 of	 Energy	 to	 research	 nuclear	 power	 for	
Chile.	In	2010,	in	a	presentation	to	the	IEA,	Chile’s	then-Energy	Minister	spoke	of	a	start	
to	nuclear	energy	production	by	2024,	but	stated	that	“currently,	public	opinion	is	not	
favourable	 to	 nuclear	 energy	 development	 in	 Chile”	 (Tokman	2010).	 That	 same	 year,	
the	 Bachelet	 government	 submitted	 a	 major	 report	 on	 the	 issue,	 detailing	 the	
possibilities	 and	 challenges	 of	 the	nuclear	 option	 for	 the	 country.	Only	weeks	 later,	 a	
devastating	 earthquake	 of	 8.8	 on	 the	Richter	 scale	 and	 a	 damaging	 tsunami	hit	 Chile.	
The	 following	 year,	 nuclear	 disaster	 occurred	 at	 Fukushima	 in	 Japan	 after	 an	
earthquake	 and	 tsunami.	 These	 events	 dampened	 enthusiasm	 in	 Chile	 for	 nuclear	
																																																						
21	 Inglehart	 (1997	p.	 33)	 described	 post-materialism	 in	 the	 following	way:	 “[A]n	 individual’s	 priorities	
reflect	the	socioeconomic	environment:	one	places	the	greatest	subjective	value	on	those	things	that	are	
in	relatively	short	supply”.	Influenced	by	Maslow’s	hierarchy	of	needs	Inglehart	(1977,	p.	42),	argued	that	
in	 order	 to	 survive,	 people	must	 first	 have	 their	 basic	material	 needs	 satisfied.	When	 these	 needs	 are	
taken	 care	 of,	 people	 pursue	 higher	 order	 needs.	More	 affluent	 countries	 have	 seen	 a	 “gradual	 shift	 in	
which	 needs	 for	 belonging,	 esteem,	 and	 intellectual	 or	 aesthetic	 satisfaction	 became	more	 prominent”	
(1997,	p.	34).	In	Inglehart’s	terminology,	these	needs	are	more	“postmaterialist.”	See	also	Abrahamson’s	
(2011)	survey	of	critiques	and	countercritiques	of	the	postmaterialism	thesis.		
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power,	 though	 the	 nuclear	 option	 was	 still	 under	 consideration	 during	 the	 Piñera	
government	of	2010	to	2014.	In	practical	terms,	considering	both	the	fact	that	Chile	is	
such	a	seismic	country,	and	the	trend	of	protest	surrounding	major	new	power	projects,	
nuclear	power	would	seem	difficult	to	defend	as	a	key	future	element	of	the	country’s	
energy	portfolio.	
	
Energy	 efficiency	was	 first	 seriously	 considered	 after	 the	 2004	 Argentine	 gas	 supply	
failure	as	another	element	in	strengthening	Chile’s	energy	security.		Between	2005	and	
2012,	 despite	 the	 growth	 in	GDP	 and	 corresponding	 growth	 in	 energy	 demand,	 Chile	
was	 able	 to	 reduce	 its	 energy	 intensity22	 by	 10%	 (World	 Bank	 2015c).	 In	 2010,	 a	
publically	funded	National	Energy	Efficiency	Plan	2010-2020	(Plan	Nacional	de	Acción	
de	Eficiencia	Energética)	set	a	 target	of	a	15%	reduction	on	 total	energy	use	by	2020	
(Chile	 Sustentable	 2012;	 CCTP	 2013).	 However,	 in	 the	 same	 year,	 with	 a	 change	 of	
government,	 this	 program’s	 funding	 was	 reduced	 and	 the	 plan	 fell	 into	 obscurity	
(Nasirov	&	Silva	2014).	Energy	 efficiency	only	became	a	key	pillar	 of	national	 energy	
policy	after	HidroAysén	with	a	current	target	of	20,000	Gigawatt	hours	savings	per	year	
(an	installed	generation	equivalent	of	2000MW)	by	2025	(Ministerio	de	Energía	2018).	
	
It	 seemed,	 then,	 that	 when	 HidroAysén	 was	 being	 contemplated	 for	 Chile,	 the	 key	
remaining	 energy	 option	was	 to	 bolster	 hydroelectricity	 production,	 especially	 in	 the	
less	 climate	 change-affected	 far	 south.	The	 country’s	 south	 still	 had	 large	unexploited	
hydroelectric	potential	–	the	bulk	of	this	in	the	Aysén	region	which	has	just	one	percent	
of	Chile’s	population,	but	30%	of	total	precipitation,	as	well	as	glacier-fed	runoff.		Total	
unexploited	hydroelectric	potential	in	Chile	was	calculated	to	be	21	279	MW	by	Rudnick	
et	 al.	 (2008,	 p.	 35)	 –	 a	 large	part	 of	 this	 in	Aysén.	As	Chile’s	 total	 installed	 electricity	
capacity	by	2015	was	19	868	MW	(CNE	2015)	 this	 untapped	hydroelectric	 capability	
seemed	to	offer	significant	potential	for	the	country’s	future	energy	needs.		
	
3.4	Hydroelectric	development	in	Chile	
	
																																																						
22	A	measure	of	energy	efficiency	calculated	as	units	of	energy	per	unit	of	GDP	–	not	the	same	as	total	
energy	consumption.			
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Chile’s	first	hydroelectric	power	plant	was	established	to	power	mining	in	the	town	of	
Lota	 in	1897	and	hydroelectricity	had	been	at	 the	 core	of	Chile’s	national	program	of	
electrification	since	the	1940s	(Kurtz	2013).	Early	dam	building	was	focused	on	major	
rivers	 closest	 to	 the	 large	population	centres	 in	 central	 and	 south-central	Chile.	From	
1960,	larger	dams	were	built,	including	the	377MW	Rapel	Dam	on	the	Rapel	River	and	
the	El	Toro	and	Antuco	dams	on	the	Laja	River.	In	1985	the	Colbún/Machicura	complex	
added	490MW	to	the	country’s	expanding	hydroelectric	capability	(Bauer	2009,	p.	613).	
Between	 1962	 and	 the	 mid	 1980s,	 despite	 political	 and	 economic	 instability,	
hydroelectric	generation	capacity	was	quadrupled	 in	Chile	(Nelson	2013,	p.	196).	And	
between	 1990	 and	 2005,	 15	 new	 hydro	 projects	 were	 completed	 in	 the	 SIC.	 Dam	
building	 was	 now	 moving	 south,	 including	 the	 first	 two	 dams	 on	 the	 upper	 Bío	 Bío	
River,	 Pangue	 and	 Ralco	 dams,	 the	 latter	 being	 Chile’s	 largest	 hydroelectric	 power	
generator	 with	 a	 capacity	 of	 690	 MW	 (Bauer	 p.	 614).	 	 By	 2015,	 Chile	 had	 45	
hydroelectric	installations	with	a	generating	capacity	of	10MW	or	more,	as	well	as	many	
smaller	installations	(CCTP	2013).		
	
The	chief	player	in	Chilean	hydroelectric	development	had	long	been	Endesa	(Empresa	
Nacional	 de	 Electricidad,	 Sociedad	 Anónima	 or	 National	 Electricity	 Enterprise,	 Plc.).	
Established	in	1943,	Endesa	operated	as	a	state	enterprise,	with	significant	operational	
independence,	until	its	privatisation.	Charged	with	the	important	task	of	nation	building	
through	national	electrification,	the	company’s	free	reign	reputedly	included	being	able	
to	 negotiate	 loans	 with	 international	 banks	 without	 recourse	 to	 the	 Chilean	 Central	
Bank	(Nelson	2013,	p.	196).	As	a	result	of	its	independence,	and	because	of	its	perceived	
nation	building	 role,	 Endesa	was	under	 little	 obligation	 to	disclose	 information	on	 its	
hydroelectric	 projects	 or	 consult	 other	 stakeholders	 on	 its	 plans	 or	 operations.	 This	
tendency,	 reported	 also	 by	 interviewees	 for	 this	 study	 (Nikolas	 Espinoza,	 ex-
HidroAysén	employee	interviewed	3/08/13),	is	perceived	to	have	become	embedded	in	
corporate	culture,	so	that	even	after	the	company	was	privatised,	Endesa	still	operated	
in	this	way.	 	This	would	eventually	have	important	implications	for	the	conduct	of	the	
company’s	largest	ever	project,	the	HidroAysén	megaproject	in	Patagonia.	
	
In	 1982	 under	 the	 military	 government,	 Chile’s	 national	 electricity	 market	 was	
restructured	according	to	neoliberal	market	principals.	In	1989,	Endesa	was	privatised.	
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This	 privatisation	 was	 controversial	 as	 many	 Chileans	 had	 been	 proud	 of	 the	 state	
enterprise’s	 historical	 role	 in	 national	 development	 and	 resented	 Endesa	 becoming	 a	
source	of	private	profit	(Bauer	2009,	p.	627)	particularly	as	post-privatisation,	Endesa’s	
new	 owners	 and	 managers	 had	 close	 ties	 to	 the	 military	 dictatorship	 (Bosworth,	
Dornbusch	 &	 Labán	 1994).	 In	 August	 1997,	 in	 a	 turning	 point	 for	 Chile’s	 electricity	
sector,	 Endesa’s	 management	 announced	 the	 takeover	 of	 Endesa	 Chile	 by	 Endesa	
España,	the	large	Spanish	power	company.	The	deal	was	even	more	controversial	than	
the	 initial	 privatisation,	 criticised	 as	 contravening	 business	 ethics	 as	well	 as	 financial	
regulations.	The	sale	soon	became	known	as	a	“scandal”	and	Endesa	(Chile’s)	president	
José	Juraszcek	was	forced	to	resign	(Bauer	2009,	p.	633;	Parisi	&	Yáñez	2000).	Today,	
Endesa	(Chile)	is	controlled	by	Enersis	S.	A.,	the	leading	private	power	company	in	Latin	
America,	which	is	in	turn	majority	owned	by	Endesa	España.	The	Spanish	Endesa	Group	
is	 a	 majority	 owned	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 Italian	 company	 Enel,	 one	 of	 the	 largest	
multinational	power	utilities	with	operations	in	more	than	30	countries	(Enersis	2015).		
	
3.5	Ownership	of	Chile’s	electricity	market	and	water	rights		
	
Electricity	 generation,	 transmission	 and	distribution	 in	Chile	 are	 separated,	 and	 since	
1982,	wholly	privatised.	 	Foreign-based	companies	now	dominate	 in	all	 three	sectors.		
Endesa	is	the	chief	player	in	the	Chilean	hydroelectric	and	overall	electricity	generation	
market,	 supplying	 35%	 of	 power	 in	 Chile	 overall	 in	 2015	 (Enersis	 2015).	 Other	 key	
actors	include	AES	Gener	and	French-based	GDF	Suez	and	Colbún	(MaRS	2015,	p.	9),	the	
only	 large	 Chilean	majority-owned	 company	 in	 the	 energy	 generation	 sector.	 Colbún	
was	privatised	under	military	rule	and	is	majority-owned	by	the	Matte	Group,	property	
of	one	of	Chile’s	powerful	family	“dynasties”	(Millas	2007)	the	Matte	family.	Electricity	
transmission	 in	 Chile	 is	 dominated	 by	 Canadian-owned	 Transelec,	 which	 provides	
energy	transmission	to	96%	of	Chile’s	population	(Transelec	2018).	Chilectra	(majority	
owned	by	Italian	Enel	group)	and	the	Spanish-owned	Compañia	General	de	Electricidad	
(CGE)	 are	 the	 two	 chief	 actors	 in	 energy	 distribution.	 Transnational	 energy	
conglomerates	therefore	dominate	ownership	of	the	Chilean	electricity	system.		
	
Likewise,	water	rights	over	Chile’s	major	river	systems	with	hydroelectric	potential	are	
today	 largely	 owned	 by	 transnational	 interests.	 The	 Pinochet	 administration’s	 1981	
Water	Code	established	a	system	of	private	water	rights	ownership	for	any	actor	who	
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could	catalogue	water	 flow	and	have	 it	registered.	Water	rights	were	claimed	for	 free,	
but	 once	 registered,	 these	 became	 transferrable	 property,	 creating	 the	 basis	 for	 a	
market	in	non-consumptive	water	rights	(Bauer	1998;	Budds	2004).	Rights	to	the	water	
in	many	of	Chile’s		important	rivers	were	originally	registered	by	state-run	Endesa,	and	
these	 	 flowed	 into	 private	 hands	 together	 with	 the	 corporation’s	 other	 assets	 on	
privatisation	 (Latta	 2010).	 Water	 rights	 ownership	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 hydroelectric	
development	in	Chile,	so	that	companies	with	extensive	water	rights	ownership	are	well	
equipped	to	plan	for	large	hydroelectric	developments.	
While	foreign	ownership	is	not	necessarily	problematic,	the	argument	here	is	that	in	a	
landscape	 of	 ownership	 by	 large	 transnational	 corporations	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 a	
country’s	 electricity	 sector	 and	 water	 rights,	 transnational	 energy	 megaprojects	 like	
HidroAysén	become	inevitable.	Globalisation	has	allowed	transnational	corporations	to	
escape	nation	states	and	expensive,	complex	projects	such	as	HydroAysén	would	not	be	
viable	without	 a	mix	 of	 private,	 global	 investors.	 	 Because	 the	 transnational	 business	
interests	which	 invest	 in	 such	projects	 are	distant	 from	 the	 environmental	 and	 social	
damage	that	arises	(Gellert	&	Lynch	2003)	there	may	be	a	blurring	of	the	line	between	a	
company’s	 plans	 and	 a	 country’s	 national	 interests	 –	 especially	 its	 environmental	
interests.	 In	 this	 landscape,	 the	Chilean	state	had	effectively	relinquished	control	over	
much	of	national	energy	planning,	allowing	 the	market	 to	respond	to	energy	demand,	
rather	than	creating	a	national	energy	strategy.	In	the	face	of	growing	energy	demand	
and	 the	2004	energy	crisis	 in	Chile,	 the	government	 therefore	had	particularly	 strong	
motives	to	remove	barriers	to	investment	and	facilitate	large	new	energy	projects,	like	
the	HidroAysén	megaproject	 for	Patagonia.	The	prevailing	nature	of	ownership	 in	 the	
Chilean	energy	sector	was	therefore	an	additional	crucial	factor	in	setting	the	stage	for	
HidroAysén.		
	
In	addition	to	the	possible	outcomes	of	foreign	ownership	outlined	above,	the	notion	of	
the	‘nationality’	of	the	HidroAysén	project	became	an	important	aspect	of	the	discourse	
surrounding	the	megaproject.	HidroAysén’s	own	communications	strategy	would	draw	
strongly	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 hydropower	 being	 ‘Chilean’,	 while	 downplaying	 the	 majority	
foreign	 multinational	 ownership	 of	 the	 company.	 By	 contrast,	 those	 opposed	 to	 the	
project	would	attempt	to	characterise	the	project	as	foreign	and	neo-colonial,	given	the	
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Spanish/Italian	element	of	the	project’s	ownership.	As	the	communications	campaign	of	
the	 eventual	 protest	 movement	 against	 the	 project	 was	 largely	 foreign	 funded,	 with	
many	 international	NGOs	 involved,	HidroAysén	would	 in	turn	attempt	to	discredit	 the	
protest	 campaign	as	 foreign.	The	anti-dams	campaign’s	 chief	marketing	strategist	and	
also	 its	main	 funder,	Douglas	Tompkins,	would	particularly	be	vilified	as	 ‘foreign’	and	
his	 interests	 in	 protecting	 Chilean	 Patagonia	 would	 be	 questioned.	 The	 notion	 of	
sovereign	 versus	 foreign	 would	 therefore	 become	 crucial	 symbolic	 aspects	 of	 the	
mediatized	representation	of	HidroAysén.	This	element	of	discourse	on	the	megaproject	
will	be	examined	in	detail	in	Chapters	5,	6,	7	and	8.	
	
3.6	Endesa	and	Colbún	establish	HidroAysén	
	
In	September	2006	Endesa	and	Colbún	signed	an	agreement	with	Colbún	 to	establish	
HidroAysén.	Endesa	held	the	controlling	share	at	51%,	and	Colbún	49%	of	the	project	
and	 the	 company.	 The	 objective	 of	 the	 newly	 formed	 joint	 venture,	 as	 stated	 on	
HidroAysén’s	website	was	to:	
	
…make	 use	 of	 a	 percentage	 of	 the	 hydroelectric	 potential	 existing	 in	 the	
Baker	and	Pascua	Rivers	to	generate	clean	and	renewable	energy	by	means	
of	constructing	and	operating	five	hydroelectric	stations	–	two	on	the	Baker	
River	and	three	on	the	Pascua	River	–	and	adjacent	works.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 															(HidroAysén	2011)	
	
The	 two	dams	on	 the	Baker	River	would	 generate	 360MW	and	600MW,	 respectively,	
while	the	three	dams	on	the	Pascua	River	would	have	generating	capacities	of	460MW,	
500MW	 and	 770MW	 (HidroAysén	 2011).	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 dams,	 tunnels,	 canals,	
powerhouses	 and	 associated	 electromechanical	 equipment,	 “adjacent	 works”	 would	
include	roads,	ports,	airports,	rubbish	dumps	and	camps	to	house	some	5000	workers	
with	all	 the	necessary	 infrastructure	to	support	 living	 in	a	remote	setting	for	seven	to	
eight	 years	 during	 construction	 (HidroAysén	 2011).	 The	 transmission	 line	 to	 feed	
HidroAysén’s	 power	 into	 the	 SIC	would	 stretch	 nearly	 2300kms	 north	 from	 the	 dam	
sites,	traversing	the	properties	of	some	5000	landowners.	A	key	objective	of	the	project	
was	 to	maximise	 energy	 production	 relative	 to	 the	 reservoir	 size.	 HidroAysén	would	
indeed	be	one	of	the	most	efficient	hydroelectric	projects	in	the	world	on	this	measure	
(Reinhardt	&	Schon	2013,	p.	11).	At	the	company’s	establishment,	the	dams	were	to	be	
operational	by	2020.		
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If	HidroAysén	were	approved,	the	two	companies	would	control	more	than	70%	of	the	
country’s	total	power	generation.	Because	of	this,	the	joint	venture	had	to	apply	for,	and	
was	granted,	permission	from	the	Chilean	antitrust	court	(Tribunal	de	la	Defensa	de	La	
Libre	 Competencia	 or	 TDLC).	 The	 TDLC	 particularly	 identified	 potential	 risks	 to	
competition	 in	 the	 Chilean	 electricity	 market	 from	 the	 concentration	 of	 ownership	
introduced	by	HidroAysén,	and	it	imposed	conditions	to	reduce	these	risks,	including	to	
the	extent	of	the	parent	companies’	water	rights	holdings	(Tafur	2011),	in	order	to	limit	
future	hydroelectric	ventures	by	the	company.	
	
The	 Endesa/Colbún	 alliance	 brought	 formidable	 structural,	 economic	 and	 political	
power	 to	 the	new	energy	project.	 Endesa,	 already	Chile’s	 largest	 energy	 supplier	 and	
backed	 by	 Enel,	 a	 company	 that	 had	 61	million	 customers	 and	 assets	worth	 US$190	
billion	 (Enel	 2010),	 benefitted	 from	 the	 legitimising	 power	 of	 Colbún,	 a	 company	
perceived	as	thoroughly	Chilean.	Colbún	was	already	one	of	Chile’s	principal	generators	
and,	 importantly,	 the	 powerful	 billionaire	 Matte	 family	 has	 long	 had	 close	 ties	 with	
political	 power	 structures	 in	 Chile	 (Carmona	 Ulloa	 2002;	 Matamala	 2015).	 Bernardo	
Larraín	 Matte,	 CEO	 of	 Colbún	 at	 the	 time	 HidroAysén	 was	 established	 is	 the	 son	 of	
Eliodoro	 Matte	 Ossa,	 one	 of	 the	 Chicago	 Boys,	 the	 architects	 of	 Chile’s	 neoliberal	
economic	transformation	under	Pinochet23.	The	then	Colbún	head	also	reportedly	had	
close	personal	ties	to	Sebastián	Piñera,	who	would	become	Chile’s	president,	and	who	
was	head	of	state	when	HidroAysén	was	approved	(Benedikter	&	Siepmann	2013).		
	
Colbún,	however,	is	run	by	a	billionaire	family	dynasty	in	a	country	where	inequality	is	
stark:	the	Matte	family,	reportedly	worth	over	US	$10	billion,	is	one	of	just	four	families	
that	control	47%	of	assets	 in	 the	Santiago	Stock	Exchange	 (Escobar	2010)	and	whose	
combined	 income	made	up	12.49%	of	GDP	 in	 2008	 (Mercopress	 2010).	Although	 the	
Mattes	are	also	known	for	 their	philanthropy,	 the	notion	of	such	privilege	would	 turn	
out	to	be	a	liability	in	the	communicational	sparring	and	battle	for	issue	definition	that	
																																																						
23	The	Chicago	Boys	were	a	group	of	about	130	students	from	Chile’s	Universidad	Católica	that	received	
US	AID	and,	later,	Ford	Foundation	scholarships,	for	MA	and	PhD	study	of	Economics	at	the	University	of	
Chicago	 between	 1955	 and	 1973.	 Their	 academic	 thought	 on	 their	 return	 to	 Chile	 emphasized	
monetarism	 and	 the	 free	 market,	 in	 contrast	 with	 structuralist	 and	 Marxist	 economic	 thought	 that	
dominated	 in	Chile	 under	Allende.	 From	1974,	 Chicago	Boy	 economists	 oversaw	 the	Pinochet	 regime’s	
drastic	economic	changes	(Brender	2010).	
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the	 HydroAysén	 debate	 would	 become.	 This	 was	 particularly	 so	 because	 when	
HidroAysén	 was	 established,	 aspirations	 for	 a	 continuing	 trajectory	 of	 fast-paced	
development	 in	Chile	were	high,	and	yet	practical	barriers	 to	a	good	education,	 social	
mobility	 and	 economic	 advancement	 were	 real.	 As	 this	 study	 will	 show,	 HidroAysén	
would,	over	time,	come	to	symbolise	the	frustrations	that	many	Chileans	experience	as	a	
result	 of	 their	 country’s	 unequal	 development.	 It	 would	 become	 emblematic	 of	
inequality	itself.		
	
3.7	Development	and	inequality	in	Chile	
	
In	the	last	40	years,	Chile	has	experienced	a	remarkable	trajectory	of	economic	growth.	
Led	 particularly	 by	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 mining	 sector,	 Chile’s	 GDP	 increased	 from	
US$27.57	 billion	 in	 1980	 to	 US$258.1	 billion	 in	 2014	 (World	 Bank	 2015a),	 and	
US$277.1	 billion	 in	 2017	 (World	 Bank	 2018).	 	 Gross	Domestic	 Product	 per	 capita	 by	
2014,	 adjusted	 for	 Purchasing	 Power	 Parity,	 was	 $22,34624.	 This	 put	 Chile	 ahead	 of	
every	 other	 country	 in	 Latin	 America,	 and	 allowed	 it	 to	 be	 classed	 a	 “high	 income	
country”	 by	 the	World	 Bank	 (2015b).	 Chile	 joined	 the	 OECD	 in	 2010	 and	 is	 the	 only	
South	 American	 member	 of	 this	 exclusive	 group	 of	 the	 world’s	 most	 economically	
powerful	nations.	
	
Successive	 governments	 have	 worked	 towards	 the	 goal	 of	 transitioning	 Chile	 from	
“developing”	 to	 “developed”	 economy	 status.	 During	 Chile’s	 2010	 bicentennial	
celebrations,	 president	 Sebastian	 Piñera	 presented	 a	 plan	 entitled	 “Chile	 País	
Desarollado”	 (Chile,	a	Developed	Country)	detailing	50	 initiatives	 to	reach	“developed	
country	 status”	 by	 2018	 (Gobierno	 de	 Chile	 2011).	 Though	 there	 is	 no	 established	
convention	for	the	designation	of	“developing”	and	“developed”	country	(Nielsen	2011)	
–	 and	 indeed	 debate	 as	 to	whether	 countries	 should	 indeed	 be	 classified	 in	 this	way	
(Rahnema	&	Bawtree	1997)	–	international	organisations	consider	GDP	per	capita	and	
levels	of	industrialisation	as	key	criteria	in	determining	a	country’s	development	status.	
Countries	 ranked	 as	 advanced	 economies	 by	 organisations	 like	 the	 World	 Bank,	 the	
International	Monetary	Fund	and	 the	OECD	 tend	 to	have	diverse	 economies	 and	GDP	
																																																						
24	This	figure	is	in	“international	dollars”,	which	the	World	Bank	defines	as	a	hypothetical	unit	of	currency	
allowing	the	same	purchasing	power	in	a	national	currency	as	a	US	dollar	would	have	in	the	US	economy	
at	a	given	time	(World	Bank	2015b).	
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per	 capita	 above	 US$15,000.	 In	 addition,	 a	 country’s	 Human	 Development	 Index,	 a	
figure	 that	 takes	 into	 account	 life	 expectancy	 and	 education	 opportunities	 as	well	 as	
income	 per	 capita,	 is	 a	 key	 measure	 of	 development.	 By	 2015,	 Chile’s	 Human	
Development	 Index	was	 0.832,	 putting	 it	 in	 the	 top	 quartile	 of	 all	 UN	 countries,	 and	
giving	it	“very	high	human	development”	(UNDP	2015).	Chile	was	also	included	in	the	
High	Income	Group	of	countries	by	the	World	Bank	in	2015	(World	Bank	2016).			
		
Although	 Chile’s	 per	 capita	 income	 appears	 relatively	 high,	 income	 distribution	 is	
problematic.	 	While	10%	of	Chileans	have	 incomes	higher	than	the	average	per	capita	
income	 in	 Norway,	 the	 United	 States	 or	 Singapore,	 the	 poorest	 10%	 have	 incomes	
similar	to	the	inhabitants	of	Ivory	Coast	(Zahler	Torres	2011).	A	2013	report	based	on	
2010	 data	 from	Chile’s	 own	 taxation	 department,	 the	 Servicio	 de	 Impuestos	 Internos	
(SII),	 found	 stark	 discrepancies	 between	 rich	 and	 poor	 in	 Chile	 (López,	 Figueroa	 &	
Gutiérrez	 2013).	While	 the	 richest	 1%	of	 Chilean	 taxpayers	 (83,493	 people)	 received	
14.7%	of	total	income,	the	poorest	81%	of	tax	contributors	(6.6	million	out	of	a	total	of	
8.2	million	 contributors)	 received	 34.4%	of	 total	 income.	Nearly	 81%	of	 Chileans	 fell	
into	a	group	for	which	the	average	monthly	income	was	US$338,	while	the	richest	1%	
had	an	average	monthly	income	of	US$12,572.	The	income	of	the	richest	1%,	therefore,	
is	nearly	40	times	more	than	the	income	of	81%	of	the	population	(López,	Figueroa	&	
Gutiérrez	2013,	p.5),	or	put	another	way,	the	bottom,	40%	received	only	1.65%	of	total	
income	while	 the	top	1%	received	21%	of	 the	total	 (OECD	2015c,	p.	53).	 Importantly,	
during	 the	 timeframe	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	 debate	which	 is	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 study,	 the	
income	gap	in	Chile	widened,	so	that	the	percentage	of	national	income	concentrated	in	
the	richest	10%	rose	from	38.1	percent	to	39.2	percent	between	2006	and	2009	(CASEN	
2013).		
The	 2013	 study	 undertaken	 by	 López,	 Figueroa	 and	 Gutiérrez	 also	 made	 an	
international	 comparison	 of	 the	 top	 income	 earners	 in	 20	 advanced	 economies	 for	
which	 data	 were	 available	 (including	 the	 US,	 the	 UK,	 Canada,	 France,	 Spain,	 Japan,	
Norway,	Sweden,	Denmark,	and	Australia).	This	established	that	the	percentage	of	total	
income	 of	 the	 richest	 1%	 in	 Chile	 was	 almost	 twice	 the	 average	 (1.84	 times)	 of	 this	
percentage	for	the	group	of	countries	examined	(López,	Figueroa	&	Gutiérrez	2013,	p.	
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15).	Chile’s	rich	are	therefore	comparatively	much	richer,	and	income	inequality	more	
marked	in	this	country	than	in	other	advanced	economies.		
	
The	OECD	reported	in	2014	that	income	inequality	in	Chile	was	the	highest	of	any	OECD	
member,	and	that	one	in	five	Chileans	was	poor	–	compared	with	the	one	in	10	OECD	
average.	Twenty	seven	percent	of	Chileans	reported	not	having	enough	money	to	buy	
sufficient	 food	 –	 double	 the	 average	 OECD	 rate.	 And	 social	 spending	 was	 the	 third	
lowest	 of	 all	 OECD	 countries,	 accounting	 for	 10.2%	 of	 GPD,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 21.9%	
OECD	average	(OECD	2014b,	p.	1).	Chile’s	GINI	coefficient	(a	measure	of	the	extent	of	a	
country’s	 income	 distribution	 inequality	 where	 0	 represents	 perfect	 equality	 and	 1	
perfect	 inequality)	was	0.50	in	2014.	This	was	the	highest	 figure	for	an	OECD	country	
and	 substantially	 higher	 than	 the	 OECD	 average	 of	 0.31	 (OECD	 2014b,	 p.	 3).	 The	
argument,	then,	that	there	are	“two	Chiles”	(Zahler	Torres	2011)	–	the	Chile	of	the	top	
19%	who	live	with	incomes	comparable	to	those	in	a	“developed”	country,	and	the	Chile	
of	 the	 remaining	 81%,	 whose	 incomes	 and	 life	 possibilities	 are	 closer	 to	 those	 of	 a	
middle	or	low	income	country	–	seems	to	provide	a	more	accurate	representation	of	the	
country’s	 development	 and	 unequal	 income	 distribution	 than	 the	 GPD	 per	 capita	
indicator,	 where	 the	 high	 incomes	 of	 a	 small	 percentage	 provide	 an	 inaccurate	
impression	of	 the	 country’s	 overall	 economic	performance.	The	 “two	Chiles”	divide	 is	
also	 particularly	 pronounced	 in	 Aysén,	 which	 Chile’s	 Ministry	 of	 Social	 Development	
reports	has	higher	levels	of	multidimensional	poverty	(20.9%)	than	the	country	average	
(16.9)	and	also	higher	levels	of	inequality	than	the	Chilean	average	(CASEN	2015).		
	
Another	important	source	of	data	on	Chile’s	economy	and	society,	the	country’s	biennial	
national	 socioeconomic	 questionnaire	 scheme	 CASEN	 (Encuesta	 de	 Caracterización	
Socioeconómica	Nacional)	 has	 also	 examined	 the	 very	 richest	 0.1%	of	 the	 population	
(which	CASEN	believes	to	under-declare	incomes	in	such	questionnaires).	This	section	
of	the	population	is	made	up	of	some	4460	families	(CASEN	2013).	These	Chileans	are	
the	principal	 shareholders	 of	 Chile’s	 publically	 listed	 corporations,	 the	 chiefs	 of	 these	
corporations,	the	owners	of	Chile’s	banks,	insurance	companies,	supermarkets,	mining,	
fishing,	 forestry	 and	 salmon	 industries,	 and	 owners	 of	 Chile’s	 media	 (Duran	 &	
Kremerman	2011).	It	is	these	people	that	are	often	referred	to	as	“los	dueños	de	Chile”	–	
“the	 owners	 of	 Chile”	 (Carmona	 Ulloa	 2002),	 in	 a	 phrase	 that	 echoes	 the	more	 than	
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century-old	 declaration	 by	 Eduardo	 Matte	 Pérez:	 “We	 are	 the	 owners	 of	 Chile,	 the	
owners	of	capital	and	the	land.	What	remains	is	a	mass	that	is	to	be	influenced	and	sold.	
This	 mass	 has	 no	 weight	 of	 opinion,	 no	 prestige”	 (Matte	 Pérez	 was	 quoted	 in	 the	
newspaper	El	Pueblo	of	19	March	1892,	cited	by	Durán	&	Kremerman	2011).		
	
The	 fact	 that	 Eduardo	 Matte	 Pérez	 was	 the	 great,	 great	 grandfather	 of	 Colbún	 chief	
Bernardo	Larraín	Matte,	might	seem	to	have	little	bearing	on	his	descendant’s	attitudes	
or	 actions	 today,	 except	 that	 it	 clearly	 attests	 to	 the	 intergenerational	 persistence	 of	
powerful	economic	elites	in	Chile,	a	phenomenon	that	has	been	repeatedly	documented	
(Núñez	 &	 Miranda	 2011;	 OECD	 2015c;	 Solimano	 2014;	 Solimano	 &	 Pollack	 2006;	
Torche,	F.	2009).	While	of	course	any	country	has	elites	that	occupy	the	top	positions	in	
its	politics,	industry,	cultural	and	sporting	life	and	knowledge	generation,	Chile’s	elites	–	
families	like	the	Mattes	and	the	other	4000-odd	families	that	belong	to	the	top	echelons	
of	Chilean	society	–	have	actually	constructed	the	country’s	prevailing	economic	system	
over	 generations	 (Benedikter	 &	 Siepmann	 2013).	 In	many	 cases,	 political	 power	 has	
also	been	transmitted	over	generations,	so	that	daughters	and	sons	of	the	perpetrators	
of	 the	 Pinochet	 dictatorship,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 the	 individuals	 themselves,	 still	 have	
political	 sway.	 In	 Chile,	 economic	 power	 and	 accompanying	 political	 influence	 are	
therefore	concentrated	and	enduring	to	the	degree	that	these	elites	have	been	charged	
with	“hijacking	the	country”,	in	the	words	of	Chilean	journalist	Fernando	Paulsen	cited	
by	 Durán	 &	 Kremerman	 (2011).	 Chile’s	 elites	 have	 historically	 shaped	 and	 most	
importantly,	maintained	the	structure	of	the	country’s	economy	to	their	own	advantage.	
The	maintenance	of	this	status	quo,	sometimes	termed	“elite	closure”	(Núñez	&	Miranda	
2011;	 Torche	 2005),	 is	 achieved	 through	 the	 elites’	 ability	 to	 influence	 politics	 and	
economic	 policy	 –	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 income	 taxation	 –	 thereby	 “blocking	 any	
serious	attempt	 to	 shift	 income	distribution”	 (Solimano	2011,	p.	10),	 and	entrenching	
intergenerational	disadvantage.	Additionally,	it	has	been	noted	that	income	tax	evasion	
is	 particularly	 high	 among	 Chile’s	 top	 income	 earners	 (Fairfield	&	 Jorratt	 2015).	 It	 is	
indeed	 the	structure	and	extent	of	 income	taxation,	 the	effectiveness	of	 tax	collection,	
the	 size	 of	 redistribution	 transfers	 (eg:	 unemployment	 benefits)	 and	 the	 degree	 of	 a	
country’s	 public	 spending	 (particularly	 on	 education	 and	 health)	 that	 have	 the	 most	
impact	 on	 reducing	 inequality	 (OECD	 2015c)	 and	 increasing	 intergenerational	 social	
mobility.	Chile’s	“elite	closure”	and	its	decades	of	neoliberal	economic	policy	have	been	
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effective	over	generations	in	heading	off	reforms	that	would	deliver	this.	Tax	collection	
in	 Chile,	 for	 example,	 is	 20.2%	 of	 GPD,	 compared	 to	 the	 33.7%	 OECD	 average,	 and	
Chile’s	 public	 expenditure	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 GDP	 is	 the	 lowest	 in	 the	 OECD	 (OECD	
2015c,	p.	58).	Tax	evasion	and	avoidance	have	now	also	become	key	focuses	of	Chile’s	
taxation	 regime	 (World	 Bank	 2014).	 The	 OECD	 reports	 that	 such	 measures	 are	 an	
important	 step	 towards	 creating	 a	 more	 inclusive,	 less	 unequal	 Chile	 (OECD	 2015c),	
where	 intergenerational	 social	 mobility	 is	 not	 restricted	 by	 the	 level	 of	 wealth	 and	
education	of	an	individual’s	parents.	
	
Despite	 the	 apparent	 entrenchment	 to	 date	 of	 inequality	 in	 Chile,	 research	 into	
inequality	 in	 age	 cohorts	 has	 shown	 that	 for	 some	 Chileans	 the	 social	 and	 economic	
divide	 may	 have	 diminished	 in	 recent	 years	 (Sapelli	 2011).	 In	 younger	 age	 cohorts,	
income	distribution	is	more	equal,	so	that	the	GINI	index	for	those	born	from	the	end	of	
the	1960s	to	the	late	1970s	is	between	8-12	points	below	the	index	for	the	nation	as	a	
whole.	Examining	education	by	age	cohort	also	produces	a	different	picture	of	Chile.	For	
example,	while	Chileans	over	45	years	old	have	less	education	than	the	OECD	average,	
those	 younger	 than	 30	 have	 levels	 that	 are	 close	 to	 the	 average	 for	 OECD	 countries	
(Sapelli	2011).	Such	research	does	point	to	an	increased	possibility	for	social	mobility	in	
younger	age	cohorts,	 independent	of	 the	social	and	economic	status	of	an	 individual’s	
family.		
	
Some	groups	in	Chile,	other	than	an	enduring	elite,	are	therefore	beginning	to	be	able	to	
experience	 more	 economic	 success,	 more	 education,	 and	 more	 social	 equity.	 As	
Inglehart	1997,	2002)	tells	us,	societies	that	are	focused	primarily	on	the	attainment	of	
material	 well-being	 have	 different	 values	 to	 postmaterialist	 societies,	 where	
participation	 in	 civil	 society,	 defence	 of	 the	 natural	 environment,	 and	 the	 pursuit	 of	
individual	goals,	 take	precedence	over	more	 immediate	material	concerns.	The	young,	
educated	and	relatively	more	affluent	groups	discussed	above	can	certainly	be	regarded	
as	postmaterialist.		However,	equating	these	groups	with	a	stable	middle	class	in	Chile	is	
problematic.	Constituting	some	49%	of	the	population,	Chile’s	emergent	middle	class	is	
still	considered	by	the	OECD	to	be	“vulnerable”	(OECD	2010)	with	precarious	incomes,	
unstable	employment,	a	high	percentage	of	 involvement	in	the	informal	economy,	and	
often	no	access	to	a	social	safety	net.	As	expectations	have	risen,	however,	there	is	now	
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a	changing	tolerance	for	both	economic	inequity	and	social	hierarchy	in	Chile.	The	great	
financial	 successes	 of	 Chile’s	most	wealthy	have	not	 gone	unnoticed	by	Chileans	who	
have	not	enjoyed	such	wealth,	and,	following	Hirschman’s	“tunnel	effect”	(Hirschman	&	
Rothschild	1973)	optimism	about	being	on	the	cusp	of	progress	has	turned	into	anger	
over	 the	 unfairness	 of	 Chile’s	 prevailing	 social	 system.	 This	 is	 particularly	 so	 among	
better	educated	younger	cohorts	and	 the	emergent	middle	 class,	whose	nascent	post-
materialism	 inspires	 more	 libertarian	 and	 participatory	 values.	 Promised	 by	 their	
government	that	they	would	soon	live	in	a	“developed”	country,	and	observing	some	of	
their	 compatriots	 already	 enjoying	 the	 country’s	 much	 lauded	 economic	 success,	
Chileans	 with	 precarious	 economic	 situations	 and	 stunted	 possibilities	 for	 social	
mobility	 felt	 frustration.	By	2011,	 social	 inequality	was	 a	powder	keg,	 needing	only	 a	
spark	of	 ignition	to	 light	a	 fire	of	protest.	Two	 issues	 that	were	prominent	 just	at	 this	
time	 –	 education	 and	 the	 environment	 –	 would	 become	 synonymous	 with	 this	
discontent.		
	
3.8	Education,	environment,	unrest	
	
The	Chilean	winter	of	2011	saw	the	largest	mobilisation	of	protesters	on	the	streets	of	
Chilean	 cities	 since	 the	 country’s	 return	 to	 democracy.	 Student	 protests,	 demanding	
free,	quality	state	education	were	frequent	and	sometimes	violent.	One	of	the	students’	
chief	 demands	was	 for	 an	 end	 to	 profit	 in	 higher	 education.	 Chile	was	 the	 first	 Latin	
American	country	to	introduce	market-based	post-secondary	education,	when	Pinochet	
opened	up	the	previously	small,	largely	elite	university	system	to	private	enterprise	in	
1980.	By	2015,	75%	of	students	attended	private,	for-profit	tertiary	institutions,	making	
Chile’s	 proportion	 of	 private	 spending	 on	 tertiary	 education	 the	 highest	 of	 all	 OECD	
countries:	76%	against	an	OECD	average	of	31%.	Fees	are	a	heavy	burden	on	students	
and	their	families,	who	can	pay	between	US$2000-US$6000	for	a	year’s	tuition	(OBHE	
2015).	 The	 social	 mobility	 offered	 by	 obtaining	 tertiary	 education	 is	 therefore	 still	
beyond	the	reach	of	many	young	Chileans.25	
	
																																																						
25	In	her	second	term	of	government,	Bachelet	attempted	far-reaching	education	reforms,	however,	by	the	
end	of	her	presidency,	these	were	regarded	to	have	been	largely	ineffective	in	higher	education,	failing	to	
reform	for-profit	education	(Benedikter	&	Zlosilo	2017).	
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In	 addition	 to	 the	 economic	 burden	 of	 for-profit	 education,	 corruption	was	 now	 also	
being	 uncovered.	 In	 2011,	 a	 special	 commission	 of	 Chile’s	 House	 of	 Representatives	
(Comisión	 Investigadora	 Sobre	 el	 Funcionamiento	 de	 la	 Educación	 Superior	 or	
Investigative	 Commission	 into	 the	 Functioning	 of	 Higher	 Education)	 found	 extensive,	
ongoing	use	of	corrupt	practices	in	Chile’s	private	universities	to	maximise	profits.	The	
commission’s	report	(Comisión	Investigadora	Sobre	el	Funcionamiento	de	la	Educación	
Superior	2011)	refers	to	widespread	“legal	subterfuge”	and	tax	evasion,	(p.	2),	“conflicts	
of	interest”	(p.7),	“abusive	practices”	(p.4)	and	“profit	making	on	the	margins	of	the	law”	
(p.4)	 in	 the	 private	 university	 sector.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 head	 of	 Chile’s	 National	
Accreditation	 Commission	 for	 universities	 (Comisión	 Nacional	 de	 Acreditación)	 was	
prosecuted	for	receiving	bribes	to	expedite	universities’	accreditation,	and	in	2012,	was	
sentenced	to	jail	along	with	two	former	university	rectors	(Hurtado,	E	2012).	Students’	
frustrations	 when	 the	 2011	 unrest	 erupted	 were	 therefore	 not	 only	 a	 result	 of	
indebtedness,	but	also	over	the	quality	and	fairness	of	for-profit	education.	
	
Perhaps	most	 importantly,	another	key	finding	of	 the	2011	special	commission	report	
underscored	 the	notion	of	 inter-generational	 inequality	 and	 elite	 closure	 that	 already	
fuelled	 students’	 frustrations.	 	 As	 students	 already	well	 knew,	 the	 report	 stated	 that:	
“The	architects	of	the	model	of	higher	education	who	were	functionaries	in	the	epoch	of	
the	military	dictatorship	today	are	owners	or	directors	of	these	establishments”	(p.	7).	
Together	 with	 international	 conglomerates	 –	 for	 example,	 US-based	 Laureate	
International	 Universities,	 which	 owns	 three	 of	 Chile’s	 largest	 private	 institutions	 –	
Chile’s	 enduring	 elites	 therefore	 own,	 administrate	 and	 profit	 from	 close	 to	 three	
quarters	of	higher	education	institutions.	When	the	student	protests	exploded	in	2011,	
students	 knew	 that	 to	 surmount	 socio-economic	 barriers,	 they	 needed	 a	 good	 higher	
education,	but	they	also	understood	that	the	economic	systems	set	up	by	the	country’s	
enduring	elites	were	the	chief	obstacle	to	them	doing	so.	The	private	university	system	
itself	therefore	became	symbolic	of	social	inequity	in	Chile.	
	
By	 2011,	 frustration	 at	 social	 unfairness	 also	 extended	 to	 Chileans’	 thinking	 on	 the	
environment.	Awareness	of	the	environment,	and	an	imperative	towards	its	protection	
had	been	increasing	since	the	early	1990s,	often	in	response	to	environmental	damage	
or	 new	 environmental	 threats.	 Chile’s	 free	 market,	 with	 its	 ever-growing	 economy	
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based	on	extractive	 industries,	has	not	been	good	to	 its	environment.	 In	the	far	north,	
mining	 has	 re-landscaped	 vast	 swathes	 of	 the	 country,	 polluted	 air	 and	 drained	
watercourses;	in	the	country’s	forested	south,	intensive	harvesting	has	created	serious	
erosion,	and	short-cycle	single	species	plantations	are	 increasingly	 taking	 the	place	of	
native	forests.	In	the	waterways	of	Chile’s	far	south,	the	world’s	most	intensive	salmon	
farming	 industry	has	caused	algal	blooms	which	poison	 fish	and	shellfish,	 threatening	
the	 livelihoods	 of	 local	 fishermen.	 And	 Chile’s	 capital,	 Santiago,	 has	 “one	 of	 the	most	
serious	 air	 pollution	 problems	 in	 the	 world”	 (Garcia-Chevesich	 et	 al.	 2014,	 p.	 202).	
Research	 into	 environmental	 attitudes	 in	 Chile,	 particularly	 among	 young	 people,	
indicates	high	levels	of	environmental	awareness	and	concern,	and	a	strong	willingness	
to	engage	in	pro-environmental	behaviours	(Cordano	et	al.	2010).	Of	interest	is	that	in	
Chile	 during	 the	 controversy	 over	HidroAysén,	 environmental	 concern	 seems	 to	 have	
increased26	–	a	trend	that	I	discuss	in	the	concluding	chapter	of	this	thesis.			
If	 Chileans	 sought	 some	 group	 to	 blame	 for	 contaminated	 air,	 dying	 waterways	 and	
toxic,	 drying,	 rivers,	 it	was	 easy	 for	 them	 to	 identify	 a	 culprit:	 those	 that	 owned	 and	
profited	 from	 environmentally	 damaging	 industries.	 Research	 confirms	 that	 in	 many	
cases,	these	are	members	of	the	same,	elite	group	that	are	understood	to	be	“los	dueños	
de	 Chile”	 –	 Chile’s	 “owners”	 (Carmona	 Ulloa	 2002;	 Mönckeberg	 2001).	 By	 the	 time	
protest	 erupted	 over	 the	HidroAysén	 project,	 then,	 environmental	 threats	were	 often	
symbolically	equated	with	the	prevailing	and	enduring	social	system	in	Chile.	The	fact	
that	one	of	 the	most	visible	manifestations	of	 the	11-year	HidroAysén	protest	–	street	
marches	in	Santiago	and	other	cities	in	Chile	–	occurred	concurrently	with	the	student	
protests,	 underscored	 the	 sentiments	 that	 students	 and	 those	 protesting	 the	 dam	
megaproject	 shared.	 	 The	 anti-dams	 protest	 was	 therefore	 conferred	 with	 a	 layer	 of	
meaning	which	became	difficult	for	the	dams’	proponents	to	shift:	that	the	HidroAysén	
megaproject	 was	 a	 project	 by	 elites	 and	 multinational	 companies,	 whose	 primary	
beneficiaries	 would	 not	 be	 ordinary	 Chileans,	 but	 the	 elites	 and	 multinationals	
themselves.	 This	 notion	 was	 strongly	 emphasised	 in	 the	 anti-dams	 movement’s	
communications	 material.	 To	 show	 how	 HidroAysén	 became	 emblematic,	 this	 study	
investigates	 to	 what	 extent	 and	 by	 what	 mechanism,	 issues	 like	 inequality	 and	
																																																						
26	Franzen	&	Vogl	(2013)	measured	environmental	attitudes	in	33	countries	and	found	that	only	in	Chile	
had	environmental	concern	increased	during	the	survey	period.	
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frustration	 at	 elite	 closure	 became	 associated	 with	 an	 energy	 megaproject.	 As	 the	
construction	of	HidroAysén	in	media	discourse	was	crucial	to	the	outcome	of	the	debate	
surrounding	 the	 megaproject,	 discussion	 now	 turns	 to	 the	 media	 in	 Chile	 as	 the	
landscape	in	which	the	debate	unfolded.				
	
3.9	Media	in	Chile:	a	historical	perspective	
	
The	 media	 in	 Chile	 have	 historically	 been	 diverse.	 Before	 Pinochet’s	 1973	 coup,	 the	
country	 had	 a	 vigorous	 and	 heterogenous	 media	 landscape.	 A	 partisan	 press	 with	
publications	closely	aligned	to	–	and	in	many	cases	owned	by	–	political	parties	spoke	to	
the	 left	and	the	poorer	classes,	as	well	as	to	the	wealthy,	conservative	right	(Sunkel	&	
Geoffroy	 2001;	 Tironi	 &	 Sunkel	 2000;	 Ulloa	 Galindo	 2014).	 Print	 media	 particularly	
were	competitive	and	highly	politicised.	As	in	other	Latin	American	countries,	the	most	
influential	 elite	newspapers	had	been	established	by	powerful	 families	and	expressed	
the	political	and	economic	ambitions	of	those	elites	(Waisbord	2010).	Under	the	Allende	
government	(1970-1973)	there	were	ten	daily	newspapers	in	the	capital	Santiago	alone,	
spanning	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 Circulation	 was,	 however,	 unevenly	 distributed.	
Newspapers	which	 supported	 the	 Allende	 government	 had	 a	 combined	 circulation	 of	
250,000,	 whereas	 right-orientated	 La	 Tercera	 alone	 had	 a	 circulation	 of	 200,000	
(Hudson	1994).		
Radio	in	Chile	had	always	been	commercial	in	character	and	acted	chiefly	as	a	medium	
of	 entertainment,	 rather	 than	 one	 of	 information,	 and	 was	 much	 less	 closely	 tied	 to	
political	parties	than	the	print	media.	Perhaps	due	to	its	profitability	from	advertising,	
radio	 remained	 chiefly	 commercially-orientated,	 despite	 fact	 that	 the	 two	 largest	
national	 radio	broadcasters	Radio	Agricultura	 (Agricultural	Radio)	 and	Radio	Minería	
(Mining	Radio)	were	controlled	by	private,	conservative	organisations	with	close	links	
to	the	Chilean	right	(Castillo	2009,	p.	16)	
Television	 had	 been	 introduced	 into	 Chile	 in	 the	 1960s,	 and	 in	 juxtaposition	 to	 print	
media	and	radio,	the	concept	of	private	ownership	of	television	was	rejected	right	from	
the	outset.	 	Due	to	its	perceived	educational	and	cultural	function,	television	remained	
in	state	and	university	ownership	and	private	television	broadcasters	did	not	appear	in	
Chile	until	1990.	In	1968	Televisión	Nacional	de	Chile	(TVN)	began	broadcasting	and	a	
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general	 law	 regulating	 television	 made	 it	 the	 only	 network	 authorised	 to	 operate	
country-wide	 in	 1970	 (Hurtado,	 M	 1989).	 Some	 smaller	 channels	 were	 also	 run	 by	
several	of	Chile’s	universities.		
Freedom	 of	 the	media	 in	 Chile	 had	 been	 protected	 by	 constitutional	 guarantees	 that	
dated	back	 to	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 republic,	 after	Chile	 asserted	 independence	 from	
Spain	 in	 1810.	 Press	 freedom	had	 been	 regarded	 by	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 independence	
movement	 as	 an	 “individual	 natural	 right”	 (Collier	 1967,	 p.147). The	 freedom	 of	
expression	provisions	of	the	first	1811	constitution	had,	however,	been	diluted	by	many	
amendments	 to	 the	 original	media	 freedom	provisions.	 The	 1921	 constitution,	which	
existed	until	 1980,	was	 subject	 to	progressively	more	 restrictions	between	 the	1930s	
and	the	1960s	(Castillo	2009;	HRW	1998)	reflecting	the	authoritarian	nature	of	a	series	
of	governments	during	 this	period,	and	attempts	by	a	conservative	 legislature	 to	curb	
Chile’s	 turn	 towards	 the	 left.	 	 Under	 the	 Allende	 government,	 amendments	 to	 this	
constitution	aimed	to	restore	some	of	the	now	limited	freedom	of	expression	available	
to	Chileans,	by	recognising	freedom	of	expression	and	freedom	of	the	press	as	“absolute,	
unlimited	rights”	of	citizens	(Castillo	2009,	p.	20).	
After	the	coup,	freedom	of	expression	and	media	freedom	disappeared	entirely.	Media	
aligned	with	the	left-wing	coalition	Unidad	Popular	were	confiscated	by	the	military	and	
closed	 immediately,	 their	 property	 transferred	 to	 the	 state	 or	 sold	 privately.	 Perhaps	
most	 immediately	 obvious	 was	 the	 effect	 on	 television.	 The	 military	 occupied	 the	
buildings	of	TVN,	arrested	many	of	its	staff	and	destroyed	recordings.	The	TVN	director	
was	 swiftly	 replaced	 by	 a	 Pinochet	 appointee	 and	 responsibility	 for	 TVN	 was	
transferred	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 to	 the	 government’s	 General	 Secretariat	
which	 oversaw	 all	 political	 communication,	 including	 censorship	 and	 control	 of	 the	
press	(Tironi	&	Sunkel	2000,	p.140).	Media	that	continued	to	operate	were	required	to	
support	 the	military	 government.	 The	 chief	 national	 print	 publications	 that	 remained	
were	 the	 publications	 of	 the	 El	 Mercurio	 chain,	 the	 newspaper	 La	 Tercera,	 the	 news	
magazine	Qué	Pasa,	and	the	independent	review	Ercilla.	Within	18	months	of	the	coup,	
Chile’s	Journalists’	Association	reported	that	400	journalists	had	lost	their	jobs,	200	had	
left	the	country,	and	fourteen	had	been	imprisoned	(HRW	1998).	 Journalists	practiced	
self-censorship,	 and	 their	 output	 was	 also	 subject	 to	 prior	 censorship	 by	 media-
embedded	operatives	from	the	military	government’s	intelligence	agency,	the	Dirección	
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de	 Inteligencia	 Nacional	 (DINA).	 Government	 officials	 also	 fabricated	 stories	 for	
publication	 in	 order	 to	 discredit	 perceived	 enemies	 (Castillo	 2009).	 The	 threat	 of	
imprisonment	and	torture	was	real	for	media	practitioners	that	refused	to	comply.	The	
exact	figure	for	journalists	imprisoned	and	tortured	under	the	Pinochet	regime	remains	
unknown,	but	 it	seems	that	23	 journalists	were	“disappeared”	or	killed	between	1973	
and	 1990,	 and	 double	 that	 number	 of	 journalism	 students,	 print	 workers	 and	 other	
media	 personnel	 shared	 that	 fate	 (Carmona	 1997).	 On	 the	 whole,	 media	 censorship	
during	 the	 early	 years	 of	 Pinochet	 period	 was	 therefore	 effective.	 As	 one	 Chilean	
journalist	Eduardo	Gallardo	put	it:	“No	one	really	resisted.	It	was	much	too	dangerous”	
(Gallardo	in	Long	2015).	
	
Some	 media	 outlets	 did,	 however,	 attempt	 to	 speak	 back	 against	 the	 dictatorship.	
Within	a	few	years	of	the	coup,	a	number	of	authorised	media	outlets	began	to	challenge	
the	limits	of	censorship.		Radio,	always	less	politicised	than	print	media,	was	more	free	
to	 do	 this	 (Bresnahan	 2002).	 However,	 pushing	 the	 limits	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	
showed	that	the	regime	maintained	a	close	eye	on	radio	broadcasters	also.	Recalcitrant	
radio	 stations	 were	 closed	 down,	 their	 editors	 banished	 to	 distant	 regions	 of	 the	
country,	and	recordings	were	removed	and	destroyed.	By	1978,	the	regime	had	acted	to	
minimise	media	challenges	to	its	authority	by	replacing	direct,	prior	censorship	with	a	
legal	framework	which	added	new	crimes	to	the	State	Security	law	and	media	laws.	In	
1980,	a	new	constitution	established	severe	limitations	on	freedom	of	speech	and	of	the	
media	(Castillo	2009,	p.	50).	 In	1983-4	when	discontent	with	 the	regime	erupted	 into	
street	protests,	prior	censorship	rapidly	returned,	and	the	media	were	prevented	from	
discussing	 protest	 activity	 by	 additional	 legislation,	 which	 prohibited	 reporting	 any	
challenges	 to	 the	 state’s	 authority.	 Contempt	 of	 Authority	 provisions	 of	 the	 Military	
Code	of	Justice	and	the	national	security	provisions	of	the	State	Security	Law	effectively	
curbed	 the	 activities	 of	 any	 government	 critics	 in	 the	 media,	 and	 were	 also	 used	 to	
prosecute	journalists	who	contravened	them.	By	1988,	even	on	the	eve	of	the	return	to	
democracy,	 23	 journalists	 were	 still	 being	 prosecuted	 under	 the	 provisions	 of	 these	
laws	(HRW	1998).		
It	became	clear	some	years	after	the	military	uprising	that	media	of	the	right	had	been	
instrumental	 in	 fomenting	 the	 circumstances	of	 the	 coup	 (CIA	2000;	Kornbluh	2003).	
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The	El	Mercurio	Project	was	a	push	by	the	US	Central	Intelligence	Agency	(CIA)	to	incite	
public	 animosity	 against	 Allende	 through	 Chile’s	 conservative	media.	 The	 agency	 did	
this	by	channelling	funds	to	the	country’s	largest	newspaper,	staunchly	conservative	El	
Mercurio.	 In	 the	 late	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s,	 the	 newspaper	 had	 been	 in	 financial	
difficulty,	 and	 the	 El	Mercurio	 group	 threatened	 to	 collapse.	 But	 after	 a	 1970	 visit	 to	
Washington	by	Augustín	Edwards,	 the	paper’s	 then	owner,	 to	 lobby	 for	action	against	
Allende,	 the	paper	received	substantial	CIA	 funding	and	became	part	of	a	propaganda	
campaign	against	Allende’s	government.	Reporters	and	editors	were	put	on	the	payroll	
and	stories	were	placed,	including	many	“virulent,	inflammatory	articles	and	editorials”	
which	 called	 for	 opposition	 to,	 and	 the	 overthrow	 of,	 Allende’s	 Popular	 Unity	
government	 (Kornbluh	 2003,	 p.92).	 In	 1971,	 an	 employee	 of	 the	 Edwards	 group	
requested	 additional	 “covert	 support	 totalling	 US1	 million”	 to	 ensure	 the	 group’s	
survival.	By	December	that	year,	the	group	had	received	an	additional	US$1.95	million,	
averting	 its	 collapse,	 and	 enabling	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 barrage	 of	 anti-government	
criticism	(Kornbluh	2003,	p.94).	The	CIA	later	confirmed	that	its	propaganda	effort,	 in	
which	El	Mercurio	was	the	dominant	actor,	played	a	key	part	in	setting	the	stage	of	the	
1973	military	coup	(CIA	2000).	
The	media	landscape	in	Chile	just	before	the	coup	and	during	the	Pinochet	regime	was	
the	 foundation	 for	 the	 media	 ecology	 that	 would	 develop	 once	 Chile	 returned	 to	
democracy.	 With	 the	 banning	 of	 any	 media	 of	 the	 left,	 censorship,	 and	 the	 legal	
circumscription	of	material	deemed	sensitive	by	the	military	government,	as	well	as	an	
immigration	brain-drain	of	media	personnel,	Chile’s	pluralistic	media	would	take	time	
to	recover.	Another	enduring	aspect	of	the	Pinochet	era’s	effect	on	Chile’s	media	was	the	
economic	influence	of	the	20-year	dictatorship	on	media	ownership.		
3.10	Historical	roots	of	contemporary	media	ownership	in	Chile	
Chile’s	media	market	was	completely	changed	by	the	new	economic	order	that	followed	
the	 coup.	 	 The	 neoliberal	 imperative	 that	 guided	 the	 Pinochet-era	 economy	 was	 a	
radical	 juxtaposition	 to	 the	 socialist	 economic	principles	of	 the	Allende	period.	 In	 the	
second	 half	 of	 the	 1970s,	 private	 clinics,	 private	 schools,	 universities,	 and	 private	
pension	funds	began	to	proliferate.	In	1976,	Chile’s	copper	industry,	nationalised	under	
Allende,	became	the	national	corporation	Codelco,	 in	which	the	state	worked	together	
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with	 private	 companies	 for	 copper	 exploitation.	 	 In	 the	 1980s,	 transport,	
telecommunications,	water	 infrastructure	 and	 air	 transport	were	 also	 privatised.	 The	
media	 was	 also	 affected	 by	 the	 neoliberal	 turn.	 In	 this	 new	 economic	 landscape,	 the	
country’s	 two	 largest	 media	 organisations,	 which	 had	 found	 themselves	 suddenly	
without	 competitors	 following	 the	 coup,	 developed	 a	 policy	 of	 buying	 struggling	
regional	media	outlets	or	founding	new	ones	(Ulloa	Galindo	2014).	Although	this	might	
have	 offered	 an	 opportunity	 for	 diversification	 and	 decentralisation	 of	 the	 media,	 in	
practice	much	content	and	the	editorial	 line	of	these	smaller	 local	publications	closely	
matched	 that	 of	 the	 parent	 organisation.	 In	 this	way,	 print	media	 ownership	 in	 Chile	
became	 concentrated	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 two	 ideologically	 conservative	 groups.	 The	 El	
Mercurio	group	discussed	above,	owned	then	(as	today)	by	Chile’s	prominent	Edwards	
family,	 dominated	 the	 market	 under	 the	 military	 government	 with	 50%	 of	 national	
print	 media	 ownership.	 An	 additional	 30%	 of	 national	 print	 media	 circulation	 was	
under	 the	 banner	 of	 Copesa	 (Consorcio	 Periodístico	 de	 Chile),	 owned	 by	 another	
prominent	 family	 dynasty,	 the	 Pico-Cañas	 (Hudson	 1994).	 Not	 only	 were	 these	 two	
groups	aligned	with	the	military	government	due	to	their	political	affinity,	but	they	also	
became	subordinated	to	it	by	the	financial	aid	they	received.	While	the	state	intended	to	
let	the	market	regulate	these	media,	it	was	not	willing	to	lose	two	ideological	allies	and	
at	the	time	of	the	Latin	American	debt	crisis	in	1982,	it	rescued	both	groups,	El	Mercurio	
with	 a	 $27	 million	 subsidy	 from	 the	 state	 reserve	 bank,	 which	 was	 never	 repaid	
(González-Rodríguez	2008b,	p.	66).	
Radio	and	television	remained	nominally	state-owned	under	the	dictatorship,	although	
private	 finance	 soon	 controlled	 these	 spheres	 too.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 radio,	 the	 regime’s	
Radio	Nacional	de	Chile	was	established	 in	1974,	mainly	as	an	amalgamation	of	 radio	
stations	confiscated	at	the	time	of	the	coup.	It	aimed	to	propagate	the	regime’s	ideology	
domestically	and	counteract	negative	opinions	on	the	regime	further	afield.	In	television	
broadcasting,	TVN	and	the	smaller	university-run	stations	remained	under	government	
control	 throughout	 the	 Pinochet	 era	 and,	 for	 most	 of	 this	 time,	 were	 managed	 by	
“ideologues”	who	used	 them	 for	 “propaganda	purposes”	 to	attempt	 to	strengthen	and	
maintain	 the	 regime’s	 position	 (Tironi	&	 Sunkel	 2000,	 p.	 171).	Despite	 the	 important	
ideological	nature	of	these	media,	the	state	was	unwilling	to	finance	them	fully.	By	1977	
when	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 state	 television	 subsidies	 were	 insufficient,	 all	 previous	
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restrictions	 on	 commercial	 advertising	were	 abolished,	 enabling	 the	 private	 sector	 to	
move	 into	 the	 development	 of	 this	medium.	 In	 the	 final	 days	 of	 the	 Pinochet	 regime,	
private	 television	 was	 finally	 authorised,	 and	 two	 commercial	 channels	 Megavisión	
(Channel	9),	owned	by	entrepreneur	Ricardo	Claro	and	La	Red	(Channel	4)	launched	by	
Chicago	Boy	banker	(Valdes	2008)	Álvaro	Saieh	appeared.	Both	businessmen	had	had	
close	 ties	 to	 the	 regime	during	 the	dictatorship	 (Castillo	2009,	 p.	 57;	Tironi	&	 Sunkel	
2000,	p.	172).		
Several	 scholars	 have	 noted	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 Chile’s	 media	 landscape	 under	
Pinochet	 allowed	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 exceptionally	 concentrated	 media	 market,	 the	
structure	 of	 which	was	maintained	 in	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 (Bresnahan	 2003;	
Corrales	&	Sandoval	2003;	Sunkel	&	Geoffroy	2001)	and	is	largely	retained	even	today	
(Mönckeberg	 2011;	 Ulloa	 Galindo	 2014).	 Of	 course,	 several	 other	 countries	 in	 Latin	
America,	including	Argentina,	have	experienced	right-wing	dictatorships	and	neoliberal	
economic	 restructuring	 with	 drastic	 effects	 on	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 media	
freedom	–	the	influence	of	which,	as	in	Chile,	is	demonstrably	ongoing	(Waisbord	2010).	
The	 genealogy	 of	 Chile’s	 present-day	media	 is	 therefore	 by	 no	means	 unique.	 	 But	 in	
Chile’s	case,	media	repression	was	overlayed	by	a	neoliberal	turn	so	complete	that	Chile	
has	been	held	up	as	“exemplar	of	 ‘pure’	neo-liberal	practices”	(Harvey	2007,	p.	74).	In	
Pinochet’s	 Chile,	 the	 concentrated	 media	 industries	 were	 active	 participants	 in	 and	
indeed	upholders	of	 the	politics	of	dictatorship,	 the	neoliberal	economic	order,	and	by	
extension	 the	 enduring	 social	 order.	 	 This	 oligopoly	 was	 the	 distinguishing	
characteristic	of	the	media	landscape	when	Chile	began	its	return	to	democracy	in	1990.	
The	return	to	democracy	–	or	to	what	Patricio	Aylwin,	at	his	presidential	inauguration	
in	1990,	 called	 “a	democracy	as	 far	possible”	 (RSF	2011)	–	 rather	 than	 strengthening	
media	plurality	in	the	long	term,	instead	intensified	media	concentration.	
3.11	Media	and	the	transition	to	democracy		
Towards	 the	 end	 of	 Pinochet	 era,	 Chilean	 media	 were	 better	 able	 to	 criticise	 the	
government	than	in	the	years	that	followed	the	1973	military	coup.	By	the	late	1970s,	
the	 there	 were	 underground	 print	 media	 run	 by	 workers’	 organisations,	 students’	
groups	and	grassroots	religious	groups.	These	were	protected	by	their	small	circulation,	
with	government	censors	more	interested	in	the	content	of	large-circulation	dailies.		
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The	first	openly	pro-democracy	publication	to	appear	was	the	magazine	Hoy,	 in	1978.	
Hoy	avoided	censorship	–	though	the	government	did	close	it	down	periodically	–	with	a	
pragmatic	 approach	 and	 avoiding	 confronting	 the	 regime	 (Mobarec	 &	 Spiniak	 2001).	
Current	affairs	magazines	Análasis	and	Apsi	appeared	in	the	late	1970s	–	both	harassed	
and	 closed	 repeatedly	 by	 the	 regime	 for	 their	 investigative	 reports.	 In	 1983,	
investigative	 journalism	 magazine,	 Cauce,	 was	 established.	 Such	 low-circulation	
publications,	 their	 readership	 limited	 to	 an	 educated,	 sophisticated	 audience	 –	where	
their	 political	 influence	 was	 significant	 –	 never	 reached	 a	 mass	 public.	 They	 were	
therefore	unable	to	survive	through	market	mechanisms	of	advertising	and	circulation	
revenues	 and	 only	 funding	 by	 foreign	 political	 parties,	 foundations	 and	 international	
NGOs	committed	to	democratisation	allowed	them	to	continue	(Castillo	2009).	Only	in	
the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 political	 transition	 to	 democracy,	 two	 larger-circulation,	 self-
financing	opposition	daily	newspapers	appeared,	La	Época	 and	Fortín	Mapocho.	From	
1987,	 these	newspapers	played,	 for	 a	 time,	 a	 Fourth	Estate	 role	 in	 the	Chilean	media	
landscape,	 defending	 freedom	 of	 expression,	 holding	 the	 government	 to	 account	 and	
helping	 to	 rebuild	 democratic	 political	 culture.	 As	 the	 1988	 plebiscite	 that	 ended	 the	
Pinochet	 years	 approached,	 these	 papers	 also	mobilised	 the	 electorate	 and	 reminded	
them	how	to	vote.	
At	the	same	time	as	the	print	media	was	becoming	more	open,	Chile’s	television	sector,	
now	 fully	 part	 of	 the	market	 system,	 supported	 by	 commercial	 advertising	 and	 now	
almost	universal	–	it	would	reach	99%	of	households	by	1992	(Bresnahan	2003,	p.	55)	–	
was	 the	 stage	 for	 a	media	 event	 that	would	mark	 the	 so-called	apertura	 (opening)	 of	
Chilean	TV	also.	The	1987	visit	of	Pope	 John	Paul	stimulated	huge	public	 interest	and	
Chileans	watched	carefully	how	the	regime	would	handle	the	visit.	The	Catholic	Church	
urged	 the	government	 to	broadcast	 the	visit	 in	 full.	TVN	and	 the	University	of	Chile’s	
channel	were	accused	of	censorship	and	manipulation,	while	the	Universidad	Católica’s	
Channel	 13	 broadcast	 the	 pope’s	 speeches	 in	 their	 entirety,	 including	 criticisms	 of	
human	rights	abuses,	and	the	pope’s	calls	for	democracy	in	Chile.		
The	“opening”	of	 television	with	 the	pope’s	visit	was	 further	completed	by	the	 largely	
televised	campaign	leading	up	to	the	plebiscite.	The	“Yes”	and	the	“No”	campaigns	–	the	
former	 to	keep	Pinochet	as	 leader	until	1997	and	 the	 latter	 to	 return	 to	democracy	–	
presented	 highly	 symbolic	 televised	 content.	 The	 characteristics	 of	 these	 televised	
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campaigns	 are	 important	 here,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 prominent	 TV	
advertisements	for	HidroAysén	recalled	the	negative,	fear-engendering	“Yes”	campaign.	
This	is	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	7.	
This	development	of	an	opposition	media	and	the	return	to	a	kind	of	pluralism	that	was	
unimaginable	 just	a	 few	years	earlier,	would	seem	to	have	been	positive	signs	 for	 the	
regeneration	 of	 a	 democratic	 media	 system	 in	 Chile.	 	 Despite	 the	 remarkable	
peacefulness	 of	 Chile’s	 return	 to	democracy	 in	1990,	 though,	 the	 transition	was	what	
Chileans	 call	 “pactada”	 –	 a	 negotiated	 transition	 –	 so	 that	 under	 Aylwin	 and	 the	
Concertación	 de	 Partidos	 por	 la	 Democracia	 (Coalition	 of	 Parties	 for	 Democracy),	
consensus	 politics	 dominated	 in	 Chile.	 The	 transition	 was	 also	 notable	 for	 being	
characterised	by	what	Kaltwasser	 terms	“inter-elite	pact	making”	(2007,	p.	343),	with	
little	 involvement	by	civil	 society,	a	 tendency	 that	he	argues	helped	 to	 institutionalise	
closed-door	 negotiations	 between	 elites	 in	 Chile.	 This	 is	 significant	 in	 the	 case	 of	
HidroAysén,	and	is	addressed	in	Chapter	5.		
The	political	mood	of	Chile	 in	 the	 transition	was	significant	 for	 the	media.	Now,	 there	
was	 less	place	 for	print	media	which	had	been	established	specifically	 to	argue	a	pro-
democracy,	 anti-regime	 standpoint.	 After	 the	 tumultuous	 years	 under	 Pinochet,	
Chileans	 seemed	 to	 have	 little	 appetite	 for	 political	 controversy.	 Of	 course,	 the	
generation	of	a	“passive,	depoliticised	populace”	(Bresnahan	2003,	p.	42)	had	been	one	
of	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 regime.	 Dismantling	 of	 democratic	 institutions,	
destruction	of	society’s	capacity	for	“collective	self-determination”	(Kaltwasser	2007,	p.	
345)	and	a	thorough	“atomisation	of	civil	society”	(Kaltwasser	2007,	p.	347)	were	some	
of	the	authoritarian	regime’s	power	maintenance	strategies.		Once	the	regime	ended,	it	
seemed	that	political	life	was	not	a	priority	for	most	Chileans.	Now,	even	human	rights	
abuses	 under	 the	 regime	 featured	 little	 in	 public	 debate,	 and	 received	 little	 domestic	
media	attention	in	the	early	years	of	the	return	to	democracy.	The	literature	on	the	role	
of	the	media	in	transitions	to	democracy	indeed	confirms	this	phenomenon.	The	phase	
of	mobilisation	against	an	old	regime	is	often	the	high	point	of	the	media’s	place	in	the	
transition	 process,	 a	 period	 when	 the	 media	 can	 play	 a	 “catalytic	 role”	 in	
democratisation.	In	later	stages	of	the	transition,	however,	the	public’s	“news	appetite”	
can	 become	 “blunted	 by	 growing	 cynicism”	 (Jebril,	 Stetka	&	 Loveless	 2013,	 p.	 14)	 so	
that	the	media	become	less	central	to	the	democratisation	process.	
	 89	
In	 addition	 to	 political	 consensus,	 this	 period	 was	 also	 characterised	 by	 an	 almost	
complete	 maintenance	 of	 the	 economic	 status	 quo.	 There	 was	 no	 dismantling	 of	
Pinochet’s	 neoliberal	 market	 orthodoxy.	 Notably,	 by	 far	 the	 largest	 share	 of	 state	
advertising	 also	 continued	 to	 go	 to	 the	 larger	 media	 groups,	 as	 it	 had	 done	 under	
Pinochet	 (Bresnahan	 2003),	which	 amounted	 to	 a	 kind	 of	 state	 sponsorship	 of	 select	
media.	Media	 therefore	 functioned	 under	many	 of	 the	 same	 conditions	 as	 during	 the	
dictatorship	 –	 now	without	 censorship,	 but	 also	 without	 any	 great	 public	 interest	 in	
political	change	which	had	originally	galvanised	the	alternative	media.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 mindful	 of	 the	 climate	 of	 consensus	 and	 in	 a	 pragmatic	 move	 to	
consolidate	 their	 audience,	 print	 media	 of	 the	 right	 moved	 closer	 to	 the	 center.	 The	
result	 was	 that	 the	 left-opposition	media,	 which	 had	 always	 had	 smaller	 circulations	
and	 suffered	 precarious	 financial	 conditions,	 lost	 readership	 while	 more	 established	
print	 publications	 like	 those	 of	 the	 El	 Mercurio	 and	 Copesa	 groups	 increased	 theirs.	
Within	a	few	years	of	the	end	of	the	regime,	many	of	the	former	opposition	publications	
had	 disappeared.	 Left-leaning	 newspaper	 Fortín	 Mapocho	 closed	 in	 1991,	 political	
magazines	 Análisis	 and	 Apsi	 closed	 in	 1993	 and	 1995	 respectively.	 La	 Época	 ceased	
publication	 in	1998.	 In	2005,	Rocinante	 and	Plan	B,	 leading	examples	of	 independent,	
political	journalism	in	Chile,	closed	(González	2005;	Mönckeberg	2011).	In	2006,	Diario	
Siete,	 a	 critical,	 independent	 newspaper,	 acquired	 in	 2004	 by	 the	 Copesa	 group	 on	
condition	 of	 non-interference	 in	 editorial	 matters,	 was	 closed	 by	 its	 new	 owners	
(González-Rodríguez	 2008a).	 By	 2006,	 the	 last	 of	 the	 long-standing	 regional	
newspapers,	El	Sur,	which	circulated	in	the	city	of	Concepción,	was	acquired	by	the	El	
Mercurio	group.	 In	the	16	years	since	the	return	to	democracy,	more	publications	had	
closed	than	new	ones	had	been	established.			
In	the	broadcast	media,	a	similar	trend	of	conglomeration	was	also	underway.	This	was	
particularly	 evident	 in	 radio	 broadcasting,	 where	 transnational	 business	 chains	were	
acquiring	many	of	Chile’s	major	FM	stations,	and	access	to	licenses	for	community	radio	
stations	 was	 becoming	 more	 complicated.	 	 	 In	 terrestrial	 television,	 a	 mix	 of	
conservative	 Chilean	 businessmen	 and	 transnational	 business	 interests	 bought	
television	stations.	For	example,	 future	right-wing	president	and	billionaire,	Sebastian	
Piñera,	acquired	the	channel	Chilevisión	during	this	period,	and	prominent	supporter	of	
the	 military	 regime,	 Ricardo	 Claro	 (Peña	 2008)	 acquired	 the	 majority	 share	 of	
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Megavisión,	with	Mexican	group	Televisa.	The	channel	La	Red	was	bought	by	politically	
conservative	Mexican	media	magnate	Remigio	Ángel	González	who	was	known	to	adjust	
the	 editorial	 lines	 of	 his	 Latin	 American	 media	 outlets	 to	 suit	 the	 agendas	 of	 host	
governments	(Rockwell	&	Janus	2001).		
It	 has	 been	 argued,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Chilean	media,	 that	 “where	 Pinochet	 failed,	
democracy	succeeded”	(González-Rodríguez	2008a,	p.	62)	–	that	is,	in	democratic	Chile,	
pluralism	 has	 become	 more	 impoverished,	 and	 the	 media	 have	 become	 more	
concentrated	and	ideologically	homogenous	than	they	had	been	towards	the	end	of	the	
Pinochet	years.	 	The	post-regime	Concertación	governments	 inherited	a	media	system	
shaped	 by	 the	 previous	 regime	 and	 applied	 a	 laissez	 faire	 approach.	 By	 leaving	 the	
“pure”	neoliberal	system	untouched,	post-Pinochet	governments	allowed	the	market	to	
do	 its	work	 in	a	media	 landscape	where	pluralism	was	 still	 fragile.	Not	 long	after	 the	
transition,	 this	 had	 diminished	 the	 diversity	 and	 democratising	 capacity	 of	 Chile’s	
media.	 	Although,	as	Waisbord	points	out,	“only	an	economically	solvent	press	can	rail	
against	government”	(Waisbord	2000,	p.	65),	likewise	media	that	have	limited	degrees	
of	 separation	 from	market	 interests	have	a	 limited	capacity	 to	keep	 those	 interests	 in	
check,	 because	 “watchdogs	 do	 not	 bite	 their	 owners”	 (p.	 6).	 	 The	 result	 in	 a	
conglomerated,	advertising-saturated	market	like	Chile	was	a	decline	in	the	diversity	of	
viewpoints	 in	 both	 print	 and	 broadcast	 media,	 a	 paucity	 of	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 key	
issues,	and	a	corresponding	trend	towards	 infotainment.	Of	course,	 the	phenomena	of	
corporate	media	conglomeration	(Bagdikian	1980;	2000;	McChesney	1997;	2015)	and	
the	rise	of	infotainment	(Brants	1998;	Thussu	2007),	as	discussed	in	the	Chapter	2,	are	
long-term,	 global	 trends.	 These	 trends	 are	 perhaps	 particularly	 significant	 in	 newly	
democratising	 counties,	 however,	 where	 the	 replacement	 of	 state	 ideological	 control	
with	market-driven	 imperatives	can	 inhibit	 the	democratic	 role	 that	normative	media	
theory	 attributes	 to	 the	 free	 media	 –	 a	 role	 may	 be	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 the	
democratisation	process	itself	27	(Berman	&	Witzner	1997;	Dahl	1989)	
The	outcome	for	Chile	was	that	by	2006,	the	year	that	HidroAysén	was	established,	the	
country	had	a	media	landscape	that	fell	short	of	equity	and	pluralism.	This	was	a	system	
																																																						
27	In	the	literature	on	media	and	democratisation,	it	is	still	unclear	whether	the	media	lead	or	follow	
democratic	change.	See	Jakubowicz	(FreedomHouse	2012)	and	O’Neil	(2003).	
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where	news	reporting	was	impoverished,	where	sensational	crime	stories	and	football	
were	over-reported,	while	more	significant	news	stories	were	often	“intentionally	not	
reported”	 (González-Rodríguez	 2008a).	 In	 a	 2005	 survey	 of	 television	 52,2	 %	 of	
Chileans	(CNTV	2005,	p.	80)	felt	that	news	was	presented	highly	superficially,	and	63%	
(p.	 80)	 considered	 news	 to	 be	 unfairly	 orientated	 towards	 just	 one	 side	 of	 politics.	
Importantly	for	this	study,	the	same	survey	also	indicated	that	72.4%	(p.	82)	of	Chileans	
felt	 that	significant	 issues	 like	the	environment	were	underreported.	This,	 then,	was	a	
media	system	with	a	structure	and	output	that	responded	more	to	“the	interests	of	the	
dominant	sectors,	rather	than	those	of	citizens	and	society”	(González-Rodríguez	2008a,	
p.	75).	
3.12	Media	during	the	HidroAysén	timeframe	
Increasing	media	concentration,	commercialisation	and	trivialisation	of	“news”	in	Chile	
in	 the	 15	 years	 after	 Pinochet,	 continued	 through	 the	 period	 that	 the	 HidroAysén	
project	was	in	the	planning	and	approvals	process,	and	was	the	subject	of	much	public	
discussion	–	2006	 to	2014.	The	 continued	 tendency	 towards	economic	and	 territorial	
concentration	 (Mönckeberg	 2011;	 Ulloa	 Galindo	 2014),	 on	 one	 hand	 gave	 Chile’s	
conglomerated	 media	 a	 capacity	 to	 accumulate	 Castells’	 ‘communication	 power’,	 as	
discussed	in	Chapter	2;	and	on	the	other	hand	simply	magnified	opportunities	for	profit	
making	 in	 the	media	 industries,	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 in-depth	 treatment	 of	 news	 and	
more	serious	media	content.	In	the	following	chapters,	I	discuss	how	these	tendencies	
influenced	media	coverage	of	the	HidroAysén	megaproject.		
A	 2014	 survey	 of	 ownership	 of	 Chilean	 media	 outlets	 –	 TV,	 newspapers,	 magazines,	
radio	 and	 online	 digital	 media	 –	 (Poderopedia	 2014)	 showed	 that	 there	 were	 509	
separate	 registered	media	 outlets	 that	 functioned	 on	 a	 national	 and	 regional	 level	 in	
Chile.	The	majority	of	these	were	held	by	one	of	20	key	Chilean	and	international	media	
groups	 which	 tended	 to	 own	 cross-platform	 holdings.	 As	 under	 Pinochet,	 the	 El	
Mercurio	 group,	 property	 of	 Augustín	 Edwards	 Eastman,	 dominated	 the	 industry,	
owning	 56	 print,	 digital,	 radio	 outlets,	 an	 advertising	 agency	 and	 a	 wire	 service.	 El	
Mercurio’s	 emol	 digital	 site	 was	 the	 commanding	 presence	 in	 the	 country’s	 online	
media.	The	El	Mercurio	group	owned	three	principal	newspapers	in	Santiago,	and	seven	
provincial	newspapers.	Together	with	the	Copesa	consortium,	publisher	of	La	Tercera,	
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(now	 owned	 by	 Álvaro	 Saieh),	 the	 El	 Mercurio	 group	 held	 90%	 of	 print	 media	 and	
attracted	90%	of	readers	in	Chile.	In	the	magazine	market,	the	Mexican	group	Televisa	
was	 the	 dominant	 holder,	 owning	 17	 of	 Chile’s	 most	 popular	 magazines.	 The	 radio	
sector	was	more	diverse,	comprising	in	total	some	1500	radio	stations		(Godoy	2016,	p.	
662).	 A	 total	 of	 four	 groups	 owned	70%	of	 the	market,	with	 the	 Spanish	 group	Prisa	
proprietor	 of	 220	 stations,	 accounting	 for	 30%	of	 the	 total	 radio	market	 and	 50%	of	
advertising	revenues	in	radio.	In	television,	of	the	now	six	free	to	air	channels,	five	were	
owned	 by	 prominent	 Chilean	 businessmen	 –	 almost	 all	members	 of	 the	 conservative	
intergenerational	elite	discussed	above	–	and	prominent	businessmen	from	other	parts	
of	 Latin	 America28.	 The	 sixth	 channel,	 TVN,	 although	 still	 state	 run,	 continued	 to	 be	
commercially	financed	and	therefore	subject	to	commercial	pressures	on	content.	TVN,	
Mega,	 Chilevisión	 and	 Canal	 13	 –	 accounted	 for	 95%	 of	 terrestrial	 broadcasting	
(Poderopedia	 2014).	 Cable	 channels	 provided	 a	 diversity	 of	 content,	 but	 had	 a	 low	
audience	share	–	with	only	25%	of	viewers	able	to	access	these	channels	(Godoy	2016,	
p.	 655).	 The	 dominant	 content	 on	 cable	 channels	was	 children’s	 programming,	 films,	
and	entertainment	content	from	the	United	States:	cable	was	not	a	rich	source	of	news	
or	current	affairs	content.	News	programs	like	CNN-Chile	(established	in	2008)	and	24	
Horas	 Noticias	 (24	 Hours	 News)	 established	 in	 2009,	 have	 brought	 more	 extensive	
news	 coverage,	 however,	 these	 are	 still	 niche	 channels	 with	 low	 viewer	 numbers	
(Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	2012).		
Despite	 the	 large	 audience	 share	 of	 a	 reduced	 number	 of	 media	 outlets,	 some	
researchers	point	out	 that	Chile’s	 contemporary	media	 landscape	 is	 in	 fact	one	of	 the	
least	concentrated	and	most	pluralistic	in	Latin	America	(Godoy	2016),	particularly	with	
little	 state	 interference,	 compared	 to	many	 other	 countries	 in	 Latin	America.	 Godoy’s	
recent	detailed	study	of	the	ownership	structure	of	the	Chilean	media	market	considers	
the	 El	 Mercurio/La	 Copesa	 duopoly	 in	 print	 media,	 for	 example,	 to	 be	 far	 less	
problematic	 than	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 of	 conglomerates	 like	 Globo	 in	
Brazil,	 Televisa	 in	 Mexico	 and	 Clarín	 in	 Argentina.	 This	 study	 stresses	 the	 “fiercely	
competitive”	 (Godoy	 2016,	 p.	 662)	 nature	 of	 the	 Chilean	 media	 market	 –	 which	 is	
																																																						
28	For	comprehensive	survey	data	on	media	ownership	in	Chile	during	the	period	under	examination	the	
Media	Map	 Project	 (2013)	 and	 Godoy	 (Poderopedia	 2014)	 can	 be	 viewed.	Mönckeberg	 (2016)	 can	 be	
viewed	 for	 a	detailed,	 qualitative,	 long-term	assessment	of	 the	 evolution	of	media	ownership	 since	 the	
return	to	democracy.			See	Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	(2012)	for	information	on	digital	media	ownership.	
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certainly	true	in	terms	of	competition	for	advertising	expenditure	and	audience	share.	
However,	 other	 research	 demonstrates	 that	 such	 democratising	 media	 governance	
reforms	that	have	recently	been	enacted	in	countries	such	as	Brazil	and	Argentina,	have	
not	 been	 carried	 out	 in	 Chile	 –	 this	 due	 to	 the	 weakness	 of	 media	 reform	 advocacy	
coalitions	 in	 Chile	 (Mauersberger	 2016).	 Mauersberger	 considers	 that	 such	
democratising	 reforms	 that	 are	 changing	 media	 landscapes	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 Latin	
America	are	“unlikely”	in	Chile	in	the	future.	
The	 legal	 and	policy	 frameworks	 for	media	 freedom	 in	Chile	during	 the	period	under	
discussion	were	mixed.	Although	Chilean	law	had	re-established	freedom	of	expression	
and	freedom	of	the	media	in	2001	(Bresnahan	2003),	 legal	weaknesses	resulting	from	
incomplete	 reform	 after	 military	 rule	 remained.	 Criminal	 defamation	 and	 desacato	
(contempt)	 laws	 were	 used	 during	 this	 timeframe	 to	 silence	 journalists.	 Journalists	
were	 also	 subject	 to	 attacks	 by	 Chile’s	 Carabineros	 (police	 force)	 while	 reporting	 at	
protests.	Other	subjects	deemed	too	“sensitive”	 for	media	coverage	during	 this	period	
were	protests	against	 former	military	officers	of	 the	Pinochet	 regime,	 for	which	 three	
journalists	were	arrested	and	beaten	by	police	 in	2007,	(RSF	2008)	and	the	subject	of	
paedophilia.	 In	 2011,	 journalist	 Francisco	 Martorell	 still	 faced	 the	 threat	 of	
imprisonment	 for	 defamation	 due	 to	 his	 reporting	 of	 a	 paedophilia	 case	 in	which	 an	
elite	Chilean	was	implicated	(RSF	2011).	After	police	beatings	of	several	journalists	and	
cameramen	covering	protests	in	2011,	police	violence	against	journalists	was	described	
as	 having	 increased	 “at	 a	 frightening	 rate”	 by	 the	 President	 of	 Chile’s	 Foreign	
Correspondents	Association,	Mauricio	Weibel.	Nine	 attacks	 on	media	 practitioners	 by	
police	had	been	recorded	by	October	of	that	year,	usually	related	to	journalists’	filming	
or	 photographing	 police	 violence	 against	 protesters	 (Freedom	 House	 2012).	 While	
occurrences	 like	 these	 are	 still	 rare,	 and	 Chile	 is	 usually	 regarded	 by	media	 freedom	
monitors	 like	 Reporters	 without	 Borders	 and	 Freedom	 House	 as	 one	 of	 the	 least	
constrained	 media	 systems	 in	 Latin	 America,	 the	 combination	 of	 ownership	
concentration	 and	 commercialisation,	 the	use	 of	 the	penal	 code	 to	 silence	 journalists,	
and	the	policy	of	police	beatings	of	media	personnel	in	2011,	prompted	Freedom	House	
to	change	Chile’s	media	freedom	status	in	2012	from	“Free”	to	“Partly	Free”	(Freedom	
House	2012)	 –	 although	by	2014	and	 in	 subsequent	 years,	 Freedom	House	has	 again	
rated	 Chile’s	 media	 as	 “Free”	 (Freedom	 House	 2018).	 Among	 Chilean	 journalists	
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themselves,	however,	relatively	rare	incidents	like	police	beatings	were	seen	as	less	of	a	
threat	to	media	freedom	than	the	pressure	of	the	market	–	which	in	2010,	was	regarded	
as	 the	 chief	 pressure	 on	 their	work	by	31.8%	of	 journalists,	 second	 to	pressure	 from	
advertising	 interests	(29.3%)	and	 influence	of	media	ownership	(28%)	(Mellado	et	al.	
2010b).		
Despite	 this	 rather	 bleak	 assessment	 of	 Chile’s	 media	 when	 the	 HydroAysén	 debate	
unfolded,	there	were	also	positive	developments	during	these	years.	In	2008,	during	the	
first	Bachelet	presidency,	Chile’s	Law	on	Transparency	of	Public	Functions	and	Access	
to	Information,	was	enacted.	 	This	is	a	useful	tool	for	investigative	journalists,	obliging	
government	agencies	to	respond	to	 information	requests	within	a	required	timeframe	
(Freedom	House	2015).	Some	publications	during	the	HidroAysén	timeframe	also	gave	
space	to	alternative	voices	and	ideological	positions.	Founded	in	2005,	El	Cuidadano	is	a	
news	 outlet	 that	 is	 “libertarian,	 committed	 to	 care	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 human	
rights,	 and	 that	 believes	 in	 communication	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 strengthen	 democracy”	 (El	
Cuidadano	2005).	The	independent	online	news	site	El	Mostrador	was	Chile’s	first	fully	
online	news	outlet	when	it	converted	from	a	print	edition	(founded	in	2001)	to	a	purely	
online	 presence	 in	 2003.	 El	 Mostrador	 is	 also	 known	 for	 its	 progressive	 politics,	
declaring	 “a	 commitment	 to	 independent	 and	 pluralist	 content”	 and	 the	 “defence,	
perfection	and	deepening”	of	democracy	(El	Mostrador	2006)	as	its	mission.	Despite	its	
relatively	 small	 audience	 reach,	El	Mostrador	 is	 an	 agenda	 setting	 (McCombs	&	 Shaw	
1972;	 2006)	 media	 outlet,	 sometimes	 leading	 the	 national	 news	 agenda	 with	 its	
investigative	 reports.	 Online	 investigative	 journalism	 site	 Ciper.cl	 (Centro	 de	
Investigación	 Periodística	 –	 Centre	 for	 Journalistic	 Investigation)	 is	 similar	 to	 El	
Mostrador	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 small	 audience,	 but	 cross-media	 agenda	 setting	 abilities.		
Finally,	 the	 weekly	 satirical	 publication	 The	 Clinic,	 founded	 in	 1998	 –	 the	 year	 that	
Pinochet	 was	 arrested	 and	 taking	 its	 name	 from	 the	 London	 clinic	 where	 that	 event	
occurred	–	combines	parody	with	in-depth	analysis	of	current	affairs.	The	Clinic’s	print	
edition	has	a	significant	circulation	with	140,000	readers	weekly.	It	has	458,000	Twitter	
followers	and	3	million	monthly	website	visits	(Watts	&	Franklin	2013).	
During	the	HidroAysén	debate	in	Chile,	then,	it	was	certainly	possible	for	journalists	to	
research	 and	 publish	 in-depth	 investigative	 news	 content,	 and	 for	 citizens	 to	 freely	
access	 diverse	 viewpoints	 in	 the	 media.	 An	 examination	 of	 Chileans’	 actual	 media	
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consumption,	 however,	 shows	 that	 the	 kinds	 of	 media	 most	 people	 consumed	
comprised	 much	 infotainment-type	 content,	 with	 a	 paucity	 of	 serious	 current	 affairs	
analysis	 or	 news.	 A	 key	 media	 consumption	 study	 (Godoy	 &	 Gronemeyer	 2012)	
indicates	 that,	 in	 the	HidroAysén	 timeframe,	most	 Chileans	 obtained	 their	 news	 from	
free	 to	 air	 television	with	 85%	 of	 the	 population	 consuming	 this	medium	 every	 day.	
Sixty	per	cent	listened	to	radio	daily,	20%	internet	news	and	just	17%	newspapers	(p.	
19).	On	television,	news	was	one	of	the	most	watched	aspects	of	programming:	74.5%	
of	 viewers	watched	 newscasts	 daily	 (p.	 20).	 However,	 as	 discussed,	 news	 agendas	 of	
free	 to	 air	 television	 are	 geared	 towards	 achieving	 high	 ratings,	 with	 much	
sensationalism	 and	 an	 abundance	 of	 coverage	 of	 crime,	 celebrities	 and	 sports.	 Eighty	
percent	of	viewers	questioned	in	a	2011	survey	on	free-to-air	television	considered	that	
free-to-air	 channels	 concentrated	 overly	 on	 “celebrity	 and	 showbusiness”	 while	
neglecting	more	serious	issues	(CNTV	2011,	p.	81).	
In	 print	 media,	 Chile’s	 four	 main	 newspapers,	 in	 terms	 of	 highest	 circulation	 and	
national	reach	in	the	timeframe	of	interest	here	were	El	Mercurio,	Las	Últimas	Noticias	
(El	Mercurio	group),	La	Tercera		(Copesa)	and	La	Cuarta		(Copesa).	
	
	
	
Figure	2:	Highest	circulation	newspapers’	weekly	average	readership	figures		
2005-2010	(Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	2012,	p.	22).	 	 	 	
								
	
Of	these,	Las	Últimas	Noticias	and	La	Cuarta	are	entertainment-orientated	tabloids	with	
little	depth	or	breadth	of	news	coverage.	Right	to	center-right	orientated	publications	El	
Mercurio	 and	La	 Tercera,	 pitched	 at	 Chile’s	most	 educated,	 and	 elite,	 readers	 are	 the	
most	 “serious”	 large	 circulation	 papers.	 Although	 print	 media	 consumption	 was	
relatively	much	smaller	than	broadcast	media	consumption,	the	overall	impact	of	news	
stories	reported	in	Chile’s	leading	newspapers	at	the	time	of	HidroAysén	is	significant.	
As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 1,	 newspapers	 –	 particularly	 elite	 newspapers	 –	 have	 been	
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shown	to	have	agenda	setting	influence	on	other	media,	both	print	and	television,	on	a	
local	 and	 a	 national	 level	 (Golan	 2006;	 Protess	 &	 McCombs	 2016;	 Trumbo	 1995).	
Therefore,	 newspaper	 coverage	 of	 an	 issue	 like	 HidroAysén	 in	 influential	 elite	 print	
media,	and	the	framing	of	coverage	in	those	media,	was	likely	to	have	had	an	impact	on	
broadcast	media	 coverage	 of	 this	 issue	 also,	 and	 consequently	 on	broader	media	 and	
public	 discourse	 concerning	 this	 issue.	 The	 following	 chapter,	 which	 clarifies	 the	
methods	 of	 this	 study,	 discusses	 further	 the	 choice	 of	 print	 over	 broadcast	media	 for	
analysis	here.		
	
3.13	Digital	and	social	media	in	Chile		
	
During	the	timeframe	of	the	HidroAysén	debate,	a	key	aspect	of	Chile’s	media	–	online,	
social	and	mobile	media	platforms	–	underwent	rapid	expansion.	 	The	World	 Internet	
Project	 reports	 that	 in	2006,	 the	 internet	was	used	by	40%	of	 the	population	 in	Chile	
(compared	to	71%	for	the	EU	overall	and	50%	in	Japan,	for	example)	(WIP	2015,	p.	6).	
By	 2014,	 72%	of	 Chileans	 accessed	 the	 internet	 (Internet	World	 Stats	 2014),	making	
Chile	 the	most	 internet-connected	country	 in	Latin	America.29	While	by	2014,	39%	of	
Chileans	were	 able	 to	 access	 the	 internet	 on	 a	 smartphone,	 52%	 had	mobile	 phones	
without	internet	access	(Pew	Research	Centre	2014).	Internet	usage	was	higher	among	
the	highest	income	level:	70.8%	of	this	group	were	able	to	use	the	internet	in	2014.	In	
terms	 of	 age,	 young	 people	 accessed	 the	 internet	 most	 (93%	 of	 18-29	 year-olds).	
Internet	access	among	lower	 income	groups	was	35%,	and	only	13.9%	of	people	over	
60	 used	 the	 internet.	 By	 2014,	 then,	 although	 there	 had	 been	 notable	 growth	 in	
availability	of	the	internet	during	the	years	that	are	of	interest	to	this	study,	there	still	
existed	a	significant	digital	divide	which	extended	particularly	to	lower	socio-economic	
groups	(WIP	2015).	
	
Surveys	of	different	types	of	activities	online	show	that	the	largest	share	of	internet	use	
in	Chile	was	for	social	networking	at	76%	(Pew	Research	Centre	2014).	Chileans	were	
particularly	active	Facebook	users:	together	with	Colombians,	the	most	active	users	in	
Latin	America.		Facebook	grew	from	39,000	accounts	in	2007	to	7.5	million	accounts	in	
																																																						
29	This	figure	includes	people	who	had	access	to	the	internet	by	proxy,	that	is,	they	had	someone	access	
information	 for	 them.	 The	 WIP	 reports	 that	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	 population	 accessing	 the	 internet	
directly	themselves	in	2014	was	less	than	the	above	figure:	around	51%	(WIP	2015,	p.	6).	
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2010	(Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	2012,	p.	51).	By	2014,	96%	of	internet	users	in	Chile	were	
also	Facebook	users.	Twitter	was	a	less	widely	used	–	reaching	only	10%	of	Chileans	by	
2010	(Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	2012).	However,	 the	platform	is	considered	 influential	 in	
Chile	with	users	including	high-profile	professionals,	politicians	and	journalists.	In	2010	
president	Sebastián	Piñera	and	his	entire	cabinet	opened	Twitter	accounts	specifically	
to	seem	more	accessible	 to	his	constituents	(Economist	2010).	During	 the	HidroAysén	
debate,	 both	 of	 these	 social	 media	 platforms	 would	 become	 key	 sites	 for	 internet	
activism	and	organising	protest	for	the	anti-dams	position,	and	public	discourse	on	the	
megaproject	in	general.	This	aspect	of	social	media	use	in	the	HidroAysén	megaproject	
controversy	is	covered	in	detail	in	subsequent	chapters.	
	
Chileans	also	place	great	importance	on	the	internet	as	a	news	source.	By	2010,	when	
Chileans	accessed	the	internet	for	educational/informational	purposes,	70%	of	this	time	
was	spent	consuming	news	(Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	2012,	p.	46).	Of	interest	to	this	study,	
however,	is	that	although	via	the	internet	the	variety	of	news	sources	available	is	almost	
infinite,	the	news	websites	two	of	Chile’s	“old	media”	outlets,	El	Mercurio	–	whose	online	
site	is	known	as	emol.com	–	and	the	online	site	of	newspaper	La	Tercera	–	still	figured	in	
the	 top	10	 sites	 accessed	 (Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	2012,	 p.	 47).	 In	 this	way,	 traditional	
media,	newspapers	in	particular,	still	played	an	important	role	in	the	provision	of	news	
online	in	Chile.	So	although	online	media	can	be	considered	a	site	for	the	contestation	of	
hegemony,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	in	Chile	during	the	timeframe	of	HidroAysén	some	
of	 the	 communication	 power	 of	 the	 traditional	media	 extended	 to	 information	 online	
too.	 What	 this	 meant	 for	 Chileans	 consuming	 news	 online	 during	 the	 HidroAysén	
timeframe,	 was	 that	 they	 were	 quite	 likely	 to	 be	 consuming	 news	 which	 had	 a	
conservative	 political	 agenda	 and	 a	 tendency	 to	 report	 matters	 relating	 to	 the	
environment	not	particularly	in-depth.	News	and	deeper	analysis	on	the	dams	issue	was	
certainly	 available,	 but	 it	 seems	 not	 to	 have	 been	 regularly	 accessed	 within	 the	
timeframe	of	interest	by	the	majority	of	Chileans.		
	
3.14	Public	relations	in	Chile	
	
Few	 studies	 exist	 on	 public	 relations	 (PR)	 and	 strategic	 communications	 in	 Chile	
(Délano	 1990;	 Eyzaguirre	 1993;	 Ferrari	 2009;	 Mellado	 &	 Barría	 2012;	 Mellado	 &	
Hanusch	2011;	Mellado	et	al.	2010a)	perhaps	in	part	because	it	is	a	relatively	new	field	
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in	 this	 country.	 Although	 the	 first	 organisational	 public	 relations	 department	 in	 Chile	
was	established	by	a	copper	mining	firm	in	the	1950s,	and	PR	followed	foreign	mining	
companies	 into	 the	 country	 in	 the	 1960s	 (Ferrari	 2009),	 the	 discipline	 was	 not	 well	
recognised.	It	was	only	after	the	end	of	the	military	regime,	as	if	to	fill	a	space	that	had	
been	 occupied	 by	 the	 regime’s	 own	 communications,	 that	 PR	 began	 to	 develop	 as	 a	
profession.	 However,	 PR	 struggled	 to	 gain	 credibility.	 An	 early	 study	 of	 PR	 in	 Chile	
(Délano	 1990)	 showed	 that	 because	 of	 lack	 of	 recognition	 of	 the	 strategic	
communications	capacity	of	PR,	public	relations	positions	in	Chilean	organisations	were	
mostly	filled	by	“lawyers,	sociologists,	engineers	or	journalists”,	and	that	exceptions	to	
this	 usually	 only	 occurred	 “when	 the	 professional	 has	 been	 trained	 outside	 Chile”	
(Délano	1990,	p.	23).	Research	conducted	in	1992	showed	that	PR	as	a	profession	had	
little	legitimacy	and	was	not	recognised	by	62.8%	of	Chilean	executives	(Flanagan	1992,	
cited	 in	Ferrari	2009,	p.	380).	A	more	recent	study	(Mellado	&	Barría	2012)	 indicates	
that	although	PR	now	receives	more	recognition	as	a	professional	practice,	it	is	still	not	
necessarily	considered	an	entirely	separate	profession	in	its	own	right.	The	relationship	
between	PR	and	journalism	in	Chile	seems	to	conform	to	the	Latin	American	trend,	that	
is:	 particularly	 close	 linkage	 between	 the	 two	 professions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Chile,	 as	
Mellado	and	Hanusch	(2011)	found,	this	blurring	of	the	separation	between	journalism	
and	PR	makes	the	two	groups	so	close	that	they	“tend	to	feel	they	are	part	of	the	same	
professional	community”	(p.	391).	This	 is	not	necessarily	 the	case	 for	other	countries,	
where	several	studies	have	shown	that	journalists	and	PR	professionals	perceive	their	
roles	 as	 antagonistic	 and	 their	 ethics	 and	values	as	 incompatible	 (Aronoff	1975;	Belz,	
Talbott	 &	 Starck	 1989;	 Cameron,	 Sallot	 &	 Curtin	 1997)	 with	 journalists’	 opinion	 of	
public	relations	being	more	negative	than	the	inverse	(Shin	&	Cameron	2004;	Stegall	&	
Sanders	1986).	
	
Of	course,	as	noted	in	Chapter	2,	 the	growth	of	the	field	of	public	relations	and,	at	the	
same	time,	the	approximation	of	the	fields	of	journalism	and	PR,	are	worldwide	trends	
and	not	unique	to	Chile.	Given	the	demonstrated	closeness	of	the	two	professions	in	the	
Chilean	 context,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 Chile’s	 media	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 commercial	
trends	that	have	accelerated	and	intensified	the	news	cycle	elsewhere,	it	seems	in	Chile	
as	 elsewhere,	much	news	 content	does	also	originate	 in	PR	 information	 subsidy.	This	
means	news	consumers	 in	Chile	as	 in	many	other	national	contexts	are	subject	 to	 the	
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effects	of	Habermas’	strategic	mode	of	communication,	that	is:	“one	in	which	one	actor	
intends	to	gain	an	advantage	in	the	situation	without	the	other	becoming	aware	of	those	
intentions”	 (Salter	 2005,	 p.	 92).	 In	 Chile	 during	 the	 HidroAysén	 timeframe,	 people	
consuming	 news	 on	 the	 dams	 debate	 were	 also	 the	 consuming	 strategic	
communications/PR	 of	 both	 the	 dam	 developers	 and	 the	 anti-dams	 activist	 coalition,	
without	being	aware	of	doing	so.		
	
In	Chile,	 there	 is	an	additional	aspect	 to	 the	way	that	PR	tends	to	 function,	and	to	 the	
PR/journalism	 relationship.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 Chile	 has	 maintained	 many	 of	 the	
structures	 (social,	 cultural	 and	 economic)	 either	 built	 or	 solidified	 under	 a	 17-year	
totalitarian	 regime.	 In	 the	 years	 following	 the	 transition,	 it	 seems,	 this	 included	 a	
tendency	towards	conservatism	and	hierarchy	in	business	culture	also.	An	early	study	
of	 PR	 in	 Chilean	 business	 organisations	 (Ferrari	 2000)	 found	 that	 an	 authoritarian	
culture	 persisted	 in	 many	 organisations,	 and	 that	 this	 influenced	 the	 model	 of	 PR	
practiced	 in	 these	 organisations.	 Out	 of	 13	 Chilean	 and	 multinational	 organisations	
examined	in	the	study,	the	6	Chilean	organisations	all	practiced	a	one-way	asymmetric	
model	 of	 PR	 (Grunig	 &	 Hunt	 1984),	 based	 on	 reactive	 communications,	 while	 in	
contrast,	 the	 six	multinational	 organisations	 practiced	 a	 symmetrical	model	 based	 on	
negotiation	 and	 mediation,	 and	 one	 company	 practiced	 a	 public	 information	 model	
(Ferrari	2000	cited	in	Ferrari	2009).		
	
A	more	 recent	 study	 of	 PR	 in	 Chile	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 country’s	 prevailing	 politico-
economic	 and	 cultural/social	 landscape	 continues	 to	 shape	 PR	 in	 a	 way	 that	
distinguishes	 its	 practice	 in	 this	 country	 (and	 similarly	 other	 parts	 of	 Latin	 America)	
from	 PR	 practice	 in	 Anglo-Saxon	 and	 Western	 European	 countries.	 García	 (2015)	
examined	 and	 compared	 PR	 practice	 in	 Southern	 Europe	 (Greece,	 Italy,	 Portugal	 and	
Spain)	with	PR	practices	in	Chile,	Mexico	and	Brazil,	finding	that	clientelism	(a	concept	
“inherited	 from	 feudalism”,	 p.	 134)	 was	 a	 common	 cultural	 convention	 in	 these	
countries,	 that	 this	could	be	 identified	 in	 the	work	of	organisations,	and	consequently	
also	 in	the	organisational	behavior	of	PR.	 In	clientelism,	the	asymmetrical	character	of	
social	 relations	 and	 organisational	 structure	 is	 key.	 Clientelism	 relies	 on	 individual	
relations	 of	 dependence,	 and	 affects	 all	 kinds	 of	 interactions:	 social,	 political	 and	
economic	 (Hallin	 &	 Papathanassopoulos	 2002).	 The	 prevalence	 of	 this	 system	 in	 the	
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countries	 examined	 can	 be	 explained,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 as	 a	 response	 to	 enduring	
traditional	hierarchical	social	structures.	In	the	societies	examined,	business	also	tends	
to	have	particularly	 close	 links	with	government	 (in	 the	absence	of	 the	 former	 feudal	
patron),	 and	 priority	 is	 given	 to	 constructing	 relationships	with	 government	 officials,	
politicians	 and	 decision	 makers,	 over	 communication	 with	 other	 stakeholders.	 Of	
course,	clientelistic	relationships	and	patronage	exist	to	some	degree	in	many	societies	
(Kawata	2006),	but	García	 (2015)	shows	 that	such	a	system	 is	much	more	persistent,	
pronounced	and	culturally	embedded	in	the	countries	he	examines,	including	Chile.		
	
Chilean	 business	 tends	 to	 run	 anyway	 on	 a	 personal	 influence	model	 where	 a	 social	
approach	 and	 maintaining	 important	 contacts	 (known	 in	 Chile	 as	 “pitutos”)	 is	 key.	
Because	 of	 clientelism’s	 goal	 of	 directly	 influencing	 government	 and	 key	 decision	
makers,	 strategic	 business	 communications	 in	 Chile	 often	 constitute	 direct	
communication	with	key	groups	or	media	relations	with	elite	media	–	those	consumed	
by	decision-makers	–	rather	than	relationship-building	with	publics.	
	
As	García	puts	it:		
	
Many	businesses,	particularly	the	largest	companies…consider	it	more	of	
a	 priority	 to	 be	 in	 the	 financial	 pages	 of	 newspapers	 to	 generate	
perceptions	among	local	politicians	in	order	to	obtain	licenses,	subsidies,	
or	 public	 contracts.	 Building	 relationships	with,	 for	 example,	 their	 own	
consumers	is	less	of	a	priority.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																(García	2015,	p.	141)	
As	 discussed	 above,	 newspapers	 have	 a	 small	 but	 influential	 readership	 in	 Chile,	
comprised	mostly	of	the	business	and	political	elite,	and	these	are	the	arenas	in	which	
economic	interests,	try	to	gain	political	and	social	influence.	It	seems	then,	given	Chile’s	
clientelistic	 business	 culture,	 that	 strategic	 communications	 output	 is	 particularly	
focused	at	gaining	the	attention	of	elite	print	media,	emphasizing	the	need	to	examine	
these	 kinds	 of	 media	 (over	 more	 widely	 consumed	 media	 like	 TV	 and	 radio)	 in	 the	
HidroAysén	debate.		
The	 priority	 of	 Chilean	 PR/strategic	 communications	 to	 develop	 relationships	 with	
government/decision	 makers	 over	 building	 symmetrical	 relationships	 with	 their	
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publics,	 may	 also	 lead	 to	 a	 neglect	 of	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 (CSR).	 CSR	 as	 a	
corporate	 public	 relations	 function	 was	 nascent	 in	 Chile	 during	 the	 HidroAysén	
timeframe	and	seems	to	have	been	understood	within	the	context	of	clientelism	by	some	
Chilean	business.	 In	 clientelistic	PR	environments	 the	use	of	 gifts	 and	 the	exchange	of	
favours	 are	 considered	 part	 of	 the	 “strategic	 public	 relations	menu	with	 a	 persuasive	
purpose”	(García	2015,	p.	144),	and	this	was	one	kind	of	activity	which	was	carried	out	
by	 HidroAysén,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 following	 chapters,	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 public	
perception	of	the	company	in	the	long	term.	
As	 in	 some	 countries	 in	 southern	Europe	 and	 other	 parts	 of	 Latin	America,	 therefore,	
PR/strategic	communications	 in	Chile	often	seems	 to	 takes	place	 in	a	different	kind	of	
public	 sphere	 (Hallin	 &	 Mancini	 2004;	 2013;	 Hallin	 &	 Papathanassopoulos	 2002)	 in	
which	the	central	element	is	not	relations	with	potentially	affected	publics,	but	instead	
the	bargaining	process	between	governments	 and	organisations	which	may	 indeed	be	
more	successful	if	carried	out	informally	(García	2015,	p.	139).	This	kind	of	“inter-elite	
pact	making”	(Kaltwasser	2007,	p.	343)	may	also	mean	for	the	PR	process	in	a	country	
like	Chile	 that	 the	best	 strategic	 communication	 is	 sometimes	no	 communication	on	 a	
public	 level	 at	 all,	 and	 that	 Thompson’s	 “visibility”	 and	 its	 counter	 “invisibility”	 as	
discussed	in	Chapter	2,	may	become	a	valuable	part	of	an	organisation’s	communications	
strategy.	 The	 following	 chapters	 demonstrate	 how	 maintaining	 a	 low	 profile,	 was	 at	
times	an	intentional	strategy	in	HydroAysén’s	PR	effort.		
3.15	Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	served	as	an	overview	of	a	range	of	relevant	aspects	of	Chile	leading	
up	 to	 and	 during	 the	 time	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	 debate.	 As	 well	 as	 discussing	 Chile’s	
energy	 supply	 and	 demand	 situation,	 and	 the	 country’s	 social	 and	 development	
context,	 I	 chart	 here	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 Chilean	 media	 through	 the	 dictatorship,	
arguing	that	 the	media	systems	set	up	 in	the	military	era	still	 influence	Chile’s	media	
landscape	today.	I	also	argue	here	that	the	social	and	business	model	that	prevailed	for	
many	 companies	when	HidroAysén	was	established	was	a	hierarchical	 one,	 in	which	
closed-door	 inter-elite	 negotiations	 rather	 than	 symmetrical	 communication	 with	 a	
spectrum	 of	 stakeholders	 was	 considered	 key	 to	 obtaining	 political	 favour	 and	
bureaucratic	 licences.	 	 The	 issue	 of	 social	 licence	 (Bice	 2014;	 Boutilier	 2014;	 Lester	
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2016;	Parsons	and	Moffat	2014)	in	this	context,	was	not	seen	as	a	priority	by	Chilean	
businesses.	 This,	 then,	was	 the	 landscape	 in	which	 the	HidroAysén	megaproject	was	
first	established,	and	over	eleven	years,	emerged	from	relative	invisibility	into	vigorous	
public	 debate.	 Chapters	 5,	 6,	 7	 and	 8	 examine	 in	 detail	 the	 mediatized	 debate	 over	
HidroAysén.	The	following	chapter,	Chapter	4,	first	examines	the	methodology	used	for	
this	study.	
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Chapter	4:	Aims	and	Methodology	
	
4.1	Introduction	
	
What	 might	 be	 a	 way	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 an	 eight-year	 communications	 battle	 where	
opposing	parties’	sparring	for	ascendency	in	discourse	on	the	disputed	matter	produced	
such	a	volume	and	variety	of	communications	output?	Where	should	the	focus	be	for	a	
study	 which	 aims	 to	 unpick	 the	 winding	 course	 of	 this	 extended	 narrative?	 How	 to	
understand	the	means	by	which	one	party	in	the	conflict	rendered	the	invisible	visible?	
How	 did	 the	 two	 sides	 in	 this	 debate	 represent	 themselves,	 and	 how	 were	 these	
representations	 reflected	 in	 the	 media	 content	 on	 the	 dams	 over	 such	 an	 extended	
period	of	time?	How	should	the	important	role	of	imagery	and	advertising	in	discourse	
like	 this	 be	 understood?	 How	 also	 should	 the	 issue	 of	 language	 and	 translation	 be	
treated	in	a	study	like	this	one,	given	that	most	of	the	source	material	in	the	HidroAysén	
case	is	in	Spanish?	How	might	one	understand	which	of	the	sparring	parties	gained	the	
power	 of	 definition	 at	 given	moments	 in	 the	 debate?	 And	 how	might	 the	 amount	 of	
media	coverage	help	to	pinpoint	which	moments	 in	the	 lengthy	discourse	are	critical?	
How,	 through	 its	 discursive	 construction	 did	 the	 megaproject	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 this	
conflict	 come	 to	 represent	more	 than	a	debate	over	an	energy	 infrastructure	project?	
This	 chapter	 attempts	 to	 answer	 these	 kinds	 of	 questions	 as	 it	 clarifies	 the	
methodological	approach	taken	in	this	study.	This	broader	set	of	questions	informs	the	
research	questions	of	this	study,	which	are:		
	
• How	 was	 the	 HidroAysén	 debate	 articulated	 in	 key	 Chilean	 media	 over	 the	
period	2008-2014?	
• Why,	and	when,	did	the	developing	company	seek	invisibility	for	its	project	and	
how	did	a	protest	campaign	“visibilise”30	the	project?	
• How	did	HidroAysén	come	to	represent	more	than	an	environmental	conflict	
over	a	hydroelectric	megaproject?	
• How	did	HidroAysén	become	emblematic?		
																																																						
30	I	use	this	word	occasionally	in	this	study,	meaning	‘to	make	visible’.	It	equates	to	the	Spanish	visibilizar,	
a	word	 frequently	used	by	 interviewees	 for	 this	 study	 in	relation	 to	HidroAysén.	A	 typical	definition	of	
visibilizar	 is	 “to	make	visible	by	 some	procedure	or	device	 that	which	usually	 cannot	be	 seen	with	 the	
naked	eye”	(Spanish	Oxford	Living	Dictionaries).	
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• What	 lessons	can	be	drawn	from	the	emblematic	case	of	HidroAysén	about	the	
communication	of	conflicts	over	megaprojects?		
	
I	 begin	 this	 chapter	 with	 a	 brief	 discussion	 of	 the	 commonly	 recognised	 thought	
paradigms	in	the	social	sciences,	including	their	differing	views	on	methodologies.	Then,	
I	 explain	 how	 some	methodologies	may	 be	more	 suitable	 than	 others	 for	 case	 study	
research	of	the	kind	presented	here.	I	then	detail	the	methodologies	incorporated	into	
the	multi-perspectival	approach	taken	in	this	study.	Following	this,	the	discussion	turns	
to	 the	 fieldwork	 and	 data	 collection	 that	 inform	 this	 study.	 	 Finally,	 I	 address	 the	
analysis	of	the	data	collected,	relating	this	process	back	to	the	research	questions	of	this	
thesis	 as	 a	 whole.	 I	 include	 in	 this	 section	 a	 discussion	 of	 language	 and	 translation.	
Throughout	this	chapter	–	as	through	the	whole	thesis	–	I	am	mindful	of	the	importance	
of	contingency	and	of	the	limitations	of	any	given	research	method	bearing	in	mind	that	
no	methodology	offers	“undebatable	conclusions”	(Ellis	&	Bochner	2000,	p.	734)	or	is	“a	
set	of	more	of	less	successful	procedures	for	reporting	on	a	given	reality”	(Law	2004,	p.	
143)	 but	 is	 instead	 an	 enterprise	 which	 is	 “a	 messy	 one”,	 and	 not	 “a	 series	 of	 neat,	
hermetic	stages”	(Brewer	2000,	p.	5).	Through	this	chapter	–	and	this	study	as	a	whole	–	
I	also	consider	the	need	to	remain	reflexive	and	to	be	aware	of	my	own	perspectives	as	
a	researcher,	given	that	“the	self	is	in	fact	the	site	of	knowledge	production”	(Ginsburg	
2006,	p.	492).	This	chapter	ends,	therefore,	with	a	discussion	of	reflexivity	in	relation	to	
the	conduct	of	the	research	that	informs	this	study.	
4.2	Methodological	framework	
4.2.1	Paradigmatic	and	methodological	controversies	
	
The	literature	has	tended	to	 identify	at	 least	 four31	(Guba	&	Lincoln	1994)	ontological	
paradigms	within	the	social	sciences	that	differ	fundamentally,	particularly	in	their	aims	
and	their	understanding	of	the	nature	of	knowledge.	Positivism,	postpositivism,	critical	
theory,	and	constructivism	have	been	associated	with	discrete	and	axiomatic	values.	All,	
however,	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 overarching	 questions	 about	 the	 nature	 and	 scope	 of	
																																																						
1	 Lincoln,	 Lynham	 and	 Guba	 add	 an	 additional,	 fifth,	 participatory	 paradigm	 to	 this	 list	 in	 their	
contribution	 to	 the	 2011	 edition	 to	 the	 same	 volume	 (Lincoln,	 Lynham	 &	 Guba	 2011,	 p.	 98).	 Other	
researchers,	like	Morgan	(2014a)	feel	that	pragmatism	should	also	be	considered	a	paradigm	
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their	enquiry.	Scholars	 in	all	of	these	paradigms	have	asked,	 for	example,	whether	the	
social	sciences	should	indeed	seek	knowledge	in	the	same	ways	as	knowledge	is	sought	
in	the	natural	sciences.	Can	social	science	research	ever	demonstrate	relations	of	cause	
and	effect,	given	that	social	reality	is	not	governed	by	any	law-like	phenomena?	(Benton	
&	 Craib	 2001).	 Can	 generalisations	 in	 social	 sciences	 ever	 be	 “truly	 universal,	
unrestricted	 to	 time	 and	 space”,	 leading	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	making	 valid	 theoretical	
inferences?	(Kaplan	1964,	p.	91	cited	in	Lincoln	&	Guba	2000,	p.	27).	Perhaps	the	most	
enduring	 controversy	 is	 in	 the	 area	 in	 which	 these	 ontologies	 differ	 most	
fundamentally:	in	the	research	methodologies	they	favour.		
	
The	divide	between	advocates	and	practitioners	of	qualitative	and	quantitative	research	
has	 been	 a	 significant	 philosophical	 fault	 line	 in	 the	 social	 sciences.	 Although	 the	
literature	 cautions	 to	 avoid	 drawing	 a	 simplistic	 dichotomy	 between	 qualitative	 and	
quantitative	research,	questioning	whether	qualitative	research	can	provide	the	level	of	
certainty	about	observed	phenomena	that	quantitative	research	is	perceived	to	provide	
has	 long	 been	 a	 feature	 social	 science	 enquiry.	 At	 opposite	 ends	 of	 the	 spectrum	 of	
ontologies,	 positivist	 research	 usually	 relies	 purely	 on	 ‘factual’	 knowledge	 and	
measurable,	 discrete,	 empirically	 observable	 elements.	 Positivism	 is	 built	 on	
quantifiable	observations	that	lend	themselves	to	statistical	analysis.	The	constructivist	
paradigm,	 however,	 is	 concerned	 with	 how	 people	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 world.	
Constructivism	 (sometimes	 termed	 naturalistc	 enquiry	 or	 interpretivism)	 prioritises	
meaning	 and	 interpretation	 and	 considers	 that	 the	ways	 in	which	 people	 understand	
their	world	constructs	their	own	reality.	Constructivist	research	–	which	is	most	often	
qualitative	–	takes	the	view	that	the	best	way	to	understand	a	phenomenon	is	to	view	it	
in	its	context.		
	
Despite	paradigmatic	controversies	–	and	past	claims	that	positivist	and	constructivist	
ontologies	 and	 their	 preferred	 methodological	 styles	 are	 irreconcilable	 (Lincoln,	
Lynham	 &	 Guba	 2011)	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 research	 styles	 should	 not	 be	
considered	 as	 being	 in	 opposition	 to	 one	 another.	 As	 Geertz	 predicted	 almost	 three	
decades	ago	when	he	wrote	of	a	“blurring	of	genres”	(Geertz	1988;	1993),	scholarship	
has	 identified	 a	 trend	 of	 rapprochement	 between	 paradigms	 (together	 with	 their	
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respectively	 accompanying	 theorists	 and	 methodologies).	 By	 2011,	 Lincoln,	 Lynham	
and	Guba	argued	that	
		
the	various	paradigms	are	beginning	to	“interbreed”	such	that	two	theorists	
previously	thought	to	be	 in	 irreconcilable	conflict	may	now	appear,	under	a	
different	theoretical	rubric,	to	be	informing	one	another’s	arguments		
	
	(p.	97)		
	
With	the	blurring	of	paradigms	has	come	a	“third	methodological	movement”	(Teddlie	
&	Tashakkori	 2011,	 p.	 285)	 –	mixed	methods	 research	 –	which	holds	 that	 qualitative	
and	quantitative	methods	are	innately	compatible.	When	used	in	combination,	because	
these	different	methods	may	allow	access	to	different	types	of	knowledge,	they	can	offer	
deeper	 insights	 into	 the	 study	 target	 (Cresswell	 2011,	 p.	 269;	 Teddlie	 &	 Tashakkori	
2011,	p.	285).	
	
4.2.2	“Multiple	ways	of	seeing”	
	
Mixed	 methods	 research,	 based	 on	 pragmatism,	 has	 been	 defined	 by	 Johnston	 et	 al.	
(Johnson,	R,	Onwuegbuzie	&	Turner	2007,	p.	123)	as	a	combination	of	qualitative	and	
quantitative	 research	 approaches,	 “for	 the	 broad	 purposes	 of	 breadth	 and	 depth	 of	
understanding	 and	 corroboration”.	 Some	 scholars	 have	 described	mixing	methods	 as	
“methodological	eclecticism”	(Hammersley	1996;	Yanchar	&	Williams	2006),	others	as	
“a	palette	of	methods”	 (Stake	1995,	p.	xi-xii),	and	some	have	emphasised	 its	ability	 to	
“cancel	 out	 the	 respective	 weaknesses	 of	 each	 method”	 (Hammersley	 1996,	 p.	 167).	
Other	 scholars	 have	 emphasised	 that	 mixing	 methodologies	 allows	 the	 researcher	
“multiple	ways	of	seeing”	and	therefore	“multiple	standpoints	on	what	is	important	and	
to	 be	 valued	 and	 cherished”	 (Greene	 2007,	 p.	 20).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 mixed	 methods	
research,	many	scholars	have	also	discouraged	a	binary	distinction	between	qualitative	
and	 quantitative	 methodologies,	 (Bryman	 1998;	 Coxon	 2005;	 Denscombe	 2008;	
Giddings	2006;	Gorard	&	Taylor	2004;	Vogt	2008),	arguing	that	such	a	distinction	does	
not	hold	in	practice,	is	not	watertight,	and	is	instead	“questionable”	(Cresswell	2011,	p.	
272).	This	is	because	methods	that	prioritise	numerical	data	usually	involve	qualitative	
judgements,	 and	 likewise	 quantitative	 studies	 need	 to	 consider	 context	 –	 usually	 a	
qualitative	concern	(Sandelowski,	Voils	&	Knafl	2009).	Some	authors	have	written	that	
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studies	that	include	multiple	strands	of	either	qualitative	or	quantitative	data	should	be	
considered	 mixed	 methods	 research	 (while	 others	 have	 proposed	 this	 be	 termed	
“multiple	methods”	(Morse	&	Niehaus	2009).		
Although	the	mixed	methods	approach	has	been	referred	to	as	“a	new	star	in	the	social	
science	sky”	(Mayring	2007,	p.	1),	 the	notion	of	combining	and	 linking	qualitative	and	
quantitative	research	in	the	same	study	to	facilitate	data	triangulation	(Denzin	1978)	is	
not	 new.	 Interest	 in	mixing	methods	has	 been	building	 since	1970s	 (Cresswell	 2011)	
and	has	risen	“increasingly	sharply”	 (Fielding	2012,	p.	124)	since	2000,	 fuelled	by	the	
trend	towards	a	delinking	of	paradigms	and	methodologies	(Johnson,	L	&	Onwuegbuzie	
2004).	 Case	 study	 researchers,	 fieldwork	 sociologists	 and	 cultural	 anthropologists	
argue,	however,	that	their	data	gathering	has	been	mixing	methods	for	the	investigation	
of	 complex	 social	 phenomena	 since	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 (Holmes	 2006	 cited	 in	
Cresswell	2011).	Although	for	Morse	and	Niehaus	(2009),	ethnography	is	an	approach	
that	 is	distinct	 from	mixed	methods	research,	Creswell	argues	 that	 this	 is	a	debatable	
point,	 and	 that	 mixed	 methods	 are	 being	 used	 within	 many	 larger	 frameworks,	
including	the	kind	of	case	study	research	that	constitutes	this	study	(Cresswell	2010).	
As	 Creswell	 also	 points	 out	 “collecting	 QUAL	 data	 and	 transforming	 it	 into	 QUAN	
counts”	 is	 “the	 procedure	 used	 in	 traditional	 content	 analysis”	 (2010,	 p.	 52).	
Sandelowski,	 Voils	 and	 Knafl	 (2009)	 suggest	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 data	 transformation	
required	for	content	analysis	(a	computer-assisted	version	of	which	this	study	employs)	
indeed	qualifies	as	method-mixing.	Mixed	methods,	therefore,	are	somewhat	of	a	broad	
church	 in	 terms	 both	 of	 the	 thought	 paradigms	 that	 they	 bridge,	 overarching	
frameworks	 within	 which	 they	 fit,	 and	 the	 practical	 data	 collection	 and	 analysis	
methods	that	they	encompass.	
In	 the	research	presented	 in	 this	study,	 I	endeavour	 to	make	use	of	 “multiple	ways	of	
seeing”	to	best	understand	the	complex,	multifaceted	case	of	HidroAysén.	This	study	is	
therefore	 not	 aligned	 with	 a	 single	 method,	 methodology,	 thought	 paradigm	 or	
intellectual	tradition,	yet	builds	on	several.	To	facilitate	“multiple	ways	of	seeing”,	I	use	
mixed-	 and	 multi-methods	 in	 a	 detailed	 single	 case	 study,	 employing	 a	 smaller	
quantitative	component	on	a	corpus	of	media	content,	together	with	computer-assisted	
content	analysis,	to	inform	an	overall	qualitative	lens.		If	the	approach	used	here	needs	
an	 identifying	 label,	 it	 might	 be	 called	 what	 Cresswell	 terms	 “mixed	 methods	
	 108	
interpretivism”	(Cresswell	2011,	p.	277)	–	where	quantitative	methods	play	a	secondary	
or	supporting	role	 in	 largely	qualitative	research,	and	 the	overall	paradigm	remains	a	
mainly	 constructive/interpretive	 one.	 Creswell	 indeed	 calls	 for	 more	 studies	 that	
employ	this	kind	of	research	style.	
For	 this	 study	 of	 “becoming	 emblematic”	 –	 essentially	 an	 analysis	 of	 a	 process	 of	
meaning	creation	–		a	constructivist	way	of	thinking	is	often	the	key	framework.	But	it	is	
not	 the	 only	 one.	 Case	 study	 research	 like	 that	 presented	 here	does	 fit	 appropriately	
within	 the	 interpretivist/constructivist	 paradigm	 where	 the	 social	 formation	 of	
meaning	 is	 paramount	 (Gillham	2000;	 Stake	1995;	 2000;	 2005).	 But	 case	 studies	 can	
equally	 fall	within	 a	more	 postpositivist	 paradigm	 and	 be	 conducted	 according	 to	 an	
understanding	that	a	“real”	reality	can	be	apprehended	(Yin	2003).	As	a	mixed-methods	
study,	 the	 research	 here	 also	 draws	 on	 some	 aspects	 of	 pragmatism	 (generally	
considered	 to	 be	 mixed	 methods’	 philosophical	 partner)	 as	 described	 by	 the	
philosopher	 Dewey	 (Dewey	 1920/2008;	 1922/2008).	 Methodologically,	 pragmatism	
departs	 from	 the	qualitative/quantitative	 binary	 and	philosophically,	 from	arguments	
about	 the	 nature	 of	 reality	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 finding	 truth	 (Morgan	 2014b,	 p.	 5)	
advocating	rather	“freedom	of	enquiry”	(Dewey	1925/2008).	Importantly,	pragmatism	
also	 emphasises	 the	 transformative	 capacity	 of	 social	 research,	 and	 its	 ability	 to	
facilitate	social	change.	Given	that	this	research	presents	“lessons”	from	the	case	study	
examined	 here,	 and	 positions	 itself	 as	 being	 of	 practical	 use	 in	 understanding	 the	
communication	of	environmental	conflict,	 it	 is	certainly	concerned	with	the	possibility	
for	 application	 of	 its	 findings.	 	 The	 pragmatic	 approach	 to	 enquiry	 therefore	 seems	 a	
good	fit	for	many	parts	of	this	study.	
4.2.3	Seeing	just	one	case		
The	 term	 ‘case	 study’	has	been	described	as	 “a	definitional	morass”	 (Gerring	2006,	p.	
17)	where	conflicting	ideas	have	surrounded	both	what	constitutes	case	study	research,	
and	 the	 validity	 of	 such	 research.	 Gillham	 defines	 a	 case	 study	 as:	 “a	 unit	 of	 human	
activity	 embedded	 in	 the	 real	 world,	 which	 can	 only	 be	 studied	 or	 understood	 in	
context”	and	that	“merges	in	with	its	context	so	that	precise	boundaries	are	difficult	to	
draw”	 (Gillham	 2000,	 p.	 1)	 .	 A	 case	 study	 is	 therefore	 not	 a	 naturally	 existing	
phenomenon.	 Only	 the	 demarcation	 of	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 unit	 of	 study	 –	 the	
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production	of	what	Stake	(2008,	p.	121)	calls	a	“bounded	system”	–	defines	a	case.	Case	
studies	 are	 also	 intensive.	 They	 “comprise	 more	 detail,	 richness,	 completeness	 and	
variance	–	that	is,	depth	–	for	the	unit	of	study	than	does	cross	unit	analysis”	(Flyvbjerg	
2011,	p.	 301).	 Flyvbjerg	writes	 that	definitive	of	 case	 studies	 is	 also	 typically	 the	 fact	
that	 they	evolve	 in	 time,	often	as	a	 “string	of	 concrete	and	 interrelated	events”	which	
only	constitute	the	case	when	seen	as	a	whole	(2011,	p.	301).	
The	value	of	case	study	research	has	often	been	questioned.		Case	studies	have	earned	
much,	 particularly	 positivist,	 criticism	 for	 having	 “a	 total	 absence	 of	 control”	 and	
therefore	 “no	 scientific	 value”32	 (Campbell	&	Stanley	1966,	p.	 6-7).	 Critics	have	 asked	
what	 value	 there	 can	 be	 in	 knowing	 only	 the	 unique.	 Case	 studies	 have	 also	 been	
criticised	 for	 their	 widely	 varying	 methodological	 procedures	 (Maoz	 2002),	 and	 for	
their	perceived	lack	of	external	validity	and	generalizability,	which	has	been	seen	to	be	
compounded	 by	 researcher	 subjectivity	 and	 a	 bias	 towards	 hypothesis	 verification	
(Diamond	 1996).	 Much	 scholarly	 writing	 suggests,	 however,	 that	 case	 studies	 have	
earned	this	criticism	unfairly.	
While	the	social	sciences	may	not	yet	have	produced	general,	predictive	theory,	they	do	
provide	abundant	context-dependent	knowledge.	“In	the	study	of	human	affairs”,	notes	
Flyvbjerg,	 “there	 appears	 to	 exist	 only	 context-dependent	 knowledge”	 (2006,	 p.	 221).	
The	 case	 study,	 Flyvbjerg	 (2001;	 2006;	 2011)	 argues,	 is	 especially	 well	 suited	 to	
producing	this	kind	of	knowledge.	To	address	the	generalisability	of	the	findings	of	case	
study	research,	many	scholars	now	consider	that	the	social	sciences	need	an	alternative,	
less	 positivist,	 way	 of	 thinking	 and	 talking	 about	 case	 studies,	 which	 recognises	 the	
effectiveness	of	even	the	single	case	for	knowledge	generation	and	transfer	(Donmoyer	
2000)	as	well	as	the	value	of	case-specific	knowledge	without	generalisation.	Flyvbjerg	
(2011,	p.	305)	writes	that:	
One	can	often	generalize	on	the	basis	of	a	single	case,	and	the	case	study	
may	 be	 central	 to	 scientific	 development	 via	 generalization	 as	
supplement	or	alternative	to	other	methods.	But	formal	generalization	is	
overvalued	as	 a	 source	of	 scientific	development,	whereas	 the	 “force	of	
example”	and	transferability	are	underestimated.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
																																																						
32	Flyvbjerg	(2006)	notes	that	Campbell	later	made	an	about-turn	in	his	views	on	case	study	research,	and	
by	1975	was	writing	of	the	value	of	this	kind	of	research	(Campbell	1975).	
	 110	
Others	contend	that	case	studies	are	so	effective	for	generalisation	that	they	can	indeed	
assist	theory	development	(Eckstein	1975;	George	&	Bennett	2005).	This	case	study	of	
the	 HidroAysén	 controversy	 does	 offer	 lessons	 which	 may	 shed	 light	 on	 the	
communication	of	environmental	conflicts	 in	other	contexts.	Though	its	aim	is	not	the	
production	of	empirical	theory,	this	study	does	generalise	and	does	endeavour	to	make	
the	case-specific	knowledge	uncovered	here	transferrable.				
On	the	question	of	possible	verification	bias	in	case	study	research,	much	reflection	on	
this	type	of	research	shows	the	very	opposite	effect	(Flyvbjerg	2011).	Case	studies	often	
refute	 preconceived	 views	 and	 force	 the	 researcher	 to	 revise	 hypotheses	 as	 the	
phenomenon	under	study	unfolds.	 “The	Field”,	says	Geertz,	 “is	a	powerful	disciplinary	
force:	assertive,	demanding,	even	coercive”	(Geertz	1995).	This	has	indeed	been	true	for	
the	case	study	presented	here.	As	the	HidroAysén	megaproject	case	itself	unfolded	over	
time,	and	as	my	own	field	study	in	Chile	developed	over	several	months,	I	began	to	see	
that	 my	 original	 hypotheses	 had	 failed	 to	 adequately	 capture	 what	 it	 was	 that	 was	
particular	about	the	HidroAysén	case.	The	on-the-ground	research	therefore	shaped	the	
direction	 of	 this	 study	 significantly,	 refuting	 my	 initial	 beliefs	 and	 teaching	 me	 as	 a	
researcher	 how	 best	 to	 understand	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 emblematic	 HidroAysén	
conflict.	
What	of	researcher	subjectivity	and	of	reflexivity	in	case	studies?	Demanding	extensive	
field	work	as	they	usually	do,	case	studies	may	require	that	the	researcher	participate	in	
the	 activities	he	or	 she	 is	 describing.	As	Flyvbjerg	notes,	 the	 case	 study	 entails	 “close	
proximity	 to	reality”	and	“the	most	advanced	 form	of	understanding”	 is	only	achieved	
when	“researchers	place	themselves	within	the	context	being	studied”	(Flyvbjerg	2011,	
p.	301).	Positivists/postpositivists	 counter	 that	 researcher	 subjectivity	 in	 case	 studies	
invalidates	 research	 findings.	 While	 researchers	 using	 qualitative	 methodologies	
recognise	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 researcher	 guides	 everything	 from	 topic	 choice	 to	
hypothesis	 formulation,	 to	 the	 selection	 of	 methodologies,	 data	 streams	 and	 data	
interpretation;	the	same	recognition	of	subjectivity	in	research	choices	does	not	always	
come	 from	 proponents	 of	 quantitative	 methods.	 Case	 study	 research	 recognises	
subjectivity,	and	 indeed	values	 it.	As	Flyvbjerg	(2011,	p.	301)	points	out,	proximity	 to	
the	 object(s)	 of	 study	 allows	 “talking	 back”,	 a	 characteristic	 feature	 of	 case	 study	
research	that	George	and	Bennett	describe	as	follows:		
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When	a	case	study	researcher	asks	a	participant	“were	you	thinking	X	when	
you	did	Y”,	and	gets	the	answer,	“No,	I	was	thinking	Z,”	then	if	the	researcher	
had	 not	 thought	 of	 Z	 as	 a	 causally	 relevant	 variable,	 she	 may	 have	 a	 new	
variable	demanding	to	be	heard.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 																			(George	&	Bennett	2005,	p.	20)	
Case	 study	 researchers,	 therefore,	 do	 not	 try	 to	 deny	 or	 even	 minimise	 subjective	
engagement	 with	 the	 object	 of	 study	 –	 this	 is	 in	 fact	 essential	 to	 achieving	 deeper	
insights	on	the	case	at	hand.		
4.2.4	Case	study	as	ethnography	
Is	case	study,	then,	ethnography?	Certainly,	case	studies	can	involve	many	of	the	data	
collection	methods	 that	 ethnographic	 studies	 do:	 in-depth	 interviews,	 direct	 and/or	
participant	 observation,	 analysis	 of	 documents,	 archives	 and	 artefacts.	 As	 discussed	
above,	 an	 assemblage	 of	 data	 from	 these	 kinds	 of	multiple	 sources,	 common	 in	 case	
studies,	can	provide	an	understanding	of	the	fine-grain	structure	of	a	phenomenon	and	
its	 context.	 This	 ability	 to	 reveal	 such	 detail	 is	 akin	 to	 Clifford	 Geertz’	 “thick	
description”	 (Geertz	1973)	 that	 seeks	an	assemblage	of	 “very	densely	 textured	 facts”	
(Geertz	 1973,	 p.	 321)	 “to	 bring	 us	 into	 touch	 with	 the	 lives	 of	 strangers”	 (p.	 317).	
Geertz	 saw	his	ethnography	as	 “not	an	experimental	 science	 in	 search	of	 law,	but	an	
interpretative	one	 in	search	of	meaning”	 (p.	311).	This	kind	of	 search	 for	meaning	 is	
also	the	objective	of	a	(mainly)	qualitative	case	study,	such	as	the	one	presented	here.		
Though	ethnography	is	used	in	the	social	sciences,	it	is	often	associated	foremost	with	
research	 in	 anthropology	 such	 as	 that	 of	 Geertz.	Willis	 (2007)	 argues,	 however,	 that	
social	 science	 case	 studies	 are	 much	 more	 similar	 to	 ethnographies	 than	 they	 are	
dissimilar	and	that	aspects	of	ethnography	can	fruitfully	be	combined	with	case	study	
research	 in	 the	social	 sciences.	 In	 fact,	 the	 terms	 “case	study”	and	 “ethnography”	are	
sometimes	used	interchangeably	to	describe	the	methodology	used	in	a	single	mixed-
methods	research	project	(White,	Drew	&	Hay	2009,	p.	19).	Though	I	do	not	regard	the	
research	presented	here	as	ethnography	–	in	part	because	it	does	not	incorporate	the	
ethnographic	 hallmark	 of	 extended	 participant-observation	 and	 the	 production	 of	
highly	detailed	field	notes	–	this	case	study	does	borrow	much	from	the	ethnographer’s	
kit	of	methods,	and	it	does	bring	multiple	data	together	in	a	dense,	detailed	narrative	
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that	 is	 close	 to	 “thick	description”.	 If	what	 I	present	here	 is	partly	ethnographic,	 it	 is	
ethnographic	 in	 the	 narrative	 sense	 that	 van	 Maanen	 describes:	 in	 the	 researcher	
drawing	 “close	 to	 people	 and	 events”	 and	 then	 “writing	 about	 what	 was	 learned	 in	
situ”.	 “Ethnography	 is,”	after	all,	as	van	Maanen	also	notes,	 “a	storytelling	 institution’	
(van	Maanen	1995,	p.	3).	
In	 addition,	 although	 as	 a	 researcher,	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 be	 reflexive	 about	 my	 own	
presence	 in	 the	 research	 and	 the	 subjectivity	 inherent	 in	 case	 study,	 unlike	 an	
ethnographer,	 I	do	not	 focus	greatly	on	my	own	role.	Although,	 to	better	understand	
the	 HidroAysén	 case	 I	 put	 myself	 in	 the	 setting	 that	 I	 wanted	 to	 study,	 as	
ethnographers	 do,	 I	 do	 not	 purport	 to	 present	 an	 “insider’s”	 view	 of	 the	 case	 here.	
Although	I	conducted	numerous	semi-structured,	 in-depth	interviews	with	key	actors	
in	 the	 debate,	 and	 observed	 several	 public	 –	 and	 private	 –	 events	 connected	 to	 the	
conflict	surrounding	the	HidroAysén	project,	I	was	not	for	any	great	length	of	time	an	
ethnographic-style	participant-observer	of	the	HidroAysén	case.			
4.2.5	Paradigmatic	or	emblematic?	
Several	 scholars	 concerned	 with	 the	 case	 study	 methodology	 have	 written	 about	
different	 types	 of	 case	 study.	Apart	 from	 the	 obvious	 distinction	 between	 single	 and	
multiple-case	 studies,	 and	 randomly	 selected	versus	 intentionally	 selected	cases,	Yin,	
for	 example,	 identifies	 five	 types	 of	 single	 cases,	 which	 he	 describes	 as	 “critical,	
unusual,	 common,	 revelatory	 or	 longitudinal”	 cases	 –	 each	 concerned	 with	 revealing	
subtly	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 case	 under	 examination	 (Yin	 2014,	 p.	 51).	 Stake	
additionally	writes	 of	 “intrinsic”	 and	 “instrumental”	 cases	 (Stake	2005,	 pp.	 445-448)	
and	Flyvbjerg	adds,	partly	overlapping	with	Yin,	“extreme	or	deviant”	cases,	“maximum	
variation	 cases”	 and	 “paradigmatic	 cases”	 (2011,	 p.	 306-308).	 It	 is	 the	 last	 of	 these	
categories	that	best	fits	the	case	of	HidroAysén.		
Flyvbjerg	 calls	 paradigmatic	 cases	 “exemplars”	 which	 have	 “metaphorical	 and	
prototypical	value”	(2011,	p.	308).	For	Pavlich	these	are	“pivotal	cases”	(2012,	p.	645).		
A	paradigmatic	case	“involves	placing	an	exemplar	alongside	a	phenomenon;	by	virtue	
of	so	placing,	it	shows	or	reveals	key	elements	of	that	phenomenon”	(Pavlich	2012,	p.	
	 113	
646).		The	exemplar	is,	then,	a	singular	case	that	becomes	exemplary	of	a	wider	set.33	In	
philosophical	terms,	such	cases	are	the	comparison	of	one	paradigm	with	the	class	that	
the	 particular	 paradigm	 is	 designed	 to	 reveal.	 By	 being	 placed	 alongside	 the	
phenomenon	 it	 is	 exemplar	 of,	 a	 paradigmatic	 case	 renders	 that	 phenomenon	
intelligible	(Amgaben	2002).		
Paradigmatic	cases,	though	of	interest	in	themselves,	are	therefore	most	important	for	
their	 “illustrative”	 (Pavlich	 2012,	 p.	 646)	 value	 because,	 as	 Flyvbjerg	 puts	 it,	 they	
“highlight	more	general	characteristics	of	the	societies	in	question”	(Flyvbjerg	2011,	p.	
308).	 This	 study,	 which	 is	 concerned	 with	 how	 the	 communications	 surrounding	 a	
certain	case	caused	 it	 to	become	 illustrative	of	or	metaphorical	 for	a	particular	set	of	
characteristics	 of	 the	 society	 in	which	 it	 is	 embedded,	 can	 certainly	 be	 considered	 a	
paradigmatic	 case.	 HidroAysén,	 seemingly	 at	 first	 purely	 an	 environmental	 conflict,	
came	to	represent	much	more	than	this.	Because	this	study	is	concerned	above	all	with	
representation	and	the	discursive	construction	of	the	paradigmatic	case	of	HidroAysén,	
it	 proposes	 that	 the	 megaproject	 became	 an	 emblem.	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
“exemplar”	paradigm	that	serves	as	an	illustrative	pattern	or	model,	and	the	symbolic	
emblem,	that	stands	for	or	represents	a	particular	idea	or	concept,	are	closely	related	–	
even	the	same	thing.	While	this	study	does	consider	HidroAysén	a	paradigmatic	case,	it	
also	more	than	this.	The	notion	proposed	here	of	a	case	becoming	emblematic	serves	to	
underscore	 both	 the	 process	 of	 becoming,	 over	 time,	 and	 also	 the	 mediatized	
construction	of	the	case	as	an	emblem,	in	both	language	and	images.	Flyvbjerg	(2011)	
notes	that	it	is	not	always	possible	to	determine	in	advance	whether	a	given	case	will	
be	paradigmatic,	because	being	paradigmatic	depends	not	only	on	the	case	 itself,	but	
on	 interpretation	 (for	 example,	 the	 public’s,	 the	 researcher’s)	 that	 informs	 the	
understanding	of	a	case.	A	case	therefore	unfolds	as	paradigmatic.	This	seems	closely	
aligned	with	to	the	notion	of	becoming.	In	paradigmatic	cases,	then,	there	also	there	is	a	
process	of	becoming,	which,	at	the	most	basic	level,	is	what	is	being	examined	here.	
4.2.6	Discourse,	and	its	critical	moments	
																																																						
33	 Pavlich	 cites	 Foucault’s	 exploration	 of	 Bentham’s	 panopticon	 as	 a	 paradigmatic	 example	 of	 the	
disciplinary	techniques	of	power.	He	writes	“This	paradigmatic	case,	by	virtue	of	its	being	placed	side	by	
side	with	the	phenomenon	of	modern	power	is	at	once	an	element	thereof	and	yet	serves	to	make	such	
power	intelligible”	(2012,	p.	646).	
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How	 is	 it	 that	 a	 particular	 case,	 like	 HidroAysén,	 becomes	 associated	 with	 certain	
things,	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 others?	 How	 does	 a	 case	 evolve	 so	 that	 a	 certain	way	 of	
understanding	it	may	become	fixed	over	time?	Scholarship	has	long	understood	social	
meaning	as	being	bound	up	with	language,	so	that	complex	practices	of	communication	
systematically	 construct	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 world.	 	 The	 study	 of	 ‘discourse’,	 the	
construction	 of	 meaning	 and	 reality	 through	 language,	 is	 widely	 used	 in	 qualitative	
research	 and	 is	 associated	 with	 techniques	 varying	 from	 linguistic	 analysis	 to	 the	
examination	of	the	normative	quality	of	language	in	discussion.		
For	Foucault,	discourse	was	the	way	in	which	language	constitutes	the	objects	of	which	
we	speak	 (Foucault	1965;	1980)	and	discourse	was	closely	 linked	 to	political	power.	
Foucault	argued	that	discourses	embody	power	as	they	condition	the	perceptions	and	
understandings	 of	 those	 subject	 to	 them,	 advancing	 some	 interests	 and	 suppressing	
others	 (Foucault	1980).	Discourse	 can	be	 thought	of	primarily	 in	microperspective	–	
that	 is,	as	being	evident	above	all	 in	 language	–	and	therefore	as	being	best	analysed	
using	 a	 detailed,	 textually	 orientated	 linguistic	 approach	 like	 Critical	 Discourse	
Analysis	(CDA)	(Chouliaraki	&	Fairclough	1999;	Fairclough	1995;	1998;	2003;	Fowler	
1991;	 van	 Dijk,	 T.	 1988a;	 van	 Dijk,	 T.	 1988b;	 1991;	Wodak,	 R.	 1996;	Wodak,	 R.	 	 &	
Chilton	 2005;	 Wodak,	 R.	 &	 Meyer	 2009).	 Or	 it	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 a	
macroperspectival	 sense,	 where,	 though	 embedded	 in	 language,	 discourse	 is	
considered	a	larger	concept	related	to	jointly	constituted	knowledge	and	societal-level	
understandings	 of	 an	 issue:	 as	 Dryzek	 puts	 it,	 “a	 discourse	 is	 a	 shared	 way	 of	
apprehending	the	world”	(2005,	p.	9).	
Superficially,	there	would	seem	to	be	a	fundamental	disjuncture	between	the	notion	of	
discourse	held	by	social	theory-inspired	researchers	and	those	whose	interest	is	in	the	
detailed	 analysis	 of	 texts.	 Foucauldian	 discourse	 analysis,	 particularly,	 has	 been	
described	 as	 having	 “a	 high	 level	 of	 abstraction”,	 “extraordinary	 vagueness”	 and	 as	
being	“an	approach	that	eschews	formalization”	(Arribas-Ayllon	&	Walkerdine	2011).	
However,	as	Fairclough	explains,	effective	analysis	of	discourse	must	take	into	account	
both	textual	elements	and	their	wider	social	context:			
This	is	not,	or	should	not	be	an	‘either/or’.	On	the	one	hand,	any	analysis	of	
texts	which	 aims	 to	be	 significant	 in	 social	 scientific	 terms	has	 to	 connect	
with	 theoretical	 questions	 about	 discourse	 (eg:	 the	 socially	 ‘constructive’	
	 115	
effects	of	discourse).	On	the	other	hand,	no	real	understanding	of	the	social	
effects	 of	 discourse	 is	 possible	 without	 looking	 closely	 at	 what	 happens	
when	people	talk	or	write.			
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																		(Fairclough	2003,	p.	3)	
Carvalho	 (2008)	 extends	 the	 argument	 for	 analyses	 of	 discourse	 to	 consider	 social	
processes	 “outside”	 the	 text,	 so	 that	 all	 analysis	 of	 discourse	 combines	 a	 textual	
dimension	with	a	contextual	one.	This	is	perhaps	particularly	necessary	for	the	analysis	
of	discourse	on	 the	environment,	where,	as	 in	 the	case	of	HidroAysén,	 “a	diversity	of	
actors	actively	try	to	 influence	the	definition	of	the	problem”	and	such	distinct	actors	
“exercise	 power	 through	 trying	 to	 impose	 a	 particular	 frame	 or	 discourse	 onto	 a	
discussion”	 (Hajer	 &	 Versteeg	 2005,	 p.	 177).	 Scholars	 of	 environmental	 discourses,	
such	 as	 Anderson	 (1997)	 and	 Lester	 (2007)	 have	 also	 found	 that	 to	 understand	
sources’	 strategies	 for	 achieving	 the	 power	 of	 definition	 in	mediatized	 debates,	 text	
analysis	directed	at	media	content	and	other	source	documents	must	be	supplemented	
with	 additional	 methods,	 like	 observational	 analysis	 or	 in-depth	 interviews.	 As	
Anderson	explains,	only	in	this	way	is	it	possible	“fully	to	assess	their	[sources’]	success	
or	failure	in	influencing	agendas”	(Anderson,	A	1997,	p.	37).	Carvalho	concurs	with	this	
position,	 calling	 for	 special	 emphasis	 to	 be	 put	 on	 “the	 role	 of	 actors’	 discursive	
strategies	 in	media	discourse”	 and	more	 adequate	 study	of	 “the	ways	 they	 and	 their	
standings	are	represented	in	the	media”	(2008,	p.	165).	
This	 study	with	 its	multi-perspectival	approach	 to	understanding	 the	construction	of	
HidroAysén	and	its	interest	in	the	way	in	which	competing	sources	attempted	to	take	
control	 of	 risk	 definition	 in	 relation	 to	 the	megaproject,	 pays	 particular	 attention	 to	
discourse.	 Although	 I	 view	 language	 as	 key	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 HidroAysén	 was	
constructed,	 I	 do	 not	 employ	 linguistic-style	 discourse	 analysis	 here.	 Rather,	 I	
understand	discourse	in	the	more	constructivist	sense,	akin	to	the	definition	given	by	
Hajer	and	Versteeg,	for	whom	discourse	is:	
an	ensemble	of	 ideas,	concepts	and	categories	through	which	meaning	
is	given	 to	social	and	physical	phenomena	and	which	 is	produced	and	
reproduced	through	an	identifiable	set	of	practices.	The	 ‘discussion’	 in	
other	words	is	the	object	of	analysis.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Hajer	&	Versteeg	2005,	p.	175)		
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Such	 “discussion”	 here	 is	 accessed	 through	 a	 range	 of	 print	 media	 articles,	 PR	 and	
advertising	 material,	 and	 social	 media	 content,	 which	 were	 collected	 across	 the	
timeframe	of	the	HidroAysén	debate.	I	supplement	this	with	extended	semi-structured	
interviews	with	key	actors	 in	 the	debate.	 I	use	computer-assisted	content	analysis	 to	
gain	language-based	insights	into	the	newspaper	article	corpus.	For	PR	and	advertising	
texts	where	the	content	is	often	more	image-based,	semiotics	offer	an	insight	into	the	
discursive	strategies	of	 image	use	(as	 I	elaborate	 in	 the	sections	below.)	 	Using	these	
kinds	of	content,	I	am	able	to	carry	out	an	examination	of	what	Fairclough	(e.g.:	1995)	
describes	as	the	progressive	transformation	of	texts	along	discursive	chains.	I	am	also	
able	 to	 identify	 certain	 aspects	 of	 language	 use	 that	 seem	 to	 have	 to	 assisted	 in	
constructing	HidroAysén	 in	 a	 particular	way.	 I	 bring	 all	 these	 different	 data	 strands	
together	 in	a	 thickly	descriptive	narrative,	which	 is	concerned	with	showing	how	the	
discourse	surrounding	HydroAysén	shifted	and	solidified	over	time.	
Importantly,	Carvalho	notes	that	analyses	of	discourse	have	not	traditionally	accounted	
adequately	for	long-term	temporal	context.	“Most	forms	of	analysis”	she	writes,	“do	not	
express	 awareness	 of	 the	 time	 sequence	 of	 texts	 nor	 do	 they	 clearly	 explain	 the	
implications	of	previous	discursive	positions	on	subsequent	ones”	 (Carvalho	2008,	p.	
163).	This	study,	which	examines	the	discursive	process	of	becoming,	is	fundamentally	
concerned	with	the	arc	of	the	discourse	on	HidroAysén	over	time.	It	also	considers	how	
media	texts	build	on	each	other	over	time:	intertextuality	is	a	key	feature	of	discourse	
in	a	longer-term	case	study.	Clearly,	however,	an	eleven-year	debate	produces	a	lot	of	
coverage	 in	many	 types	of	media,	and	a	great	deal	of	PR	output.	On	a	practical	 level,	
therefore,	 a	 study	 which	 examines	 discourse	 in	 an	 extended	 case	 like	 this	 needs	 to	
restrict	in	some	ways	both	the	type	and	the	amount	of	media	output	it	analyses.			
Chilton	(1987)	offers	the	concept	of	“critical	discourse	moments”,	events	that	stimulate	
conflict	and	mediatized	debate,	which	may	provide	an	opportunity	 for	more	 in-depth	
coverage	 of	 an	 issue	 than	 is	 usually	 the	 case,	 and	 which	 lead	 to	 periods	 where	
discourse	 on	 an	 issue	 is	 shaped	 and	 sedimented.	 It	 is	 during	 these	moments,	 argues	
Chilton,	 that	 “meaning	 is	 mobilised”	 (p.	 17).	 Various	 factors	 may	 define	 these	 key	
moments:	 political	 activity	 or	 decision-making,	 scientific	 findings	 and	 other	 socially	
significant	 events.	 Critical	 discourse	 moments	 are	 not	 necessarily	 self-evident,	 and	
their	identification	process	requires	considered	reflexivity.		
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In	a	lengthy	case	study,	such	moments	can	be	pinpointed	by	detailed	consideration	of	
actual	events	within	 the	case	 timeline,	 triangulated	with	 research	data.	 In	 this	 study,	
both	to	focus	in	on	important	events	within	the	discourse,	and	as	a	means	of	 limiting	
the	 amount	 of	 data	 I	 analyse,	 I	 identify	 key	 happenings	 in	 the	 unfolding	 case	 of	
HidroAysén	(eg:	key	protests,	key	government	decisions	related	to	the	project).	I	also	
examine	 both	 the	 quality	 and	 quantity	 of	 media	 coverage	 corresponding	 with	 these	
periods	 to	 identify	 whether	 such	 events	 were	 indeed	 considered	 key	 in	 the	 media	
(which	may	coincide	with	a	spike	in	coverage	or	a	change	in	the	terms	of	discourse).	I	
then	 triangulate	 with	 data	 from	 interviews	 in	 which	 interviewees	 were	 asked	 to	
identify	 moments	 or	 episodes	 they	 considered	 the	 most	 significant	 in	 the	 lengthy	
discourse	 on	 the	 case.	 To	 assist	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 critical	 discourse	 moments,	
Carvalho	(2008)	suggests	constructing	a	chronology	of	events.	 I	provide	a	timeline	of	
the	 HidroAysén	 case	 in	 the	 appendix	 to	 this	 thesis.	 Using	 the	 concept	 of	 critical	
discourse	moments,	I	shift	the	gaze	of	this	study	repeatedly	between	a	long-term	view	
of	the	developing	discourse,	and	shorter	periods	where	key	events	unfolded.		
In	 the	 sections	 that	 follow,	 I	 discuss	 practical	 aspects	 of	 the	 research.	 First	 I	 give	
overviews	of	 the	case	timeframe	and	fieldwork	process.	Then,	 for	each	different	data	
stream,	 I	 explain	 the	 process	 of	 fieldwork	 and	 data	 collection,	 and	 subsequent	 data	
analysis.	 In	doing	so,	 I	keep	 in	mind	 this	 study’s	 research	questions,	as	 stated	above,	
and		in	alignment	with	the	key	silences	in	research	addressed	in	Chapter	1.		
4.3	Data	collection	and	research	design	
4.3.1	Case	study	timeframe	
This	study	examines	the	communications	surrounding	the	HidroAysén	conflict	over	an	
11-year	 timeframe	 (2006-2017)	 with	 special	 focus	 on	media	 discourse	 in	 the	 years	
2008-2014	 (further	 discussed	 in	 section	 4.3.4	 below).	Media	 discourse	 on	 the	 dams	
project	 for	Patagonia	began	around	2006	when	HidroAysén	was	established,	and	has	
continued	right	through	until	2018.	Of	course,	the	discourse	related	to	the	project,	both	
the	 parties’	 strategic	 communications	 in	 PR	 material,	 and	 debate	 across	 a	 range	 of	
media	 platforms,	 waxed	 and	waned	 during	 this	 time.	 In	 critical	 discourse	moments,	
coverage	of	the	proposed	project	in	traditional	and	social	media	tended	to	proliferate.		
At	 other	 times,	 HidroAysén	 almost	 disappeared	 from	 the	 media	 –	 and	 sometimes,	
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staying	out	of	the	media	was	a	deliberate	strategy.	As	a	case	study	of	the	HidroAysén	
debate,	 this	 study	 surveys	 mediatized	 discourse	 and	 communications	 material	 from	
the	project’s	initiation,	through	to	its	government	approval,	country-wide	protest,	the	
subsequent	retraction	of	its	approval,	litigation	in	Chile’s	environmental	tribunals,	and	
ultimately	the	dissolution	of	the	company	and	project.	
		
4.3.2	Field	work,	data	gathering	and	research	design	
The	process	of	gathering	data	for	this	study	involved	fieldwork	on	the	ground	in	Chile,	
and	 the	 collection	 of	 secondary	 sources,	 both	 in	 Chile,	 and	 also	 before	 and	 after	my	
fieldwork	there.		
I	conducted	fieldwork	for	almost	nine	months	in	Chile,	from	April	to	December	2013.	I	
was	 based	 for	 six	 months	 of	 this	 period	 in	 the	 country’s	 capital,	 Santiago.	 Here,	 I	
conducted	interviews,	and	made	contacts	in	the	anti-dams	movement,	as	well	as	in	the	
company	 itself.	 These	 contacts	 were	 crucial	 to	 acquiring	 further	 interviews,	
particularly	 in	 Chile,	 where,	 as	 discussed,	 institutions	 and	 social	 relations	 run	 on	 a	
personal	 influence	model	 and	 “pitutos”	 –	 “contacts”	 –	 are	 all-important.	 During	 this	
time,	as	 I	 got	 to	know	key	actors	on	both	sides	of	 the	HidroAysén	debate,	 I	was	also	
able	to	observe	meetings	open	to	the	public,	 two	invitation-only	events	and	one	anti-
dam	demonstration	in	Santiago.		
The	 remaining	 three	months	of	my	 fieldwork	period	were	 spent	 in	 the	Aysén	 region	
where	the	project	would	be	based.	I	drove	the	Carretera	Austral	(Southern	Highway	–	
for	most	 of	 its	 length,	 a	 rough	 dirt	 track)	 spending	 time	 in	 each	 of	 the	 communities	
close	 to	 or	 potentially	 affected	 by	 the	 dams.	 I	 conducted	 interviews	 in	 the	
towns/villages	 of	 Coyhaique,	 Caleta	 Tortel,	 Cochrane	 and	 Villa	 O’Higgins.	 In	 these	
locations,	 I	 also	 had	 many	 informal	 conversations	 with	 local	 people,	 which	 greatly	
assisted	my	insights	on	the	case.	
For	 the	period	 that	 I	was	 in	Santiago,	 I	was	based	 in	 the	 Institute	of	Communication	
and	Image	at	the	University	of	Chile	as	a	Visiting	Researcher.	Here,	I	was	able	to	draw	
on	the	expertise	of	a	number	of	journalists	and	media	academics,	which	was	invaluable	
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for	 grounding	me	 in	 the	 landscape	 of	 the	 contemporary	media	 in	 Chile.	 During	 this	
period	 in	 Santiago,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 formal	 interviews	 I	 conducted,	 I	 was	 able	 to	
discuss	HidroAysén	with	numerous	Chileans,	most	of	whom	had	strong	views	on	 the	
project	and	its	meaning	–	beyond	simply	its	environmental	impact	–	whether	they	had	
ever	been	to	Aysén	or	not.	Although	as	mentioned	above,	 I	do	not	consider	 the	work	
presented	 here	 to	 be	 ethnography,	 this	 period	 of	 immersion	 in	 the	 context	 of	
HidroAysén	was	 invaluable	 for	developing	an	ethnographic-like	understanding	of	 the	
case	and	its	context.	
4.3.3	Interviews:	strategy	and	use.	
Extended,	 semi-structured	 interviews	 are	 a	mainstay	 of	 qualitative	 research.	 	 These	
“conversations	with	 a	 purpose”	 (Burgess	 1984,	 p.	 102)	 are	 designed	 to	 have	 a	 fluid,	
dialogic	structure	and	a	relatively	informal	style,	able	to	cover	both	themes	initiated	by	
the	researcher,	and	unexpected	ideas	introduced	by	the	interviewee:	the	“talking	back”	
discussed	 above.	 Such	 interviews	 produce	 situated	 knowledge,	 that	 is,	 knowledge	
which	 is	 context-dependent,	 so	 that	 “meanings	and	understandings	are	created	 in	an	
interaction”	(Mason	2007,	p.	63).	This	kind	of	qualitative	interviewing	therefore	tends	
to	be	regarded	as	either	 the	construction	or	at	 least	 the	reconstruction	of	knowledge,	
rather	 than	the	excavation	of	 it	 (Kvale	1996;	Mason	2002).	Prior	 to	 interviewing,	 the	
researcher	must	establish	as	 far	as	possible,	 the	facts	or	circumstances	of	the	case	or	
issue	 under	 examination	 so	 that	 in	 the	 interview,	 it	 is	 people’s	 interpretations	 and	
perceptions	 that	 are	 sought.	 Semi-structured	 interviews,	 then,	 seek	 subjective	
knowledge	 and	 are	 a	 process	 through	 which	 the	 interviewer	 is	 active	 in	 the	
construction	of	knowledge	together	with	the	interviewee.	The	qualitative	interviewer	
therefore	needs	to	be	reflexive	about	his/her	own	role	in	this	kind	of	interview.		
My	 fieldwork	 in	Chile	 for	 this	examination	of	 the	HidroAysén	case	 involved	38	semi-
structured	 interviews.	 I	 interviewed	 key	 actors	 from	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	
debate.	 On	 the	 anti-dams	 side,	 interviewees	 included	 anti-dam	 activists	 and	 social	
movement	 participants	 and	 leaders,	 environmental	 NGO	 leaders,	 well-known	
independent	 (ie:	 not	 affiliated	 with	 a	 social	 movement)	 critics	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	
project,	the	incumbent	Senator	for	Aysén,	the	Minister	of	the	Environment	at	the	time	
HidroAysén	 went	 through	 the	 environmental	 approvals	 process,	 one	 head	 of	 local	
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government	 in	Aysén,	 and	 one	 candidate	 standing	 for	 political	 office	 in	Aysén	 on	 an	
anti-dams	mandate,	a	local	tourism	operator,	anti-dams	writers,	media	strategists	and	
PR	personnel,	and	also	the	key	philanthropist-funder	and	communications	strategist	of	
the	anti-dams	position.	From	the	project	development	and	pro-dams	side	I	interviewed	
the	then-HidroAysén	CEO	(who	occupied	this	post	2010-2014)	and	the	previous	CEO	
who	 led	 the	 company	 at	 its	 establishment	 until	 2010.	 I	 also	 interviewed	 key	
HidroAysén	 staff	 members,	 from	 technical	 personnel	 to	 those	 leading	 the	
communication	 of	 the	 project	 to	 those	 charged	 with	 community	 engagement.	 I	 was	
additionally	able	 to	 interview	two	past	employees	of	 the	company	–	one	an	engineer	
and	a	previous	head	of	communications.	I	also	interviewed	the	pro-dams	Lower	House	
member	 for	 Aysén,	 and	 the	 leader	 of	 a	 local	 pro-dams	 social	 movement	 seemingly	
established	 in	 response	 to	 the	 anti-dams	 position.	 	 A	 co-incidental	 meeting	 whilst	
waiting	for	a	remote	river	punt	car	ferry	on	the	(then	to	be	dammed)	Rio	Baker	also	led	
to	 a	 fruitful	 interview	 in	 Santiago	with	 the	 ex-account	 executive	 of	 HidroAysén’s	 PR	
company.	 In	 Chile	 in	 2013	 when	 I	 undertook	 fieldwork,	 there	 were	 also	 several	
prominent	 observers	 of	 and	 commentators	 on,	 the	 project.	 Of	 these	 I	 was	 able	 to	
interview	 three	 newspaper	 editors	 or	 journalists,	 a	 well-known	 environmental	
scientist,	a	political	strategy	consultant,	two	media	academics	and	two	energy	experts.		
In	the	interviews,	I	was	trying	to	find	out	a	number	of	things	about	the	communications	
processes	of	both	 sides	 in	 the	HidroAysén	debate.	 I	was	 interested	 in	understanding	
source	strategies,	that	is,	the	way	in	which	each	side	sought	to	shape	the	discourse	on	
the	megaproject	through	their	own	strategic	communications	output	and	initiatives.	I	
was	also	interested	in	their	perceptions	of	the	extent	to	which	this	had	been	reflected	
in	actual	media	 coverage.	 	We	also	discussed	 to	what	extent	media	 coverage	of	 their	
position	 might	 have	 changed	 over	 time.	 I	 also	 asked	 most	 interviewees	 what	
HidroAysén	(and	the	protest	movement	against	 it)	meant,	symbolically,	and	to	reflect	
on	how	the	project	came	to	mean	this.	Journalists	and	other	media	workers	were	also	
asked	 about	 how	 they	 perceived	 their	 role	 in	 the	 reporting	 of	 the	 conflict	 over	
HidroAysén.	Additionally,	 I	was	 interested	in	establishing	practical	considerations	for	
the	research:	 for	example,	what	were	key	episodes	 in	 the	debate	 (here	called	critical	
discourse	moments)	and	what	was	the	most	recognised	PR/strategic	communications	
output?	Because	I	interviewed	such	a	diverse	range	of	actors,	not	all	interviewees	were	
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asked	 the	 same	 questions	 –	 though	 I	 asked	 some	 set	 questions	 of	 almost	 every	
interviewee.	
Although	I	believe	that	I	was	able	achieve	exceptionally	good	access	to	a	broad	section	
of	 key	 actors	 in	 the	 debate,	 it	 was	 important	 to	 be	 reflexive	 both	 in	 the	 process	 of	
interviewing,	 and	 in	 the	 subsequent	 treatment	 of	 the	 interview	material.	 Of	 course,	
because	 HidroAysén	 was	 so	 controversial	 and	 political,	 I	 knew	 I	 ran	 the	 risk	 of	
interviewees	simply	telling	me	what	they	thought	I	wanted	to	hear:	repeating	PR	“spin”	
–	particularly	in	the	case	of	interviews	I	conducted	with	the	then-head	of	the	company	
and	with	senior	management	and	communications	staff.	I	tried	to	remain	as	neutral	as	
possible	 in	 these	 interviews	 (though,	 clearly,	 being	 neutral	 is	 also	 a	 position.)	
Interestingly,	 some	 employees,	 including	 the	 then-CEO,	 were	 critical	 of	 the	 way	
HidroAysén	 had	 communicated	 its	 project.	 Because	 I	 also	 interviewed	 three	 ex-
HidroAysén	employees	–	none	of	whom	seemed	to	have	any	interest	in	defending	the	
company	–	 and	because	 these	 ex-staff	members	were	also	 critical	 in	 a	 similar	way,	 I	
considered	the	self-criticism	to	be	genuine,	and	that	much	of	 the	material	 from	these	
interviews	could	likewise	be	considered	genuine.	
All	interviewees	were	informed	of	the	nature	of	the	project	and	of	the	intended	use	of	
the	interviews	by	means	of	an	information	sheet	in	Spanish	that	was	e-mailed	to	them	
before	 the	 interview.	 This	 summary	 also	 contained	 information	 explaining	 that	 the	
project	 had	 received	 ethics	 clearance	 from	 the	 Tasmania	 Social	 Sciences	 Human	
Research	Ethics	Committee.	Prior	 to	 the	 interview,	each	participant	 signed	a	consent	
form	acknowledging	their	voluntary	participation.	Participants	were	given	the	option	
to	remain	anonymous	in	this	study.	Out	of	the	38	people	interviewed,	only	two	chose	
this	option.	All	interviews	were	conducted	by	me	in	Spanish,	except	for	two	interviews	
with	native	or	bilingual	English	speakers,	which	were	conducted	in	English.	Interviews	
were	 recorded,	 and	 recordings	 were	 transcribed	 by	 three	 different	 native	 Chilean	
speakers	 of	 Spanish.	 All	 interview	 transcripts	 were	 proofread	 by	 one	 of	 the	
transcribers,	 to	check	for	consistency	 in	convention	and	expression.	 I	 transcribed	the	
interviews	in	English	myself.	
Interview	 content	 has	 been	 used	 in	 this	 study	 qualitatively	 as	 a	means	 of	 adding	 to	
thick	 description	 of	 the	 events	 and	 discourse	 that	made	 up	 the	HidroAysén	 conflict.	
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Interview	 data	 is	 also	 used	 to	 triangulate	 the	 other	 data	 streams	 used	 here	 (as	
elaborated	 below).	 All	 interview	 material	 extracted	 for	 use	 in	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	
translated	 by	me	 from	 Spanish	 to	 English.	 	 A	 note	 on	 language	 is	 included	 below	 to	
address	some	of	 the	 risks	and	challenges,	but	also	 the	opportunities,	of	 conducting	a	
study	of	this	nature	in	a	two-language	environment.	
4.3.4		Media	articles	and	computational	text	analysis	
As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	although	television	and	radio	are	the	most	widely	
consumed	media	in	Chile,	these	media	convey	little	in-depth	news	content,	particularly	
on	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 environment.	 In	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 developing	 media	
discourse	 on	 the	 HidroAysén	 megaproject,	 it	 was	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 draw	 the	
traditional	 media	 coverage	 component	 of	 this	 study	 from	 key	 national	 newspapers.	
Such	 newspapers	 in	 Chile	 have	 both	 an	 agenda	 setting	 capacity	 (McCombs	 &	 Shaw	
1972;	2006)	and	are	the	preferred	source	of	news	for	Chile’s	decision-making	elites.	As	
discussed	previously,	this	last	factor	is	particularly	important	in	Chile	given	the	nature	
of	 inter-elite	 negotiation,	 influence	 and	 behind-closed-doors	 decision-making	 that	 is	
the	standard	way	of	‘doing	business’	in	Chile	(Kaltwasser	2007).	
According	 to	 these	 criteria,	 I	 decided	 to	 compile	 a	 corpus	 of	 coverage	 from	 two	
important	national	newspapers,	El	Mercurio	and	La	Tercera	that	covered	the	period	of	
the	 most	 important	 developments	 in	 the	 lengthy	 discourse	 over	 HidroAysén.	 El	
Mercurio	and	La	Tercera	both	have	national	daily	print	editions.	Both	are	ideologically	
conservative.	 In	order	 to	access	a	view	of	 the	media	discourse	on	HidroAysén	which	
was	not	from	a	conservative	news	source,	I	additionally	complied	a	collection	of	news	
pieces	covering	the	issue	from	the	more	pluralistic	online	news	site,	El	Mostrador.	The	
media	corpus	was	compiled	in	the	same	way	for	each	media	outlet:	that	is,	by	keyword	
searching	 the	 online	 archive	 of	 each	 newspaper.	Much	 time,	 thought	 and	 reading	 of	
media	coverage	went	 into	 the	 formulation	of	 search	 terms.	Finally,	 I	decided	 to	keep	
the	search	terms	as	simple	as	possible,	and	carried	out	two	searches,	one	for	the	words	
‘HidroAysén’	 (because	 I	 was	 interested	 in	 finding	 every	 article	 that	 mentioned	 the	
project)	 and	 one	 for	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 (because	 I	 was	 interested	 in	 finding	
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articles	 that	 likely	 mentioned	 the	 protest	 against	 the	 megaproject34).	 This	 media	
corpus	 needed	 to	 be	 compiled	 in	 digital	 format	 so	 that	 computer-assisted	 content	
analysis	could	be	carried	out.	
The	timespan	of	the	media	corpus	for	each	newspaper	covers	the	period	of	all	the	key	
developments	in	the	debate	over	HidroAysén,	however,	the	extent	of	each	newspaper’s	
online	 archive,	 and	 the	 earliest	 date	 HidroAysén	 or	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 was	
mentioned	was	different	 for	each	media	outlet.	Because	of	 this,	 I	decided	to	 limit	 the	
timeframe	of	the	corpus	to	begin	in	late	2008	and	extend	until	mid-2014,	despite	the	
fact	 that	some	articles	covered	the	debate	earlier.	These	early	articles	are	sometimes	
referred	to	in	the	discussion	in	the	following	chapters,	as	is	some	of	the	media	coverage	
after	 the	 middle	 of	 2014,	 as	 media	 discourse	 on	 HidroAysén	 did	 not	 end	 when	 the	
project	was	dissolved.		
During	 the	 data-gathering	 process,	 I	 also	 collected	 media	 coverage	 from	 two	 local	
newspapers	from	the	region	affected	by	the	dams:	El	Diario	de	Aysén	and	El	Divisadero.	
Though	the	coverage	in	these	local	papers	is	of	interest,	as	I	began	to	understand	more	
about	 the	 case,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 partly	 due	 to	 Chile’s	 ‘centralising’	 logic,	 where	
decisions	 are	 influenced	 and	made	 in	 the	 capital,	 examining	national-level	 discourse	
was	 the	 most	 appropriate	 way	 to	 observe	 how	 HidroAysén	 became	 emblematic.	
Gathering	 and	 reading	 many	 of	 these	 articles	 did	 help	 inform	my	 understanding	 of	
local	perspectives	on	 the	megaproject.	 	Given	 the	 transnational	nature	of	 the	protest	
against	 HidroAysén,	 I	 also	 make	 note	 of	 some	 media	 content	 from	 international	
newspapers,	including	the	The	New	York	Times	and	El	Mundo.	
In	examining	media	coverage	in	the	two	key	national	newspapers,	as	well	as	a	smaller	
but	ideologically	different	news	outlet,	I	was	interested	in	uncovering	a	long-term	view	
of	the	development	of	mediatized	discourse	surrounding	HidroAysén.	I	was	interested	
in	comparing	the	way	that	that	the	megaproject,	and	protest	against	it,	were	portrayed	
in	 the	media	 over	 time.	 I	 wanted	 to	 know	what	ways	 of	 understanding	 HidroAysén	
were	 available	 and	 what	 ways	 were	 precluded.	 I	 was	 particularly	 interested	 in	
examining	 what	 happened	 to	 the	 discourse	 in	 critical	 discourse	 moments.	 Also,	 by	
																																																						
34	I	could	not,	for	example,	simply	search	“protest”	as	several	other	issues	were	being	protested	at	the	
time,	including	the	student	protest,	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
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assessing	 the	 amount	 of	 discourse	 on	 the	 dams,	 I	 wanted	 to	 be	 able	 better	 to	
understand	 the	 concepts	 of	 invisibility	 and	 visibility	 in	 relation	 to	 HidroAysén.	 I	
wanted	to	know	which	social	actors	became	key	sources	within	the	debate.	In	addition,	
I	wanted	 to	 contrast	 the	 coverage	 in	 the	 two	 ideologically	 conservative,	widely	 read	
and	influential	outlets	to	coverage	in	the	ideologically	more	liberal	and	pluralistic,	but	
less	prominent	publication.	I	considered	content	analysis	an	important	tool	to	assist	in	
finding	insight	into	the	media	corpus.		
Content	 analysis	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	 methods	 used	 in	 mass	 communication	 research	
(Hansen	 &	 Machin	 2013;	 Riffe,	 Lacy	 &	 Fico	 2014).	 Holsti	 (1969)	 defined	 content	
analysis	as	“any	technique	for	making	inferences	by	systematically	identifying	specified	
characteristics	of	messages”	(p.	14)	while	Krippendorf	(2004,	p.	18)	understands	it	as:	
“a	research	technique	for	making	replicable	and	valid	inferences	from	texts	(and	other	
meaningful	 matter)	 to	 the	 contexts	 of	 their	 use”.	 Although	 earlier	 descriptions	 of	
content	analysis	had	termed	it	“objective”	(Berelson	1952,	p.	18),	such	positivist	claims	
for	content	analysis	have	since	been	largely	abandoned.	In	addition,	it	has	become	clear	
that	 there	 is	 no	 simple	 relationship	 between	 frequency	 and	 salience,	 so	 that	 the	
frequency	 of	 occurrence	 of	 certain	 themes	 or	 symbols	 within	 a	 text	 (which	 content	
analysis	 usually	 counts)	 cannot	 usually	 be	 causally	 linked	 to	 any	 social	 implications.	
Because	of	this,	although	content	analysis	can	be	useful	in	providing	“some	indication	
of	relative	prominences	and	absences	of	key	characteristics”	(Hansen	&	Machin	2013,	
p.	89)	within	a	mediatized	discourse,	it	must	be	anchored	firmly	in	context	in	order	for	
its	findings	to	be	interpreted.	As	already	discussed,	this	study	uses	content	analysis	as	
one	aspect	of	a	largely	qualitative	study.	
Because	of	the	very	large	corpus	of	media	texts	collected	for	this	study	(2385	articles	in	
the	 final	 corpus)	 I	 understood	 that	 a	 sufficiently	 thorough	 manual	 content	 analysis	
would	 not	 be	 feasible	 for	me	 as	 a	 single	 researcher.	 I	was	 also	 interested	 in	 flexible	
treatment	of	the	data,	that	is,	being	able	to	analyse	and	re-analyse	it	in	different	ways	–	
for	 example,	 examining	 the	whole	 corpus,	 examining	 critical	discourse	moments	 and	
comparing	content	across	 time	and	across	publications.	For	 these	reasons,	 I	opted	 to	
carry	out	content	analysis	using	the	natural	language	analysis	software,	Leximancer.		
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This	software,	developed	at	the	University	of	Queensland	(Smith	2000a;	2000b;	2003;	
Smith	&	Humphreys	2006)	and	commercialised	in	2006,	quantifies	knowledge	within	
text	just	as	manual	content	analysis	does,	by	coding	text	segments	according	to	a	set	of	
concepts.	 	 Though	 manual	 content	 analysis	 pre-determines	 the	 concepts	 to	 be	
quantified,	 Leximancer	 does	 this	 automatically	 according	 to	 word	 co-occurrence	
statistics.	Put	simply,	a	word	is	defined	by	its	context	in	usage.	This	means	each	word	is	
characterised	 by	 other	 words	 that	 appear	 near	 it	 –	 not	 distant	 from	 it	 –	 in	 text,	 a	
concept	 drawn	 from	 corpus	 linguistics	 (Beeferman,	 Berger	 &	 Lafferty	 1997;	 Stubbs	
1996).	Each	word	is	therefore	correlated	with	the	appearance	of	a	certain	set	of	other	
words,	 and	 word	 co-occurrence	 can	 be	 calculated	 in	 terms	 of	 probability.	 This	
probability	 measure,	 based	 on	 the	 algorithms	 of	 Bayesian	 theory,	 reveals	 the	
relatedness	 between	 words.	 Using	 resultant	 co-occurrence	 and	 frequency	 data,	 the	
software	 creates	 a	 ranked	 list	 of	 important	 lexical	 terms	 based	 on	which	 it	 builds	 a	
thesaurus	 for	 the	 text	 or	 texts	 being	 examined.	 This	 thesaurus	 “learns”	 a	 set	 of	
classifiers	 or	 concepts	 from	 the	 text	 (which	 can	 be	 manually	 “seeded”	 or	 full	
automated)	and	the	text	is	automatically	classified	using	these	weighted	term	concepts,	
producing	a	concept	index	and	a	concept	co-occurrence	matrix.	Finally,	the	relative	co-
occurrence	 frequencies	of	 the	 concepts	are	 calculated,	 and	a	 concept	map	 is	 created,	
illustrating	 concept	 frequency,	 concept	 connectedness	 and	 concept	 hierarchy	 (which	
may	not	be	the	same	as	frequency)	(Smith	&	Humphreys	2006).		
	
Apart	from	the	ability	to	deal	with	large	collections	of	text,	especially	in	the	era	of	“big	
data”	 (Lewis,	Zamith	&	Hermida	2013)	and	 the	enhanced	capacity	 for	discovery	 that	
quick,	 flexible	computer-assisted	content	analysis	offers,	 it	might	be	argued	that	such	
analysis	 allows	 greater	 “objectivity”	 than	 manual	 methods.	 While	 this	 study	 is	 not	
concerned	with	objectivity	in	a	positivist	sense,	the	fact	that	programs	like	Leximancer	
can	derive	concepts	or	classifiers	directly	 from	the	text	itself	(rather	than	these	being	
imposed	by	the	researcher)	may	better	reflect	meaning	embedded	within	text.	In	this	
way	 inter-coder	 reliability	 also	 ceases	 to	 be	 a	 concern.	Having	 said	 this,	 Leximancer	
also	allows	manual	control	over	many	stages	of	the	analysis	process,	which	introduces	
researcher	subjectivity,	but	may	also	facilitate	a	more	nuanced	understanding	from	the	
textual	 data.	 Importantly	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 study,	 Leximancer	 also	 handles	
Spanish	language	texts.	
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Computer-assisted	content	analysis	techniques	have	been	variously	criticised	for	their	
reduced	capacity	to	“understand”	the	subtleties	that	human	coders	may	be	able	to,	and	
for	 being	 equally	 as	 subjective	 as	 human-led	 coding	 (Conway	 2006;	 Simon	 2001).	 I	
acknowledge	these	kinds	of	drawbacks	of	computer-assisted	techniques,	and	endeavor	
to	overcome	such	perceived	limitations	by	alternating	a	macro	computer-assisted	view	
of	 discourse	 in	 the	 media	 corpus	 and	 a	 micro,	 interpretative,	 article-scale	 view	 of	
meaning	 in	 key	 individual	 texts	 at	 key	moments	 in	 discourse.	 In	 this	way,	 I	 uncover	
both	 broad	 trends	 and	 small	 but	 significant	 instances	 in	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	
HidroAysén.	
4.3.5	PR	and	advertising	output		
During	the	HidroAysén	debate	timeframe,	both	sides	engaged	in	much	PR	and	strategic	
communications	activity.	This	ranged	from	events	to	explain,	promote	and	defend	the	
dams,	 to	 events	 to	 criticise	 and	 protest	 them.	 It	 ranged	 also	 from	 newspaper	
advertising	 (for	 both	 sides)	 to	 regular	 radio	 spots	 (particularly	 HidroAysén),	 to	
television	 ads,	 vast	 billboards	 beside	 key	national	 highways	 (and	 lesser	 roads	 in	 the	
Aysén	 region),	 bus	 shelter	 advertising,	 and	 prominent	 ads	 at	 the	 national	 capital’s	
airport.	 The	 anti-dams	 campaign	produced	bumper	 stickers,	 (to	which	 the	pro-dams	
side	 later	 responded	 with	 its	 own),	 it	 produced	 badges,	 T-shirts	 and	 other	
merchandise,	 held	 photography	 exhibitions,	 and	 published	 a	 large-format	 hardcover	
book.	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 also	 organised	 a	 multi-day	 horseride	 across	 Aysén	 to	
attract	 publicity	 locally	 and	 nationally.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 myriad	 pamphlets,	
explainers,	 brochures	 and	 flyers	were	 produced	 by	 both	 sides.	 Media	 releases	were	
written	and	distributed	with	the	intention	of	influencing	media	coverage.	Online,	both	
had	 extensive	 websites	 with	 audiovisual	 presentations.	 Several	 anti-dam	
documentaries	were	made	and	songs	were	composed.	HidroAysén	 itself	produced	 its	
own	video	material,	explaining	the	benefits	of	the	project	for	the	region	and	providing	
computer-generated	simulations	of	how	the	dams	would	 look.	 In	addition	to	this,	 the	
company	engaged	in	CSR-like	activities	in	the	potentially	affected	region.	
How	 can	 a	 study	 like	 this	 one	 harness	 such	 a	wide	 range	 of	 PR	 output	 over	 such	 a	
broad	 timespan	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 protest,	 and	 the	 object	 of	
protest,	represented	themselves?	In	order	to	limit	the	scope	of	analysis,	a	decision	was	
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made	firstly	to	include	particularly	the	most	well-known	material	that	became	familiar	
and	instantly	recognisable	to	Chilean	publics.	This	included	television	advertisements,	
newspaper	 ads,	 billboards	 and	bumper	 stickers.	 In	 addition,	 some	material	 from	 the	
websites	 of	 both	 sides	 was	 used,	 as	 these	 were	 dynamic	 PR	 resources	 that	 were	
constantly	 available	 to	 anyone	 with	 an	 internet	 connection	 throughout	 the	 debate	
timeframe.	 I	 also	needed	 to	analyse	and	describe	 some	material	 that	was	 less	widely	
available,	 and	 targeted	 at	 more	 specific	 publics.	 For	 example,	 I	 examined	 media	
releases	 from	both	sides	 in	 the	debate,	with	 the	 intention	of	 following	 the	discourse,	
where	possible,	from	release	through	to	journalistic	text.	I	was	interested	in	computer-
simulated	imagery	of	the	proposed	dams	that	HidroAysén	showed	privately	to	people	
in	 its	 door-to-door	 stakeholder	 engagement	 in	 the	 potentially-affected	 region.	 I	 also	
wanted	 to	 examine	 the	 large	 format	 hard-cover	 book	 on	 the	 dams	 debate	 that	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 produced	 –	 intended	mostly	 to	 occupy	 the	 desks	 and	 coffee	
tables	 of	 decision-making	 elites.	 I	 was	 interested,	 too,	 in	 events,	 like	 the	 Vota	 sin	
Represas	(Vote	without	Dams)	media	event	that	I	attended	in	Santiago	in	2013.		
Analysis	of	PR	and	advertising	output	was	crucial	to	this	study,	as	I	needed	to	unpack	
discursive	strategies	of	social	actors	on	both	sides,	as	Carvalho	puts	it,	“in	a	variety	of	
channels,	both	‘before’	and	‘after’	journalistic	texts”	(Carvalho	2008,	p.	161).	Together	
with	 content	 from	 interviews	 where	 I	 sought	 clarification	 of	 the	 communications	
strategies	 of	 each	 side	 in	 the	 debate,	 PR	 content	 indicated	how	 these	 intentions	 had	
actually	 been	 manifested.	 Of	 course,	 in	 a	 debate	 where	 natural	 landscapes	 were	 in	
contention,	much	 of	 the	PR	discourse	 around	HidroAysén	was	 image-based.	 But	 this	
was	 not	 a	 debate	 illustrated	 only	 by	 gorgeous	 images	 of	 nature.	 Some	 of	 the	 image-
based	 communications	 sparring	 over	 HidroAysén	 was	 by	 means	 of	 oddly	 hybrid,	
computer-manipulated	 images	 that	 referenced	 each	 other	 intertextually	 across	 the	
debate,	 over	 time.	 Some	 of	 this	 imagery	 was	 fundamental	 to	 understanding	 how	
HidroAysén	became	emblematic.		
As	 well	 as	 using	 PR/advertising	 output	 in	 the	 thick	 description	 of	 HidroAysén,	 this	
study	examines	some	of	this	output	using	a	semiotic	framework.	Defined	by	Saussure	as	
“a	 science	 that	 studies	 the	 life	 of	 signs	 in	 society”	 (Saussure	 1966,	 p.	 16),	 semiotics,	
particularly	of	the	French	tradition	of	Saussure	and	Barthes,	has	been	used	widely	in	the	
study	 of	 advertising	 (Barthes	 1972;	 Berger	 2000;	 Danesi	&	 Perron	 2000;	 Goldman	&	
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Papson	1996;	Harris	1995)	and	also	 to	 research	marketing	 (Floch	2001).	Semiotics	 is	
concerned	fundamentally	with	the	way	we	create	meaning	systems	through	signs	and	
signification		–		the	process	of	assigning	meaning	to	and	deriving	meaning	from	a	sign.	
Semiotics	 understands	 communication	 processes	 as	 being	 multi-layered,	 and,	
importantly	for	the	purposes	of	this	study,	as	being	“concerned	with	the	creation	of	the	
symbolic”	(Kim	1996,	p.	2).	
Semiotic	analysis	can	be	useful	in	studying	various	types	of	advertising	and	PR	output	
because	advertising	and	PR	are	strategic	communication	–	that	is,	“the	purposeful	use	of	
communication	by	an	organisation	to	fulfill	its	mission”	(Hallahan	et	al.	2007,	p.	5)	–	and	
strategic	 communication	 is	 inherently	 symbolic.	 Tasked	with	 enhancing	 the	 strategic	
positioning	 and	 the	 competitiveness	of	 an	organisation,	 such	 communication	 seeks	 to	
promote	 certain	 definitions	 and	 discourses	 over	 others.	 Strategic	 communication	 has	
been	charged	with	seeking	to	legitimise	and	maintain	the	power	of	the	already	powerful	
(Bourdieu	 1977;	 Foucault	 1982)	 although	 of	 course,	 it	 is	possible	 for	 counter-power,	
and	the	actors	of	civil	society,	 to	be	 influential	 in	 the	public	sphere,	by	using	strategic	
communication	 for	 their	 purposes	 (Habermas	 2006).	 However,	 when	 counter-power	
engages	 in	 strategic	 communication	 that	 mirrors	 its	 discursive	 opponents’	
communication	 techniques,	 it	 likewise	 engages	 in	multi-layered	 ideological	 discourse	
which,	 as	 Eco	 explains	 is	 “a	 series	 of	 semiotic	 statements,	 more	 or	 less	 explicit.	 .	 .	
ignoring	 or	 hiding other	 properties”	 (Eco	 1976,	 p.	 636).	 This	 kind	 of	 ideological	
communication	from	either	side	in	a	discursive	conflict,	therefore,	hides	the	existence	of	
other	 possibilities	 or	 premises,	 and	may	 reduce	 the	 complexities	 of	 reality.	 Strategic	
communications,	 then	 –	 typically	 an	 attempt	 by	 one	 group	 to	 seek	 influence	 over	
another	 –	 need	 to	 be	 understood	 on	 two	 levels,	 the	 “surface”	 meaning	 of	 what	 the	
communication	 appears	 to	 be	 about	 and	 the	 “underlying”	 meaning	 of	 the	
communication.	 Semiotics	 is	 a	 useful	 framework	 for	 examining	 such	 communication	
because	the	goal	of	semiotics	is	“ultimately	to	unmask	the	arrays	of	hidden	meaning	in	
the	underlying	level”	(Beasley	&	Danesi	2002,	p.	20).	This	means	that	semiotics	can	be	
applied	effectively	to	a	wide	range	of	strategic	organisational	communications	output	–	
including	as	(Catellani	2011)	does,	to	strategic	communications	on	the	environment	of	
large	corporations,	and	environmental	protest	against	such	organisations.	
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In	the	case	of	HidroAysén	and	the	protest	against	it,	strategic	communication	created	a	
complex	 discourse	 in	 images	 and	 text,	 in	 which	 surface	 layers	 of	 meaning	 obscured	
hidden	 ones.	 HidroAysén	 and	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 became	 discursive	 sparring	
partners	in	this	debate,	so	that	one	adversary’s	symbolic	PR/advertising	output	began	
to	reference	the	other’s	intertextually.	Over	time,	the	strategic	communications	sparring	
ground	 between	 Patagonia	 sin	Represas	 and	HidroAysén	 came	 to	 be	 a	 rich	 source	 of	
rhetorical	meaning	making	where	semiosis	(“the	psychological	processes	prompted	by	
signs	 after	 signs	 and	 their	 meanings	 form	 a	 certain	 structure”)	 (Kim	 1996,	 p.	 3)	
strengthened	and	solidified	so	that	HidroAysén	itself	became	a	sign.	This	sign	signified	
many	 things	 related	 to	 the	 society	 in	which	 the	megaproject	was	 embedded,	making	
HidroAysén	much	more	than	an	environmental	conflict.		
	
4.3.6	Social	media	data	
During	the	timeframe	of	the	HidroAysén	debate,	internet	use	grew	exponentially,	as	
noted	 in	Chapter	3.	 	 	Social	media	use	among	 internet	users	was	almost	universal,	
with	 94%	of	 internet	 users	 accessing	 social	media	 in	 Chile	 in	 2012	most	 of	 these	
Facebook	 (Godoy	 &	 Gronemeyer	 2012,	 p.	 50).	 Twitter	 usage	 in	 Chile	 has	 always	
been	 smaller:	 by	 2014	 only	 5%	 of	 Chileans	 had	 Twitter	 accounts,	 7.2%	 by	 2017	
(Statistica	 2017).	 As	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 the	 elite	 nature	 of	 Twitter	 users	 in	 Chile	
make	this	social	media	platform	an	important	site	of	influence,	opinion	making	and	
“shoulder	rubbing	with	politically	influential	people”	(Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	2012,	p.	
50).		
Recent	 research	 on	 social	 media	 use	 in	 Chile	 has	 confirmed	 that,	 as	 in	 other	
countries	 studied,	 Chileans	 who	 are	 frequent	 social	 media	 users	 are	 also	 more	
politically	 active.	 This	 was	 especially	 true	 for	 younger	 people	 who,	 in	 the	
HidroAysén	 timeframe	 used	 social	 media,	 particularly	 Facebook,	 for	 protest	
organising	 as	 well	 as	 online	 protest	 discourse	 (Valenzuela	 2013;	 Valenzuela,	
Arriagada	&	Scherman	2012).	During	 the	protests	of	2011,	 the	 student	movement	
and	 the	 anti-dams	 movement	 also	 both	 began	 to	 focus	 on	 gaining	 national	 and	
international	media	coverage	and	support	for	their	protests.		Until	this	point,	social	
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media-based	cyber	activism	in	Chile	had	largely	been	focused	on	attracting	attention	
of	 and	 interacting	with	 others	 already	within	 the	movements.	At	 this	 point,	 social	
media	 also	 seems	 to	 have	 attracted	 government	 attention	 for	 the	 first	 time:	 the	
government	 announced	 in	 June	 2011	 that	 it	 would	 start	 monitoring	 Twitter	 and	
Facebook	 “to	 listen	 to	what	 citizens	have	 to	 say”	 (Matamoros	2011).	 Social	media	
therefore	played	a	varied	and	changing	communications	role	in	Chile	the	timeframe	
of	the	HidroAysén	debate.	
This	study	uses	content	from	Facebook	and	Twitter	created	by	both	HidroAysén	and	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas,	 and	 other	 users,	 qualitatively	 in	 the	 thick	 description	 of	
discourse	surrounding	HidroAysén.	Using	social	media	content	in	this	way,	I	am	able	
to	trace	themes,	sometimes	even	particular	phrases,	to	show	how	they	proliferated	
in	social	media	and	became	part	of	wider	media	discourse.	 I	also	show	how	social	
media	content	was	occasionally	able	 to	operate	mainstream	media	 “switches”	–	as	
conceptualised	 by	 Arsenault	 &	 Castells	 (2008)	 and	 Castells	 (2009)	 –	 and	 enter	
mainstream	media,	so	that	the	discourse	of	activism	became	the	discourse	used	even	
in	conservative	publications	like	El	Mercurio.	
4.3.7	A	note	on	language		
This	 study	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 cross-language	 study,	 in	 that	 almost	 all	 its	 source	
material	is	in	Spanish,	with	the	study	itself	written	in	English.	Any	of	the	Spanish	source	
material	that	is	quoted	within	the	text	presented	here	is	therefore	translated.	Working	
in	 two	 languages	–	and	 likewise	across	 two	cultures	–	adds	complexities,	but	also	has	
advantages.	 	Some	qualitative	studies	that	call	for	much	translation	have	been	accused	
of	making	 “disadvantageous	methodological	 choices”	 including	 failing	 to	 acknowledge	
the	 subjectivity	 of	 translation	 as	 a	 study’s	 possible	 limitation	 (Squires	 2009).	 On	 the	
other	hand,	studies	that	examine	media	and	its	discourse	outside	the	Anglophone	orbit	
are	both	necessary	and	 important,	 as	 they	have	 the	potential	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	de-
westernisation	and	increase	the	cosmopolitanism	of	media	and	communication	studies	
(Curran	&	Park	2000;	Thussu	2009;	Waisbord	2016;	Wang	2011),	and	also	counteract	
“aggressively	monoglot	views	of	the	world”	(Cronin	2003,	p.	3).	Waisbord	(2014)	writes	
in	this	context	of	“scholarship	without	borders”	(p.	66),	and	considers	the	presentation	
of	Latin	American	cases,	 like	this	one,	 in	English	as	one	important	step	in	undoing	the	
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intellectually	 unjustifiable	 practice	 of	 “compartmentalizing	 research	 in	 geographical	
boxes”	 (p.	 73).	 In	 a	 world	 of	 globalised	 media,	 and	 globalising	 scholarship,	
communications	researchers	are	therefore	increasing	called	upon	to	use	translation	in	
their	work.		
There	 is	 now	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 literature	 in	 translation	 studies	 (Bassnett	 2014;	 Eco	
2001;	Pym	2014)	and	most	theorists	agree	on	the	role	of	the	translator	as	being	more	
than	simply	a	mechanical	one	of	finding	word	equivalence.		As	Bassnett	writes:	
Translation	is	not	just	the	transfer	of	texts	from	one	language	into	another,	it	
is	 now	 rightly	 seen	 as	 a	 process	 of	 negotiation	 between	 texts	 and	 between	
cultures,	a	process	during	which	all	kinds	of	transactions	take	place,	mediated	
by	the	figure	of	the	translator.	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																					(Bassnett	2005)	
	
One	of	the	dilemmas	of	a	cross-language	study	like	this	one,	where	most	of	the	data	is	in	
another	 language,	 is	 therefore	 the	 role	 the	 translator.	 Can	 the	 researcher	 be	 the	
translator	or	should	these	roles	be	kept	separate?	To	what	degree	should	the	translator	
be	reflexive	of	this	practice,	and	to	what	degree	should	this	be	explicit	in	the	subsequent	
write-up	 of	 the	 study?	 Should	 the	 translator	 be	 ‘visible’,	 and,	 as	 Temple	 and	 Young	
(2004)	put	 it,	 “why	should	 it	matter	 if	 translator	and	translation	disappear?”	(p.	164).	
The	answers	to	these	kinds	of	questions	have	their	base	in	the	researcher’s	approach	to	
knowledge.	 A	 positivist	 study	 might	 seek	 to	 produce	 “correct”	 translations	 or	
equivalencies	 of	 any	 other-language	 text,	 offering	 ways	 to	 increase	 validity	 and	
promising	objectivity	once	translation	problems	are	“solved”	(Temple	&	Young	2004,	p.	
163).	In	contrast,	a	study	with	a	constructivist	understanding	that	knowledge	is	situated	
in,	and	produced	by,	 the	social	world	must	acknowledge	 that	 translation	 is	ultimately	
subjective,	and	that	translation	forms	part	of	knowledge	production.	This	study,	situated	
for	the	most	part	on	the	ground	of	social	constructivism,	considers	language	in	general	
as	value-laden.	Language	is	much	more	than	morphology	and	lexicology:	 it	 is	rhetoric,	
discourse	and	power.	There	can	be	little	objectivity,	then,	when	it	comes	to	word	choice	
in	any	language,	and	in	translation	especially,	words	that	are	chosen	above	other	words	
are	more	 than	 lexical	 choices.	 All	 of	 this	makes	 translation	 “a	 far	 from	 innocent	 and	
politically	 neutral	 activity”	 (Sigismondi	 2016).	 Any	 cross-language	 study	 therefore	
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demands	 that	 the	 researcher	 be	 reflexive	 about	 the	 non-neutral,	 culture-spanning,	
power-laden	 business	 of	 translation.	 I	 describe	 below	 how	 my	 own	 experience	 of	
translating	and	interpreting	several	languages	in	a	variety	of	contexts	has	equipped	me	
well	for	thoughtful	reflexivity	in	translation	here.		
In	 this	 cross-language	 study,	 I	 combine	 the	 roles	 of	 researcher	 and	 translator.	 The	
literature	on	translation	indicates	that	combining	these	two	roles	can	be	acceptable	in	
terms	of	academic	rigour,	and	practicality,	but	 the	researcher	should	make	these	dual	
roles	 explicit,	 and	 remain	 “visible”	 in	 the	process	of	 translation	 (Birbili	 2000;	Temple	
1997;	Xian	2008).	Birbili	(2000)	points	out	the	that	quality	of	the	translation	depends	
on	the	autobiography	of	the	researcher-translator,	and	Squires	(2009)	admonishes	the	
authors	 of	 many	 cross-language	 studies	 for	 failing	 to	 provide	 a	 description	 of	 the	
translator’s	or	 interpreter’s	 credentials.	To	 counter	 this,	mine	are	 as	 follows.	 I	 have	a	
First	Class	Honours	degree	 in	Modern	European	Languages	(University	of	Durham)	 in	
German,	Russian	and	Spanish.	During	 this	degree,	 I	 studied	simultaneous	 interpreting	
from	German	to	English	and	translating	from	Russian	to	English.	In	1998	I	worked	as	a	
Russian/English	interpreter	on	remote	geology	expeditions	in	Siberia.	For	my	Masters	
degree	 in	 Political	 Science	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Melbourne,	 I	 interviewed	 Russian	
journalists	 in	 Russian	 during	 fieldwork	 in	 Moscow.	 The	 interviews	 were	 used	
qualitatively	 in	my	 thesis	with	my	 translation	 into	 English.	 I	 have	 been	 studying	 and	
speaking	Spanish	 for	26	years,	 for	 the	 last	14	years	only	Latin	American	Spanish,	and	
had	worked	 in	 several	 countries	 in	 Latin	 America	 before	my	 field	 work	 in	 Chile.	 	 In	
Australia,	I	have		worked	as	a	Spanish/English	interpreter,	mainly	in	medical	and	legal	
settings.	In	2007	I	spent	three	months	in	Chile,	and	was	therefore	already	familiar	with	
Chilean	Spanish	and	Chilean	culture	–	including	the	unique	cultural	identity	of	Chilean	
Patagonia	–	before	I	commenced	the	fieldwork	for	this	study.		
Though	I	am	competent	in	Chile’s	language	and	culture,	as	an	Australian	I	was	never	an	
“insider”	 during	 fieldwork	 for	 this	 study.	 This	meant,	 for	 example,	 that	 in	 interviews	
some	 of	 the	 unique	 Chilean	 colloquialisms	may	 have	 been	 less	 used	 by	 interviewees,	
and	also	 that	 some	events	and	 tendencies	–	 for	which	 there	might	have	been	cultural	
shorthand	 in	 a	 conversation	 between	 Chileans	 –	 were	 probably	 described	 more	
explicitly	 to	me.	 In	 examining	media	 content,	 there	were	 also	 language	 challenges:	 in	
social	 media	 content,	 no	 colloquialisms	 are	 spared.	 In	 PR	 output,	 language	 is	
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particularly	redolent	with	multiple	layers	of	meaning.	In	newspaper	content,	language	is	
more	 formal,	 but	 I	was	 concerned	 I	would	miss	 (or	mis-translate)	 important	 phrases	
and	intertextual	references,	or	understand	language	with	several	layers	of	meaning	on	
face	value.	For	this	reason,	in	the	earlier	stages	of	my	research,	I	often	referred	language	
and	 translation-related	 questions	 to	 one	 of	 the	 interview	 transcribers,	 a	 Chilean	
graduate	 student	 in	 law	 who	 is	 fluent	 in	 English	 and	 who	 has	 closely	 followed	 the	
HidroAysén	case.	As	my	research	progressed,	I	found	that	I	had	learned	‘the	language	of	
HidroAysén’	–	meaning	that	I	had	become	very	familiar	with	the	concepts,	expressions,	
phrases,	 events	 and	 sources	 that	 populated	 the	 debate	 over	 HidroAysén	 and	 I	 found	
cultural	 and	 language	 mediation	 less	 necessary.	 In	 any	 translation	 for	 this	 study,	
however,	 I	 am	 always	 strongly	 reflexive	 in	 terms	 of	 lexical	 choice,	 the	 possibility	 (or	
not)	of	equivalency	and	the	‘value-laden-ness’	of	any	word	choice.	When	a	Spanish	word	
has	more	than	one	possible	translation	equivalent	in	English,	and	where	choosing	just	
one	 variant	would	 change	 the	meaning,	 I	 am	 explicit	 about	 this	 in	my	 text.	 I	 remain	
aware	that	my	translation	here	is	subjective	to	a	degree,	but	argue	also	that	my	many	
years	of	interpreting	and	translation	work	and	study,	as	well	as	my	experience	of	cross-
language	 academic	 research,	 equip	 me	 well	 to	 take	 the	 role	 of	 reflexive	
researcher/translator	in	this	case	study	of	HidroAysén.	
4.4	Conclusion	
In	this	chapter	I	have	described	in	detail	how	I	work	with	the	abundant	communications	
material	which	formed	the	discourse	over	HidroAysén.	I	have	explained	how	I	build	on	
several	 intellectual	 and	methodological	 traditions	 to	 examine	 the	 case	 of	 HidroAysén	
from	multiple	 perspectives.	 In	 the	 chapters	 that	 follow,	 using	 this	 mix	 of	 methods,	 I	
build	 a	 description	 of	 discourse	 over	 the	 key	 years	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	 controversy,	
2008-2014,	and	I	also	examine	some	of	the	discourse	before	and	after	this	timeframe.	
The	next	chapters	are	set	out	chronologically.	Chapter	5	covers	2006	to	2008,	a	period	
during	which	HidroAysén	was	at	first	 largely	invisible.	Chapter	6	focuses	on	discourse	
on	 the	 dams	 from	mid-2008	 to	 early	 2010,	when	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign	 had	made	
HidroAysén	 visible	 nationally.	 Chapter	 7	 covers	 the	 phase	 when	 HidroAysén	 reacted	
with	an	aggressive	communications	campaign.	Chapter	8	charts	the	way	in	which,	after	
the	vehement	2011	protests,	HidroAysén	sought	to	be	invisible	once	again.	This	chapter	
also	examines	discourse	on	HidroAysén	after	the	project	was	finally	rejected.	Following	
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these	research	chapters,	I	present	some	lessons	from	this	case	study	in	Chapter	9,	which	
concludes	this	thesis.	
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Chapter	5:	Making	the	invisible	visible	
	
5.1	Introduction		
	
Why,	 and	 in	 what	 circumstances,	 would	 a	 company	 developing	 the	 largest	 and	 most	
costly	 infrastructure	project	 in	a	 country’s	history	endeavour	 to	keep	 that	project	 low	
profile?	 How	might	 such	 a	 project’s	 degree	 of	 visibility	 matter?	 How	 could	 a	 protest	
group	make	 an	 undertaking	 like	 the	 project	 in	 question	 visible?	 	 And	 how	might	 the	
ways	in	which	such	a	project	did	finally	become	visible	‘set’	the	discourse	surrounding	it,	
so	 that	 mediatized	 frames	 and	 narratives	 that	 became	 attached	 to	 the	 project	 might	
persist	over	time?		This	chapter	addresses	these	questions	in	relation	to	the	early	stages	
of	 the	 lengthy	mediatized	sparring	between	Patagonia	sin	Represas	and	HydroAysén.	 I	
account	 here	 for	 HidroAysén’s	 “low	 profile”	 beginnings,	 and	 the	 opposing	 campaign’s	
effort	to	bring	the	project	to	national	public	attention.	In	this	chapter,	I	understand	the	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 campaign	 as	 a	 two-fold	 struggle	 for	 visibility:	 that	 is,	 both	 to	
place	HidroAysén	under	scrutiny	by	bringing	the	megaproject	into	public	discourse,	and	
to	stimulate	debate	over	the	megaproject	within	an	anti-dams	 frame.	Through	analysis	
of	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 advertising	 campaign,	 I	 also	 identify	 key	 themes	 which	
started	to	contribute	towards	HidroAysén	becoming	layered	with	symbolic	meaning.		
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 use	 Thompson’s	 (2005)	 and	 Lester	 &	 Hutchins’	 (2012)	 framework,	
discussed	in	chapter	2,	of	visibility	and	its	inverse,	or	as	Lester	and	Hutchins	(p.	847)	put	
it,	“the	power	of	the	unseen”.		I	also	draw	here	on	Beck’s	work	on	risk,	noting	that	those	
actors	 whose	 communication	 of	 risk	 was	 the	 most	 visible	 –	 Beck’s	 “relations	 of	
definition”	–	(Beck	2009b)	seemed	to	have	a	strategic	advantage	over	less	visible	actors.	
As	Cottle	(2000)	Lester	&	Hutchins	(2012)	and	Thompson	(2005)	tell	us,	ultimately	an	
actor’s	 (or	 a	 network	 of	 actors’)	 degree	 of	 visibility	 –	 and	 the	 power	 to	 control	 that	
visibility	 –	 has	 a	 strong	 correlation	 with	 the	 extent	 of	 their	 political	 power.	 The	
Patagonia	 sin	Represas	 campaign	 recognised	 the	primacy	of	 this	 kind	of	 visibility	 and	
sought	to	gain	this	for	itself,	as	well	as	to	make	its	opponents	visible.	
	
However,	 in	the	HidroAysén	case,	the	kind	of	 invisibility	 that	Lester	and	Hutchins	have	
identified	is	also	key.	As	these	authors	point	out:		
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Questions	of	control	and	strategy	in	the	contemporary	media	landscape	cannot	
be	fully	understood	without	paying	serious	attention	to	the	idea	of	invisibility,	
or	the	planned	and	coordinated	avoidance	of	media	communication,	attention	
and	representation	in	order	to	achieve	political	and/or	social	ends.		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 													(2012,	p.	849)	
	
	
This	 chapter	 accordingly	 examines	 HidroAysén’s	 motives	 and	 strategies	 for	 initially	
attempting	to	maintain	relative	invisibility	on	a	national	level,	while	working	to	generate	
public	consent	locally.	I	also	examine	here	how,	while	attempting	to	remain	low	profile,	
HidroAysén	 was	 cultivating	 close	 relationships	 with	 those	 authorities	 relevant	 to	
progressing	 the	 megaproject	 though	 the	 environmental	 approvals	 process.	 While	 the	
analysis	here	builds	on	a	theoretical	framework	that	is	not	specific	to	the	Latin	American	
context,	 I	am	mindful	 in	this	chapter	of	how	cultural	context	and	historical	precedents	
influence	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 concepts	 of	 invisibility/visibility	 may	 play	 out	 in	 a	
Chilean	context.	
	
Occasionally,	 in	 the	 struggle	 for	 visibility	 and	 risk	 definition	 in	 conflicts	 over	
megaprojects,	 images,	 actions	 or	 rhetoric	 arise	 that	 achieve	 symbolic	 power.	 As	
Anderson	 (1997)	 tells	 us	 lesser-resourced	 groups,	 like	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas35,	 can	
succeed	“in	the	realm	of	symbolic	politics”	(p.	209).	This	chapter	therefore	also	analyses	
the	ways	in	which	Patagonia	sin	Represas	sought	to	utilise	symbolic	power	in	order	to	
intervene	in	the	development	of	the	HidroAysén	megaproject.	I	document	here	how	this	
protest	 organisation	 worked	 intentionally	 and	 strategically	 to	 construct	 HidroAysén	
symbolically,	to	make	it	represent	more	than	a	conflict	over	dams.		
5.2	Antecedents	in	the	discourse:	Pangue	and	Ralco	
	
The	 narrative	 of	 the	 emblematic	 case	 of	HidroAysén	 begins	with	 the	 story	 of	 another	
river	and	another	set	of	hydroelectric	projects	entirely.	Between	1990	and	2004,	the	Bío	
Bío	River,	500kms	southeast	of	Chile’s	capital	Santiago,	was	the	site	of	struggles	over	the	
building	of	 two	 (out	of	 a	planned	six)	hydroelectric	dams	by	Endesa.	These	 two	dams	
																																																						
35	 Later	 in	 the	 mediatized	 sparring	 between	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 and	 HidroAysén,	 the	 developing	
company,	 and	 the	 media,	 attempted	 to	 represent	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 as	 a	 “millionaire	 campaign”	
(Carmona,	El	Mostrador	06/06/2011)	However,	despite	the	assistance	of	 foreign	NGOs	and	donors	that	
this	 chapter	 documents,	 it	 seems	 clear	 across	 the	whole	 course	 of	 the	 controversy,	 that	 HidroAysén’s	
advertising,	communications	and	CSR	spending	was	far	greater	than	that	of	the	anti-dams	campaign.		
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and	 the	 opposition	 to	 them	 set	 a	 precedent	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 extended	 legal	
wrangling	that	accompanied	their	development,	and	for	the	kind	of	discourse	that	began	
to	 solidify	 around	 dam	 building	 and	 its	 opponents.	 Both	 these	 factors	 would	 have	
important	implications	for	HidroAysén.	
	
In	1990,	the	year	of	Chile’s	return	to	democracy,	Endesa	was	given	approval	to	build	the	
467MW	Pangue	Dam,	to	be	operational	from	1996.	Pangue,	situated	on	land	occupied	by	
indigenous	 Pehuenche	 people,	 was	 a	 landmark	 project,	 bringing	 issues	 surrounding	
indigenous	 rights,	 water	 rights,	 and	 environmental	 harm	 from	 hydroelectric	 dam	
building	 in	Chile	 to	national	and	even	 international	attention	 for	 the	 first	 time.	During	
Pangue’s	 construction,	 Endesa	 was	 taken	 to	 court	 over	 water	 rights	 by	 the	 project’s	
opponents	–	residents	and	irrigators	–	who	initially	won	a	halt	to	the	project	in	Chile’s	
Court	 of	 Appeals,	 triggering	 heated	 political	 debate.	 The	 ruling	 was	 reversed	 by	 the	
Supreme	Court,	however,	supported	by	the	Dirección	General	de	Aguas	(DGA,	National	
Water	Authority)	in	what	has	been	described	as	“flawed”	legal	reasoning	(Bauer	2004)	
representing	 	 “a	 major	 transfer	 of	 wealth…to	 electric	 companies”	 (Ibid.	 p.	 111).	 The	
Pangue	ruling,	and	many	legal	judgements	on	similar	projects	that	followed,	have	been	
criticised	 for	 their	 “narrow	 legalistic	 position”,	 adopted	 specifically	 to	 avoid	 political	
challenge	 in	 the	 face	of	difficult	policy	and	regulatory	 issues.	This	kind	of	 institutional	
arrangement	 has	 been	 seen	 as	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 system	where	 the	 state	
plays	a	subsidiary	role	to	the	interests	of	business,	leaving	a	dangerous	“partial	vacuum”	
in	regulatory	decision-making,	so	that,	as	Bauer	puts	 it,	 “the	more	powerful	actors	can	
generally	 do	 as	 they	 please”	 (Ibid.	 p.	 112).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 private,	 foreign-owned	
company	Endesa	was	that	powerful	actor.	
	
Following	Pangue,	Endesa	began	work	on	a	690MW	hydroelectric	project,	the	Ralco	Dam.	
For	 almost	 a	 decade	 during	 Ralco’s	 construction,	 Endesa	 faced	 legal	 disputes	 from	 the	
Pehuenche,	 now	 supported	 by	 international	 environmental	 organisations	 like	 the	 US-
based	International	Rivers	Network.	 	Two	independent	reports	showed	that	Endesa	had	
not	 compensated	 the	 Pehuenche	 affected	 by	 Pangue	 as	 agreed,	 and	 that,	 despite	 the	
company’s	 commitments	 to	 the	 contrary,	 the	 dam	 had	 contributed	 to	 the	 further	
impoverishment	of	 an	already	marginalised	people	 (Johnston	&	Garcia–Downing	2004).	
The	case	against	Endesa	to	stop	Ralco	was	drawn	as	a	rights	issue,	and	was	taken	to	the	
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Inter-American	Court	of	Human	Rights,	on	grounds	of	ethnocide.	This	court	ruled	against	
Endesa	in	2003,	but	by	then,	the	dam	was	close	to	complete,	and	the	Chilean	government	
treated	Ralco	as	a	“fait	accompli”	(Gonzales	2004).	When	Ralco	was	inaugurated	in	2004,	
environmentalists	re-iterated	that	the	government	had	neglected	to	protect	the	territorial,	
cultural	and	human	rights	of	indigenous	families,	and	the	ecosystem	in	which	they	lived,	
as	 recognised	 in	Chilean	 law.	Ralco,	 then,	was	 “essentially	 the	expression	of	unbalanced	
development,	that	favours	economic	interests	over	the	needs	of	the	community”	as	head	
of	the	Chilean	environmental	NGO,	Instituto	de	Ecología	Política,	Manuel	Baquedano	put	it	
(quoted	 in	 Gonzales	 2004).	 This	 kind	 of	 sentiment	 would	 be	 echoed	 repeatedly	 in	 the	
discourse	 that	 surrounded	 HidroAysén.	 And	 it	 was	 on	 the	 date	 of	 the	 inauguration	 of	
Ralco	that	Endesa	announced	plans	to	develop	dams	in	Aysén.		
	
During	 the	 Ralco	 conflict,	 mainstream	 media	 discourse	 over	 the	 environment	 and	
hydroelectric	dam	building	began	to	sediment	 in	certain	ways.	One	 important	discourse	
was	of	nature	as	 resource	 (foundational,	 of	 course,	 for	 the	neoliberal	project	 in	general	
and	 not	 unique	 to	 Chile).	 Rivers	 were	 “hydraulic	 potential”	 (El	 Mercurio	 20/03/03),	
hydroelectric	 power	 was	 “Chile’s	 petroleum”	 (Fontaine,	 El	 Diario	 09/05/2003).	 A	
discursive	 connection	 was	 also	 made	 between	 energy	 and	 progress	 so	 that	 Ralco	
represented	“an	undeniable	and	necessary	contribution	 to	 the	development	and	growth	
of	 the	 country”	 (Ingendesa,	 2002,	 p.	 2,	 cited	 in	 Latta	 2007,	 p.	 232)	 any	 delay	 to	which	
“could	 check	 the	 progress	 of	 economic	 growth”	 (La	 Tercera	 08/08/1998).	 Another	
discourse	was	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘native	 energy’.	 In	 an	 interview	with	 the	 conservative	
magazine	Caras,	 the	 CEO	 of	 Endesa	 emphasised,	 in	 support	 of	 Ralco,	 that	 it	was	 “quite	
clear	that	hydroelectricity	is	the	only	autonomous,	national	energy	that	we	have”	(quoted	
in	Sepulveda	1996	cited	by	Latta	2007).	There	was	also	abundant	discourse	on	scarcity.	
Headlines	emphasised	the	danger	of	energy	running	out,	for	example:	“New	delay	in	Ralco	
would	 put	 supply	 in	 danger”	 (Estrategía	 2002).	 Ralco,	 and	 other	 projects	 like	 it	 were	
deemed	 “necessary”,	 with	 headlines	 like:	 “The	 country	 needs	 the	 Ralco	 project”	
(Sepulveda	1996	cited	by	Latta	2007).	Such	discourse	drew	hydroelectric	energy	into	the	
ideological	space	of	the	nation’s	growth	and	development,	and	even	its	national	security.	
Its	 implication	 was	 that	 those	 who	 were	 “for”	 the	 project	 were	 “for”	 the	 country’s	
common	good.	Transnational	 corporations	developing	 such	projects	 as	Ralco	 (and	 later	
HidroAysén)	were,	therefore,	“exemplary	citizens”	(Latta	2007,	p.	233)	who	had	at	heart	
	 139	
the	needs	of	all	Chileans	 in	 their	heroically	challenging	undertakings	that	harnessed	the	
power	 of	 Chile’s	 natural	 heritage.	 In	 discourse	 on	 hydroelectric	 development,	 private	
investment	therefore	came	to	equal	public	good.	Opponents,	were,	in	contrast,	detractors	
from	the	national	project	who	were	fundamentally	misguided.	At	the	time	of	Ralco,	their	
beliefs	 came	 to	 be	described	 in	media	discourse	 as	 “green	 fundamentalism”	 (Estrategía	
2003).	Phrases	 like	this	were	also	used	to	describe	anti-dam	protesters	 in	the	discourse	
surrounding	HidroAysén.	
	
When	 Ralco	was	mentioned	 in	media	 coverage	 at	 the	 time	 that	 HidroAysén	was	 being	
debated,	 therefore,	 it	 was	 shorthand	 for	 a	 certain	 set	 of	 discourses	 on	 hydroelectric	
projects.	These	same	discourses	–	both	pro-	and	anti-dams	–	quickly	became	associated	
with	HidroAysén.	 One	 2011	 article	which	 appeared	 in	El	Mercurio’s	 Sábado	 (Saturday),	
reminded	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 issues	 that	 had	 accompanied	 Ralco.	 The	 article	 took	 the	
journalist	 to	 the	 dams’	 region,	 to	 survey	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 Pehuenche.	 The	 journalist	
found	 the	 municipality	 to	 be	 the	 poorest	 in	 Chile,	 with	 –	 despite	 the	 presence	 of	 the	
country’s	 largest	 energy	generator	–	Chile’s	highest	 electricity	 costs.	The	 journalist	 also	
found	a	kindergarten	built	by	Endesa	which	had	never	been	staffed	by	 the	 teachers	 the	
company	had	promised;	she	found	90%	unemployment,	communities	divided,	a	sense	of	
dislocation,	hopelessness,	alcoholism,	despair	and	suicide	–	despite	the	US$20	million	that	
Endesa	had	contributed	towards	the	resettlement	and	assistance	of	some	400	Pehuenche	
when	Ralco	was	built.	She	also	 found	that	Endesa’s	assistance	had	ceased	once	the	dam	
was	built.	 The	 article	quoted	 a	2010	 report	by	10	parliamentary	 representatives	which	
states:		
	
Six	years	since	the	installation	of	the	dam,	it	is	evident	that	the	negative	
effects	 associated	 with	 these	 hydroelectric	 projects	 have	 been	 greater	
than	 the	benefits	 for	 the	communities	of	 the	Alto	Biobío.	Economic	and	
social	 growth	 have	 not	 been	 noted.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 environmental	
damage	and	underemployment	seem	to	be	the	major	contributions.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			
				(Drysdale,	El	Mercurio	2011)	
	
Despite	 such	 negative	 conclusions	 (which	 were	 not	 often	 reflected	 in	 El	 Mercurio,	 a	
newspaper	 which	 was	 usually	 strongly	 pro-business)	 the	 then-CEO	 of	 HidroAysén,	
Hernán	Salazar,	asked	 in	an	 interview	 if	 the	experience	of	Ralco	offered	any	 lessons	 for	
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the	conduct	of	HidroAysén,	had	stated	that	“Ralco	was	a	good	project.	I	have	no	doubt	of	
that”	(Riveros,	El	Mercurio	07/10/2006).	This,	then,	was	the	already	complex	discursive	
situation	 which	 surrounded	 hydroelectric	 megaprojects	 when	 Endesa	 and	 Colbún	
established	HidroAysén	in	2006.	
	
5.3	The	first	word	
	
In	October	2006	HidroAysén	CEO	Hernán	Salazar	made	 the	 first	public	presentation	on	
the	megaproject	 in	 the	 town	 of	 Coyhaique,	 Aysén,	 as	 an	 invited	 speaker	 at	 conference	
entitled	 “Chile	 and	 its	Energy	Dilemmas”.	El	Mercurio	 described	him	as	 “nervous”	 as	he	
presented	 to	 a	 “more	 than	 difficult	 public”	 (Riveros,	 El	 Mercurio	 07/10/2006)	 which	
included	 Aysén	 locals,	 environmental	 leaders	 from	 Santiago	 and	 a	 prominent	
representative	of	the	salmon	farming	industry	who	opposed	the	project.	The	newspaper	
also	 described	 this	 first	 face-to-face	 meeting	 with	 the	 project	 developers	 as	 being	
“dominated	by	a	climate	of	tension”.		During	Salazar’s	session,	a	group	of	activists	entered	
the	venue	wearing	T-shirts	bearing	the	words:	“Aysén:	without	dams”	and	silently	stood	
up	on	chairs	to	signal	their	rejection	of	the	project	(Merinches,	El	Mercurio	15/10/2006).	
	
Communication	of	the	HidroAysén	project	had	begun	before	this,	however,	on	a	local	level	
in	Aysén	at	least.	Local	environmental	groups	had	recently	gained	organising	experience	
through	protesting	Canadian	 company	Noranda’s	planned	project	Alumysa,	which,	 until	
the	project	was	withdrawn	in	2003,	proposed	six	dams	in	Aysén	watersheds	to	power	a	
giant	 aluminium	 smelter	 in	 a	 coastal	 fjord.	 The	 Aysén	 division	 of	 the	 national	
environmental	NGO	Comité	Pro	Defensa	de	la	Fauna	y	Flora	(Committee	for	the	Defence	of	
Fauna	and	Flora)	or	CODEFF,	had	been	active	 in	 this	 campaign	and	 from	 it,	 a	Coalición	
Cuidadana	 Aysén	 Reserva	 de	 Vida	 (Citizens’	 Coalition	 for	 Aysén	 Life	 Reserve)	 had	
emerged	in	January	2006.		Alert	to	further	megaprojects	planned	for	Patagonia,	this	group	
began	a	local	communication	campaign	on	HidroAysén	during	2006	before	the	company	
had	begun	its	communications	in	the	region.	The	coalition	dropped	leaflets	in	letterboxes,	
called	 public	 meetings	 and	 pasted	 posters	 in	 local	 communities.	 The	 work	 was	 small-
scale,	 carried	 out	 by	 volunteers.	 By	 January	 2007,	 the	 coalition	 had	 become	 part	 of	 a	
larger	 Consejo	 de	 Defensa	 de	 la	 Patagonia	 Chilena	 or	 CDP	 (Council	 for	 the	 Defence	 of	
Chilean	 Patagonia)	 and	 in	 April	 2007,	 this	 group	 launched	 the	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	
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campaign	which	 began	 to	 garner	 international	 funding	 for	 the	 protest.	 Diverse	 activist	
groups	joined	the	campaign	so	that	by	May	2013,	CPD	consisted	of	68	local,	national	and	
international	NGOs	(Orrego	2013).		
	
Despite	being	established	directly	in	response	to	the	arrival	 in	Patagonia	of	HidroAysén,	
the	 campaign’s	 intention	 was	 never	 to	 protest	 this	 project	 alone,	 but	 instead	 also	 to	
“visibilise”	 the	several	other	hydroelectric	projects	proposed	 for	 this	part	of	Chile.	Over	
time,	 however,	 as	 the	 controversy	 surrounding	 HidroAysén	 became	 more	 intense,	 the	
campaign	 began	 to	 focus	 on	 HidroAysén	 as	 an	 emblematic	 project.	 ‘Patagonia	 without	
Dams’	 seemed	 therefore	 to	 mean,	 Patagonia	 (and	 Chile)	 without	 all	 the	 things	 that	
HidroAysén	 became	 emblematic	 of,	 and	 that	 other	 projects	 seemed	 able	 to	 avoid	
representing.			
	
Interviewed	 in	 May	 2013,	 Mitzi	 Urtubia,	 journalist	 and	 communications	 consultant	 to	
Santiago-based	 Ecosistemas,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 CDP	 members,	 recalled	 the	 start	 of	 the	
Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign:	
	
Our	campaign	was	highly	proactive.	It	began	even	before	the	project	began	its	
own	campaign	and	because	of	 this,	 the	discussion	and	 information	given	 to	
people	 by	 us	 was	 even	 before	 the	 company	 was	 able	 to	 inform	 on	 the	
megaproject	 it	wanted	 to	 construct.	 So	we	started	 first	 and	because	of	 this,	
over	 time,	we	began	winning,	 communicationally.	 It	was	we	 that	 started	 to	
inform	 people,	 to	 tell	 people	 there	 [in	 Patagonia]	 that	 they	 could	 oppose	
certain	processes.	And	because	of	that	head	start	we	gained	a	lot	of	time.		
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 																							(Urtubia,	interviewed	15/05/2013)			
	
It	was	not	only	the	anti-dams’	movement’s	commitment	to	communicate	first	that	gave	it	
a	communicational	advantage,	however.	The	strategy	of	the	project	developer	at	this	early	
stage	was	initially	to	communicate	as	little	as	possible,	on	a	national	level	at	least,	and	to	
focus	 its	 communications	 in	 the	 local	 communities.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 HydroAysén’s	 low	
profile,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	initiated	a	national	“citizen’s	alert”.	Urtubia	explained	how	
creating	“visibility”	was	important	for	Patagonia	sin	Represas:		
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We	 believed	 that	 visibility	 was	 key.	 You	 have	 to	 be	 visible,	 and	 not	
establishing	this	kind	of	project,	shall	we	say,	behind	the	backs	of	the	public.		
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 											(Urtubia,	interviewed	15/05/2013)			
It	 is	clear	from	the	literature	on	corporate	communications	and	reputation	management	
as	reviewed	in	Chapter	2	(Anthonissen	2008;	Arpan	&	Roskos-Ewoldsen	2005;	Doorley	&	
Garcia	 2010)	 that	 rapid,	 proactive	 public	 relations	 communications,	 rather	 than	
attempted	 invisibility,	 are	 essential	 from	 an	 organisational	 stance	 in	 order	 to	 engender	
stakeholder	 confidence.	 This	 is	 especially	 so	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 crisis	 or	 impending	 crisis	
situation,	 where	 a	 company	 risks	 “undesired	 visibility”	 (Doorley	 &	 Garcia,	 p.	 330)	 as	
HidroAysén	 would	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 protest	 against	 it.	 As	 mediatized	 discourse	 on	 the	
project	 unfolded,	HidroAysén’s	 early	 attempts	 to	 remain	 low	profile	 on	 a	 national	 level	
ceded	an	early	communicational	advantage	to	the	dams’	opponents.			
5.4	Funding	and	branding	the	campaign:	Douglas	Tompkins	and	other	
international	donors	
	
When	the	CDP	was	formed	in	2006,	it	counted	on	thousands	of	volunteer	hours	and	much	
goodwill	and	enthusiasm	to	get	the	job	of	protecting	Patagonia	done.	That	volunteer	spirit	
was	 needed	 as,	 historically,	 there	 had	 been	 little	 Chilean-sourced	 funding	 for	
environmental	 protest.	 Interviewees	 for	 this	 study	 commented	 that,	 despite	 the	
experience	of	Ralco,	there	was	no	Chilean-based	funding	for	environmental	NGOs.	Flavia	
Liberona,	head	of	Santiago-based	environmental	NGO	Terram	explained:		
	
Environmental	 NGOs	 by	 definition	 don’t	 have	 any	 Chilean	 resources.	 If	 you	
want	to	have	funding	in	Chile	and	be	environmentally	focused,	you	have	to	get	
your	money	from	the	miners	or	electrical	companies.	There	is	no	funding	from	
the	 state.	 Nothing’s	 legislated.	 Nothing	 comes	 from	Chile.	 Zero.	 100%	of	 our	
finances	come	from	overseas.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	(Liberona,	interviewed	27/06/13)	
	
The	 CDP’s	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 campaign	 would	 be	 almost	 entirely	 funded	 by	
international	 environmental	 NGOs	 and	 granting	 foundations,	 making	 it	 a	 transnational	
campaign	 from	 the	 outset.	 CDP	 organisations	 received	 grants	 from	 the	US-based	Tides,	
Weeden	and	Holloman	Price	Foundations,	 and	 from	 the	Global	Greengrants	Fund.	They	
also	 gained	 funding	 from	 the	 US-based	 International	 Rivers	 Network	 and	 the	 Natural	
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Resources	 Defense	 Council,	 as	 well	 as	 smaller	 NGOs	 and	 granting	 bodies	 in	 the	 US	
(Carmona,	 El	 Mostrador	 06/06/2011).	 In	 terms	 both	 of	 funding	 and	 experience	 in	
activism,	 the	 campaign	 additionally	 had	 the	 advantage	 of	 being	 supported	 by	 the	
American	millionaire	environmental	philanthropist	Douglas	Tompkins36.		
	
Tompkins	(who	died	in	a	kayaking	accident	in	Aysén	in	2015,	aged	72)	was	the	founder	
of	 North	 Face	 and	 Esprit	 clothing	 brands.	 In	 the	 late	 1980s,	 having	 become	
“disenchanted	 with	 consumer	 culture”	 (Tompkins	 Conservation	 	 2015)	 Tompkins	
established	the	Foundation	for	Deep	Ecology	and	moved	to	Chilean	Patagonia.	With	his	
wife	Kris,	he	bought	large	tracts	of	 land	here	and	in	neighbouring	Argentina	where	he	
carried	out	restoration	and	conservation	work	to	re-establish	natural	habitats	in	places	
damaged	by	 farming	 and	 forestry.	 The	Tompkins	 have	 protected	more	 land	 than	 any	
other	private	individuals	(almost	2	million	hectares),	and	their	restored	land	is	handed	
back	to	national	governments	to	become	national	parks	(Pimm	2010).	
	
Interviewed	 in	 2013	 Tompkins	 described	 himself	 as	 “a	 kind	 of	 hybrid	
activist/conservationist”	who	 had	 long	 been	 close	 to	 the	 anti-dams	movement.	 In	 his	
words:	“I’ve	participated	in	dams	campaigns	from	India	to	Quebec	and	California	and	so	
forth”	 (Tompkins,	 interviewed	 05/12/2013).	 He	 had	 also	 participated	 in	 activism	
against	the	Bío	Bío	dams37.	In	the	case	of	the	dams	proposed	for	the	Baker	and	Pascua	
rivers,	Tompkins’	involvement	was	personal,	as	the	proposed	project	would	impact	his	
wife’s	Patagonia	National	Park	project	and	his	own	Pumalín	Park:	
	
So	 we	 had	 a	 direct	 biophysical	 involvement,	 that	 is,	 they	were	 cutting	 right	
through	the	very	landscapes	that	we	were	working	on	for	conservation,	so	that	
of	course	got	our	energies	flowing.	Mobilised	us.	
	
	
Tompkins	 was	 therefore	 involved	 in	 the	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 campaign	 from	 the	
beginning.	 He	 brought	 his	 expertise	 derived	 from	 25	 years	 of	 activism	 and	 advocacy	
advertising,	 as	 well	 as	 financial	 means	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 campaign’s	 advertising	 output	
																																																						
36	For	a	discussion	of	the	networks	of	a	“transnational	conservation	elite”	see	Holmes	(2011),	bearing	in	
mind,	however,	Tompkins’	adherence	to	Deep	Ecology,	not	neoliberalism.	See	discussion	of	Deep	Ecology	
in	section	5.8.3.	
37	 This	 detail	 regarding	 Tompkins’	 longstanding	 involvement	 in	 the	 anti-dams	movement	 is	 important	
because	later	Tompkins	would	be	accused	of	becoming	involved	in	the	Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign	
purely	out	of	self-interest,	to	protect	his	own	land	holdings	in	Patagonia.	
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(though	he	declined	to	reveal	how	much	had	been	spent	on	 the	campaign).	Tompkins	
also	functioned	as	the	“art	director”	and	brand	advisor	of	the	campaign,	as	he	explained.		
	
We	 took	 the	 slogan,	 the	 name,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas,	 as	 our	 brand	 so	 to	
speak,	and	we	developed	it	along	the	lines	of	how	you	would	develop	a	brand	
so	 that	you	can	communicate	with	 the	audience	 that	you	are	 trying	 to	direct	
your	message	to.	Here	we	are	trying	to	sell	an	idea.	The	idea	is	that	these	dams	
shouldn’t	 be	 built	 because	 it’s	 bad	 development.	 We	 also	 created	 a	 brand	
image,	or	an	 issue	 image	so	 that	all	 the	Chilean	public	and	 the	press	and	 the	
politicians	would	know	when	they	saw	–	just	from	the	logotype	and	the	image	
itself	–	who	and	what	was	behind	it.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Tompkins,	interviewed	05/12/2013)	
	
This	brand	and	this	 logo,	and	 the	environmental	message	behind	 them,	would	need	to	
become	ubiquitous	 in	order	to	bring	the	project	Tompkins	and	Patagonia	sin	Represas	
opposed	 from	near	 “invisibility”	 to	 national	 attention.	However,	 as	 discourse	 over	 the	
dams	continued,	 the	 involvement	of	Tompkins	and	other	 international	donors	 (always	
openly	declared	and	never	hidden)	would	become	a	controversy	used	by	the	anti-dams	
campaign’s	critics	to	question	the	motives	and	detract	from	the	credibility	of	Patagonia	
sin	 Represas’	 campaign.	 This	 alleged	 ‘foreign-ness’	 and	 ‘elite-ness’	 of	 opposition	 to	
HidroAysén	 would	 indeed	 become	 an	 unintended	 part	 of	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	
‘brand’.		
	
5.5	“Low	profile”:	HidroAysén’s	“invisible”	beginnings			
	
Near	the	end	of	2005,	Endesa	announced	the	start	of	a	feasibility	study	into	building	the	
complex	 of	 dams	 that	 would	 become	 the	 HidroAysén	 megaproject.	 The	 HidroAysén	
company	was	formed	in	2006	and	established	offices	in	Coyhaique	and	Cochrane	from	
2007.	Only	in	mid-2007,	the	company	first	presented	its	project	in	the	region,	with	what	
it	termed	“casas	abiertas”	–	open	houses	–	in	Coyhaique,	and	also	in	the	small	towns	and	
villages	closest	to	the	proposed	dam	locations	on	or	near	the	Baker	and	Pascua	Rivers:	
Cochrane,	 Caleta	 Tortel	 and	Villa	O’Higgins.	 These	were	 public	 spaces	where,	 for	 one	
day,	 locals	could	come	to	discover	the	scale	and	location	of	 the	project,	 talk	to	project	
staff,	 hear	 presentations,	 and	 take	 away	 the	 company’s	 publicity	 material.	 The	
company’s	 strategy	 at	 this	 stage	 was	 the	 “generation	 of	 confidence”	 in	 its	 “zone	 of	
influence”	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 Aysén	 according	 to	María	 Irene	 Soto,	 then	 HidroAysén’s	
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Manager	of	Communications	and	Community	Engagement	 (interviewed	14/11/2013).	
Publicising	 the	 project	 nationally	 was	 not	 a	 priority.	 In	 2013	 HidroAysén’s	 then-
Technical	Manager	confirmed	that:	“until	2010,	there	was	no	national	communications	
strategy	at	all”	(Carlos	Briso,	interviewed	6/08/2013).	Even	if	HidroAysén’s	PR	reached	
every	Aysén	resident,	which	seems	unlikely,	considering	that	the	total	population	of	the	
region	was	almost	92,000	 in	2005	out	of	Chile’s	 total	population	of	some	16.3	million	
that	 year	 (Chile:	 Ciudades,	 Pueblos,	 Aldeas	 y	 Caseríos	 2005),	 HidroAysén	 was	
communicating	 the	 largest	 energy	 infrastructure	project	 in	 the	 country’s	history	with	
barely	 0.5%	 of	 the	 population.	 	 As	media	 coverage	 of	 the	 project	was	 still	 limited	 in	
2006/2007,	HidroAysén	was	almost	invisible	to	most	Chileans	outside	Aysén.	
	
The	 first	CEO	of	HidroAysén,	Hernán	Salazar,	 explained	 in	an	 interview	 for	 this	 study	
that	to	“focus	communication	in	the	region”	and	on	a	national	level,	to	keep	the	project	
“low	profile”	was	a	directive	 from	the	project’s	owners	Endesa	and	Colbún,	who	were	
perhaps	keen	 to	avoid	 the	difficulties	Endesa	had	experienced	on	 the	Bío	Bío.	 Salazar	
explained	 the	 shareholders’	 reasoning	 as	 having	 been	 that	 this	 would	 “generate	 less	
conflict”,	although	by	the	time	he	left	the	company	in	2010,	he	felt	it	was	clear	“without	
doubt”	 that	 this	 strategy	 had	 increased	 the	 conflict	 that	 HidroAysén	 was	 creating	
(Salazar,	interviewed	4/12/13).		
	
One	interviewee,	Nicholas	Espinoza,	an	environmental	planning	consultant	who	worked	
at	 HidroAysén	 from	 2010-2012,	 understood	 the	 company’s	 early	 communications	
strategy	as	follows:		
	
I	think	that	HidroAysén	from	its	beginning,	was	a	project	that	cultivated	a	
low	profile	and	tried	to	generate	a	closeness	to	the	authorities,	and,	shall	
we	say,	directly	to	the	 immediate	community…to	the	potentially	affected.	
And	 it	 didn’t	 have,	 despite	 being	 a	 national	 project,	 any	 policy	 of	
communication	at	a	national	level.		[It	was]	invisible	at	a	national	level,	and	
it	appeared	in	the	arena	only	because	it	was	opposed.	
																																								
		 																		(Espinoza,	interviewed	7/08/2013)	
	
Whether	 the	 lack	 of	 communication	 on	 a	 national	 level	 was	 a	 deliberate	 attempt	 to	
remain	 invisible	 to	 avoid	 conflict,	 or	 a	 crucial	misreading	 of	 the	prevailing	 social	 and	
communications	 landscape,	 is	 unclear.	 Several	 interviewees	 attributed	 the	 company’s	
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silence	 to	 corporate	 culture,	 in	 concordance	 with	 the	 discussion	 of	 HidroAysén’s	
corporate	 lineage	 in	 Chapter	 3.	 For	 Espinoza,	 the	 organisational	 mentality	 of	
HidroAysén	still	had	much	of	“the	culture	of	a	state	enterprise”,	led	by	engineers,	where	
projects	were	created	 for	national	benefit	and	were	a	source	of	national	pride.	 In	 this	
“traditional	 methodology,	 from	 20	 or	 30	 years	 ago”	 there	 was	 no	 need	 to	 have	 a	
considered,	 sustained	 program	 of	 communications	 with	 stakeholders	 because	 “you	
were	 developing	 the	 country…you	 were	 received	 with	 open	 arms”38	 (Espinoza,	
7/08/2013).		
	
HidroAysén’s	 communications	 director,	 Soto,	 added	 that	 in	 Chile,	 in	 the	 past,	 “more	
information	was	hidden”	because	of	the	way	large	energy	projects	were	conducted:		
	
In	general	energy	in	Chile	has	been	developed	in	a	very	technical	way,	and	
the	engineers	didn’t	feel	the	necessity	to	come	to	communities	and	explain	
projects.	Or	if	they	did,	it	was:	first	you	develop	your	engineering	project,	
then	you	communicate.	You	appear,	in	some	ways	like	a	teacher,	and	you	
explain	to	the	communities	just	how	the	project	is.	You	don’t	develop	the	
possibility	for	dialogue.		
	
	 	 	 	 	 																								(Soto,	interviewed	14/11/2013)		
	
It	may	be	legitimate	that	in	Chile,	when	HidroAysén	was	established,	the	practice	of	early	
stakeholder	 engagement	 in	megaproject	 development	 had	 not	 been	 routine.	 Two-way	
PR	 dialogue	 and	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 initiatives	 with	 potentially	 affected	
communities	may	indeed	have	been	in	their	infancy	(Desta	2010;	Dobers	&	Halme	2009;	
Hansen	&	Machin	2008;	Rwabizambuga	2007).	This	may	have	been	particularly	so	 for	
Chile,	where,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	clientelism,	inter-elite	pact	making,	and	personal	
influence	 are	 still	 a	 dominant	 framework	 for	 doing	 business.	 However,	 HidroAysén’s	
majority	 shareholder,	 Endesa	 was	 owned	 by	 Enersis,	 and	 ultimately	 the	 Spanish	
multinational	Endesa	España,	and	subsquently	the	Italian	company	Enel39,	both	of	which	
																																																						
38	This	notion	recalls	the	“rhetoric	of	the	technological	sublime”	described	by	Leo	Marx	(1964/2000),	Nye	
(1994)	 and	 Frick	 (2008)	where	 technological	 achievements	 (often	 in	 conquering	 the	 forces	 of	 nature)	
inspire	 awe	 and	 wonder.	 Flyvbjerg	 has	 incorporated	 the	 “technological	 sublime”	 into	 his	 four	
megaproject	sublimes,	noted	in	Chapter	1.		
39	As	Spanish	and	Italian-based	businesses	respectively,	Enel	and	Enersis	might	be	considered	to	be	run	
on	a	Southern	European	and	Latin	American	business	model	of	clientelism,	where	PR	relationships	with	
the	public	are	less	important	than	generating	positive	media	coverage,	sometimes	staying	“invisible”	by	
avoiding	media	coverage	is	important,	and	cultivating	personal	relationships	with	decision	makers	is	key	
(Rodrigo	&	Orrego	2007,	p.	13).	However,	Enel	and	Enersis	are	large	multinational	business	organisations	
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do	 business	 in	 many	 developed	 countries	 including	 much	 of	 Europe,	 where	 early	
stakeholder	 engagement	 and	 credible	 CSR	 are	 routine.	 	 It	 seems,	 therefore,	 that	 the	
HydroAysén	shareholders’	push	for	the	project	to	stay	low	profile	on	a	national	level	was	
more	because	in	Chile,	up	to	this	point,	staying	low	profile	had	been	possible.	Until	the	
time	 of	 Ralco	 and	 then	 HidroAysén,	 a	 low	 level	 of	 corporate	 communication	 on	 a	
national	 level	about	 large	 infrastructure	projects	had	been	an	acceptable	way	of	doing	
business.	Local	 communities	bore	 the	 impacts	of	megaprojects,	but	 in	doing	 so,	 as	 the	
dominant	discourse	went,	 they	were	helping	to	build	the	country.	So	despite	 it	being	a	
“proyecto	 país”	 –	 a	 nation	 building	 project	 –	 as	 key	 commentators	 and	 much	 media	
coverage	began	to	describe	HidroAysén	(for	example	Ostornol,	El	Mercurio	25/04/2007)	
it	seemed	the	project	developers	felt	discussion	on	the	project	could	be	confined	to	the	
potentially	 dams-affected	 area,	 and	 to	 talks	 between	 decision	 makers	 in	 the	 capital.	
Large-scale	national	publicity	and	generation	of	social	 licence	to	operate	were	thought	
unnecessary	in	Chile.	
	
However,	 there	 is	 also	 some	 evidence	 in	 the	 data	 collected	 for	 this	 study	 that	
HidroAysén’s	 stakeholders	 opted	 for	 invisibility	 for	 the	 project	 because	 of	 the	
perception	 that	 this	 might	 make	 the	 project’s	 trajectory	 quicker,	 and	 therefore	 more	
profitable.	As	HidroAysén’s	Soto	put	it:	
	
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	shareholders,	in	general,	they	want	to	spend	
the	 least	 quantity	 of	 resources	 and	 get	 a	 project	 running	 at	 the	 least	
possible	cost.	The	point	of	view	of	the	business	in	question	here	was:	what	
can	we	do	more	quickly?	You	have	to	consider	that	processes	of	dialogue	
and	generation	of	confidence	are	long	ones.	If	I’m	going	to	build	a	project,	I	
can’t	attempt	to	gain	the	confidence	of	the	communities	in	one	year.	It’s	a	
long-term	process.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	 										(Soto,	interviewed	14/11/2013)	
	
Interviews	 and	 media	 coverage	 also	 seem	 to	 confirm	 that	 there	 was	 an	 intentional	
strategy	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 company	 of	 “hiding”	 or	 not	 informing	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	
conflict.	 As	 one	 ex-HidroAysén	manager	 who	 preferred	 to	 remain	 anonymous,	 put	 it:	
																																																																																																																																																																								
which	must	adapt	 their	 business	 practices	 to	 frameworks	 acceptable	 in	 the	national	 contexts	 in	which	
they	do	business.		
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“What	was	done,	right	 from	the	beginning,	was	always	that	things	were	hidden.	Better	
that	people	didn’t	know”	(interviewed	21/05/2013).	And,	according	to	Patricio	Segura,	
journalist	and	spokesman	for	Patagonia	sin	Represas:	“I’m	not	sure	if	hiding	is	the	right	
word,	but	certainly	they	kept	some	things	covered	because	they	didn’t	want	to	generate	
conflict	(Patricio	Segura,	interviewed	18/05/13).	Urtubia	felt	that	“there	was	a	strategy	
of	not	informing,	to	avoid	conflict	–	something	which	evidently	generates	more	conflict”	
(Urtubia,	05/05/13).	And	even	Daniel	Fernández,	HidroAysén	CEO	from	2010-2014	also	
later	 referred	 to	 “hiding”.	 Speaking	 in	 El	 Mercurio	 about	 the	 company’s	 new	
communications	strategy	in	2010,	he	said:	
	
Another	 decision	 is	 that	 we	won’t	 continue	 hiding	 the	 project	 and	we’ll	
participate	 in	 every	 instance	 possible,	 speaking	 with	 sincerity	 and	 not	
stating	anything	that	isn’t	correct.40	
																																																																												(Esturillo,	El	Mercurio	21/08/2010)	
	
																																																																																																																					
That	 HidroAysén	 sought	 invisibility	 initially	 also	 seems	 to	 be	 suggested	 by	 the	
company’s	 media	 relations	 strategies.	 In	 the	 two	 years	 between	 the	 company’s	
establishment	 in	2006	and	mid-2008	HidroAysén	produced	four	media	releases.	Then	
once	HidroAysén	entered	 the	environmental	 approval	process	 in	2008	 there	were	12	
releases.	The	yearly	figure	for	releases	thereafter	were	again	 lower	(2009:	5;	2010:	3;	
2011	 to	 July:	 7),	 until	 the	 second	 half	 2011	 (when	 the	 company	 again	 opted	 for	
invisibility)	 withdrawing	 from	 national-level	 communications	 initiatives	 almost	
entirely,	so	that	there	were	only	3	releases	between	August	2011	and	the	end	of	2014	
(HidroAysén	 2014)	 (see	 table	 in	 Chapter	 6).	 The	 following	 two	 chapters	 examine	 PR	
output	and	quantity	of	media	 coverage	more	 closely,	but	 this	detail	 seems	 to	 support	
the	argument	here	concerning	the	company’s	 low	profile,	which	appears	to	have	been	
an	intentional	strategy	for	the	first	two	years	after	HydroAysén	was	established.	
	
5.6	“Buying	consciences”:	HidroAysén’s	CSR	and	PR	initiatives	in	Aysén	
	
																																																						
40	This	public	admission	of	communicational	errors	on	the	part	of	the	company’s	CEO	might	perhaps	have	
formed	 part	 of	 a	 strategy	 that	 included	 a	 corporate	 apologia	 (García	 2015)	 as	 an	 element	 of	 the	
company’s	crisis	communication.	This	is	discussed	further	in	Chapter	8.	
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If	HidroAysén’s	early	strategy	was	to	maintain	a	low	profile	nationally,	on	the	ground	in	
Aysén	 the	 company’s	 intentions	were	 different.	 In	 its	 “open	 houses”	 it	 promoted	 the	
megaproject	 as	 a	 source	 of	 growth,	 employment	 and	 modernization	 in	 a	 remote,	
undeveloped	region,	distant	from	the	mining-rich	regions	of	Chile’s	north.	As	part	of	the	
company’s	commitment	to	the	region,	and	to	become	closer	to	its	“vecinos”	(neighbours)	
as	the	HidroAysén	communications	material	often	refers	to	the	people	of	the	region,	it	
promised	improvements	to	the	region’s	chief	road	route	–	still	mostly	unpaved.	It	also	
undertook	to	employ	20%	of	a	peak	dam	building	workforce	of	5000	directly	from	the	
region	 for	 the	 decade	 the	 project	 would	 take	 to	 build.	 And	 to	 diffuse	 the	 claim	 that	
Aysén	 would	 be	 sacrificed	 to	 produce	 power	 for	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 country	 without	
injecting	 energy	 into	 the	 region,	 HidroAysén	 proposed	 a	 mini-hydroelectric	 project,	
‘Energía	más	Barata’	(Cheaper	Energy),	to	lower	local	energy	costs	(HidroAysén	2011).	
	
Other	CSR	initiatives	were	also	directed	at	local	stakeholders.	HidroAysén	offered	post-
secondary	 scholarships,	 sponsored	 football	 clubs	 and	 local	 fire	 brigades,	 delivered	
presentations	on	energy	in	schools,	engaged	in	training	and	capacity	building	for	local	
people,	 sponsored	 parks,	 donated	 to	 dental	 and	 veterinary	 clinics,	 and	 even	 brought	
food	 parcels	 to	 the	 retirement	 home	 in	 the	 regional	 capital	 Coyhaique	 (HidroAysén	
2008-2009).	 The	 company	 also	 began	 running	 a	 program	 of	 competitive	 grants	 in	
regional	 towns	 and	 villages	 through	 which	 community	 groups	 and	 individuals	 could	
apply	 for	 funds	 for	 projects	 (HidroAysén	 2008).	 It	 also	 ran	 a	 radio	 program,	
Conversemos	con	HidroAysén	(Let’s	talk	with	HidroAysén),	which	was	broadcast	weekly	
by	 three	 local	 radio	 stations,	 and	 featured	 HidroAysén	 staff	 and	 invited	 guests	
discussing	 the	 project.	Conversemos	 con	HidroAysén,	however,	was	much	 criticised	 by	
the	anti-dams	movement	for	its	subjectivity:	
	
This	 is	 not	 exactly	 a	 space	 governed	 by	 journalistic	 standards	 of	 truth	
and	 impartiality.	On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	 evidently	 not	 only	 a	 program	of	
public	 relations,	 but	 one	 of	 pure	 propaganda.	 The	 program	 makes	 a	
series	of	affirmations	without	delivering	any	proven	evidence	in	support	
of	 its	 claims,	 for	 example,	 its	 claims	 about	 the	 supposed	 high	 level	 of	
support	that	the	project	has	in	the	area.					 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 																																																																					(Mladinic	2010)	
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It	seemed	clear,	then,	that	with	its	range	of	local	CSR	and	communication	initiatives,	the	
company	 was	 attempting	 to	 become	 a	 constant	 presence	 in	 the	 daily	 lives	 of	 Aysén	
communities,	and	an	integral	part	of	citizens’	imagining	of	the	regional	future.	
	
That	 HidroAysén’s	 local	 CSR	 efforts	 were	 voluntary	 actions	 that	 appeared	 to	 further	
social	good	beyond	the	company’s	interests	and	legal	requirements	–	McWilliams	et	al’s	
basic	CSR	definition	(McWilliams,	Siegel	&	Wright	2006)	–	is	a	possible	interpretation	of	
these	 initiatives.	But	 that	HidroAysén’s	 strategic	 communications	and	CSR	drive	were	
also	 to	 diffuse	 dissent,	 create	 legitimacy	 and	 win	 social	 licence	 for	 the	 megaproject	
seems	 obvious.	 Although	 credible	 CSR	 actions	 are	 regarded	 as	 necessary	 and	
legitimising	 by	 megaproject	 developers	 and	 resource-extractive	 industries	 in	 most	
contemporary	contexts,	it	was	the	nature	and	scope	of	HidroAysén’s	CSR	that	troubled	
many	commentators.	Instead	of	fostering	co-creation	with	local	communities	in	building	
the	 project	 and	mitigating	 its	 negative	 impacts,	 HidroAysén’s	 brand	 of	 CSR	was	 later	
accused	of	“buying	consciences”	(El	Mercurio	2011)	by	attempting	to	pressure	locals	to	
accept	the	project	with	gifts,	favours	and	donations41.		
	
The	 company’s	 CSR	 initiatives	 began	 in	 2007	 and	 were	 most	 active	 in	 2008,	 when	
HidroAysén	 submitted	 its	 Environmental	 Impact	 Study	 (EIS),	 the	 crucial	 stage	 of	 the	
approvals	process,	to	the	local	authority	 in	Coyhaique.	Not	only	were	decision-makers	
on	 the	 EIS	 based	 in	 Aysén,	 but	 the	 EIS	 process	 also	 allowed	 for	 the	 submission	 of	
citizens’	questions	or	objections,	which	the	company	would	be	obliged	to	address	in	full.	
By	generating	approval	 for	 the	project	 locally,	 it	 seems	HidroAysén	aimed	 to	mitigate	
any	 objections	 that	 would	 delay	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 project,	 or	 lead	 to	 local	 protest	
when	 construction	 began.	 However,	 in	 early	 2010	 the	 regional	 representative	 of	 the	
Contraloría	 General	 (Comptroller	 General)	 mandated	 an	 end	 to	 HidroAysén’s	 CSR	
initiatives	 in	 the	 region,	 citing	 a	 conflict	 of	 interests	while	 the	project	was	 still	 in	 the	
approvals	 process	 (Contraloría	 General	 de	 la	 República	 de	 Chile	 2010).	 Some	 of	 the	
company’s	 longer-term	 initiatives	did	 continue,	 though,	 until	 2013,	 and	are	discussed	
again	in	Chapter	8.	Interviewed	in	2013,	HidroAysén’s	director	of	Communications	and	
Community	 recognised	 that	 the	 early	CSR	program	had	 lacked	 subtlety.	Although	 she	
																																																						
41	HidroAysén’s	CSR	actions	here	might	be	considered	“CSR-washing”,	though	Pope	and	Wæraas	(2016)	
tell	us	that	CSR	washing	is	in	fact	rare.	
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considered	 that	 the	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 campaign	 had	 introduced	 the	 idea	 of	
HidroAysen’s	“buying	allegiances”	into	the	discourse	on	the	project,	she	said:	
	
We	also	made	some	errors,	because	we	didn’t	take	into	account	that	being	
such	a	 large	company,	we	were	 like	a	Goliath.	And	in	addition	to	that	we	
were	putting	money	on	 the	 table,	which	obviously	made	us	unequal.	We	
didn’t	put	ourselves	on	the	same	level	as	the	community	and	it	kept	being	
a	relationship	of	from	‘up	here’	to	‘down	there’.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 													(Soto,	interviewed	14/11/2013)	
	
For	Latta,	HidroAysén’s	attemps	at	“generating	consent”	(Latta	2010)	for	the	project	set	
up	a	the	relationship	between	the	company	and	local	communities	that	was:	
	
	
reminiscent	of	the	noblesse	oblige	embedded	in	the	historical	relationship	
between	 patrones	 and	 peones42,	 which	 lay	 at	 the	
core	 		 of	 		 Chile’s	 		 institutions	 		 of	 		 social	 		 class	 		 rooted	 		 in	 the	 rural	
hacienca.		
	
				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 												(Latta	2010,	p.	10)	 	
	
HydroAysén’s	CSR	therefore	appeared	to	underscore	the	intergenerational	inequalities,	
persistent	social	divisions	and	also	the	neoliberal	dominance	of	multinational	business	
interests	that	the	project	was	beginning	to	become	emblematic	of.	Although	intended	to	
do	 the	 opposite,	 HidroAysén’s	 CSR	 actions	 and	 CSR	 communication	 seem	 to	 have	
contributed	to	 the	way	 in	which	the	project	became	emblematic	of	a	divided,	unequal	
Chile.			
	
5.7	“A	closeness	to	the	authorities”		
	
While	 apparently	 endeavouring	 to	 remain	 out	 of	 nation-wide	 public	 discourse,	 it	
seemed	that	HidroAysén	was	carrying	out	important	work	lobbying	decision	makers	in	
the	 capital	 to	 favour	 the	 megaproject.	 As	 Espinoza	 (interviewed	 07/08/13)	 put	 it,	
HydroAysén	was	 endeavouring	 to	 cultivate	 a	 “closeness	 to	 the	 authorities”.	 This	was	
particularly	so	once	the	project	entered	the	environmental	approvals	process	in	2008.	
																																																						
42	Patrón	can	be	translated	as	patron,	lord	or	boss,	and	connotes	a	position	of	wealth	and	power.	Peón	can	
be	translated	as	peasant	or	unskilled	labourer.		
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“There	was	an	active	lobby	by	the	shareholders,”	confirms	a		PR	executive	from	Burson-
Marsteller,	 one	 of	 the	 three	 agencies	 contracted	 by	 HidroAysén,	 and	 who	 wished	 to	
remain	anonymous	(interviewed	16/12/13).	“This	wasn’t	outsourced,	there	wasn’t	any	
external	agency.	The	company’s	owners	did	this	directly,	but	our	agency	was	aware	of	
this	process.”	This	interviewee	explained	that	HidroAysén’s	bosses	could	have	influence	
over	 decision-makers	 in	 government	 “because	 they	 knew	 each	 other”	 and	 that	 the	
lobbying	 was	 done	 behind	 closed	 doors	 “on	 the	 level	 of	 power.	 Yes,	 directly	 to	 the	
source	of	power”.	
	
As	 this	 interviewee	suggested,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	elite	networks	 linking	corporate	and	
political	 spheres	 in	 Chile	 are	 extensive	 on	 both	 the	 left	 and	 right	 of	 politics.	 Some	
examples	of	HidroAysén’s	“closeness	to	the	authorities”	include	the	fact	that	Sebastian	
Piñera’s	 brother-in-law,	 Eduardo	Morel	Montes,	 was	 second-in-charge	 at	 HidroAysen	
until	 February	2012	 (Poderopedia	2015).	 	 Jorge	Rosenblut,	 president	 of	Endesa	Chile	
from	2009	had	been	Presidential	Secretary	during	the	1998-2002	Frei	government	and	
Daniel	 Fernández,	 CEO	 of	 HidroAysén	 from	 2010	 had	 been	 head	 of	 three	 state	
corporations	prior	 to	 leading	the	megaproject.	Bernado	Matte,	President	of	Colbún,	 is,	
like	 Piñera,	 a	member	 of	 Chile’s	wealthy	 elite,	 and	 shares	 social	 circles	with	 the	man	
who	 was	 president	 at	 the	 crucial	 time	 in	 HidroAysén’s	 approvals	 trajectory.	 Latta	
suggested	 in	 2010	 that	 “Matte	 undoubtedly	 has	 little	 difficulty	 securing	 an	 audience	
with	the	president”	(p.	14).	Because	of	the	closeness	of	such	inter-elite	relationships,	the	
elite	closure	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	critics	of	HidroAysén	pointed	to	possible	conflicts	
of	interest.	Pointing	out	the	project’s	close	ties	with	Chile’s	elite	became	a	key	aspect	of	
the	Patagonia	sin	Repreas	communications	campaign.		
	
Although	closed-doors	negotiations	are	difficult	to	pick	apart	 in	a	study	of	this	nature,	
precisely	 because	 they	 are	 intended	 to	 be	 invisible,	 there	were	 hints	 of	 this	 in	 other	
aspects	 of	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	 HidroAysén	 and	 the	 data	 collected	 here.	 For	
example,	the	general	manager	of	Endesa	in	Chile	explained	to	a	shareholders’	meeting	
in	April	2007:	“we	are	collaborating	closely	with	the	regulating	entity	so	that	norms	are	
established	 that	 are	 in	 accordance	 with	 our	 interests”	 (Rodrigo	 &	 Orrego	 2007).	
Interviewees	 for	 this	 study	 also	 spoke	 of	 “invisible	 negotiations”	 (political	 strategist	
Carlos	 Martinez	 interviewed	 12/06/13)	 	 and	 “subterranean	 negotiations”	 	 (Antonio	
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Horvath,	 Senator	 for	 Aysén,	 interviewed	 26/11/13)	 between	 HidroAysén’s	 directors	
and	 authorities	 in	 Santiago	 and	 in	 the	 region,	 intended	 to	 smooth	 the	 path	 of	 the	
approvals	process	for	the	megaproject.		
	
It	seemed	that	central	government	lobbying	of	the	local	assessing	authorities	was	also	a	
part	 of	 the	 behind-the-scenes	 negotiations	 on	 energy	 projects	 like	 HidroAysén.	 El	
Mostrador	 revealed	 in	 a	 feature	 in	 late	 2008	 that	 the	 then-head	 of	 the	 CNE,	Marcelo	
Tokman,	 had	 a	 “secret	 weapon”:	 two	 lobbyists	 known	 as	 “energy	 fast	 trackers”	 who	
“travelled	the	length	and	breadth	of	the	country”	meeting	with	local	authorities	and	and	
“pressuring”	 these	 decision	 makers	 in	 a	 way	 that	 was	 reported	 as	 “particularly	
unsubtle”.	The	article	confirmed	that	then-HidroAysén	head	Salazar	had	also	met	with	
at	least	one	of	these	“fast	trackers”	(Urquieta,	El	Mostrador	17/11/2008).	
	
Other	instances	of	what	seemed	like	lobbing	for	HidroAysén	–	or	at	least	the	fostering	of	
a	 close	 relationship	 between	 the	 company	 and	 the	 government	 –	 were	 indeed	more	
public.	Following	the	damaging	earthquake	of	February	2010,	Endesa	Chile	announced	
a	 US$10	 million	 donation	 to	 the	 government’s	 eathquake	 recovery	 fund	 (La	 Tercera	
16/03/2010).	 A	 giant	 cheque	 was	 handed	 over	 by	 Pablo	 Yrarrázabal,	 President	 of	
Enersis	 (owner	 of	 Endesa)	 at	 a	 highly	 publicised	 media	 conference,	 only	 days	 after	
President	 Piñera	 and	 energy	minister	 Ricardo	 Raineri,	 had	met	 privately	with	 Fluvio	
Conti,	CEO	of	Enel	(parent	company	of	Enersis),	reportedly	to	discuss	HidroAysén	(La	
Tercera	03/05/2010).	Local	Aysén	newspaper	El	Divisadero	reported	the	donation	and	
its	 presentation	 as	 a	 “scandalous”	 case	 of	 “corporate	 lobby”	 and	 a	 “communications	
display	with	cheques	as	props”	(El	Divisadero	03/04/2010).	In	media	discourse,	it	was	
also	clear,	however,	 that	 the	affinity	of	HidroAysén	 for	 the	authorities	was	 reciprocal.	
During	 2008	 and	 2009,	 both	 of	 the	 leading	 presidential	 candidates	 for	 the	 2010	
presidential	election	(Eduardo	Frei	and	Sebastián	Piñera)	declared	themselves	in	favour	
of	the	project,	and	their	position	was	frequently	quoted	in	the	media,	as	a	compilation	of	
quotes	published	in	El	Mercurio	showed	(Bustamante	Rocha,	El	Mercurio	25/04/2009).	
And,	 shortly	 before	 HidroAysén	 was	 due	 to	 submit	 its	 environmental	 impact	
assessment,	 the	 Minister	 of	 the	 Interior,	 Edmundo	 Pérez	 Yoma	 also	 made	 a	
controversial	 public	 declaration	 in	 support	 of	 the	 project	 (Aránguiz,	 El	 Mercurio	
07/02/2008).	 Such	 strategic	 statements	 did	 not	 pass	 by	 the	 dams’	 opponents	
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unnoticed.	Interviewed	in	El	Mercurio	in	February	2008,	leading	environmentalist	Juan	
Pablo	Orrego	condemned	Perez	Yoma’s	comments:		
	
It	 seems	 to	 me	 completely	 inappropriate	 and	 bordering	 on	 illegality	 in	
terms	 of	 administrative	 probity…This	 is	 a	 political	 operation	 of	 the	 kind	
that	we	haven’t	seen	since	the	Ralco	scandal.		
	
	 	 	 	 													(Bustamante	Rocha,	El	Mercurio	14/02/2008)	
	
It	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 literature	 on	 megaprojects	 that	 the	 “strategic	 manipulation	 of	
information”	(Flyvbjerg,	Garbuio	&	Lovallo	2009,	p.	175)	and	the	 lack	of	 transparency	
described	 above	 and	 are	 often	 associated	 with	 such	 projects.	 These	 tendencies	 are	
perhaps	more	pronounced	in	Latin	America,	and	Chile,	given	the	tendency	of	business	in	
this	country	 to	rely	on	personal	 influence,	and	 informal,	private	negotiations	between	
elites.	 Although	 HidroAysén’s	 “closeness	 to	 the	 authorities”	 was	 not	 always	 clearly	
visible	 in	 media	 reporting	 on	 the	 project,	 this	 kind	 of	 closeness	 was	 understood	 by	
observers	in	Chile	of	the	unfolding	case	of	HidroAysén,	because	this	was	precisely	how	
business	 had	 always	 functioned	 in	 Chile.	 HidroAysén’s	 perceived	 closeness	 to	 the	
authorities	therefore	became	part	of	the	discursive	construction	of	the	project,	so	that	
its	close	ties	with	an	intergenerational	elite	in	Chile	became	one	of	the	things	the	project	
was	known,	and	criticised,	for.	
	
5.8	Patagonia	sin	Represas	makes	HidroAysén	visible	
	
In	April	2007	began	what	the	groups	behind	Patagonia	sin	Represas	described	as	
“the	 most	 ambitious	 and	 relevant	 public	 education	 campaign	 that	 has	 ever	 been	
launched	in	Chile”.	One	of	the	campaign’s	publications	describes	how:	
	
With	 more	 creativity	 than	 resources,	 and	 with	 the	 participation	 and	
commitment	 of	 hundreds	 of	 collaborators,	 we	 began	 this	 crusade	 to	
educate	public	opinion	on	the	project.	We	aimed	to	create	awareness	of	its	
disastrous	 consequences,	 illustrate	 the	 available	 options	 in	 terms	 of	
alternative	 and	 sustainable	 energy	 scenarios,	 shed	 light	 on	 institutional	
failings	 in	 the	 environmental	 approvals	 process,	 uncover	 lobbying,	
political	 and	 economic	 pressure	 and	 conflicts	 of	 interests.	 Above	 all,	 we	
wanted	 to	 keep	 public	 opinion	 informed	 about	 a	 project	 that	 is	 both	
unnecessary	and	unsuitable	for	the	country.	
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	 	 	 	 	 	 														(Patagonia	sin	Represas	2010)	
	
While	HidroAysén’s	communications	were	almost	exclusively	locally	focused,	Patagonia	
sin	Represas	ran	a	 local	and	national	campaign	from	the	outset.	According	to	Carolina	
Morgado	 (interviewed	 16/11/13)	 who	 worked	 with	 Douglas	 Tompkins	 at	 Tompkins	
Conservation	and	Fundación	Pumalin	 (Pumalín	Foundation),	 although	communication	
in	the	region	mattered,	national	communication	was	key	because	“decisions	are	taken	at	
a	national	level”.	Almost	all	Patagonia	sin	Represas’	publicity	in	the	region	therefore	had	
the	goal	of	also	speaking	to	a	national	audience.	An	early	example	of	this	was	the	2007	
“Cabalgata	 sin	Represas”,	 an	 anti-dams	horseride	which	was	 an	 act	 of	 local	 solidarity	
with	 the	 aim	 of	 attracting	 national	 attention,	 or	 as	 DeLuca	 (2006)	 would	 call	 it,	 an	
“image	 event”.	 Dressed	 in	 traditional	 attire	 (still	 daily	 dress	 for	 many)	 120	 Aysén	
citizens	rode	for	nine	days	across	the	region,	to	arrive	in	the	regional	capital	Coyhaique	
where	they	filed	on	horseback,	protest	banners	flying,	past	the	HidroAysén	offices.	The	
organiser	explained:	
The	 objective	 of	 the	 ride	 is	 so	 that	 the	 people	 affected	 by	 the	 HidroAysén	
project	gain	visibility,	and	so	it	becomes	clear	that	it	is	us,	the	people	of	Aysén,	
who	are	against	these	dams	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																									(Estrada	2007)		
The	 protest	 ride	 was	 reported	 nationally	 on	 Channel	 13,	 which	 was	 then	 the	 most	
watched	 Chilean	 television	 channel	 (Canal	 13	 28/11/2007)	 and	 was	 the	 first	 high-
profile,	televised	symbolic	act	of	the	anti-dams	campaign.	
To	increase	visibility	for	HydroAysén	throughout	Chile,	the	campaign	immediately	began	
to	work	simultaneously	on	two	modes	of	national-level	publicity.	The	first	was	an	image-
based	campaign	of	anti-dams	billboards	along	the	length	of	the	country’s	main	highway,	
Ruta	 5,	 in	 key	 cities,	 and	 in	 the	 Aysén	 regional	 capital,	 Coyhaique.	 Similar	 images	
appeared	on	posters	 throughout	 the	 country.	 Local	 activists	were	encouraged	 to	print	
these	direct	from	the	campaign	website	for	use	in	their	vicinities.	Ads	also	appeared	on	
bus	 shelters,	 and	 a	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 bumper	 sticker	 became	 ubiquitous.	 The	
second	 strategy	 was	 to	 publish	 full-page	 newspaper	 advertisements	 in	 publications	
including	El	Mercurio,	La	Tercera,	The	Clinic,	the	(small	circulation)	Chilean	print	edition	
of	 Le	 Monde	 Diplomatique	 and	 also	 in	 local	 Aysén	 newspapers.	 A	 third	 key	
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communications	output	was	a	 large-format	hard	cover	book,	released	by	the	campaign	
in	 2007	 and	 taking	 its	 name	 from	 the	 campaign.	 In	 2008,	 around	 the	 time	 that	
HidroAysén	entered	the	environmental	approvals	process,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	also	
strategically	 ran	 a	 television	 advertisement	 on	 key	 national	 channels,	 and	 radio	
advertisements	were	 broadcast	 locally.	 The	 sub-sections	 below	 address	 each	 of	 these	
communications	strategies	individually.			
	
5.8.1	“Imagen	país”	–	anti	dam	advertising	and	the	“national	image”	
	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 advertising	 billboard	 campaign	 was	 launched	 in	 early	 2007.	
Many	of	the	billboards	were	present	until	2013,	with	regularly	renewed	images,	though	
others	 were	 swiftly	 censored.	 In	 Santiago’s	 international	 airport,	 for	 example,	 such	
billboards	were	removed	less	than	24	hours	after	they	had	been	erected	for	being	too	
“controversial”	(Liberona	2007).	At	Balmaceda	Airport,	the	main	air	access	to	the	Aysén	
region,	 similar	 billboards	 were	 crudely	 covered,	 without	 explanation.	 And	 when	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 tried	 to	 buy	 advertising	 space	 in	 the	 Santiago	 Metro,	 the	
campaign’s	 advertising	 agency	 was	 refused,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 ads	 “generated	
controversies	 which	 were	 out	 of	 line	 with	 the	 organisation”	 (Ibid.).	 Considering	 that	
these	were	paid	advertising	spots,	 the	actions	of	 these	state	enterprises	were	seen	as	
curbing	 freedom	of	 expression	 (Ibid).	 	 HidroAysén	 later	 ran	 an	 advertising	 campaign	
throughout	Santiago’s	transport	network.	
The	imagery	of	these	billboards	was	simple.	Each	was	a	photomontage	showing	a	string	
of	high	voltage	electricity	pylons	set	against	 iconic	Chilean	 landscapes.	As	 interviewee	
Morgado	 explained,	 the	 campaign	 used	 the	 pylons	 to	 signify	HidroAysén,	 rather	 than	
dams,	because:	
Of	course,	if	you	show	a	dam,	nobody	is	able	to	discern	that	this	is	something	
damaging,	 because	 you	 see	 a	 lake,	 and	 people	 do	 say	 ‘lake’	 when	 they	 talk	
about	dams.	So	 it	had	 to	be	an	 image	of	 the	 thing	 that	would	 in	 fact	be	most	
visually	 disruptive,	 which	 would	 be	 the	 80-metre	 towers,	 running	 for	 some	
2000kms.		
	 	 															(Morgado,	interviewed	16/11/13)	
The	 campaign	 also	 considered	 carefully	 the	 kinds	 of	 landscapes	 against	 which	 the	
pylons	were	depicted.	Because	the	project’s	power	line	would	traverse	so	much	of	Chile,	
many	 landscapes	 and	 communities	 would	 indeed	 be	 affected.	 Initially	 the	 campaign	
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showed	Patagonian	landscapes.	But	in	the	words	of	one	campaign	publication:	“because	
we	know	that	people	tend	to	protect	and	take	care	of	places	that	they	are	familiar	with”	
(Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 2010),	 it	 also	 singled	 out	 iconic	 natural	 landscapes	 in	 other	
parts	of	Chile.	These	were	well-known	lakes,	waterfalls	or	volcanoes	–	familiar	signifiers	
of	the	“national	image”	–	that	were	located	near	each	town	or	city	where	the	billboards	
were	erected.		The	ads	depicted	power	lines	crossing	every	one	of	these	landscapes.	At	
this	stage,	with	the	exact	route	of	the	planned	power	line	not	known,	the	billboards	and	
posters	 were	 intended	 as	 symbolic	 communication:	 not	 as	 actual	 depictions	 of	 what	
HidroAysén’s	 power	 line	 might	 look	 like.	 The	 billboards	 bore	 anchorages	 such	 as:	
“Destruction	is	not	a	solution”	and	“The	worst	national	image”.	Importantly,	all	ads	also	
incorporated	the	words	“Chilean	Patagonia	without	dams”,	an	anchorage	that	was	used	
specifically	 to	 generate	 a	 feeling	 of	 national	 ownership	 and	 national	 pride	 over	
Patagonia.	None	of	the	anti-dams	advertisements	at	this	stage	mentioned	HidroAysén.	
	 	 			 	
Figure	3:	“Destruction	is	not	a	solution”	 			Figure	4:	“The	worst	national	image”	
The	anti-dams	campaign	also	felt	it	important	to	create	a	single,	symbolic	image	that	
would	become	representative	of	the	whole	campaign:			
It	had	to	be	something	that	would	immediately	capture	public	attention,	that	
was	 recognizable	 and	 appreciated…Although	 the	 region	 of	 Aysén	 has	
innumerable	 landscapes	 and	 places	 of	 extraordinary	 scenic	 beauty,	 these	
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weren’t	 as	 well	 known	 or	 recognized…It	 was	 decided	 therefore	 to	 use	 an	
iconic	 image	 of	 Patagonia…recognized	 globally,	which	was	 the	 controversial	
image	of	the	Torres	del	Paine	crossed	by	high	voltage	power	lines.		 	
	 	 	 	 	 					 	 																			(Patagonia	sin	Represas	2010)	
This	 image	of	power	 lines	crossing	 the	centerpiece	of	Patagonia’s	best-known	national	
park,	 and	 perhaps	 Chile’s	most	 distinctive	 national	 landscape	would	 be	 denounced	 as	
“misleading”	 (El	 Mercurio	 12/12/2010)	 and	 as	 “propaganda”,	 considering	 that	 the	
power	line	would	actually	begin	several	hundred	kilometers	to	the	north	of	the	Torres.	
Later,	when	the	company	began	to	respond	to	the	Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign	 in	
2008,	HidroAysén	singled	out	this	symbolic	 image.	“They	tried	to	demonstrate	that	we	
were	 lying”	noted	Urtubia	 (interviewed	15/05/13).	According	 to	 another	 interviewee,	
the	company’s	reactive	effort	to	reject	the	image	only	reinforced	its	impression:		
If	you	say	‘look,	we	aren’t	going	to	pass	the	Torres’,	then	you’ve	already	lost.	In	
communicational	 terms,	 you’ve	 lost,	 because	 people	 are	 left	 with	 the	
impression	that	the	lines	will	be	run	past	the	Torres.	
																																																																																														(Espinoza,	interviewed	7/08/2013)	
As	 semiotic	 analysis	 tells	 us,	 no	 message	 contains	 only	 one	 meaning	 (Barthes	 1972;	
1973/1975;	 Miller	 1987).	 Texts	 –	 like	 this	 series	 of	 protest	 advertisements	 –	 are	
inherently	subjective	and	each	reader	finds	his	or	her	own	meaning	in	a	text.	I	focus	now	
on	 this	most	 recognised	 image	 in	 this	 series,	 the	 ‘Torres’	 image,	 to	 demonstrate	 how	
HidroAysén	and	Patagonia	sin	Represas	could	derive	such	different	meanings	from	the	
same	advertisement.	And	while	I	focus	on	one	advertisement	in	this	section,	much	of	this	
analysis	does	also	apply	to	the	series	as	a	whole.		
The	‘Torres’	advertisement	depicts	a	view	across	Lake	Pehoe	to	the	granite	spires	of	the	
Paine	Massif,	 rising	dramatically	 from	the	Patagonian	steppe.	The	Torres	(towers)	and	
Cuernos	 (horns)	del	Paine	are	 the	much-recognised	 centerpiece	of	 this	 iconic	national	
park,	 which	 receives	 some	 155,000	 visitors	 each	 year,	 more	 than	 half	 of	 these	
international.	 	 Torres	 del	 Paine	 is	 a	 UNESCO	 Biosphere	 Reserve,	 and	 in	 2013,	 it	 was	
voted	 by	 the	 TripAdvisor	 media	 group	 as	 the	 ‘Eighth	 Wonder	 of	 the	 World’	 (Parque	
Nacional	 Torres	 del	 Paine	 	 2014).	 The	 image	 of	 the	 Torres	 is	 therefore	 well	 known	
internationally	and	an	instantly	recognisable	source	of	national	pride	for	Chileans.	The	
advertisement	 depicts	 the	 dawn	 view	 of	 these	 mountains,	 lit	 dramatically	 with	 early	
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light.	Although	most	classic	views	of	 the	Torres	show	them	 in	 full	daylight	as	a	snowy	
backdrop	to	the	ice-blue	glacier	fed	lake,	this	image	depicts	them	partly	shrouded	in	grey	
cloud.	Digitally	super-imposed	on	the	image,	and	partially	obscuring	the	mountain	view,	
are	two	high	voltage	power	pylons,	with	a	web	of	power	lines	strung	between	them.		The	
advertisement	bears	a	simple	anchorage	which	translates	as:	Chilean	Patagonia	Without	
Dams!	 and	 the	 image	 also	 includes	 the	 emblem	 of	 the	 CDP,	 which	 conducted	 the	
campaign.	
	 	
Figure	5:	Patagonia	sin	Represas’	controversial	Torres	del	Paine	image.	
While	 the	 signs	 that	 constitute	 the	 above	 description	 are	 clear	 (mountains,	 water,	
clouds,	powerlines,	accompanying	anchorage)	the	codes,	or	rules	that	 link	the	signifier	
to	the	signified	rely	on	such	associations	being	conventionally	understood.	For	example,	
the	 sign	 of	 the	 Torres	 del	 Paine	 is	 linked	 by	 a	 code,	 or	 convention,	 which	 signifies	
magnificent	natural	heritage,	national	image	and	national	pride	in	Chile.	The	Torres	also	
represent	a	distant,	perfect,	natural	 idyll.	For	city	dwellers	in	Chile	–	particularly	those	
sweltering	under	the	blanket	of	smog	that	defiles	Santiago	–	they	represent	a	last	vestige	
of	undefiled	nature.	Although	distant	and	unobtainable	for	many,	they	are	a	place	to	be	
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revered	 and	 protected.	 The	 grey	 clouds	 and	 fiery	 half-light	 are	 signs	 which	 by	
conventional	codes,	often	signify	trouble	or	threat.	The	superimposed	power	lines	stand	
in	metonymically	for	the	HidroAysén	megaproject.	The	name	of	the	project	and	images	
of	dams	are	absent	signifiers,	not	only	in	this	advertisement,	but	right	across	this	image-
based	campaign.	In	this	series	of	advertisements,	power	lines	became	symbolic	signifiers	
for	 the	 project.	 They	 also	 created	 a	 binary	 between	 the	 natural	 and	 the	manmade.	 In	
other	 ads	 in	 the	 series,	which	 include	 in	 their	 anchorages	words	 such	 as	 “worst”	 and	
“destruction”,	power	lines	–	and	thereby	the	megaproject	–	came	to	connote	the	worst	of	
technology	 and	 development	 (in	 contrast,	 implicitly,	 to	 the	 ‘best’	 of	 the	 country,	 as	
depicted	in	the	accompanying	images).		
For	Patagonia	sin	Represas,	this	 image,	and	the	others	in	the	series,	was	used	with	the	
intention	of	establishing	a	convention	or	code	of	HidroAysén	as	“destruction”.	And	while	
Barthes	(1973/1975)	and	Miller	(1987)	tell	us	that	the	semiotic	critic	is	ethically	bound	
to	avoid	misinterpreting	or	misreading	a	 text,	 the	megaproject	developers	 felt	no	such	
compulsion.	Reading	the	images	with	power	lines	more	literally	–	and	no	doubt	aware	of	
the	 potential	 to	 undermine	 their	 opponents	 –	 HidroAysén	 denounced	 them	 as	
dishonesty	on	the	part	of	the	anti-dams	campaign.	The	company’s	CEO	later	wrote	(in	a	
Letter	to	the	Editor	of	El	Mercurio)	of	“a	campaign	of	disinformation	based	in	myths	and	
falsehoods”	 in	 relation	 to	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 ads	 (Fernández,	 El	 Mercurio	
15/12/2010).	 Allowing	 a	 new	 code	 to	 become	 established	 between	 the	 signifier,	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 and	 a	 signified,	 dishonesty,	 was	 something	 the	 anti-dams	
campaign	wanted	to	avoid	at	all	costs,	because:		
our	absolute	preoccupation	from	day	one	in	order	to	establish	ourselves	as	a	
valid	interlocutor,	was	to	provide	correct	information,	without	deception.		
	 	 	 	 	 																				(Morgado,	interviewed	16/11/2013)	
In	order	to	clarify	the	symbolic	intention	of	the	Torres	del	Paine	image	and	other	images	
in	the	series,	therefore,	the	anchorage	of	any	new	images	became	a	more	explicit:	“Here	
this	 would	 be	 unacceptable.	 In	 Aysén	 too.”	 When	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign	 heard	 a	
comment	 that	 “it	would	be	equivalent	 to	showing	 it	 [the	power	 line]	on	Easter	 Island”	
(Patagonia	 sin	Represas	 2010)	 they	made	 a	 swift	 intertextual	 response,	 incorporating	
into	 their	 campaign	 an	 image	 that	 showed	 power	 lines	 slung	 behind	 the	 moai,	 the	
unmistakable	statues	of	Chile’s	Easter	Island.	This	too	bore	the	new	clarifying	anchorage,	
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and	the	image	sought	to	underscore	the	symbolism	of	the	Torres	advertisement.	
	 	
Figure	6:	“Here,	this	would	be	unacceptable.	In	Aysén	too.”	
This	 widespread	 visual	 campaign,	 then,	 was	 intended	 above	 all	 to	 render	 low-profile	
HidroAysén	visible	nationally,	but	it	also	became	a	significant	moment	in	the	discourse	
on	the	dams.	The	campaign	began	to	solidify	what	HydroAysén	meant	or	represented	–	
destruction	and	threat	–	and	what	opposition	to	it	symbolised	–	rejection	of	destruction	
by	ill-considered	development,	defence	of	natural	heritage	and	national	pride.	However,	
unintentionally,	the	campaign	allowed	another	meaning	to	enter	discourse	on	the	dams,	
one	 that	 associated	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 with	 stretching	 of	 the	 truth.	 	 All	 these	
meanings	 would	 become	 a	 part	 of	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	 the	 emblematic	 case	 of	
HidroAysén.	
5.8.2	“Reasons	to	reject	HidroAysén”:	newspaper	advertisements	and	“censorship”	
		
At	the	same	time	as	 the	visual	campaign	of	billboards	and	posters,	meant	 to	 introduce	
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more	 of	 Chile	 to	 the	 dams	 megaproject,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 was	 printing	
advertisements	in	key	national	and	local	newspapers.	As	discussed	in	previous	chapters,	
Chile’s	 two	 leading	newspapers	 are	 the	news	 sources	of	 decision-making	 elites.	 These	
two	 publications	were	 therefore	 prioritised.	 Some	 36	whole-page	 advertisements	 and	
letters	to	the	president	(at	first	Bachelet,	then	Piñera)	were	run	across	these	four	outlets	
from	2007	to	2010.	The	ads	were	initially	alternated	in	turn	between	El	Mercurio	and	La	
Tercera	 at	 the	 rate	 of	 two	 a	 month	 (Morgado,	 interviewed	 16/11/13),	 and	 appeared	
with	varying	frequency	in	the	other	outlets.		Text	for	the	ads	was	written	by	a	collective	
of	 activists	 drawn	 from	 the	 CDP	 with	 imagery	 designed	 by	 Think	 al	 Cubo,	 a	 creative	
agency	 in	 Santiago.	The	 ads	presented	 the	 anti-dams	position	on	 the	 insufficiencies	of	
the	EIS,	failures	of	environmental	institutional	processes,	the	irreversible	environmental	
impacts	 of	 the	 dams	 and	 their	 transmission	 line	 –	 including	 the	 loss	 of	 species	 and	
ecosystems	and	impacts	on	national	parks.	They	also	discussed	the	social	effects	on	the	
region	 and	 negative	 impacts	 on	 tourism,	 they	 documented	 the	 growing	 monopoly	 in	
water	 rights	 ownership,	 and	 they	 pointed	 out	 alternatives	 to	 building	 HidroAysén.	
Overall,	 the	 ads	 were	 intended	 to	 present	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign’s	
arguments	directly	to	the	places	of	power.		
	
Imagery	and	 themes	used	 in	 these	advertisements	 at	 first	 reflected	 the	billboards	and	
posters	 campaign,	 covering	 the	 natural	 environment	 and	 the	way	 of	 life	 in	 Patagonia.	
However,	around	the	time	that	the	company	submitted	its	EIS	to	the	review	process	in	
August	2008,	when	HydroAysén’s	communications	strategies	changed	from	low-profile	
to	 reactive,	 and	 when	 discourse	 over	 HidroAysén	 evolved	 into	 a	 more	 antagonistic	
debate,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 changed	 its	 linguistic	 and	 visual	 discourse	 also.	 Now,	
instead	 of	 the	 advertisements’	 texts	 and	 images	 being	 straightforward,	 they	 included	
elements	 of	 word	 play,	 caricature	 and	 satire.	 Some	 advertisements	 underscored	
HidroAysén’s	 closeness	 to	 the	 authorities,	 with	 phrases	 like	 (in	 the	 context	 of	 a	
discussion	on	water	rights)	“A	suit	made	to	measure	for	HidroAysén”,	and	(in	the	context	
of	 the	 EIS)	 “timeframes	 moulded	 in	 favour	 of	 HidroAysén”	 and	 “HydroAysén	 obtains	
unmerited	 admissibility”.	 Other	 ads	 also	 referred	 to	 “corporate	 blackmail”,	 “false	
philanthropy”	 and	 “brainwashing”.	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 called	 this	 frank	 language,	
jokingly,	 their	 own	 “lobby	 feroz”	 (“ferocious	 lobby”)	 after	 a	 particular	 advertisement	
which	revealed	HidroAysén’s	image-enhancing	PR	efforts.		
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Figure	7:	The	Ferocious	Lobby:	Why	has	HidroAysén	needed	 to	 contract	 three	PR	
agencies	 that	 are	 experts	 in	 image	 washing?	 (Source:	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	
website).		
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However,	as	the	ads’	discourse	on	the	dams	became	more	conflictual,	El	Mercurio	and	La	
Tercera	 were	 less	 willing	 to	 publish	 them.	 Interviewees	 for	 this	 study	 spoke	 of	
censorship:	 “We	 did	 suffer	 processes	 of	 censorship	 in	 certain	 periods”	 (Urtubia,	
interviewed	15/05/2013).	Liberona,	of	Fundación	Terram	also	spoke	of	“certain	 levels	
of	censorship”	(interviewed	27/06/2013).	Morgado	was	more	explicit:		
	
We	are	 constantly	 censored.	What	happens	 is	 that	 you	have	 to	 choose.	They	
censor	you	and	you	get	angry	and	you	don’t	end	up	publishing	the	ad.	Or,	they	
censor	 you	 and	you	 fix	 it	 and	 they	publish	 you.	There	were	 times	when	 this	
was	 unacceptable,	 you	 see,	 because	 basically	 they	 didn’t	 let	 us	 use	 various	
words,	 things	 like	 ‘oligopoly’,	 ‘monopoly’,	 or	 ‘irregularities’,	which	are	words	
which	 the	whole	world	 uses.	 And	 they	 also	 changed	 the	 images	 that	we	 put	
together	to	suit	them	better.	
	
She	added:	
	
The	 local	publications	never	 censored	us.	 It	was	El	Mercurio	 and	La	Tercera,	
because	they	are	newspapers	of	the	‘establishment’.	
	
	(Morgado,	interviewed	16/11/13)	
	
As	Morgado	mentioned,	El	Mercurio	 and	La	Tercera	made	 it	 a	 condition	of	publication	
that	satirical	composite	images	in	the	anti-dams	advertisement	be	changed.	Such	images	
were	published	unaltered	in	The	Clinic,	for	example,	so	that	the	changes	mandated	by	the	
two	 conservative	 newspapers	 were	 evident	 to	 any	 reader	 who	made	 the	 comparison	
between	 publications.	 The	 two	 conservative	 newspapers’	 “censorship”	 focused	
particularly	on	images	of	government	officials	and	HidroAysén’s,	Endesa’s	and	Colbun’s	
executives,	which	 had	 to	 be	 removed	 or	made	 unrecognisable	 before	 publication.	 The	
campaign	quickly	moved	away	from	publishing	in	El	Mercurio,	because	of	the	changes	it	
required,	 because	 of	 extreme	 cost,	 and	 also	 because	 of	 the	 newspaper’s	 tendency	 to	
publish	 the	 ads	 in	 page	 locations	 which	 compromised	 their	 content,	 for	 example	
opposite	 articles	 critical	 of	 the	 environment	 movement,	 according	 to	 interviewees	
Urtubia,	Segura	and	Morgado.		
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Figure	 8:	 Insert	 ad	 in	 El	 Mercurio	 (bottom),	 published	 15/07/2010,	 demonstrating	
changes	that	Patagonia	sin	Represas	referred	to	as	“censorship”.	El	Mercurio	would	not	
accept	the	image	of	Pablo	Yrarrázaval,	president	of	the	Enersis	group	which	controlled	
Endesa,	 donating	 $10	 million	 to	 the	 National	 Fund	 for	 Reconstruction.	 The	 original	
graphic	design	for	the	ad	as	published	in	The	Clinic	(06/07/2010)	is	shown	above.	
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Figure	9:	“The	shameless	insistence	on	destroying	Patagonia”.	This	image	also	shows	the	
changes	 that	El	Mercurio	 stipulated:	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 faces	 of	Bernardo	Larraín	 and	
Bernardo	Matte	Larraín	of	Colbún	and	Daniel	Fernández	of	HidroAysén	from	a	Patagonia	
sin	Represas	ad.	The	image	above	was	published,	unchanged,	in	El	Divisadero	in	Aysén.	
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Both	ads	were	published	on	14/04/2010.	
	
Despite	the	anti-dams	campaign’s	claims	of	censorship,	 it	could	be	argued	that	the	fact	
that	Chile’s	most	conservative,	establishment	newspapers	published	these	highly	critical	
ads	at	all	is	indeed	an	indicator	of	the	very	opposite.	A	diversity	of	viewpoints	within	and	
between	 media	 is,	 after	 all,	 the	 hallmark	 of	 media	 pluralism.	 However,	 as	 the	 next	
chapter	explores	in	detail,	Chile’s	most	widely	read	and	most	influential	newspapers	El	
Mercurio	and	La	Tercera,	did	both	have	clear	editorial	lines	that	were	mostly	strongly	in	
favour	of	the	HidroAysén	megaproject,	and	in	El	Mercurio	at	least,	this	stance	persisted	
over	much	of	 the	 timeline	 of	 the	dams	debate.	 Though	 anti-dams	 voices	 and	 the	 anti-
dams	 ads	 discussed	 above	 did	 sometimes	 appear	 in	 these	 two	 newspapers,	 these	
publications	(both	the	key	news	sources	of	government	decision-makers	and	also	inter-
media	agenda	setters)	most	often	published	pro-dams	discourse	and	were	critical	of	the	
anti-dams	protest	movement.	These	tendencies,	and	their	impact,	are	further	discussed	
in	Chapter	6.		
	
Despite	 their	 small	 impact	 on	 Chile’s	 key	 newspapers’	 overall	 editorial	 lines,	 the	 anti-
dams	movement	regarded	the	publication	of	these	ads	in	El	Mercurio	and	La	Tercera	in	
particular	as	having	been	successful.	After	one	ad	series	summarised	“9	reasons”	related	
to	rejection	of	the	dams	(for	example,	“9	Reasons	not	to	Destroy	Patagonia”,	“9	Reasons	
to	 Reject	 HidroAysén”	 or	 “9	 Reasons	 to	 Demand	 that	 Institutional	 Processes	 be	
Respected”)	“9	Reasons”	became	a	meme	which	was	echoed	in	the	traditional	media,	in	
advertising	and	on	social	media	soon	after	ads	appeared	(Sara	Larraín,	Director	of	Chile	
Sustentable,	 interviewed	 23/08/2013).	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 was	 gratified	 that	 the	
discourse	of	these	advertisements	had	become	widespread.		
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Figure	10,	left:	“9	More	Reasons	to	keep	Patagonia	Without	Dams	–	National	Parks”		
and	right:	“9	More	Reasons	that	the	Aysén	megadams	aren’t	necessary.	Alternatives	exist.”	
	
5.8.3	An	anti-dams	“primer”:	the	Patagonia	sin	Represas	book	
	
Another	 aspect	of	Patagonia	 sin	Represas’	 campaign	 to	make	HidroAysén	 ‘visible’	was	
the	publication	of	5000	copies	of	a	hardcover	book	entitled	“Patagonia	sin	Represas”	in	
2007	 (Rodrigo	 &	 Orrego	 2007).	 Imagery	 in	 the	 book	 echoes	 that	 of	 the	 national	
billboards	 campaign,	 and	 also	 includes	 much	 imagery	 of	 the	 negative	 environmental	
consequences	 of	 dam	 megaprojects.	 Including	 a	 collection	 of	 essays	 by	 prominent	
Chilean	 environmental	 thinkers,	 the	 book	 opens	 by	 questioning,	 if	 	 	 hydroelectric	
megaprojects	 were	 built	 in	 Patagonia,	 “how	 would	 we	 explain	 this	 to	 future	
generations?”	 (Infanti	 de	 la	 Mora	 2007).	 It	 then	 summarises	 anti-dams	 arguments	 in	
emotive	language,	characterising	“megadams”	and	power	lines	as	a	“nightmare”	(p.	62).	
It	 also	 criticises	 “growth	 without	 end”	 (p.	 123)	 and	 discusses	 an	 alternative	 style	 of	
development	to	the	neoliberal	model	where	corporations	dominate	over	governance	by	
the	nation	state	and	where	inequality	includes	“inequality	in	the	distribution	of	energy”	
(p.	131).	The	book	characterises	the	choice	of	direction	of	energy	development	in	Chile	
as	 an	 “ethical	 imperative”	 (p.	 139)	 and	 then	 presents	 an	 alternative	 energy	 plan	 for	
Chile.		
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The	 book’s	 premises	 are	 based	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 Deep	 Ecology,	 first	 described	 by	
philosopher	Arne	Naess.	Deep	Ecology	is	a	“rejection	of	the	man-in-environment	image”	
in	 favour	 of	 a	 broader	 view	 in	which	 all	 life	 forms,	 not	 only	 those	 of	 utility	 to	 human	
needs,	 warrant	 “deep	 seated	 respect,	 even	 veneration”	 (Naess	 1973,	 p.	 95).	 This	 eco-
philosopy	 is	 also	 anti-class	 and	 advocates	 local	 autonomy	 and	 decentralisation,	
particularly	because	(reminiscent	of	Gellert	&	Lynch	2003)	
	
The	vulnerability	of	a	 form	of	 life	 is	 roughly	proportional	 to	 the	weight	of	
influences	 from	afar,	 from	outside	 the	 local	 region	 in	which	 that	 form	has	
obtained	an	ecological	equilibrium.		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																									(Naess	1973,	p.	98)	
		
Although	 Deep	 Ecology,	 and	 Douglas’	 Tompkins’	 adherence	 to	 it,	 would	 later	 be	
characterised	 in	 mainstream	 and	 social	 media	 in	 Chile	 as	 “extremist”,	 “elitist”	 and	
“foreign”,	 this	 eco-philosophy	 is	 in	 fact	 opposed	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 “Shallow	Ecology”	 that	
Naess	 saw	 as	 being	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 the	 health	 and	 affluence	 of	 privileged	
people	in	affluent	countries43.		
	
The	Patagonia	sin	Represas	book,	with	 its	eco-philosophical	 foundations,	positions	 the	
campaign	as	opposing	not	just	dams	on	the	Baker	and	Pascua	Rivers,	but	any	large	dams	
in	Chilean	Patagonia.	Although	Endesa	and	Colbún,	are	mentioned	alongside	other	dam	
project	 developers	 like	 Xstrata,	 HidroAysén	 is	 never	 named.	 In	 semiotic	 terms	 this	
“absent	signifier”	–	a	 feature	which	 is	notable	by	 its	absence	–	may	have	been	a	useful	
device	for	the	anti-dams	debate.	It	allowed	the	Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign,	and	the	
book,	 to	 present	 its	 own	 arguments,	without	 being	 seen	 as	 responding	 particularly	 to	
any	 one	 project.	 This	 allowed	 the	 book	 more	 effectively	 to	 present	 a	 “deep,	 moral	
critique”	 of	 the	 model	 of	 development	 HidroAysén	 and	 similar	 projects	 represented	
(Tompkins,	interviewed	05/12/2013)	and	not	just	criticise	the	project	itself.		
	
																																																						
43	For	a	discussion	of	Deep	Ecology,	also	see	Dryzek	(2005)	pp.	183-185.	
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Figure	 11:	 Path	 to	 the	 scaffold	 (alternative	 translation:	 gallows)?	 Magnificent	
southern	rivers	would	be	condemned	to	death.	
	
The	 chief	 instigator	 of	 the	 book	 (which	 was	 edited	 by	 Chile’s	 two	 best-known	
environmentalists,	Juan	Pablo	Orrego	and	Patricio	Rodrigo)	was	Douglas	Tompkins,	who	
explained	the	book	as	follows:		
	
I	have	a	 lot	of	 experience	 in	 this	kind	of	 stuff	because	we	have	done	a	 lot	of	
books.	We	do	these	because	we	have	discovered	over	the	years	–	and	we	have	
been	 making	 them	 for	 nearly	 25	 years	 now	 –	 since	 1989,	 that	 these	 things	
really	 are	 useful,	 and	 they	 also	 have	 a	 psychological	 ‘in’,	 so	 that	 you	 are	
suddenly	 transported	away	 from	an	activist	carrying	a	placard	or	something,	
standing	 out	 in	 front	 and	 shouting	 in	 a	 street	 protest	 –	 those	 are	 good	 and	
you’ve	got	to	do	your	street	protests	too,	they	come	into	this	a	little	bit	later	–	
but	 it’s	helpful	 to	have	a	document.	You	can	give	 it	 to	 the	media	 themselves.	
And	the	media	take	you	seriously	after	that.	You	are	not	the	rag-tag	activists,	
protesters	that	many	of	the	people	in	the	employ	of	the	public	relations	of	the	
big	 companies	 are	 trying	 to	 characterise	 that	 the	 resistance	 ‘down	 there’	 is:	
just	a	bunch	of	hippies	and	they	don’t	want	any	progress.	You	have	to	get	out	of	
that	 so	 that	 you	 get	 credibility.	 And	 credibility	 starts	 right	 there	with	 press,	
opinion	leaders	and	politicians.	So	that	is	why	we	started	there	with	the	book.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Tompkins,	interviewed	05/12/2013)	
	
The	book	was	distributed	without	 cost	 to	politicians	and	decision-makers	 in	Santiago	
and	in	the	region,	as	well	as	to	local	and	regional	and	media	outlets.	In	terms	of	making	
HidroAysén	 visible	 the	 book	was	 therefore	 a	 highly	 targeted	 strategy,	 presenting	 the	
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anti-dams	 argument	 to	 those	who	 could	most	 influence	 the	 approvals	 process.	 But	 it	
was	also	intended	to	set	the	frame	of	discourse	on	the	dams.	Framing,	Entman	reminds	
us,	 is	 to	make	 “some	aspects	 of	 a	perceived	 reality…more	 salient	 in	 a	 communicating	
text,	in	such	a	way	as	to	promote	a	particular	problem	definition.”	(Entman	1993,	p.	52).	
The	book	was	 therefore	created	with	 the	 intention	of	providing	a	 frame	within	which	
those	in	positions	of	power	would	conceive	of	and	refer	to	hydroelectric	megaprojects	–	
that	is,	in	the	terms	that	Patagonia	sin	Represas	presented.		
	
As	a	public	relations	tool,	like	an	outsize	media	release,	the	Patagonia	sin	Represas	book	
was	also	intended	to	influence	journalists.	Tompkins	confirmed	this:		
	
It’s	kind	of	symbolic	in	a	way,	just	by	its	weight	and	its	size….you	can	hold	it	on	
your	knees	or	put	it	on	the	table	in	front	of	you,	and	go	through	all	the	different	
components	 that	are	 involved	 in	 this	 issue.	And	 this,	without	even	saying	so,	
becomes	the	sort	of	primer,	the	textbook	about	how	to	frame	the	issue	of	this	
campaign.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Tompkins,	interviewed	05/12/2013)	
	
This	 “primer”	 on	 the	 dams	debate,	 unlike	 a	 brochure,	 pamphlet	 or	web	page	material	
also	had	longevity	simply	because	of	its	physical	presence	and	large	size.	The	impact	of	
the	book	among	decision-makers	was	 judged	great	enough	to	have	an	additional	3000	
copies	printed	and	distributed	in	2008.	Copies	were	now	also	printed	in	English	with	the	
intention	of	maintaining	existing	overseas	funding	networks	and	fostering	new	ones.		
	
5.8.4	“Endesa	and	Colbún	want	to	raze	our	heritage”:	Patagonia	sin	Represas’	TV	and	
radio	advertisement	
	
For	three	months	in	the	middle	of	2008,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	also	ran	a	television	and	
radio	advertisement	to	increase	HidroAysén’s	visibility	nationally	as	the	project	entered	
the	 environmental	 approvals	 process.	 The	 30-second	 ad	was	 shown	 at	 prime	 evening	
viewing	time	on	several	of	Chile’s	principal	national	channels,	Canal	13,	TVN,	Chilevisión,	
MEGA	 and	 La	 Red	 (Morgado,	 interviewed	 16/11/13).	 As	 85%	 of	 Chileans	 reported	
television	as	 their	main	source	of	 information	 (Godoy	&	Gronemeyer	2012,	p.	19),	 the	
television	advertisement	was	an	important	means	of	reaching	people	who	did	not	read	
establishment	 newspapers	 like	 El	 Mercurio	 or	 La	 Tercera,	 or	 consume	 news	 in	 less	
conservative	outlets	online.	The	audio	of	this	advertisement	was	also	broadcast	 locally	
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in	Aysén	(for	example	on	Radio	Santa	María,	Coyhaique)	as	a	radio	advertisement	and	
nationally	 on	 the	 airwaves	 of	 popular	 broadcasters	 such	 as	 Radio	 Bío	 Bío.	 The	 ad	
referenced	 the	 national	 billboard	 and	 newspaper	 campaign	 intertextually,	 using	 the	
signifier	 of	 high-voltage	 electricity	 pylons	 and	 wires	 –	 which	 was	 now	 widely	
understood	 to	 connote	 HidroAysén.	 The	 megaproject	 was	 not	 named	 in	 the	 ad.	 The	
accompanying	voiceover	(also	the	audio	transcript	of	the	radio	ad)	was	simple:	
	
This	is	our	Patagonia.	Endesa	and	Colbún	want	to	raze	our	heritage	with	2300	
kilometers	of	pylons.	This	 is	not	necessary.	This	 is	 the	worst	national	 image.	
Patagonia	without	Dams!	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	12:	(double	click	to	play)	Patagonia	sin	Represas	television	advertisement	
(Can	be	viewed	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTpYL59KWuY)	
	
A	semiotic	reading	of	the	advertisement	provides	further	insight	into	its	intention.	In	the	
visual	 version	 for	 TV,	 against	 the	 snowy	 backdrop	 of	 a	 well-known	 Aysén	 landmark,	
Cerro	Castillo,	and	Autumn-tinted	poplar	trees,	a	flock	of	black	birds	is	seen	flying.	Only	
birdsong	is	heard.	It	instantly	becomes	clear	that	the	birds	are	flying	away	from	danger	
when	the	sound	of	chainsaws,	metal	on	metal	and	falling	trees	is	heard.	Trees	fall	with	a	
sound	of	splintering	timber,	leaving	a	path	for	the	pylons	which	rise	robotically	and	self-
construct,	and	a	whip-like	sound	is	heard	as	power	lines	are	strung	between	them.	The	
birds	scatter.	As	the	pylons	appear,	the	hills	in	the	background	lose	their	natural	colour,	
and	 turn	 grey.	 The	 camera	moves	 away	 from	 the	 scene.	 The	 voiceover	 changes	 from	
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mellifluous	to	angry	and	urgent	as	the	pylons	appear.	Then,	there	is	a	flash	of	light	and	
the	 pylons	 disappear,	 replaced	 by	 the	 words	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 on	 the	 screen.	
Colour	and	birdsong	return	and	the	flock	of	birds	is	seen	flying	back	in	the	direction	that	
it	had	fled	from.	
	
Like	the	billboard	campaign,	the	advertisement	warns	of	HidroAysén	as	destruction	and	
threat	 to	 the	natural	world.	 In	 this	ad,	 the	 “destroyers”	are	named,	 though	 the	project	
itself	is	not.	Naming	Endesa	and	Colbún	underscores	the	nature	of	the	companies	behind	
the	 megaproject,	 which	 for	 many	 Chilean	 television	 viewers	 and	 radio	 listeners,	 may	
already	have	had	negative	associations.	The	ad	also	emphasises	the	notion	of	Patagonia	
as	 national	 heritage,	 suggesting	 with	 the	 words	 “our	 Patagonia”	 that	 the	 territory	
belonged	to	all	Chileans	(and	by	implication,	not	just	to	large	companies	like	Endesa	and	
Colbún).	As	 in	 the	billboard	 campaign,	 the	 idea	of	 the	 “national	 image”	 is	 raised	as	 an	
argument	against	HidroAysén.	The	return	of	light	and	colour	to	the	idyllic	natural	scene	
when	the	words	‘Patagonia	sin	Represas’	appear	also	associates	the	campaign	with	the	
defence	 of	 this	 natural	 heritage.	 Together	 with	 other	 elements	 of	 this	 anti-dams	
communications	effort,	the	radio	and	television	ads	therefore	worked	to	make	this	new	
megaproject	 visible	 to	 more	 Chileans,	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 to	 depict	 HidroAysén	 as	 an	
unnecessary	and	damaging	project.	
	
5.9	Conclusion	
	
After	 two	 years	 of	 anti-dams	 campaigning	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Chile	 at	 the	 time,	 it	 was	
evident	that	the	position	of	HidroAysén	in	public	discourse	was	beginning	to	change.	In	
2006,	HidroAysén	had	been	 an	 invisible	 project	 to	most	 of	 the	 country:	 the	 company	
was	 directing	 its	 publicity	 at	 only	 0.5%	 of	 the	 population	 and	was	 avoiding	 national	
media	coverage.	By	the	end	of	2008,	television	viewers,	radio	listeners,	readers	of	key	
national	newspapers	as	well	as	more	alternative	publications	and	online	news	sites,	and	
anyone	 who	 travelled	 the	 country’s	 main	 highway,	 knew	 of	 the	 megaproject.	 The	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 bumper	 sticker	 was	 ubiquitous.	 Businesses	 hung	 anti-dams	
posters	 in	 their	 windows.	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 had	 in	 this	 way	 brought	 the	 dams	
issue	 to	public	 screens	 (DeLuca	&	Peeples	2002;	DeLuca,	Lawson	&	Sun	2012)	across	
the	 nation.	 And	 although	 no	 direct	 causal	 connection	 can	 be	 made	 between	 the	
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Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign	and	public	opinion	change	–	it	was	evident	that	public	
opinion	 on	 HidroAysén	 had	 changed	 during	 the	 period	 that	 the	 project	 was	 brought	
from	 relative	 obscurity	 to	 national	 scrutiny.	 Although	 in	 2007,	 36%	 of	 people	 were	
against	 building	 the	 dams	 (Carmona,	 El	 Mostrador	 06/06/2011)	 by	 April	 2009,	 an	
IPSOS	poll	found	that	57.6%	of	Chileans	rejected	the	project	(Orrego	2013).	
	
In	this	chapter,	in	response	to	this	thesis’	first	research	question,	I	have	shown	how	the	
developing	 company	 initially	 sought	 invisibility	 for	 its	 project,	 and	 how	 a	 protest	
campaign	communicated	 symbolically	 to	make	 that	project	visible.	 I	have	argued	 that	
HidroAysén	deliberately	attempted	 to	remain	 low-profile	 in	order	 to	avoid	conflict,	 to	
expedite	 the	 project’s	 development	 and	 therefore	 make	 the	 megaproject	 more	
profitable.	Taking	a	low-profile	stance	was	initially	perceived	as	possible:	until	shortly	
before	HidroAysén’s	establishment,	large	engineering	projects	in	Chile	had	always	been	
carried	 out	 in	 this	way.	 Following	 the	Ralco	 conflict,	 a	 low-profile	 stance	 –	 combined	
with	 intensive	 CSR-type	 activities	 in	 Aysén	 –	 now	 also	 seemed	 necessary	 to	 the	
developing	company,	in	order	to	minimise	contestation.	But	as	this	chapter	has	shown,	
HidroAysén’s	focus	on	secrecy	and	remaining	invisible	on	a	national	level	began	to	de-
legitimise	 the	 project,	 and	 also	 left	 a	 space	 in	 public	 discourse	 which	 Patagonia	 sin	
Represas	was	able	to	fill	with	information	presented	according	to	an	anti-dams	frame.	
As	Thompson	reminds	us,	achieving	“mediated	visibility”	is	crucial	because	
	
The	visibility	of	actions	and	events,	and	the	impact	of	these	words	and	images	
on	 the	ways	 in	which	 ordinary	 individuals	 understand	what	 is	 happening	 in	
distant	locales	and	form	opinions	and	moral	judgements	about	it,	have,	in	this	
age	of	mediated	visibility,	become	an	inseparable	part	of	 the	unfolding	of	the	
events	themselves.		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 															(2005,	p.	49)		
	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas,	 a	 cobbled-together	 collection	 of	 Chilean	 and	 international	
activists	and	NGOs	(with	only	a	fraction	of	the	funding	of	the	multi-billion-dollar	project	
that	it	opposed)	was	initially	able	both	to	render	HidroAysén	visible	in	this	way,	and	to	
make	 its	 own	 anti-dams	 discourse	 “an	 inseparable	 part	 of	 the	 unfolding	 of”	 the	
HidroAysén	debate.			
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In	 a	 debate	 of	 this	 nature,	 however,	 though	 any	 actor’s	 own	 PR	 representation	 is	
important,	 representation	by	mass	media	 is	crucial.	As	Lester	and	Hutchins	point	out:	
“actors	located	throughout	the	political	spectrum	must	be	present	in	both	‘legacy’	media	
and	 the	 networks	 of	 ‘mass	 self-communication’”	 (2012,	 p.	 849)	 in	 order	 to	 have	
influence	 over	 public	 opinion	 and	 political	 agendas.	 Discussion	 in	 the	 next	 three	
chapters	 therefore	 turns	 to	 the	 articulation	 of	 HidroAysén	 debate	 in	 key	 Chilean	
“legacy”	 media,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 social	 media	 networks,	 that	 were	 just	 starting	 (by	
2009/2010)	 to	become	ubiquitous	 in	Chile.	 If	 in	 this	 chapter,	HydroAysén’s	period	of	
invisibility	 has	 been	 of	 most	 empirical	 interest,	 the	 chapter	 that	 follows	 charts	 the	
beginning	 of	 a	 change	 in	 the	 company’s	 communications.	 From	 2008,	 the	 company	
began	 to	 respond	 communicationally,	 and	 by	 late	 2010,	 reactive	 communication	
dominated.	 Media	 coverage	 now	 came	 to	 be	 actively	 sought	 and	 managed	 by	
HidroAysén	 –	 often,	 it	 seemed	 –	 with	 the	 collaboration	 of	 key	 mainstream	 Chilean	
media.		
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Chapter	6:	Media	and	megaproject	
	
6.1	Introduction	
	
Mediatized	 discourse	 surrounding	 HidroAysén	 began	 to	 change	 in	 2008,	 when	 the	
company	 entered	 the	 environmental	 approvals	 process.	 Around	 the	 time	HidroAysén	
submitted	 its	 Environmental	 Impact	 Study	 (EIS;	 or	 in	 Spanish,	 Estudio	 de	 Impacto	
Ambiental,	 EIA)	document	 the	 company	 intensified	 its	 strategic	 communications	with	
the	media.	This	coincided	with	 the	 first	notable	 increase	 in	coverage	of	 the	project	by	
key	national	media	since	its	inception.	The	project	was	in	the	environmental	approvals	
process	 for	 nearly	 three	 years,	 between	 August	 2008	 and	May	 2011.	 The	 amount	 of	
coverage	 in	Chile’s	key	newspapers	during	this	period	corresponded	closely	with	new	
developments	 in	 the	 approvals	 process.	 This	 meant	 that	 between	 2008	 when	
HidroAysén	first	became	a	regular	topic	in	mainstream	media	coverage	and	2011,	when	
the	project	was	approved,	coverage	of	HidroAysén	was	far	from	consistent	in	terms	of	
quantity.	 	 In	 Chapter	 4,	 I	 discussed	Chilton’s	 concept	 of	 “critical	 discourse	moments”:	
moments	 that	 stimulate	mediatized	debate	 and	 around	which	 “meaning	 is	mobilised”	
(Chilton	 1987,	 p.	 17).	 In	 this	 chapter,	 by	 examining	 peaks	 in	 coverage	 against	 events	
over	this	period	(and	triangulating	these	with	other	research	material,	for	example,	data	
from	 interviews,	 and	 a	 timeline	 of	 events)	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 pinpoint	 critical	 discourse	
moments	during	the	HidroAysén	debate.		
	
While	examining	the	quantity	of	coverage	is	quite	straightforward,	tracking	the	quality	
of	discourse	calls	 for	more	nuanced	and	versatile	analysis.	 In	this	chapter,	 therefore,	 I	
make	a	detailed	survey	of	mediatized	discourse	surrounding	HidroAysén	in	the	period	
covering	 its	 trajectory	 through	 the	 EIS	 process,	 and	 the	 start	 of	 its	 rather	 limited	
national	communications	campaign	in	early	2009,	in	the	lead	up	to	its	eventual	reactive	
communications	response	to	Patagonia	sin	Represas,	in	late	2010	(which	is	covered	in	
the	 next	 chapter).	 I	 discuss	 HidroAysén’s	 strategic	 communications	 output,	 the	
fluctuating	media	coverage	in	three	prominent	media	outlets,	and	the	characteristics	of	
discourse	on	the	megaproject	(and	the	activism	against	it)	over	this	period.	I	alternate	
between	 macro	 and	 micro	 lenses	 in	 this	 chapter,	 examining	 media	 discourse	 on	 the	
scale	 of	 single	 articles,	media	 releases	 and	 television	 advertisements,	 and	 on	 a	 larger	
scale	to	reveal	broad	characteristics	of	a	body	of	articles	surrounding	events	or	periods	
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of	time.	For	this	I	use	computer	assisted	content	analysis	on	the	media	corpus	compiled	
for	this	study.	Because	it	was	not	until	later	in	the	HidroAysén	timeframe	(after	2010)	
that	social	media	became	a	key	forum	for	public	discourse,	I	explore	the	crucial	role	of	
social	media	discourse	on	the	megaproject	in	the	next	chapter.		
	
Having	identified	in	this	chapter	the	characteristics	of	mediatized	representation	in	the	
debate	 over	 the	 megaproject	 during	 the	 period	 mainly	 corresponding	 to	 2008-early	
2010,	 I	 am	 able	 in	 the	 following	 two	 chapters	 to	 contrast	 these	 with	 mediatized	
discourse	 in	 the	 following	years	of	 the	HidroAysén	debate,	 late	2010-201444	 and	also	
beyond	 to	 2017.	 Together,	 this	 and	 the	 following	 chapter	 continue	 to	 address	 this	
study’s	research	question	concerning	 the	articulation	of	 the	HidroAysén	debate	 in	 the	
Chilean	media	over	the	period	2008-2014.	In	their	examination	of	mediatized	discourse	
surrounding	 HidroAysén,	 this	 chapter	 and	 the	 chapter	 that	 follows	 also	 build	 on	 the	
discussion	 in	response	to	the	 final	research	question,	which	asks	how	the	HidroAysén	
case	 became	 emblematic,	 and	 came	 to	 represent	 more	 than	 a	 conflict	 over	 the	
environment.		
	
6.2	Issue-attention	cycles,	public	arenas	and	critical	discourse	moments	
Over	a	trajectory	as	lengthy	as	that	of	the	HidroAysén	project,	there	were	many	periods	
in	 which	 the	 megaproject	 seems	 to	 disappear	 from	 view	 in	 the	 media.	 As	 already	
established,	this	was	sometimes	because	the	project	developers	seem	to	have	intended	
to	keep	a	low	profile.	At	other	times,	HidroAysén’s	fluctuating	visibility	may	have	been	
an	artefact	of	Downs’	 (1972,	p.	38)	 “issue-attention	cycle”,	or	alternatively,	Hilgartner	
and	Bosk’s	 (1988)	 “public	 arenas	model”.	 For	Hilgartner	and	Bosk,	 issues	appear	and	
disappear	 in	 public	 arenas	 because	 of	 competition	 between	 the	 “large	 ‘population’	 of	
social	 problems	 claims”	 across	 different	 institutional	 arenas,	 the	 “carrying	 capacities”	
(p.	56)	of	these	arenas,	and	the	interaction	between	arenas.	Of	significance	here	is	that	
the	 interaction	between	 issues	 and	public	 attention	 to	 them	 is	never	 linear	 (Petersen	
																																																						
44	 Although	 I	 have	 endeavoured	 to	 separate	 the	 distinct	 phases	 in	 communications	 evident	 in	 the	
discourse	surrounding	HidroAysén	 into	separate	chapters	 in	this	 thesis,	Chapters	5,	6,	7	and	8,	 it	 is	not	
practical	to	divide	all	aspects	of	the	case	according	to	these	phases.	For	example,	in	this	chapter,	it	seems	
more	useful	to	identify	critical	discourse	moments	and	corresponding	peaks	in	media	coverage	across	the	
whole	 case	 study,	 rather	 than	 simply	 for	 the	 time	 period	 predominantly	 covered	 by	 this	 chapter.	 This	
helps	 to	 locate	 the	 research	 in	 the	 succession	 of	 events,	 allowing	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	
discourse	over	time.		
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2009)	 and	 is	 subject	 to	 positive	 feedback	 loops	 so	 that	 actors	 that	work	 in	 different	
public	 arenas,	 can	 both	 drive	 and	 then	 “’surf’	 the	 shifting	waves”	 (Hilgartner	 &	 Bosk	
1988,	p.	67)	of	social	problems	that	become	part	of	public	discourse,	as	the	anti-dams	
movement	did.			
In	the	case	of	communicating	such	a	long-lived,	often	slow-burning	issue	as	HidroAysén,	
the	challenge	was	to	maintain	public	interest,	even	though	the	project	would	not	impact	
the	daily	life	of	the	majority.	Caveats	on	Downs’	issue-attention	cycle	considered,	Downs	
does	remind	us	that:	
“…we	should	not	underestimate	the…public’s	capacity	to	become	bored	–	
especially	 with	 something	 that	 does	 not	 immediately	 threaten	 them,	 or	
promise	huge	benefits	 for	a	majority,	or	strongly	appeal	to	their	sense	of	
injustice.”	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Downs	1972,	p.	40)	
It	seems,	in	this	case,	that	the	protest	movement’s	symbolic	communication	was	indeed	
able	to	appeal	to	many	Chileans’	sense	of	injustice	over	time.	It	did	this	by	constructing	
HidroAysén	symbolically	 in	 its	protracted	communications	effort.	But	getting	the	anti-
dams	point	of	view	covered	in	the	mainstream	media	was	not	straightforward.	As	this	
chapter	demonstrates,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	usually	found	it	difficult	to	gain	in-depth,	
frequent	 coverage	 in	 influential	 conservative	mainstream	media.	Well-known	 Chilean	
conservationist,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 leader	 and	 head	 of	 NGO	 Ecosistemas,	 Juan	
Pablo	Orrego,	commented	in	interview	that:	
We	 have	 to	 fight	 constantly	 to	 put	 our	 arguments	 across.	 We	 are	 always	
finding	 new	ways	 to	 do	 this.	 If	 you	 don’t	 produce	 something	 new,	 just	 keep	
repeating	the	old	arguments,	you	won’t	succeed.	We	needed	the	media	to	cover	
us	and	 the	media	want	new	stories,	new	perspectives.	 So	we	give	 them	 that.		
Also	when	we	held	events	that	helped	us	to	be	covered	in	the	media,	and	to	put	
our	 arguments	 forward.	 So	 we	 created	 events	 in	 order	 to	 become	 more	
visible…And	 getting	 people	 onto	 the	 street	 is	 the	 most	 visible	 event	 of	 all.	
When	we	did	 that,	 100,000	people	 in	 the	 streets,	 they	 couldn’t	not	 cover	us.	
Even	El	Mercurio	had	to	cover	that.	
(Orrego,	interviewed	12/06/2013)	
The	effort	not	to	be	confined	indefinitely	to	a	“twilight	realm	of	lesser	attention”	(Downs	
1972,	p.	40)	seems	indeed	to	have	been	a	driver	 for	HidroAysén	becoming	symbolic	of	
more	than	an	environmental	issue.	Patagonia	sin	Represas	had	to	keep	imagining	new	
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ways	 to	bring	 attention	 to	 the	megaproject,	 sometimes	with	 strategic	 advertising	 and	
new	 arguments	 against	 the	 project	 (as	 I	 point	 out	 in	 this	 chapter).	 It	 also	 attracted	
media,	 publics’	 and	political	 actors’	 attention	 through	 street	protests	 (as	described	 in	
Chapter	7),	through	manufactured	events	(discussed	in	Chapter	8)	and,	in	the	last	years	
of	the	debate,	also	by	extended	litigation	against	the	dams	(also	discussed	in	Chapter	8).	
This	 discursive	 battle	 seemed	 to	 be	 led	 initially	 by	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas.	 Initially,	
HidroAysén	 did	 little	 other	 than	 respond	 reactively	 to	 the	 protest	 movement’s	
arguments.	 Over	 time,	 a	 large	 body	 of	 discursive	 representations	 was	 built	 up	
surrounding	HidroAysén	as	 a	product	of	 this	process,	 and	 these	become	consolidated	
into	a	symbolic,	short-hand	understanding	of	the	megaproject.	
In	 media	 coverage	 (just	 one	 of	 Hilgarner	 and	 Bosk’s	 public	 arenas),	 HidroAysén	
appeared,	and	then	effectively	disappeared	for	a	 time,	before	reappearing	again,	often	
when	new	arguments	or	events	became	part	of	the	debate.	If	such	happenings	did	gain	
much	coverage,	they	could	become	critical	discourse	moments,	which,	as	Chilton	(1987)	
tells	us,	both	provide	opportunities	for	increased	discussion	of	the	issue,	and	for	shifts	
in	 discourse.	 These	 are	 moments	 when	 HidroAysén,	 the	 nation	 building	 project	 can	
become	HidroAysén,	 a	 project	 for	 and	by	 elites	 and	 foreign	multinationals,	 symbol	 of	
economic	 inequality	 and	 injustice.	 These	 moments	 are	 therefore	 crucial	 to	 the	
production	 of	 meaning	 in	 this	 long-running	 mediatized	 debate.	 To	 pinpoint	 critical	
discourse	moments	within	the	debate,	 it	 is	important	to	have	a	clear	understanding	of	
the	 chain	 of	 events	 related	 to	 the	megaproject.	 I	 have	 therefore	 compiled	 a	 detailed	
timeline,	which	appears	in	the	thesis	Appendix.		
6.3	Mapping	key	events	against	media	coverage	
As	described	in	detail	in	Chapter	4,	data	collection	for	this	study	included	compiling	an	
archive	of	articles	 from	three	media	outlets,	El	Mercurio,	La	Tercera	and	El	Mostrador.	
The	 corpus	 analysed	 in	 this	 and	 the	 subsequent	 chapters	 spans	 the	 period	 from	 late	
2008	 until	 late	 2014.	 This	 also	 coincides	 effectively	with	 timeframe	 in	which,	 as	 this	
thesis	 argues,	HidroAysén	was	 first	made	 “visible”	 in	 the	media	 (2008),	 subsequently	
engaged	in	reactionary	communications	(2009-2010),	was	the	subject	of	protest	(2011)	
and	then	opted	for	“invisibility”	(late	2011-2014)	as	far	as	possible	once	again.		
	 180	
During	 this	whole	period,	 there	were	2385	 articles	 across	 the	 three	publications	 that	
contained	 the	 key	 search	 terms	 ‘HidroAysén’	 or	 ‘Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 (many	
contained	both)	and	clearly	formed	part	of	the	discourse	on	the	project	(that	is,	they	did	
more	than	just	mention	the	key	search	terms;	they	discussed	the	project	or	opposition	to	
it	 in	 some	 way).	 El	 Mercurio	 published	 981	 of	 these	 articles,	 La	 Tercera	 816	 and	 El	
Mostrador	588.	This	 timeframe	starts	eight	months	before	 the	project’s	entry	 into	 the	
EIS	process	in	August	2008,	mentioned	in	the	opening	of	this	chapter,	and	finishes	just	
after	 the	 Committee	 of	 Ministers	 appointed	 by	 the	 second	 government	 of	 Michelle	
Bachelet	 retracted	 the	 project’s	 EIS	 approval	 in	 June	 201445.	 	 To	 illustrate	 in	 macro	
version	how	the	peaks	and	troughs	in	coverage	looked	over	the	timeframe	2008-2014,	I	
identified	 how	many	 articles	 from	 the	media	 corpus	were	 published	 for	 each	month	
over	this	timeframe.	The	data	were	plotted	as	follows:	
	
Figure	13:	Quantity	of	media	articles	related	to	HidroAysén	2008-2014		
																																																						
45	 Media	 discourse	 on	 HidroAysén	 does	 not	 end	 here,	 however.	 This	 thesis	 also	 refers	 to	 media	
commentary	on	the	case	that	extends	into	2017	and	2018.	This	shows	that	this	emblematic	case	came	to	
serve	as	a	shorthand	for	a	particular	kind	of	project,	and	a	particular	set	of	politics.	The	manner	in	which	
discourse	over	HidroAysén	continued	in	the	media	even	years	after	the	project	was	rejected	is	discussed	
in	the	conclusion	to	this	thesis.	
	
	
	
	
	 181	
Clearly,	the	greatest	spike	in	coverage	is	in	the	tremendous	amount	of	media	attention	
HidroAysén’s	approval,	and	the	protests	against	 it,	garnered	in	May/June	2011.	Below	
have	also	 located	other	key	events	 in	 the	data	shown	above,	and	 it	 is	clear	 that	peaks	
usually	 occur	when	 particular	 events	 or	 trends	 related	 to	HidroAysén,	 or	 the	 protest	
against	it,	are	on	the	news	agenda:	
	
	
Figure	14:	Events	in	the	HidroAysén	trajectory	plotted	against	time,	2008-2014.	
	
Key:	list	of	events	labelled	by	number	on	the	graph	above:	
(1) HidroAysén	enters	the	environmental	approvals	process,	August	2008	
(2) ENEL’s	buyout	of	Endesa,	February	2009	
(3) Legal	 appeal	 by	 CPD	 against	 HidroAysén	 rejected	 by	 Supreme	 Court,	 July	
2009.	
(4) Two	rounds	of	presidential	elections,	December	2009/January	2010	
(5) New	 HidroAysén	 CEO.	 Shift	 to	 a	 new	 communications	 offensive,	 October	
2010	
(6) Approval	of	HidroAysén,	May	2011	
(7) Nationwide	protests	against	HidroAysén,	May-July	2011	
	 182	
(8) Supreme	Court	 rejects	 appeals	 against	HidroAysén.	 CDPs	 event	 in	 Santiago	
‘Luz	Roja	a	HidroAysen’	(Red	light	for	HidroAysén),	April	2012	
9) Colbún	 announces	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 HidroAysén	 power	 line	 approvals	
process,	May	2012	
10) Discovery	Channel	documentary	on	HidroAysén	 “Desafios	Futuros”	 (Future	
Challenges)	November	 2012.	 CDP	 event	 in	 Santiago	 ‘Juntos	 desenchufemos	
HidroAysén’	(Together,	let’s	unplug	HidroAysén),	December	2012	
11) Vota	sin	Represas	(Vote	without	Dams),	July	2013	
12) Presidential	candidate	Bachelet	states	“HidroAysén	is	not	viable”,	November	
2013	
13) Committee	 of	 ministers	 withdraws	 HidroAysén’s	 environmental	 permits,	
June	2014	
	
As	these	plots	demonstrate,	clearly,	events	generate	news.	Identifying	which	events	are	
most	 newsworthy,	 and	 garner	 the	most	 coverage,	 is	 a	 first	 step	 towards	 determining	
which	 events	 are	 most	 significant	 to	 overall	 discourse	 during	 the	 timeframe	 under	
analysis	here.	It	is	not	only	events	or	trends	that	generate	the	largest	quantity	of	news	
that	can	become	critical	in	a	protracted	discourse.	After	all,	Chilton	(1987)	tells	us	that	
that	critical	discourse	moments	can	be	identified	by	two	separate	characteristics:	these	
are,	increased	coverage	of	an	issue	or	idea,	as	well	as	changes	in	discourse.	Sometimes,	
therefore,	when	a	new	aspect	of	a	debate	becomes	associated	with	a	story	in	the	news,	
this	 can	 become	 critical	 to	 the	 discourse	 too	 –	 but	 this	 “moment”	 of	 change	 in	 the	
discourse	may	not	necessarily	generate	a	 spike	 in	media	 coverage.	Locating	moments	
that	 are	 indeed	 critical	 to	 the	 discourse	 in	 the	 HidroAysén	 case	 therefore	 requires	 a	
nuanced	 balance	 of	 the	 quantitative	 with	 the	 qualitative.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 therefore,	 I	
look	both	at	events	 that	garner	the	most	 coverage,	and	periods	where	new,	 important	
attributes	became	associated	with	HidroAysén.	
	
Sometimes	 events	 that	 appear	 to	 be	 critical	 to	 the	 discourse	 are	 spontaneous	 news	
events,	 for	 example,	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 project	 in	 2011.	Media	 publicity	was	 clearly	
sought	 by	 both	 sides	 surrounding	 this	much	 anticipated	 event	 in	 order	 to	 control	 its	
framing.	Other	key	events	are	concerned	with	creating	publicity	and	making	visible,	as	
discussed	 in	 the	 section	 above.	 Examples	 of	 these	 kinds	 of	moments	 in	 the	 discourse	
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around	HidroAysén	were	two	free	public	concerts	organised	by	the	anti-dams	campaign	
in	 2012	 –	 a	 year	 in	 which	 HidroAysén	 was	 otherwise	 less	 often	 in	 the	 news.	 Other	
important	moments	in	the	discourse	on	HidroAysén	appear	to	be	manufactured	by	the	
megaproject	 developer	 itself,	 for	 example,	 the	 flurry	 of	 media	 coverage	 around	 the	
company’s	 submission	 of	 its	 EIS	 into	 the	 environmental	 reviews	 process	 in	 2008.	 In	
other	periods,	the	peaks	of	media	coverage	are	not	so	high,	but	are	more	sustained.	For	
example,	HidroAysén’s	late	2010/early	2011,	aggressive	communications	strategy	with	
a	 new	 CEO	 at	 the	 helm.	 This	 strategy,	 which	 included	 a	 controversial	 television	
advertising	campaign,	and	active	publicity-seeking,	may	have	been	one	of	 the	reasons	
for	increased	coverage	of	the	project	over	the	months	immediately	prior	to	the	project’s	
approval.	The	important	point	here	is	that	the	processes	that	lie	behind	key	moments	in	
a	protracted	discourse	are	only	sometimes	naturally	occurring	and	organic.	Other	times,	
they	 are	 manufactured	 by	 strategic	 communications	 events	 and	 strategies	 to	 draw	
media	attention	that	frequently	abandons	coverage	of	complex,	long-running	issues.		
	
However,	despite	both	sides	engaging	in	efforts	to	control	–	and	sometimes	change	–	the	
discourse	 over	 the	 megaproject,	 coverage	 remained	 unequal	 in	 terms	 of	 quantity.	
Firstly,	within	the	data	shown	above,	there	is	more	coverage	that	mentions	HidroAysén	
than	there	is	on	the	protest	against	the	project.	This	observation	comes	from	a	simple	
measure	of	how	many	articles	include	the	name	of	the	protest	group	versus	those	that	
only	 mentioned	 HidroAysén.	 El	 Mercurio	 and	 La	 Tercera,	 both	 mention	 HidroAysén	
more	 frequently	 than	 they	 do	 the	 opposition	 to	 the	 project,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	 graph	
below.	El	Mostrador	mentions	HidroAysén	and	Patagonia	sin	Represas	almost	equally.	
This	 count	 is	 based	on	 the	number	of	 articles	 that	mention	 each	 search	 term	at	 least	
once,	not	a	raw	count	of	cumulative	mentions.		
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Figure	15:	Comparison	of	incidence	of	key	search	terms	across	the	whole	corpus,	2008-
2014,	shown	by	media	outlet	
		
6.4	Sources’	voices:	who	speaks,	and	how	much	are	they	heard?	
	
Close	reading	of	the	media	corpus	compiled	for	this	study	also	reveals	basic	qualitative	
differences.	 Across	 the	 whole	 timeframe	 of	 the	 media	 corpus,	 El	 Mercurio	 and	 La	
Tercera	 tended	 to	 cover	 HidroAysén	 in	 stories	 that	 were	 longer	 and	 more	 detailed.		
Articles	that	reported	on	the	protest	movement	were	shorter	and	tended	to	provide	less	
information.		One	of	the	most	prominent	differences	between	coverage	across	the	three	
media	outlets	 is	 in	 source	 selection.	As	Entman	 (1993)	and	Entman	&	Rojecki	 (1993)	
tell	us,	source	selection	 is	a	key	marker	of	 framing	–	and	over	 time,	persistent	 frames	
can	 solidify	 into	 symbolic	 representations.	 In	 the	 study	 of	 how	 HidroAysén	 became	
emblematic,	it	is	important,	therefore	to	consider	who	speaks,	and	how	much	they	are	
heard.		
	
Because	 there	were	 so	many	possible	 sources	 in	 this	wide-ranging	debate,	 there	was	
little	scope	 to	automate	 the	analysis	of	sources	across	 the	media	corpus.	Over	several	
weeks	 I	 therefore	 read	 through	 every	 article	 in	 the	 corpus	 and	 created	 a	 count	 of	
articles	which	 predominantly	 used	 pro-project	 sources	 and	which	 used	 sources	 from	
the	anti-dams	movement,	where	identifiable.	In	many	articles	of	course,	sources	quoted	
were	from	neither	of	the	two	opposing	sides,	and	there	were	also	many	pieces	that	did	
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not	quote	sources	at	all.	I	included	in	the	count	opinion	pieces	written	by	supporters	of	
or	detractors	of	the	dams,	and	Letters	to	the	Editor	which	represented	opposing	sides	of	
the	debate.	
	
This	close	reading	showed	that	the	two	more	conservative	newspapers	included	more	
quotes	from	sources	related	to	the	megaproject,	and	from	pro-HidroAysén	elite	sources.		
El	Mostrador	was	more	 likely	to	publish	articles	that	elaborated	on	the	background	to	
the	protest	and	the	protesters’	concerns	with	 the	megaproject,	where	the	key	sources	
quoted	 were	 from	 the	 anti-dams	 coalition.	 This	 media	 platform,	 however,	 also	
published	many	articles	 from	the	viewpoint	of	 the	project’s	proponents.	 Interestingly,	
the	 data	 here	 for	 La	 Tercera	 seem	 to	 indicate	 that	 this	 newspaper	 was	 less	 pro-
HidroAysén	than	expected.	Certainly,	this	newspaper’s	editorial	line	is	regarded	to	have	
become	less	conservative	in	an	effort	to	appeal	to	middle	classes	more	(Gronemeyer	&	
Porath	2017).	Overall,	El	Mostrador	published	more	interviews	with,	and	opinion	pieces	
by,	 those	 that	expressed	 the	anti-dams	viewpoint	 than	did	 the	other	 two	publications	
examined	here.	Between	2008	and	2014,	El	Mostrador	published	367	articles	where	key	
spokespeople	were	 clearly	 anti-dams.	 (This	 included	 24	 separate	 interviews	with	 the	
protest	 leaders.)	El	Mostrador	 also	 published	71	 articles	where	 the	 key	 sources	were	
pro-dams.	El	Mercurio	 published	612	articles	with	overwhelmingly	pro-dams	sources,	
and	48	pieces	that	quoted	the	protest	movement	predominantly.	La	Tercera	published	
487	articles	in	which	pro-dams	sources	were	quoted,	and	90	articles	in	which	anti-dams	
voices	were	heard.	La	Tercera,	 did	 however,	 publish	 a	 long	 series	 of	 short	 exchanges	
between	project	supporters	and	those	who	opposed	the	project,	 in	the	form	of	Letters	
to	the	Editor	throughout	the	project	timeframe	–	particularly	from	2009.		
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Figure	 16:	 Analysis	 of	 sources	 across	 the	 whole	 corpus	 shows	 that	 the	 two	 more	
conservative	publications	predominantly	included	pro-dam	voices	in	their	discourse	on	
HidroAysén.	
	
	
Given	the	worldviews	of	the	three	media	outlets	being	examined	here,	as	discussed	in	
detail	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 this	 finding	 is	 not	 unexpected,	 and	 serves	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	
polarisation	of	the	debate	along	ideological	lines.	It	additionally	indicates	how	different	
voices	expressing	opposing	opinions	on	the	project	were	available	in	key	media	outlets	
in	relation	to	HidroAysén.	The	newspapers	that	were	the	daily	reading	of	elite	decision-
makers	 (El	 Mercurio	 particularly)	 and	 the	 educated	 middle	 class	 (La	 Tercera	
particularly)	did,	though,	allow	access	to	more	pro-dams	sources’	voices.	Although	the	
data	above	reflects	the	whole	of	the	period	2008-2014,	it	should	also	be	noted	that	this	
trend	 seems	 to	 have	 changed	 over	 time,	 with	more	 anti-dams	 voices	 being	 heard	 in	
conservative	newspapers	 later	 in	 the	 course	of	 the	debate.	This	 factor	 is	 examined	 in	
more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.	
6.5	HidroAysén	enters	the	environmental	impact	assessment	process	
Discussion	now	turns	to	media	discourse	 in	what	seems	to	have	been	the	 first	critical	
discourse	moment	in	the	timeline	of	the	HidroAysén	debate	–	the	submission	of	the	EIS	
for	 the	dams	 component	of	 the	project.	 Submitted	 in	August	2008	 to	Aysén’s	Corema	
(Comisión	Regional	del	Medio	Ambiente	–	Regional	Environment	Commission),	this	was	
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a	vast	document.	The	required	44	copies	of	 the	10,000	page	 tome46	–	 three	 tonnes	of	
paper	 in	 all	 –	 had	 to	 be	 delivered	 by	 truck	 from	 Santiago	 to	 Corema’s	 offices	 in	
Coyhaique	 (El	 Mercurio,	 30/08/08).	 Thirty-three	 government	 agencies	 were	 charged	
with	 reviewing	 the	 study	 and,	 after	 the	 document	 was	 published	 on	 Conama’s	
(Comisión	Nacional	del	Medio	Ambiente	–	National	Environment	Commission)	website,	
public	responses	would	be	possible	for	a	period	of	60	days.		
The	environmental	approvals	process	was	 the	most	crucial	 step	 towards	securing	 the	
necessary	permits	for	the	megaproject.	Preceding	the	submission,	HidroAysén	–	once	an	
almost	 “invisible”	 project,	 now	 beginning	 to	 be	 made	 visible	 by	 the	 Patagonia	 sin	
Represas	campaign	–	 for	 the	 first	 time	appeared	 to	opt	 for	a	higher	profile	of	 its	own	
volition.	However,	 the	company	did	not	yet	 respond	with	any	consistent	or	concerted	
public	 advertising	 campaign	 to	 counter	 that	 by	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas.	 It	 seemed,	
instead,	(in	alignment	with	the	tendency	in	clientelistic	business	environments	noted	in	
Chapter	3)	that	HidroAysén	was	attempting	to	steer	media	discourse	through	a	highly	
focused	campaign	of	media	relations,	 instead	of	by	communicating	more	directly	with	
its	 potential	 constituents	 through	 a	 stakeholder-focused	 communications	 campaign.	
This	is	evidenced	by,	among	other	things,	the	sharp	increase	in	media	releases	around	
the	time	of	the	EIS	submission	by	the	company,	as	noted	in	the	previous	chapter,	and	as	
demonstrated	in	the	table	below.		
	
																																																						
46	The	study	itself	is	still	available	online	(HidroAysén	Estudio	de	Impacto	Ambiental,	2008)		
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Figure	 17:	HidroAysén	media	 releases	 showing	peaks	 in	 2008	 and	2011	when	media	
relations	were	of	most	concern	to	the	company.	
	
	
These	releases	announced	the	entry	into	the	EIS	process	with	confidence,	couching	it	in	
language	that	made	success	in	the	process	seem	inevitable.	None	of	the	releases	use	the	
conditional,	 “would”	 instead	 they	 always	 state	 “HidroAysén	will…”).	 HidroAysén	 also	
repeatedly	underscored	 its	contention	 that	 the	project	was	environmentally	sound.	 In	
this	series	of	releases,	it	characterised	the	project	as	one	that	“protects	flora	and	fauna”,	
was	 “committed	 to	 reforestation”	 (15/07/08),	 and	 was	 “considering	 a	 conservation	
area…for	 the	preservation	 of	 the	 ecosystem”	 (02/06/08).	 The	 company	 also	 depicted	
itself	as	a	good	corporate	citizen.	The	project	was	characterised	as	one	that	“listens	to	
the	 people	 of	 Aysén”	 (27/05/2008),	 “respects	 local	 culture”	 and	 had	 “reduced	
relocations	 [because	 of	 flooding]	 to	 only	 14	 family	 groups”	 (06/05/08).	 The	 releases	
state	 that	 the	 project	 would	 contribute	 to	 “upskilling”	 of	 the	 region’s	 people	 to	 help	
promote	 tourism,	 and	would	build	 a	 cultural	 centre	 in	 the	 small	 town	of	Cochrane	 to	
“disseminate	 the	 culture”	 of	 the	 “project’s	 area	 of	 influence”	 (28/07/08)47.	 	 The	 final	
release	 before	 the	 EIS	 submission	 focuses	 on	 the	 study	 itself,	 underscoring	 its	
magnitude.	 The	 company	 emphasises	 here	 the	 “three	 years	 of	 careful	 work”,	 “high	
																																																						
47	 All	 the	 media	 releases	 were	 available	 on	 HidroAysén’s	 website	 (www.hidroaysen.cl)	 which,	 after	
disappearing	in	2016,	has	appeared	again	(as	of	15/10/18)	in	outline.	Currently	only	media	releases	from	
2014	appear	on	the	website.	
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technical	and	professional	standards”,	the	US$12	million	invested	in	the	study	as	well	as	
the	“187	thousand	man-hours	put	in	by	370	specialists”.	Importantly,	the	release	states	
that	 the	 EIS	 fully	 complies	 with	 Chile’s	 Law	 19.300	 the	 detailed	 law48	 on	 baseline	
studies	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 social	 conditions	 in	 potentially	 affected	 communities	
prior	 to	 projects	 being	 approved.	 The	 company	 thus	 pre-emptively	 ticks	 its	 own	
scorecard	for	its	expected	success	in	the	environmental	approvals	process.	
	
The	EIS	process	was	closely	followed	by	the	anti-dams	protest	campaign.	Patagonia	sin	
Represas	 activists	were	 on	 hand	 in	 the	 streets	 as	 the	 EIS	 truckload	was	 delivered	 at	
Corema	 and	 they	 now	 redoubled	 their	 local	 and	 national	 communications	 efforts	
against	 the	 dams	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways.	 In	 August	 2008,	 El	 Mostrador	 (19/08/2008)	
reported	a	new	stage	in	the	protest	movement’s	strategy	that	would	now	draw	on	“legal	
and	 scientific	 arguments,	more	 than	 on	 emotion.”	 The	 article	 quoted	 the	 CDP’s	 chief,	
Patricio	Rodrigo,	saying	that	the	organisation	would	now	be	entering	a	“second	stage”	in	
its	 campaign	 against	 the	 dams.	 The	 organisation	 would	 “first	 use	 the	 administrative	
avenue”	to	try	to	disrupt	the	dams’	approval	process.	“We’ll	give	objective	and	scientific	
reasons	for	why	this	project	is	unnecessary,”	Rodrigo	is	quoted	as	saying.		As	allowed	by	
law	19.300,	the	protest	movement	would	submit	“comments	and	observations”	on	the	
EIS,	 and	 encourage	 private	 citizens	 to	 do	 likewise,	 to	 which	 the	 company	 would	 be	
obliged	 to	 respond.	 In	 addition	 to	 its	 observations	 on	 the	 EIS,	 continuing	 advertising	
inserts,	 and	 political	 activities	 including	 lobbying	 local	 politicians	 in	 the	 municipal	
elections	of	 that	year,	 the	protest	campaign	would	also	now	explore	other	avenues	 to	
inform	the	public	about	the	project’s	 impact.	One	example	of	this	new	strategy	was	to	
place	phone	calls	to	all	the	5000	landowners	along	the	projected	route	of	the	2300km	
transmission	 line,	 informing	them	that	 their	properties	were	 likely	 to	be	affected.	The	
campaign	also	set	up	a	free	call	number	that	concerned	citizens	could	call	to	learn	about	
the	 project	 and	 its	 likely	 impact,	 from	 the	 campaign’s	 standpoint.	 The	 coordinator	 of	
this	 call	 centre,	 Carolina	 Morgado	 (interviewed	 16/11/2013)	 reported	 that	 between	
August	2008	and	March	2014	some	32,000	calls	were	made	and	received.		
	
Alongside	 other	 influences	 on	 the	 environmental	 approvals	 process,	 the	 protest	
movement’s	 efforts	 appear	 to	have	had	 some	capacity	 to	disrupt	 the	way	 the	process	
																																																						
48	This	law	can	be	viewed	at:	(https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=30667)	
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unfolded.	Though	the	project’s	then-CEO,	Hernán	Salazar	had	said	he	expected	to	gain	
approval	 within	 fourteen	 months	 from	 the	 date	 of	 the	 EIS	 submission,	 (El	 Mercurio,	
24/07/2008)	 in	 the	 event,	 it	 took	 nearly	 three	 years	 until	 the	 project	 was	 initially	
approved.	Many	of	the	reviewing	government	agencies	found	the	EIS,	despite	its	size,	to	
be	 lacking,	 and	 requested	 addenda	 to	 the	 study49.	 Encouraged	 by	 the	 Patagonia	 sin	
Represas	 campaign,	 private	 citizens	 also	 submitted	 11,000	 objections	 to	 Conama	 in	
Coyhaique.	HidroAysén	was	obliged	to	respond	to	each	of	these.	The	combined	impact	
of	 government	 and	 private	 citizen	 EIS	 responses	 resulted	 in	 HidroAysén	 requesting	
suspension	of	the	environmental	approvals	process.	It	did	not	re-enter	the	process	with	
the	 required	 additional	 information	 until	 October	 2009,	 and	 after	 several	 re-
submissions,	the	EIS	was	not	accepted	as	admissible	until	early	2011.	At	the	same	time,	
the	CDP	was	waging	a	series	of	court	battles	against	HidroAysén,	which	would	continue	
into	 201350,	 even	 after	 the	 project	 received	 its	 environmental	 approvals	 in	 the	
culmination	of	the	EIS	process	in	2011.		
	
6.5.1	Key	media	make	their	positions	known	
	
Some	 conservative	 media	 clearly	 announced	 their	 support	 for	 HidroAysén	 in	 the	
context	of	 the	EIS	process.	 In	 a	 forceful	 editorial	 on	 the	 eve	of	 the	EIS	 submission,	El	
Mercurio	 put	 forward	 its	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	 the	megaproject,	 saying	 that	 “if	 Chile	
aspires	to	be	developed”	it	needed	investment	in	projects	like	HidroAysén.	It	also	wrote	
that	 not	 supporting	 such	 projects	 would	 mean	 Chile	 “renouncing	 its	 future	
development”	 (El	 Mercurio,	 19/08/08).	 El	 Mercurio	 began	 in	 this	 way	 to	 reflect	 the	
binary	 that	 the	 company	was	also	 constructing	between	 furthering	HidroAysén	and	a	
bright	 future	 for	 the	 country,	 versus	 stymying	 HidroAysén	 and	 a	 doubtful,	
underdeveloped	 future	 for	 Chile.	 This	 same	 binary	 would	 become	 clear	 in	 television	
advertisements	that	the	company	would	begin	to	broadcast	from	late	2010,	and	would	
emerge	as	an	important	feature	of	the	discourse	around	the	project.	In	this	context,	the	
newspaper	clearly	appealed	for	the	project	to	be	approved,	saying	of	the	environmental	
																																																						
49	Many	of	the	thirty	three	reviewing	agencies,	including	the	Dirección	General	de	Aguas	(General	Water	
Directorate,	 DGA),	 the	 Corporación	 Nacional	 Forestal	 (National	 Forestry	 Service,	 CONAF),	 the	 Servicio	
Nacional	 de	 Turismo	 (National	 Tourism	 Service,	 SERNATUR)	 responded	 with	 reviews	 that	 were	 not	
favourable	to	the	project.	These	agencies	submitted	some	submitted	2,698	questions	and	observations	on	
the	EIS	that	HidroAysén	was	bound	to	respond	to	in	detail,	adding	much	time	and	cost	to	the	EIS	process.	
50	As	chapter	8	shows,	litigation	over	HidroAysén	began	again	in	2014,	and	continued	until	2017.	
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impact	assessment	process	“it	is	expected	that	on	this	occasion	approval	be	obtained,	in	
order	to	take	the	project	forward	through	institutional	channels.”		
	
El	Mercurio	also	made	its	position	on	protest	against	the	project	clear	in	this	editorial,	
questioning	the	motives	of	protesters	–	both	national	and	international.	It	said:		
	
Of	 course,	 the	 visibility	 of	 the	 project	 attracts	 the	 active	 participation	 of	
domestic	 and	 international	 environmental	 organisations.	 In	 a	 country	 that	 is	
open	to	the	world,	this	presence	is	inevitable,	but	it	must	not	be	forgotten	that	
these	 organisations	 defend	 interests	 that	 do	 not	 necessarily	 coincide	 with	
those	of	Chile.		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 							(El	Mercurio,	19/08/08)	
	
It	continued:	“This	reality	leads	to	the	fact	that	that	some	environmental	organisations	
have	 incentives	 to	misinform	public	opinion.”	And	 then,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	EIS	process	
specifically:	 “The	 government	 needs	 to	 ensure	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 our	
institutions,	 and	 should	 also	 denounce…assertions	 by	 interest	 groups	 which	 do	 not	
correspond	with	 reality.”	 It	was	clear	 from	this	editorial	–	and	much	media	discourse	
that	 followed	 –	 that	 El	 Mercurio	 had	 the	 national	 and	 especially	 the	 transnational	
protest	movement	in	its	sights.	
	
Other	generally	right-leaning	media	were	a	little	more	circumspect	in	their	coverage	of	
the	EIS	submission.	 In	support	of	 the	company,	La	Tercera	 (15/08/2008)	emphasised	
the	complex	technical	aspects	of	the	project.	This	account	emphasized	the	breadth	and	
depth	of	the	study,	picking	up	many	of	the	statistics	that	HidroAysén	had	underscored	
in	its	pre-submission	media	releases.	Seemingly	in	favour	of	the	company,	this	account	
also	 emphasized	 the	 US$150	million	 the	 company	 reported	 it	 would	 be	 spending	 on	
environmental	 remediation.	 However,	 the	 newspaper	 (La	 Tercera	 8/08/2008)	 also	
pointed	 out	 a	 study	 advocated	 by	 the	 opposition	 to	 the	 dams,	 indicating	 that	 energy	
efficiency	measures	 and	 non-hydro	 renewables	 could	 contribute	 7100MW	 to	 the	 SIC	
energy	grid	by	2025:	more	than	double	HidroAysén’s	projected	output.	
Centre-left	leaning	El	Mostrador	on	the	other	hand,	was	the	first	to	publish	and	discuss	
the	remarks	of	Michelle	Bachelet’s	Minister	of	 the	Environment,	Ana	Lya	Uriarte,	who	
controversially	declared	early	in	HidroAysén’s	EIS	process	that	the	study	wasn’t	“up	to	
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standard”51	 (10/10/2008).	This	declaration	was	one	of	 the	 few	government	 voices	 at	
the	 time	 that	 openly	 criticised	 the	 megaproject	 –	 and	 came	 after	 two	 ministers,	
Edmundo	 Perez	 Yoma	 and	Marcelo	 Tokman,	 had	 clearly	 stated	 their	 support	 for	 the	
project	in	the	media.		Uriarte’s	statement	immediately	provoked	the	ire	of	the	company,	
conservative	 commentators	 and	 media	 of	 the	 right,	 including	 El	 Mercurio,	 which	
attacked	 Uriarte,	 pointing	 out	 that	 she	 was	 “directing”	 the	 agencies	 responsible	 for	
approval,	and	that	her	motives	for	doing	so	were	political,	rather	than	technical.	In	the	
days	after	Uriarte’s	statement,	El	Mercurio	 interviewed	Rafael	Mateo,	general	manager	
of	 Endesa	 (Derosas,	 El	 Mercurio	 18/10/2008),	 and	 also	 published	 an	 opinion	 piece	
authored	 by	 him	 (Mateo,	 El	 Mercurio	 19/10/2008).	 In	 the	 interview,	 the	 journalist	
seems	to	be	sympathetic	to	the	megaproject,	and	asked	Mateo	“has	the	EIS	process,	do	
you	 think,	been	sullied?”	Mateo	replied,	 referring	 to	Uriarte’s	 statement:	 “It’s	possible	
that	they	[the	authorities]	have	tried.”	HidroAysén	CEO	Hernán	Salazar,	interviewed	in	
another	piece	(Molina,	El	Mercurio	12/10/2008)	said	“industry	sources	confirm	that	the	
minister	is	trying	to	show	Corema	the	direction	it	should	take,	and	reject	the	project”.		
The	point	here	is	that	conservative	media,	particularly	El	Mercurio,	were	making	their	
stance	on	the	megaproject	very	clear.	Though	the	project	seemed	to	have	support	from	
most	quarters	of	government,	the	standpoint	of	the	Minister	for	the	Environment	on	the	
project	 was	 troubling.	 Though	 she	 did	 not	 have	 final	 decision-making	 power,	 her	
position	was	 influential	and	could	 indeed	be	seen	as	seeking	 to	 influence	Corema	and	
Conama’s	deliberation	on	the	admissibility	of	 the	study.	Conservative	media	 therefore	
openly	took	up	the	argument	against	Uriarte	and	in	support	of	the	project.		
6.5.2	“Rendering	technical”,	rendering	political	
There	was	 another	 aspect	 of	 the	 EIS,	 briefly	mentioned	 above,	 that	 seemed	 to	 guide	
media	 discourse	 on	 the	 project	 from	 around	 the	 time	 the	 environmental	 approvals	
process	began	in	2008.	The	EIS	was	so	vast	in	its	scale	and	ambition,	and	therefore	so	
																																																						
51	 Interviewed	 for	 this	 study	 in	 2013	 (16/06)	Ana	Lya	Uriarte	 said:	 “Yes,	 I	 protested	publically	 at	 that	
time.	I	signalled	that	the	EIS	that	HidroAysén	had	presented	was	a	study	that	was	very	deficient	in	terms	
of	 the	 information	 it	 contained	and	 the	provisions	 for	 the	 impact	 the	project	would	generate.	That’s	an	
opinion	 I	maintain	 today…I	 think	 that	 the	 evidence	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 project	 in	 that	
presentation	are	indisputable.”	
	
	 193	
difficult	for	the	media	to	work	with,	that	it	led	to	media	coverage	that	simply	reported	
on	the	technical	scale	and	scope	of	the	EIS	rather	than	the	content	of	the	study	itself	–	as	
discussed	for	articles	particularly	in	La	Tercera	above.	This	point	was	made	by	several	
interviewees	for	this	project,	 including	engineer	and	director	of	the	NGO	Observatorio	
Latinoamericano	 de	 Conflictos	 Ambientales	 (Latin	 American	 Environmental	 Conflict	
Observatory),	Lucio	Cuenca:		
It	 seemed	 that	 the	 EIS	 intended	 to	 cover	 more	 than	 everything,	 so	 that	
HidroAysén	 couldn’t	 be	 criticised	 for	 not	 addressing	 the	 requirements	 fully.	
Whether	 there	was	 a	 deliberate	 strategy	of	 obfuscation,	 it’s	 hard	 to	 know.	 It	
had	to	be	large:	a	large	EIS	for	the	country’s	largest	ever	infrastructure	project.		
Certainly,	 the	 scale	of	 the	EIS	made	 it	 seem	 that	 the	 company	had	measured	
everything,	thought	of	everything	and	had	the	answer	to	everything	–	even	if	
they	didn’t.	It	seems	to	me	that	that’s	what	they	intended.	
		(Cuenca,	interviewed	15/10/2013)	
Cuenca’s	 comments	 recall	 a	 process	 conceptualised	 by	 Murray	 Li	 (2011)	 that	 she	
describes	as	“rendering	technical”.	This	term,	that	comes	from	a	context	of	international	
development,	 describes	 the	 way	 in	 which	 neoliberal	 systems,	 often	 from	 the	 Global	
North,	impose	their	requirements	for	classification	on	peoples	and	environments	of	the	
Global	 South.	 Rendering	 technical	 requires	 that	 a	 place	 be	 “investigated,	 mapped,	
classified,	 documented,	 interpreted”	 (p.	 60)	 in	 order	 to	 be	 better	 governed	 or	
economically	 improved.	 The	 results	 of	 such	 processes	 are	 often	 vastly	 lengthy	
documents	 and	 strategies	 for	 change	 that	 propose	 “technical	 solutions”	 (p.	 66)	 to	 all	
perceived	problems.	Rendering	technical	also	meant	long,	bureaucratic	process,	where	
rigorous	 assessments	 by	 layers	 of	 officials	 would	 ensure	 that	 proposals	 for	 change	
would	comply	(or	be	seen	to	comply)	with	the	letter	of	the	law.	
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 HidroAysén,	 rendering	 technical	 meant	 fulfilling	 government	
environmental	 approvals	 processes,	 and	 importantly,	being	 seen	 to	 do	 so:	 “respecting	
institutionality”52	 as	 it	 is	 often	 called	 in	 Chile.	 Rendering	 technical	 can	 therefore	 be	
																																																						
52	 The	 word	 “institucionalidad”	 is	 often	 used	 in	 the	 Chilean	 media	 in	 relation	 to	 megaprojects	 and	
approvals	processes.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	a	researcher	working	across	languages	must	be	reflexive	
with	translation,	and	transparent	when	there	are	words	that	may	be	difficult	to	translate	definitively.	The	
word	“institucionalidad”	is	one	such	word.	In	the	way	that	is	used	in	the	HidroAysén	discourse,	the	term	
means	‘relating	to	the	processes	of	institutions’.	I	have	sometimes	translated	it	as	“institutionality”	which,	
though	 a	 little-used	 term	 in	 English,	 seems	 the	 best	 way	 to	 keep	 the	 translation	 close	 to	 the	 Spanish	
meaning.	
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regarded	 as	 the	 production	 of	 technical	 data	 to	 fit	 institutional	 requirements,	 the	
creation	 and	maintenance	 of	 institutional	 frameworks	 that	 require	 such	 data,	 and	 by	
doing	 so,	 aim	 to	 generate	 institutional	 legitimacy	 as	 well	 as	 public	 confidence	 in	
decision-making.	 HidroAysén’s	 “rendering	 technical”	 was	 to	 carry	 out	 baseline	 local	
studies	 of	 water,	 wildlife,	 forests,	 people,	 their	 societies	 and	 economies	 (though	 key	
aspects	of	 the	study	were	quickly	 judged	by	the	reviewing	authorities	to	be	 lacking	 in	
depth	 and	 accuracy53).	 But	 crucially,	 it	 also	 meant	 that	 all	 the	 seemingly	 insoluble	
environmental	problems	that	would	be	produced	by	the	megaproject	were	proposed	to	
be	 “solved”	 by	 the	 developing	 company.	HidroAysén	had	 a	 lengthy	 technical	 study	 to	
hold	 up	 to	 every	 question	 related	 to	 environmental	 (or	 social)	 harm	 in	 the	 proposed	
project’s	 region,	 and	 government	 authorities	 could	 also	 point	 to	 the	 magnitude	 and	
seriousness	of	the	studies	they	required.	The	fact	that	the	study	was	so	long	and	that	the	
responsible	agencies	had	 little	 time	to	review	it	 initially	(just	30	days)	meant	 that	 the	
company	could	–	and	did	–	claim	that	the	authorities	had	not	reviewed	their	submission	
properly.	 This	 was	 the	 argument	 that	 Endesa	 General	 Manager,	 Rafael	 Mateo	 put	
forward	 in	 El	 Mercurio,	 (Derosas,	 El	 Mercurio	 18/10/2008)	 saying	 that	 many	 of	 the	
questions	and	observations	submitted	by	the	reviewing	agency	were	already	answered	
in	 the	 EIS,	 but	 had	 not	 been	 correctly	 understood	 or	 thoroughly	 studied	 by	 the	
reviewing	agencies.		He	also	said	that	the	public	service	agencies	had	made	“erroneous	
conclusions”	in	relation	to	the	“serious,	professional,	rigorous	and	profound”	study,	and	
that	 it	 was	 “unacceptable	 that	 authorities	 or	 ecologists…who	 may	 not	 have	 all	 the	
correct	information,	express	their	opinions	ahead	of	time.”		
	
																																																						
53	HidroAysén’s	EIS,	despite	its	vast	size,	was	found	by	several	of	the	reviewing	agencies	to	be	lacking	in	
basic	aspects	(for	example,	the	mapping	of	the	area	to	be	flooded).	Two	months	after	the	EIS	submission,	
Conama	head	José	Pablo	Sáez	said	in	El	Mercurio:	“The	EIS	is	lacking	in	essential	and	relevant	information	
for	the	environmental	assessment”	(Moya	&	Zuniga,	El	Mercurio	10/10/2008).	Even	after	the	addendum	
to	 the	study	was	submitted	 in	October	2009,	 International	Rivers,	a	US-based	NGO	which	was	working	
with	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas,	 characterised	 the	 study	 as	 “quantity	 over	 quality”	 that	 “lacks	 crucial	
information,	 ignores	 important	 issues,	 uses	 incomplete	 data,	misidentifies	 scientific	 facts	 and	 provides	
shoddy	 analyses”	 (International	 Rivers	 2009).	 Environment	 Minister	 in	 2008,	 Uriarte,	 explained	 in	
interview	(16/06/2013)	that	the	fact	that	the	EIS	was	regarded	inadmissible	by	many,	including	herself,	
should	have	meant	the	project	could	not	progress	through	the	environmental	review	process	at	all.	The	
fact	 that	 HidroAysén	 was	 allowed	 to	 progress	 in	 this	 process	 was	 regarded	 as	 one	 of	 the	 many	
“irregularities”	 related	 to	 the	project	which	would	 later	 become	 contested.	Uriarte	 considered	 that	 the	
project	was	progressed	through	the	environmental	approvals	process	for	“political	reasons”.	
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The	implication	here	was	that	any	public	statements	made	against	the	project	could	not	
be	 technical	 objections,	 because	 everything	 was	 indeed	 covered	 in	 the	 study,	 as	
required	by	the	bureaucratic	approvals	process.	Any	early	public	objections	to	the	EIS	
must	 therefore	 have	 political	 motivation.	 This	 kind	 of	 sentiment	 coincides	 with	
Brownill’s	 (2013)	 conceptualisation	 of	 rendering	 technical	 in	 the	 context	 of	
megaprojects.	 Brownill	 extends	 Li’s	 “rendering	 technical”	 as	 a	 process	 in	 which	
technical	 procedures	 provide	 sufficient	 explanation	 in	 themselves	 to	 advocate	 for	
megaprojects	 –	 and	 indeed	 are	 all	 that	 are	 necessary.	 Any	 questioning	 of	 a	 project	
outside	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 technical	 is	 therefore	 politically	 motivated.	 Ideas	 around	
political	 motivation	 for	 any	 objections	 to	 HidroAysén	 are	 of	 course	 another	 of	 the	
strands	 which	 run	 through	 the	 complicated	 public	 discourse	 on	 this	 project,	 and	 if	
earlier	 in	 the	project’s	 trajectory,	media	discourse	 tended	 to	 emphasise	 technical	 and	
bureaucratic	aspects,	from	around	the	middle	of	2009	and	into	the	presidency	of	Piñera	
in	2010,	the	media	began	to	report	on	HidroAysén	in	terms	that	emphasised	its	political	
nature.	Below,	I	demonstrate	the	change	from	coverage	of	the	technical/bureaucratic	to	
coverage	 of	 the	 political	 in	 relation	 to	 HidroAysén,	 using	 computer	 assisted	 content	
analysis	 to	gain	 insights	 into	specific	parts	of	 the	corpus.	 I	 then	drill	down	again	with	
close	 reading	 of	 corpus	 articles	 highlighted	 in	 the	 content	 analysis	 to	 discuss	
HidroAysén	as	a	“political”	project.	
	
Examining	the	corpus	with	the	text	analysis	software	Leximancer	to	obtain	a	broad	view	
of	key	themes	in	the	media	coverage	is	a	useful	way	to	view	just	these	kinds	changes	in	
discourse	over	 time.	This	 “distant	reading”	(Moretti	2013)	allows	me	here	 to	obtain	a	
wide	overall	perspective	of	a	collection	of	 texts	 from	within	 the	 larger	dataset.	 It	also	
points	to	evidence	in	individual	texts	which	can	be	examined	with	close	reading.	Using	
these	 two	 techniques	 in	 conjunction	 allows	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 the	
discourse.	 To	 demonstrate	 the	 change	 in	 mediatized	 discourse	 on	 the	 megaproject	
during	2008-2010,	 I	 therefore	worked	with	Leximancer	 to	 create	 concept	maps	of	 all	
the	corpus	articles	 from	the	beginning	of	2008-June	2009,	and	then	from	June	2009	–	
March	2010.	The	change	in	key	concepts	in	this	body	of	articles	is	clear.	
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Figure	18:	Leximancer	concept	map	of	media	articles	from	El	Mercurio,	La	Tercera	and	
El	Mostrador	January	2008-June	2009.	
	
In	 Leximancer,	 the	 concepts	 (grey	 nodes)	 and	 themes	 (coloured	 bubbles	 which	
represent	 clusters	 of	 concepts)	 are	 automatically	 generated	 and	 reflect	 the	 most	
frequent	 and	 the	 most	 semantically	 connected	 notions	 within	 the	 corpus.	 In	 these	
concept	 maps,	 the	 relative	 strength	 of	 concepts	 is	 dependent	 on	 frequency	 of	 co-
occurrence	 and	 their	 relative	 proximity	 within	 the	 text,	 because	 proximity	 signifies	
relatedness	of	concepts	(Smith	&	Humphreys	2006).	Theme	bubbles	are	colour	coded	so	
that	 the	 most	 prominent	 themes	 are	 rendered	 in	 the	 hotter	 colour	 red,	 the	 least	
prominent	in	cooler	blue	and	purple.	 	Bubble	size	does	not	denote	relative	importance	
of	a	theme.		
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In	 this	 first	concept	map	the	key	 theme,	 in	red,	 is	of	course	HidroAysén.	 	Constituting	
this	 this	 are	 concepts	 ‘ambiental’,	 ‘evaluacion’	 and	 ‘tramite’	 (‘environmental’,	
‘evaluation’	 and	 process)	 and	 also	 ‘servicios’	 (government	 agencies)	 and	 Corema	
(Comisión	Regional	del	Medio	Ambiente	-	the	regional	evaluating	agency).	Endesa	and	
Colbún	 appear,	 closely	 connected;	 also	 Aisén	 (Aysén	 is	 sometimes	 spelled	 this	 way),	
‘iniciativa’	(initiative)	and	‘proyecto’	(project).	This	theme,	then,	clearly	shows	that	the	
body	 of	 texts	 highlights	 the	 details	 of	 the	 environmental	 evaluation	 process	 for	 the	
megaproject.	The	next	key	concepts,	grouped	under	the	theme	‘Chile’	are	‘carbón’	(coal),	
‘electrica’	 (electric)	 ‘generación’	 (generation)	 ‘país’	 (country)	 and	 ‘energía’	 (energy)	 –	
clearly	 referring	 to	 Chile’s	 then-current	 mode	 of	 energy	 generation.	 Other	 themes	
include	 ‘proyectos’	 (projects)	 which	 includes	 infrastructure	 projects	 other	 than	
HidroAysén,	 and	 importantly	 ‘acuerdo’	 (agreement).	 These	 concepts	 are	 also	 closely	
connected	 with	 the	 theme	 ‘observaciones’	 (comments)	 –	 and	 Conama	 (La	 Comisión	
Nacional	del	Medio	Ambiente	–	the	national	environmental	protection	agency)	 ‘mil’	 (a	
thousand)	 and	 respuestas	 (responses)	 –	 this	 highlighting	 the	 responses	 to	 the	
thousands	of	comments	and	observations	HidroAysén	was	obliged	to	return	to	Corema	
as	part	of	the	environmental	review	process.	This	body	of	texts	clearly	also	referred	to	
‘centrales’	 (power	 stations),	 ‘hidroeléctricas’	 (hydroelectric)	 –	 denoting	 hydroelectric	
power	 generation,	 ‘rios’	 (rivers)	 ‘capacidad’	 (capacity)	 and	 MW	 (megawatts).	 In	
Leximancer,	 each	 theme	 and	 concept	 can	 be	 further	 examined	 and	 drilled	 down	 into	
under	Ranked	Concepts	under	each	‘project’–	meaning	it	is	possible	to	review	the	actual	
line	location	of	the	occurrence	of	concepts	that	feature	in	the	maps.	The	final	concept,	
then,	 ‘millones’54	 (million)	 was	 used	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 project	 and	 the	
reported	 financial	 benefit	 for	 Aysén.	 Overall,	 the	 themes	 and	 concepts	 above	 clearly	
describe	a	body	of	articles	which	delineates	 the	 technical	 features	of	 the	megaproject,	
and	also	discusses	the	technical/bureaucratic	process	that	the	project	was	undertaking	
to	gain	environmental	approvals.		
	
In	my	reading	of	the	corpus	articles,	I	noticed,	however,	that	in	the	early-mid	months	of	
2009,	 the	 discourse	 on	 HidroAysén	 had	 begun	 to	 change.	 El	 Mostrador	 wrote	 in	
February	 2009	 that	 “only	 political	 tricks	 have	 kept	 HidroAysén	 alive”	 (Donoso,	 El	
																																																						
54	In	Spanish,	billion	is	rendered	as	“thousand	million”,	therefore	discourse	around	a	project	described	as	
being	projected	to	cost	billions	of	dollars	in	English	contains	the	word	“millones”	in	Spanish.		
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Mostrador	 26/02/2009).	 The	 politicisation	 of	 the	 project	 through	 the	 nominally	
technical	process	of	environmental	approvals	was	also	underscored	by	the	way	the	EIS	
trajectory	played	out	within	the	election	cycle	in	Chile	at	the	time.	As	already	noted,	due	
to	 the	 additional	 material	 HidroAysén	 was	 required	 to	 submit	 for	 review,	 the	
megaproject’s	 developers	 had	 opted	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 approvals	 process	 until	
August	2009.	Final	approval	(or	rejection)	was	expected	in	November	2009	–	coinciding	
with	the	most	crucial	final	weeks	in	the	lead	up	to	the	2009/2010	presidential	elections.	
Whether	due	to	the	apparent	politicisation	of	the	EIS	process,	or	the	upcoming	elections	
–	likely	both	–		by	mid-2009,	the	word	“political”	was	therefore	increasingly	mentioned	
in	articles	discussing	HidroAysén.	Creating	a	semantic	map	of	media	content	from	June	-	
March	2009	helped	to	represent	this	visually:	
	
Figure	19:	Leximancer	concept	map	of	media	articles	from	El	Mercurio,	La	Tercera	and	
El	Mostrador	June	2009-March	2010	
	
Here,	 although	 the	 key	 theme	 is	 again	 HidroAysén	 -	 along	 with	 concepts	 ‘represas’	
(dams)	 generación	 (generation),	 energía/energética	 (energy	 as	 noun	 and	 adjective),	
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and	 ‘país’	 (country),	 the	 next	 most	 important	 theme	 is	 ‘proyecto’	 (project)	 and	 the	
themes	 ‘político’	 (political),	 ‘proyecto’	 (project)	 and	 ‘caso’	 (case).	 Details	 on	 the	
technical	 side	of	bureaucratic	approvals	process	were	now	replaced	with	 the	political	
unfolding	of	the	HidroAysén	case.	Therefore,	in	the	next	most	significant	theme	bubble,	
‘debate’	 (debate),	 ‘candidatos’	 (candidates),	 ‘tema’	 (theme),	 again	 ‘energy’,	 Chile	 and	
Piñera	are	key	concepts.	The	green	theme	bubble	on	the	far	right	seems	to	indicate	that	
energy	 policy	 ‘política’	 (politics/policy)	 ‘energética’	 (energy	 as	 an	 adjective)	 had	now	
become	 important	 aspects	 of	 discourse	 on	 ‘gobierno’	 (government).	 Interestingly,	
although	the	concept	‘ambiental’	(environmental)	had	been	part	of	the	key	theme	in	the	
corpus	articles	in	2008,	by	2009/early	2010,	it	was	almost	the	least	important	concept.	
It	 seems,	 then,	 that	 discourse	 on	 HidroAysén	 as	 a	 political	 project	 had	 trumped	
discourse	on	the	project’s	environmental	aspects.	
	
A	 close	 reading	 of	 the	 corpus	 texts	 shows	 that	 this	 tendency	 towards	 discussing	 the	
megaproject	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 political	 had	 already	 begun	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2008.	 In	
November	2008,	one	El	Mercurio	headline	read:	“HidroAysén	decision	will	be	taken	in	
the	middle	of	the	final	strait	of	the	presidential	race”	(Bustamante	&	Moya,	El	Mercurio,	
20/11/2008).	 In	 mid-2009,	 HidroAysén	 then	 applied	 to	 take	 the	 maximum	 time	
permissible	for	suspension	–	an	additional	60	days.	This	would	mean	that	the	decision	
on	 the	project	would	now	be	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	next	 government.	Both	 leading	
presidential	 candidates	 had	 made	 their	 positions	 on	 the	 project	 amply	 clear	 in	 the	
media.	 In	 April	 2009,	 El	 Mercurio	 published	 a	 roundup	 of	 (centre-left)	 candidate	
Eduardo	Frei	and	(conservative-right)	Sebastian	Piñera’s	statements	on	the	project.	Frei	
was	 reported	 as	 having	 said	 that:	 “When	 one	 is	 in	 government,	 one	 has	 to	 make	
decisions.	When	we	 had	 to	 decide	 on	Ralco	 and	 Pangue,	my	 hand	 did	 not	 tremble	 in	
making	this	decision”	and	“I	think	that	HidroAysén	is	an	alternative	that	we	cannot	fail	
to	 implement.”	He	also	made	 scathing	 comments	 about	 “campaigns	by	environmental	
groups”	 that	 “obstruct	 energy	projects…damaging	 the	 country’s	 development.”	 Piñera	
had	said	 in	 relation	 to	HidroAysén	 that	 “If	 I	 am	elected	president,	 I	will	prioritise	 the	
construction	of	the	dams,	because	Chile	needs	energy”	(Bustamante	Rocha,	El	Mercurio	
25/04/2009).	 It	was	clear,	 then,	 that	postponing	decision	making	on	 the	project	until	
the	 term	of	 the	next	 government	would	be	beneficial	 to	 the	project,	 no	matter	which	
candidate	 succeeded.	 By	 August	 2009,	 El	 Mercurio	 reported	 that	 HidroAysén	 had	
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“transformed	directly	 into	 a	 campaign	 issue”	 (20/08/2009).	 In	 an	 editorial	 published	
late	that	month,	El	Mercurio	also	said:	
	
In	the	case	that	Piñera	or	Frei	are	elected,	these	candidates	seem	disposed	to	
facilitate	HidroAysén,	 if	 it	 complies	with	 environmental	 norms.	 This	 seems	
obvious,	but	it	isn’t.	Once	the	technical	requirements	have	been	taken	care	of,	
these	decisions	are,	after	all,	political.	It’s	very	probable	that	because	of	this,	
HidroAysén	will	decide	to	delay	the	submission	of	its	addendum,	in	the	hope	
of	receiving	a	more	favourable	reception	in	2010.	
	
	And	in	October	2009,	another	editorial	in	El	Mercurio	(30/10/2009)	which	was	highly	
critical	of	the	environmental	review	process	stated	that	“the	impression	remains,	in	the	
end,	 that	 there	 is	 influence	 here	 with	 political	 motives.”	 Of	 HidroAysén’s	 repeated	
suspension	 of	 the	 environmental	 reviews	 process,	 El	 Mostrador	 (20/10/2009)	 had	
reported	 that	 the	 “the	 company	 has	 elected	 a	 timeframe	 that	 is	 most	 politically	
advantageous.	 This	 has	 become	 a	 political	 project.”	 	 In	 January	 2010,	 La	 Tercera	
reported	that	the	timeframe	of	Corema’s	latest	response	to	the	addenda	of	the	EIS	has	
been	 delayed	 to	 avoid	 further	 “political	 noises”	 in	 relation	 to	 HidroAysén	 at	 election	
time	(La	Tercera	19/01/2010).	And	later	in	2010,	La	Tercera	published	a	Letter	to	the	
Editor	 by	 Douglas	 Tompkins	 stating	 that	 the	 EIS	 evaluation	 had	 been	 a	 process	 of	
“political	manipulation	and	pressure”	(Tompkins,	La	Tercera	29/12/2010).	Even	after	
the	initial	approval	of	the	project,	 it	remained	in	media	discourse	a	political	 issue.	For	
example,	in	May	2011,	La	Tercera	reported	“political	opportunism”	by	the	Concertación	
(the	coalition	of	parties	that	made	up	the	then-opposition)	in	relation	to	HidroAysén	(La	
Tercera,	29/05/11).		
	
6.6	New	communications	strategy,	new	discursive	characteristics		
	
Towards	the	second	half	of	2009	HidroAysén	began	a	new	stage	in	its	communications.	
La	 Tercera	 reported	 in	 a	 detailed	 feature	 article	 (12/08/2009)	 that	 HidroAysén	 had	
“passed	 through	 its	 low-profile	 phase”	 and	 would	 now	 have	 “more	 exposure	 to	 the	
public	 on	 a	 national	 level”.	 Bernardo	 Larraín	 Matte,	 General	 Manager	 of	 Colbún	 was	
quoted	as	saying	that		
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Today	 more	 than	 ever,	 it	 is	 necessary	 for	 energy	 projects,	 among	 them	
HidroAysén,	to	communicate	not	only	with	groups	who	have	the	most	direct	
interest,	the	project’s	neighbours,	but	also	with	wider	audiences.	
	
The	 discourse	 also	 recognised	 that	 the	 communications	 strategy	 the	megaproject	 had	
used	to	date	had	been	effective	 in	 informing	of	the	project's	 technical	aspects	but	now	
communication	 needed	 to	 “expand	 its	 focus	 towards	 public	 opinion	 in	 general”.	 An	
(unnamed)	director	of	the	Enersis	group	was	paraphrased	as	saying	that:	
	
…We	 must	 now	 give	 more	 emphasis	 to	 the	 strategic	 communication	 of	
HidroAysén.	Up	to	now,	visibility	in	the	zone,	in	Aysén,	has	been	prioritised,	
not	visibility	on	a	national	 level,	because	that’s	where	the	communities	that	
relate	to	the	project	are	located.	But	now,	there’s	a	consensus	that	that	needs	
to	change.			
	
The	article	also	quotes	an	(unnamed)	“important	source	 in	Colbún”	as	saying	 that	 this	
new	communicational	phase	was	a	 result	 of	 “a	 change	of	 attitude	among	 the	project’s	
shareholders”	 to	 “make	 the	 project	 more	 visible”.	 Importantly,	 this	 source	 also	
commented	that	the	change	was	“in	the	spirit	of	countering	the	sustained	environmental	
campaign”.	
	
In	late	2009	and	early	2010,	therefore,	HidroAysén	began	to	conduct	some	new	strategic	
communications	work,	aimed	at	increasing	the	megaproject’s	national	profile.	This	was	
still	a	relatively	low-key	communications	effort55,	involving	three	separate	television	ads	
over	 one	 year,	 an	 expanded	 and	 improved	 company	 website,	 some	 newspaper	
advertising,	 and	 ads	 on	 public	 infrastructure	 like	 bus	 shelters	 in	 the	 capital	 Santiago.	
Company	representatives	also	gave	presentations	to	opinion	 leaders	 in	the	capital	and	
other	 cities	 wherever	 they	 could	 be	 invited	 to	 do	 so.	 Some	 new	 and	 enduring	
characteristics	 in	 the	 ongoing	 discourse	 around	 the	 project	 began	 to	 emerge	 in	 this	
period.	 In	 early	 2009,	 events	 transpired	which	meant	 that	 the	 first	 of	 these	 symbolic	
characteristics	was	the	megaproject’s	‘foreign-ness’	–	a	fact	drawn	upon	and	emphasised	
by	the	project’s	opponents.	
	
6.6.1	Foreigners	and	‘foreign-ness’:	The	Enel	buyout	of	Endesa	
																																																						
55	Daniel	Fernández	who	took	over	 from	Hernán	Salazar	as	 the	new	HidroAysén	CEO	in	2010	stated	 in	
interview	for	this	study	(19/12/2013)	that	until	2010,	on	the	national	level,	the	company	“did	not	have	a	
strategy	and	did	not	have	much	communication…I	believe	[this	was]	until	2010,	when	we	arrived.	Apart	
from	this	little	campaign,	there	was	nothing	else.”	
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A	 flurry	of	media	coverage	appeared	around	HidroAysén	following	the	announcement	
in	February	2009	that	Italian	firm	Enel	was	involved	in	a	buyout	of	Spanish	companies	
Endesa	 and	 Acciona’s	 shares	 in	 HidroAysén.	 The	 deal	 meant	 that	 the	 Italian	
multinational	now	owned	92%	of	Endesa,	together	with	the	Spanish	company	Enersis.	
Chilean	 company	 Colbún	 still	 owned	 49%	 of	 HidroAysén.	 El	 Mercurio	 (02/03/2009)	
characteristically	 heralded	 this	 development	 with	 a	 partisan	 opinion	 piece	 which	
stated:		
	
It	 is	hoped	that	Enel	will	also	take	a	more	active	role	in	conveying	to	the	
authorities	 and	 the	 community	 the	 importance	 of	 Endesa	 being	 able	 to	
develop	 its	 hydroelectric	 projects,	 to	 which	 there	 has	 been	 strong	
opposition.	
La	Tercera	 reported	that	 the	Enel	 takeover	was	 indeed	beneficial	 for	HidroAysén.	The	
CEO	of	Acciona	 it	 said,	had	had	a	 “very	ecologist	discourse	on	energy	which	 favoured	
renewable	 energy	 sources”	 (meaning	 ERNCs	 –	 not	 mega-hydro).	 	 It	 reported	 that	
Acciona	had	contemplated	severing	ties	with	the	megaproject	in	the	face	of	the	level	of	
rejection	it	was	experiencing	in	Chile.	Of	Enel’s	attitude	to	HidroAysén,	the	newspaper	
explained:	“If	it	is	profitable	and	it	acquires	the	necessary	permits,	Enel	will	support	it,	
despite	the	eco-opposition”	(Marticorena,	La	Tercera	21/02/2009).	
Although	Enel’s	takeover	of	Endesa	did	not	result	in	a	particularly	pronounced	spike	in	
media	coverage,	the	fact	that	over	half	of	the	HidroAysén	megaproject	was	now	owned	
by	two	of	Europe’s	biggest	utility	companies	did	begin	to	act	as	a	confluence	for	issues	
related	to	‘foreign-ness’	and	‘sovereign-ness’	in	the	discourse	surrounding	HidroAysén.	
The	project	had,	of	course,	since	its	inception	been	foreign	majority	owned	but	this	new	
buyout	now	served	as	an	inflection	point	on	the	foreign	ownership	argument,	at	a	time	
when	 the	 megaproject	 was	 particularly	 under	 scrutiny.	 The	 anti-dams	 campaign	
responded	to	the	buyout	with	one	of	its	advertising	inserts,	shown	below,	published	in	
El	 Mercurio	 (10/03/2009)	 seeming	 to	 educate	 the	 Enel’s,	 Fluvio	 Conti	 in	 the	
background	to	the	project	and	the	already	negative	public	image	of	Endesa	within	Chile.	
	
	 203	
	
Figure	 20:	 The	 headline	 reads:	 “The	 Italian	 company	 Enel	 intends	 to	 destroy	 our	
Patagonia.	 Our	 heritage.	 Our	 beauty.	 Our	 Life	 Reserve”.	 The	 article	 points	 out	 that	
“Endesa	 has	 been	 disreputable	 for	 decades	 because	 of	 actions	 that	 have	 resulted	 in	
serious	 negative	 environmental	 impacts	 and	 harmed	 the	 human	 rights	 of	 local	 and	
indigenous	communities.”		
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Shortly	after	the	Enel	buyout,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	published	an	article	on	its	website	
(Patagonia	 sin	Represas	 03/03/2009)	 asking	 if	 it	 “looks	 bad	 if	 a	multinational	 barges	
into	a	territory…for	a	motive	of	profits”.	From	this	point	on,	the	anti-dams	campaign	was	
careful	to	emphasise	the	fact	that	HidroAysén	was	majority	foreign	owned.	Patagonia	sin	
Represas	had	certainly	already	been	underscoring	in	its	discourse	that	Patagonia	and	its	
resources	were	Chilean,	and	belonged	to	all	Chileans	(even	if	it	was	conscious,	as	several	
interviewees	reported,	that	most	Chileans	would	never	visit	this	southern	extreme	of	the	
country).		It	had	referred	often	in	its	strategic	communications	to	“nuestra	Patagonia”,	in	
Spanish:	 “our	 Patagonia”,	 and	 now	 reiterated	 the	 value	 to	 all	 of	 Chile	 of	 this	 national	
asset	 –	 in	 binary	 opposition	 to	 the	 ‘foreign-ness’	 of	 the	 project,	 which	 would	 only	
produce	 value	 for	 an	 elite	 few.	 Of	 course,	 globalisation	 has	 allowed	 transnational	
corporations	to	escape	the	boundaries	of	the	nation	state,	and	megaproject	development	
by	multinational	companies	in	foreign	territories	is	routine.	But	the	notions	of	economic	
imperialism	 by	 foreign	 companies,	 resource	 extraction	 with	 resulting	 environmental	
damage	and	scant	economic	benefit	to	local	communities	hit	a	raw	nerve	in	Chile,	where	
for	decades,	multinational	mining	operations	and	hydroelectric	schemes	have	degraded	
the	 country’s	 environment	 and	 brought	 few	 benefits	 to	 the	 communities	 they	 most	
affect.		
	
The	Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign	therefore	began	now	to	add	to	its	discourses	the	
concept	of	neo-imperialism.	Mitzi	Urtubia	of	NGO	Ecosistemas	(interviewed	15/05/13)	
explained:		
	
We	 pointed	 out	 in	 our	 communications	 material	 that	 the	 developing	
company	was	largely	foreign,	and	we	linked	this	to	neo-imperialism,	and	to	
extractivism.	These	companies	coming	to	use	our	water,	our	Chilean	water,	
a	privatised	resource,	that	they	owned.		
	
Historical	 antecedents	 made	 this	 point	 particularly	 problematic	 in	 Chile.	 	 As	 Matías	
Asún,	head	of	Greenpeace	in	Chile	(interviewed	26/07/13)	reminded:	
	
Companies	 like	 Endesa	 were	 privatised	 in	 a	 way	 that	 was	 very	 far	 from	
transparent	 during	 the	 dictatorship	 in	 the	 1980s.	 They	 were	 privatised,	
moreover,	 with	 a	 series	 of	 privileges,	 which	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 electricity	
companies,	was	with	water	rights	tucked	under	their	arms.	And	they	would	
have	these	rights	 in	perpetuity	–	something	that	I	don’t	think	exists	 in	any	
other	part	of	 the	world.	Because	of	 this,	 there	 is	 this	 shadow	of	 suspicion.	
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You	aren’t	doing	business	for	the	benefit	of	the	country,	you	are	doing	it	for	
your	own	pocket.	And	when	 foreign	 companies	 came	along	and	 took	over	
Chilean	ones,	when	the	project	developers	were	now	foreign	and	would	be	
exporting	their	profits	from	Chile,	people	were	even	more	concerned	about	
this…So	emphasising	the	foreign	nature	of	HidroAysén	was	important,	and	
this	was	certainly	negative	in	relation	to	public	opinion	on	the	project.	
	
By	May	2010,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	was	able	to	draw	attention	to	such	perceived	neo-
imperialism,	 or	 neo-colonialism,	 in	 a	 particularly	 visible	 way.	 Using	 the	 same	 trans-
global	 channels	 that	 had	 brought	 Enersis	 and	 Enel	 to	 Chile	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 Chilean	
activists	became	Enel	minority	shareholders,	with	the	right	to	speak	for	ten	minutes	at	
the	annual	shareholders’	meeting	 in	Rome.	Conservationist	 Juan	Pablo	Orrego	and	the	
activist	Bishop	of	Aysen,	Monseñor	Luis	Infanti,	attended	the	meeting,	and	the	next	day,	
El	Mercurio	(02/05/2010)	quoted	the	bishop	as	saying:		
	
Endesa	Spain	entered	with	force	into	Patagonia.	Like	modern	colonists,	they	
impose	 their	 economic	 and	 political	 power	 in	 order	 to	 realise	 these	
destructive	megaprojects…	Yesterday	the	Spanish	and	today	the	Italians.		
	
The	aim	of	Orrego	and	Infanti’s	presentation	to	Enel,	and	subsequent	activism	in	Italy	
and	Spain,	was	to	“demonstrate	to	Enel	its	neo-colonialism	in	Chile,	gain	international	
visibility…and	 find	 funding	 and	 support	 from	 local	 environmental	 groups,”	 Infanti	
reported	 in	 an	 interview	 for	 this	 study	 (20/10/2013).	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Patagonia	 sin	
Represas	campaign	reportedly56	received	favourable	media	coverage	in	Italy,	began	to	
receive	regular	coverage	in	Spain’s	key	newspaper,	El	Mundo,	and	two	Italian	and	three	
Spanish	 NGOs	 joined	 the	 now	 trans-global	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 campaign	 against	
the	trans-global	megaproject.	
	
6.6.2	HidroAysén’s	“sovereign	energy”		
	
HidroAysén	now	began	to	respond,	and	in	its	strategic	communications	material	in	this	
period,	it	also	began	to	tap	into	ideas	of	‘sovereign-ness’	and	‘foreign-ness’	in	relation	
to	 the	megaproject.	Key	Chilean	media	also	began	 to	pick	up	on	 the	national/foreign	
binary.	At	this	time,	HidroAysén	was	beginning	to	make	more	presentations	to	groups	
in	 towns	 and	 villages	 in	 Aysén	 region,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 capital.	 A	 PowerPoint	
																																																						
56	Monsenõr	Luis	Infanti	reported	this	when	interviewed	but	this	was	not	further	researched	or	verified	
due	to	the	difficulty	of	searching	Italian-language	media	for	a	researcher	who	does	not	speak	Italian.	
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presentation	(dated	2009)	that	was	used	at	these	events	was	shared	with	me	by	Jorge	
Taboada,	 then-Manager	 of	 Administration	 and	 Development	 at	 HidroAysén.	 The	
presentation	emphasises	 that	HidroAysén	 is	 “national	energy”	“a	sovereign	resource”	
and	 offered	 “greater	 independence	 from	 other	 countries.”	 The	 company’s	 national	
television	 publicity	 also	 portrayed	 the	megaproject	 in	 nationalistic	 terms	 calling	 it	 a	
source	 of	 “energía	 chilena”	 (Chilean	 energy)	 (HidroAysén	 2009a)	 –	 and	 “energía	
soberana”	 (HidroAysén	 2009b)	 or	 sovereign	 energy,	 reducing	 dependence	 on	 fossil	
fuel	exports	from	neighbouring	countries.		A	series	of	television	ads	and	billboards	that	
began	 to	 appear	 from	 late	 2009	 described	 the	 energy	 that	 would	 come	 from	
HidroAysén	as	“clean,	renewable	and	Chilean”,	and	this	became	the	common	anchorage	
for	a	much	of	the	company’s	advertising	outputs	around	this	time.		
	
	
Figure	21:	A	still	from	one	HidroAysén’s	television	advertisements.	The	tagline	for	this	
series	of	ads	was	“clean,	renewable,	Chilean”.		
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Figure	22:	One	of	HidroAysén’s	billboards	 in	 the	Aysén	region,	with	graffiti	 that	
has	 altered	 the	 words	 “clean,	 renewable,	 Chilean”	 to	 “destructive,	 irreversible,	
Italian”.	
	
HidroAysén’s	 claims	 here	 were	 perhaps	 the	 kind	 that	 Flyvbjerg,	 Garbuio	 &	 Lovallo	
(2009)	 refer	 to	 as	 “strategic	 deception”.	 Hydroelectricity	 dramatically	 alters	
watercourses,	 drowns	 landscapes,	 and	 threatens	 environments	 and	 species,	 the	
environmental	effects	of	which,	as	the	altered	billboard	above	attests,	are	irreversible.	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 argument	 here	 on	 the	 national/the	 foreign,	 the	 water	 might	 be	
considered	 a	 geographical	 part	 of	 Chile	 at	 least,	 though	 water	 rights	 were	 foreign	
owned.	Denoting	hydroelectricty	as	 “clean”,	however,	 ignores	 the	environmental	 (and	
social)	damage	that	dams	and	dam	building	causes,	and	although	hydroelectrity	is	often	
promoted	 in	 the	 face	of	climate	change	as	carbon	neutral,	a	growing	body	of	research	
concludes	 that	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 case	 (Fearnside	 1997,	 2004,	 2015;	Maeck	 et	 al.	
2013;	Wherli	2011).		Perhaps	in	the	knowledge	that	long-running	environmental	issues	
could	 easily	 lose	 public	 attention,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 drew	 now	 on	 the	 ‘foreign-
ness’	 argument,	 rather	 than	 the	 environmental	 one,	 strongly	 refuting	 HidroAysén’s	
“Chilean”	claim,	and	emphasising	that	the	water	rights	in	the	Rivers	Baker	and	Pascua	
were	majority	owned	by	foreign	companies.	Still,	media	coverage	at	this	time	seems	to	
have	replicated	HidroAysén’s	frame	for	the	most	part,	and	the	notion	of	the	‘native-ness’	
of	HidroAysén	persisted.		
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To	 determine	 from	 a	 quantitative	 perspective	 when	 and	 how	 discourse	 around	 the	
national	and	 international	aspects	of	 the	project	were	expressed	 in	the	media,	 the	 full	
media	corpus	of	2385	articles	was	examined	using	Leximancer	each	year	2008-2014.	To	
pinpoint	articles	in	which	the	media	referred	to	the	megaproject’s	“nationality”,	I	loaded	
the	 corpus	 articles	 into	 Leximancer	 year	 by	 year,	 and	 used	 the	 software’s	 ‘Query’	
function	to	find	all	locations	of	the	terms	searched.	Because	multiple	different	terms	are	
associated	 with	 the	 argument	 for	 the	 project’s	 nationality,	 and	 its	 “nativeness”,	 I	
decided	 instead	 of	 using	 the	 concept	 map	 function,	 to	 let	 Leximancer	 guide	 a	 close	
reading	of	whole	articles	in	the	locations	of	the	searched	terms	were	found.	I	carried	out	
separate	‘queries’	for	the	expressions	in	Spanish	for	“sovereign”	“national”	“indigenous”	
“native”	 and	 “own”.	 I	 also	 searched	 for	 the	 term	 “independence”,	 because	 part	 of	 the	
nationalistic	argument	for	HidroAysén	was	to	allow	independence	from	other	nations	in	
terms	of	energy	requirements.	I	searched	for	these	terms	separately	and	then	together	
with	 “energy”,	 then	 “resources”	 and	 then	 “HidroAysén”.	 I	 also	 searched	 “Chilean	
energy”.	In	addition,	I	searched	for	the	words	“foreign”,	“international”	“multinational”,	
“transnational”	and	“overseas”	(in	Spanish	“extranjero”	–	which	is	used	both	as	a	noun	
and	 an	 adjective).	 The	 instances	 of	 all	 these	 terms	 were	 noted	 for	 each	 year	 of	 the	
debate	across	all	three	media.	The	following	graph	was	created	from	the	data:	
	
	
Figure	23:	Discourse	on	HidroAysén’s	national	status	peaked	in	2009/2010.	
	
It	was	clear	that	the	notable	increase	in	these	terms	in	relation	to	HidroAysén	appeared	
in	 the	2009-2010	timeframe	when	both	Patagonia	sin	Represas	and	HidroAysén	were	
using	 the	 nationality	 of	 the	 project	 in	 their	 own	 strategic	 discourse.	 El	 Mercurio	
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appeared	 especially	 to	 underscore	 the	 national	 in	 relation	 to	 the	megaproject.	 	 Some	
examples	include	an	El	Mercurio	editorial,	which	in	early	2009	(04/01/2009),	wrote	of	
“energía	 propria”	 in	 Spanish,	 “our	 own	 energy”	 in	 relation	 to	 hydroelectricity	 and	
HidroAysén.	 In	April	 2009	Enel	 executive	Andrea	Brentan,	was	quoted	 in	El	Mercurio	
(Bustamante	 &	 Orellana,	 El	 Mercurio	 16/04/2009)	 as	 saying	 that	 HidroAysén	 was	
“national…indigenous”	 and	 shortly	 after,	 an	 editorial	 in	 El	 Mercurio	 (also	 strongly	 in	
favour	 of	 HidroAysén)	 referred	 to	 the	 project	 as	 “native	 hydraulic	 potential”	
(23/06/2009).	 In	 early	 2010,	 ex-President	 of	 Endesa,	 Mario	 Valcarce	 said	 in	 an	
interview	in	El	Mercurio	that	“Chile	cannot	allow	itself	the	luxury…of	not	developing…a	
project	that	uses	sovereign	resources”	(15/04/2010).	
	
La	 Tercera	 published	 some	 interviews	 with	 opponents	 of	 the	 project	 where	 the	
international	aspects	of	the	project	were	discussed	and	where	it	was	criticised	for	being	
a	product	of	“overseas	capital”	and	then	also	“Spanish	capital”	and	“Italian	capital”	(La	
Tercera	09/05/2010)	and	the	newspaper	often	described	the	project	as	“transnational”.	
It	is	noteworthy,	however,	that	the	most	instances	of	the	word	“foreign”	and	“overseas”	
(as	 an	 adjective)	 appeared	 in	 El	 Mostrador	 –	 but	 not	 in	 the	 context	 that	 might	 be	
expected.	 For	 example,	 El	 Mostrador	 (4/10/2010)	 interviewed	 HidroAysén’s	 CEO,	
Daniel	 Fernández	 who	 spoke	 critically	 of	 “foreign	 interests”,	 “overseas	 funding”,	
“foreign	 people”	 several	 times	 to	 describe	 the	 anti-dams	 movement.	 	 Another	
interviewee	referred	 to	Douglas	Tompkins	 in	similar	 terms,	 for	example:	 “this	 foreign	
person”	 (El	 Mostrador	 21/10/2010).	 It	 is	 clear	 then	 that	 by	 2010,	 notions	 of	 the	
sovereign	and	its	opposite,	the	foreign,	were	becoming	closely	attached	not	only	to	the	
project,	 but	 also	 to	 its	 opponents.	 	 This	 would	 have	 important	 implications	 for	
HidroAysén’s	 symbolic	 construction	 and	 also	 the	 way	 discourse	 on	 the	 anti-dams	
position	was	solidifying.	I	revisit	growing	negative	discourse	on	Douglas	Tompkins	and	
Patagonia	sin	Represas	environmentalists	in	Chapter	8.	
	
6.6.3	Climate	change	enters	the	debate	
	
Although	 environmental	 concerns	 had	 not	 historically	 been	 the	 Chilean	 public’s	 key	
worry,	in	the	years	after	the	end	of	the	dictatorship,	as	post-materialist	values	(Inglehart	
1977,	 1997,	 also	 see	 footnote	 21,	 Chapter	 3)	 began	 to	 emerge	 in	 some	 groups,	
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environmental	 issues	started	to	assume	increasing	importance	(Losternau	et	al.	2011).	
After	 20	 years	 of	 relatively	 unrestrained	 growth	 in	 the	 neoliberal	model,	 the	 country	
suffered	from	much	environmental	contamination.	By	2015,	air	pollution,	soil	and	water	
contamination	 (particularly	 from	 mining)	 and	 climate	 change	 had	 become	 “issues	 of	
high	concern”	 for	Chileans	(Pino	et	al.	2015).	As	discussed	 in	Chapter	3,	 in	a	survey	of	
environmental	attitudes	in	33	countries,	Franzen	and	Vogl	(2013)	found	that	Chile	was	
the	 only	 country	 where	 environmental	 concern	 had	 increased	 significantly	 between	
2000	 and	 2010.	 I	 argue	 in	 the	 conclusion	 to	 this	 study	 that	 the	 emblematic	 case	 of	
HidroAysén	was	one	of	the	factors	that	contributed	to	that	change	in	perceptions	on	the	
environment.	So	when	HidroAysén	was	first	brought	 into	the	public	arena	by	the	anti-
dams	 campaign,	 and	 then	 the	 megaproject	 developer’s	 early	 communicational	
responses,	 environmental	 issues	 –	 climate	 change	 chief	 among	 them	 –	 could	 easily	
become	part	of	discourse	on	the	project.	
	
In	early	2009,	the	World	Bank	released	a	study	Desarrollo	con	menos	carbono:	respuestas	
latinoamericanas	 al	 desafío	 del	 cambio	 climático	 –	Development	with	 less	 carbon:	 Latin	
American	 answers	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 climate	 change	 (De	 la	 Torre,	 Fajnzylber	 &	 Nash	
2009).	 The	 study	 underscored	 the	 importance	 of	 developing	 non-fossil	 fuel	 energy	
resources	 in	 Chile,	 amongst	 them	 hydroelectricity.	 Although	 HidroAysén’s	 strategic	
communications	 had	 long	 been	 calling	 the	 project	 “clean”	 and	 “renewable”	 the	World	
Bank’s	report	might	be	considered	a	critical	discourse	moment	because	of	the	way	the	
mediatized	debate	 took	on	a	new	character	 in	connection	with	 it.	The	report	certainly	
seemed	 to	 lend	 weight	 to	 HidroAysén’s	 self-reported	 credentials	 in	 climate	 change	
abatement,	 and	 this	 newly	 underscored	 connection	 between	 HidroAysén	 and	 climate	
change	was	widely	reported	in	the	media.	
	
Media	outlets	 in	 the	 study	corpus	now	made	 the	connection	between	HidroAysén	and	
climate	 change.	 In	 the	 days	 after	 the	 report	 was	 released,	 the	 company’s	 then-CEO,	
Hernán	Salazar,	authored	a	 long	feature	article	 in	La	Tercera,	 ‘HidroAysén	and	Climate	
Change’	 (Salazar	 2009)	 in	 which	 he	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 report	 had	 championed	
hydroelectricity	as	an	avenue	for	promoting	more	climate	friendly	development	in	Chile.	
Here,	 he	 reminded	 that,	 with	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 economic	 activity	 on	 the	 continent,	
Chile	also	had	the	highest	CO2	emissions	per	capita,	and	that	in	this	regard:		
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….the	 hydroelectric	 option	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 best	 alternative	 for	 our	
country.	It	is	renewable	energy,	clean	and	sustainable,	and	available	in	our	
southern	 region.	 Its	 greater	 availability	 will	 give	 greater	 stability	 and	
security	to	our	Chilean	energy	grid.	Closing	off	definitively	the	opportunity	
to	utilise	the	possibilities	that	this	offers	means	closing	the	door	to	energy	
independence	 and	 energy	 security	 and	 an	 obligation	 to	 use	 less	 clean	
energy,	further	contributing	to	global	warming	as	we	have	been	up	to	now.	
	
He	also	wrote	that:	
	
	 HidroAysén	will	contribute	to	the	diversification	of	the	energy	grid	towards	
a	cleaner	option,	and	will	replace	the	emissions	equivalent	to	seven	fossil-
fuel	 based	 thermal	 generation	 plants.	 If	 we	 put	 this	 into	 a	 10-year	
perspective,	 it	will	substitute	160	million	tonnes	of	CO2	 in	 the	atmosphere	
which	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	 total	 emitted	 in	 Chile	 every	 three	 years,	 or	 the	
pollution	that	all	our	cars	produce	in	a	decade.	
	
To	 Chileans	 who	 were	 concerned	 with	 the	 drastic	 air	 pollution	 in	 their	 cities,	 this	
argument	must	 have	 seemed	 a	 sound	 one:	why	 build	more	 fossil-fuel	 burning	 power	
stations	 to	 further	 contaminate	 the	 air,	 when	 power	 from	 HidroAysén	 was,	 as	 the	
company	 argued,	 clean	 and	 non-polluting?	 Why	 spend	 8	 billion	 dollars	 a	 year	 on	
imported	fossil	fuels	(Hall	et	al.	2009)	when	Chile	had	its	own,	“clean”	power	resource?	
La	 Tercera	 now	 seemed	 to	 have	 a	 particular	 affinity	 for	 the	 unfolding	 of	 the	
HidroAysén/climate	 change	 debate.	 It	 published	 Letters	 to	 the	 Editor	 from	
representatives	of	Patagonia	sin	Represas	who	pointed	out	deficits	in	this	argument:	
	
Salazar	omits...information	 concerning	 the	negative	 effects	 of	 the	dams,	 in	
relation	to	carbon	emissions.	For	example,	the	dams	would	eliminate	great	
swathes	of	forest	that	capture	these	gases,	and	of	itself	the	decomposition	of	
drowned	vegetation	generates	CO2	and	methane.	Neither	does	he	consider	
the	emissions	of	a	decade	of	construction,	particularly	for	the	manufacture	
of	cement	and	other	materials	to	build	the	dam	walls.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 														
He	added:	
	 Letting	this	project	become	reality	would	mean	submitting	a	region	to	 the	
private	 interests	of	 large	 corporations.	Let	us	not	 confuse	 the	necessity	of	
energy	development	in	Chile	with	the	energy	business	of	a	few.	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 																						(Rodrigo,	La	Tercera	07/04/2009)	
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However,	 shortly	 after	 this	 exchange,	 an	 interview	 with	 Endesa	 president	 Mario	
Valcarce,	 also	 in	La	Tercera,	 again	emphasised	HidroAysen’s	perceived	climate	 change	
advantage.	Alcarce	said:		
HidroAysén	 is	 not	 a	 perfect	 solution,	 because	 in	 terms	 of	 energy,	 perfect	
solutions	 don’t	 exist.	 They	 all	 have	 their	 pros	 and	 cons.	 But	 it’s	 the	most	
reasonable,	 the	 cleanest,	 and	 the	 most	 compatible	 in	 the	 fight	 against	
climate	change,	 that	will	be	 the	greatest	problem	of	 the	next	 two	decades.	
An	 analysis	 that	 does	 not	 incorporate	 these	 conditions,	 will	 inevitably	 be	
biased	and	incomplete.	
	 	 	 	 	 																					(Astudillo,	La	Tercera	15/04/2009)	
	
Again	in	La	Tercera,	Colbún	general	manager,	Bernado	Larraín	was	quoted	as	saying	that	
HidroAysén	was	part	of	the	“worldwide	crusade	against	global	warming”	(1/04/2010).		
	
Around	this	time,	La	Tercera	published	a	Letter	to	the	Editor	by	Juan	Pablo	Orrego,	part	
of	the	anti-dams	campaign,	in	which	he	called	the	arguments	in	the	World	Bank’s	report	
“superficial”.	 He	 pointed	 out	 the	 World	 Bank	 had	 itself	 participated	 in	 a	 World	
Commission	 on	 Dams	 study	 which	 showed	 that	 arguments	 that	 hydroelectricity	 was	
“clean”	 and	 “cheap”	 neglected	 empirical	 evidence	 and	 were	 deeply	 flawed.	 He	 also	
questioned	 the	 “moral	 authority”	 of	 the	World	 Bank,	 given	 that	 the	 organisation	 had	
previously	 been	 “criticised	by	 innumerable	 experts”	 for	 its	 relationship	 to	 “promoting	
construction	of	large	hydroelectric	dams.”57	On	HidroAysén	and	climate	change,	he	said:	
	
It	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 intervene	 in	 a	 life	 reserve	 when	 we	 could	 be	
undertaking	 more	 innovative	 energy	 development.	 This	 should	 be	 the	
contribution	Chile	makes	to	solving	climate	change.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 											(Orrego,	La	Tercera	16/03/2009)	
	
Such	 “innovative	 energy	 development”	 –	 shorthand	 for	 non-conventional	 renewable	
energy	sources	 (ERNCs)	–	now	seemed	 to	be	 in	 the	crosshairs	of	 those	promoting	 the	
dams.	Interviewed	in	2013	(16/12/2013)	HidroAysén’s	ex-account	executive	at	Burson-
																																																						
57	The	connections	between	HidroAysén	and	the	World	Bank	were	made	by	many	of	the	interviewees	for	
this	 study,	 including	 Maria	 Irene	 Soto,	 HidroAysén	 communications	 chief,	 who	 spoke	 of	 “international	
lending”	and	the	World	Bank	in	relation	to	the	project,	but	declined	to	confirm	if	the	company	had	been	in	
negotiations	with	the	World	Bank.	None	of	the	interviewees	or	the	media	coverage	seem	able	to	confirm	
definitively	the	HidroAysén/World	Bank	connection.	
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Marsteller	 (the	megaproject’s	by	 then	 just-dismissed	PR	agency)	 confirmed	 this	was	a	
deliberate	 strategy	of	HidroAysén’s.	 “HidroAysén	 took	a	decision	 to	go	against	ERNCs.	
That	was	not	the	best	strategy…I	was	never	in	agreement	with	this”.		HidroAysén’s	first	
national	 communication	efforts	 from	February	2009	 therefore	 included	 two	 television	
advertisements	that	laid	out	a	choice	between	HidroAysén	and	ERNCs.	Known	by	their	
agency	names	as	“Viento”	(wind)	and	“Nieve”	(snow),	the	two	30	second	ads	by	Santiago	
advertising	 group	 180	 Grados	 Mullen	 Lowe,	 demonstrate	 HidroAysén’s	 discursive	
position	 on	 the	 unreliability	 of	 ERNCs,	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 reliability	 of	 power	 from	
hydroelectricity:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	24:	 ‘Viento’,	(double	click	on	frame	above	to	play).	The	script	reads:	Alternative	
energy	sources,	like	solar	and	wind	are	a	good	option	for	Chile.	But	not	being	constant,	
by	themselves	they	are	insufficient.	Water	offers	energy	for	Chile,	and	Chile	has	water	in	
Aysén.	 In	 favour	 of	 a	 clean,	 renewable	 and	 Chilean	 energy.	 In	 favour	 of	 water.	
HidroAysén:	Chile	with	energy.		
(Can	be	viewed	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HhSqKZeF74g)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	25:	‘Nieve’,	(double	click	on	frame	above	to	play).	The	majority	of	the	electricity	
in	Chile,	like	that	which	you’re	using	to	see	this	commercial,	generates	CO2.	The	main	gas	
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that’s	responsible	for	the	greenhouse	effect	and	climate	change	on	this	planet.	Water	is	
clean	energy	and	it	doesn’t	produce	emissions,	and	Chile	has	water	in	Aysén.	In	favour	of	
a	 clean,	 renewable	 and	 Chilean	 energy.	 In	 favour	 of	 water.	 HidroAysén:	 Chile	 with	
energy.	(Can	be	viewed	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXTV_gmV0Pk)	
	
A	 semiotic	 reading	 of	 these	 ads,	 with	 the	 dark	 screen,	 menacing	 wind	 and	 swirling	
snow,	 seems	 to	 signify	 that	 these	 forces	 of	 nature	 are	 dangerous	 and	 unpredictable.	
Only	when	 the	wind	 stops,	 or	 the	 snow	 ends,	 does	 the	 scene	 light	 up,	 do	 the	 actors	
smile,	and	is	the	contant,	predictable	ice-blue	water	of	Chile’s	Patagonian	glacier	melt	
seen.	These	signs	are	clearly	designed	to	signify	that	only	HidroAysén’s	energy	will	be	
reliable	and	constant	for	Chile.	ERNCs	are	discounted	almost	trivially.	In	the	two	ads,	a	
code,	 or	 convention	 is	 also	 established	 that	 signifies	 HidroAysén	 as	 a	 solution	 to	
further	 C02	 emissions	 and	 climate	 change,	 and	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 country’s	 energy	
problem	that	was	“clean,	renewable	and	Chilean”.	Mainstream	media	seemed	largely	to	
echo	these	codes	in	their	discourse.	
	
Later	in	2009,	while	these	ads	were	appearing	on	key	national	television	channels,	and	
in	 the	 lead	up	 to	 the	2009/2010	elections,	 the	HidroAysén/climate	 change	 and	 anti-
ERNCs	arguments	were	also	underscored	by	the	Minister	for	Energy,	Marcelo	Tokman,	
interviewed	 in	 La	 Tercera	 (Marticorena,	 La	 Tercera	 21/11/2009).	 The	 newspaper	
opened	 this	 story	with	a	headline	and	 lead	paragraph	with	a	 clearly	pro-HidroAysén	
frame:	 “Tokman	warns	 that	 that	 if	 the	dams	 in	Aysén	 are	not	built,	 coal	will	 replace	
them”	 and	 “the	 Minister	 for	 Energy	 said	 that	 the	 development	 of	 unconventional	
energies	will	 not	 be	 enough	 to	 avoid	 increasing	Chile’s	 emissions	 significantly	 in	 the	
future”.	The	main	body	of	the	article	continued:	
	
“If	the	electricity	projects	in	Aysén	are	not	carried	out,	this	generation	will	
be	 replaced	 by	 coal.	 Not	 bringing	 them	 to	 completion	 will	 have	
consequences	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions,”	 said	
Tokman.	 He	 added:	 “Due	 to	 climate	 change	 and	 because	 of	 the	 concern	
about	 increasing	 emissions,	 it	 is	 crucial	 that	we	 utilise	 the	 existing	 hydro	
resources	in	the	Aysén	region.”	
	
The	 journalist	 also	wrote	 that:	 “the	minister	 recognised	 that	 the	development	 of	 non-
conventional	 renewable	 energies	 (ERNCs)	 would	 not	 be	 sufficient	 for	 combatting	
climate	change”.	
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At	the	same	time,	new	discourse	on	nuclear	energy	began	to	appear58.	In	an	editorial	in	
June	 2009,	 El	 Mercurio	 linked	 perceived	 difficulties	 with	 ERNCs	 to	 the	 necessity	 to	
develop	nuclear	power.	It	lauded	the	development	of	solar	and	wind	energy,	but	stated,	
“however,	 such	 initiatives	 will	 not	 supply	 enough	 energy…We	 have	 to	 speed	 up	 the	
nuclear	option”	(23/06/2009).	An	energy	debate	between	election	candidates	was	also	
marked	by	a	discussion	on	the	relative	benefits	of	nuclear	versus	HidroAysén.	La	Tercera	
quoted	 both	 lead	 candidates	 as	 supporting	 further	 evaluation	 of	 the	 nuclear	 option	
(Astudillo,	La	Tercera,	08/09/2009).	And	soon	after,	La	Tercera	also	published	a	piece	
based	on	an	interview	with	Hernán	Salazar	headlined	‘HidroAysén:	Chile	should	develop	
its	hydro	potential	before	the	nuclear	option’.	Here,	the	HidroAysén	CEO	was	quoted	as	
saying:	“Only	when	countries	don’t	have	hydroelectric	resources,	they	decide	on	nuclear	
energy”	 (Astudillo,	 La	 Tercera	 21/09/2009).	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 the	 nuclear	
power	 option	 for	 Chile	 appeared	 to	 lose	 its	 practical	 attractiveness,	 and	 certainly	 its	
political	palatability,	after	the	February	2010	Chilean	earthquake,	the	March	2011	Japan	
earthquake	and	the	subsequent	Fukushima	nuclear	disaster.59	The	important	aspect	of	
the	nuclear	option	in	Chile’s	energy	debate	was,	then,	that	it	seemed	to	be	used	as	a	kind	
of	threat:	HidroAysén	or	nuclear.	The	construction	of	false	dichotomies	between	energy	
forms	(for	example	HidroAysén	or	nuclear,	HidroAysén	not	ERNCs,	HidroAysén	or	coal)	
and	 their	 attributes	 (HidroAysén	 or	 climate	 change)	 that	 has	 been	 noted	 above	 is	
reminiscent	 of	 McGaurr	 &	 Lester’s	 (2009)	 writing	 on	 “complementary	 problems	 and	
competing	 risks”.	 McGaurr	 and	 Lester	 show	 that	 climate	 change	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	
“justification”	 (p.184)	 for	 promoting	 particular	 types	 of	 energy,	 that	 particular	 energy	
sources	 can	 be	 constructed	 as	 a	 “solution	 to	 climate	 change”	 (p.	 184)	 and	 that	 “when	
environmental	 risks	 compete,	 media	 framing	 of	 one	 problem	 can	 clearly	 serve	 to	
disguise	 the	 risks	 of	 another”	 (p.	 185).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 HidroAysén,	 presenting	 the	
megaproject	 as	 a	 solution	 to	 climate	 change	 persisted	 right	 through	 the	 project’s	
trajectory.	Notably,	once	HidroAysén	was	finally	rejected	in	2014,	there	seems	to	have	
been	no	further	contemplation	of	nuclear	power	for	Chile.	
	
																																																						
58	Discourse	on	nuclear	energy	as	an	option	for	Chile	had	in	fact	been	heard	intermittently	since	1968	
when	the	country	first	investigated	the	possibility	of	meeting	its	energy	needs	with	nuclear	power	(El	
Mercurio	2007).	The	HidroAysén	debate	seemed	to	be	a	new	inflection	point	in	this	sporadic	ongoing	
discourse	however.	
59	El	Mercurio	(13/04/2011)	reported	that	by	April	2011,	84.1%	of	Chileans	were	against	nuclear	energy	
for	Chile,	up	29%	from	the	figure	in	a	survey	carried	out	in	October	2009.				
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Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 was	 also,	 meanwhile,	 attempting	 to	 influence	 the	 mediatized	
debate	 on	 HidroAysén	 versus	 nuclear	 versus	 ERNCs.	 It	 was	 now	 actively	 promoting	
“alternatives”	 to	HidroAysén	 in	 the	 form	 of	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 the	 development	 of	
wind	 and	 solar.	 In	 late-2009,	 partly	 in	 response	 to	 Energy	 Minister	 Tokman’s	
declarations	 on	 HidroAysén	 and	 nuclear	 power,	 it	 published	 a	 new	 one-page	
advertisement	in	newspapers	including	El	Mostrador,	The	Clinic,	and	once,	La	Tercera.	
	
Figure	 26:	 Advertisement	 published	 in	El	Mostrador,	The	 Clinic	 and	La	 Tercera,	 2009:	
‘Yes	to	a	clean	electric	grid	for	Chile.	No	to	HidroAysén’.	
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This	ad	read:	
The	 minister	 for	 Energy	 Marcelo	 Tokman	 and	 the	 National	 Energy	
Commission	 insist	 on	 deceiving	 the	 public	 with	 the	 false	 dichotomy	
between	dams	in	Aysén	and	coal-based,	or	even	nuclear,	power	plants.	This	
dilemma	does	not	exist.		
	
The	ad	drew	on	a	study	by	Hall	et	al.	(2009),	which	had	been	supported	by	the	CDP	and	
the	 US-based	 National	 Rivers	 Defence	 Council.	 The	 report	 regarded	 prevailing	
projections	for	growth	in	energy	demand	as	erroneous,	and	pointed	out	that	with	energy	
savings,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 exceptional	 potential	 to	 develop	 ERNC	 sources	 including	wind,	
geothermal,	 small-scale	 hydro	 and	 biomass,	 Chile	 did	 not	 need	 a	 megaproject	 like	
HidroAysén.	 The	 ad	 made	 the	 point	 that	 ERNCs	 and	 efficient	 technologies	 were	
“becoming	 more	 competitive	 every	 day”	 against	 conventional	 forms	 of	 energy	
generation.		
	
It	 is	 clear,	 then,	 that	 the	discourse	on	HidroAysén	 turned	 towards	 the	 issue	of	 climate	
change	 from	 2009	 onwards.	 To	 obtain	 and	 overview	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 language	 and	
concepts	with	which	 the	media	 corpus	 as	 a	whole	 described	 the	 connection	 between	
HidroAysén	 and	 climate	 change,	 I	 searched	 the	 corpus	 for	 articles	 containing	 the	
Spanish	 equivalent	 of	 “climate	 change”	 and	 “global	warming”	 and	 “greenhouse	 effect”.	
Seventy-seven	articles	contained	these	terms.	The	first	article	in	the	range	is	from	March	
2009	and	 the	 last	 from	November	2013.	Using	Leximancer,	 I	produced	a	concept	map	
below:	
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Figure	 27:	 Concept	 map	 showing	 and	 overview	 of	 discursive	 characteristics	 of	
HidroAysén	and	climate	change	2009-2013.		
	
The	key	theme	here	 is	HidroAysén,	along	with	 the	concepts	 ‘energía’	 (energy),	 ‘limpia’	
(clean),	 ‘desarollo’	 (development),	 ‘seguridad’	 (security),	 and	 ‘independencia’	
(independence).	‘Proyecto’	(project)	ranks	next	in	importance.	Key	concepts	around	the	
project	 are:	 ‘solución’	 (solution),	 ‘razonable’	 (reasonable),	 ‘capacidad’	 (capacity),	
‘sustentabilidad’	 (sustainability),	 also	 ‘conflicto’	 (conflict).	 Examining	 these	 two	 key	
themes,	it	seems	that	HidroAysén’s	preferred	discourse	on	the	megaproject	was	echoed	
in	the	corpus	media:	HidroAysén	as	a	reasonable,	clean	energy	solution	to	bring	energy	
independence	and	security.	Interestingly,	where	the	themes	HidroAysén	‘pais’	(country)	
intersect,	there	are	two	linked	concepts:	‘reemplazará’	(will	replace)	and	‘carbón’	(coal)	
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–	 highlighting	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 megaproject	 would	 replace	 coal-powered	 energy	
generation.	 Under	 the	 theme	 ‘país’	we	 do	 see	mention	 of	 ‘energías’	 (forms	 of	 energy)	
‘convencionales’	(conventional).	I	queried	the	word	‘conventional’	in	Leximancer	and	in	
fact	in	almost	every	instance	the	expression	was	“no	convencionales”	–	that	is	ERNCs.60	
This	theme	intersects	with	‘climático’	(climate,	as	an	adjective),	‘emisiones’	(emissions),	
‘global’,	 ‘calentamiento’	 (warming),	 ‘gases’	 (gasses)	and	 ‘invernadero’	 (greenhouse):	so	
there	was	some	discourse	on	warming	being	due	to	greenhouse	gasses.	 It	 is	clear	 that	
Patagonia	sin	Represas	takes	a	significant-enough	portion	of	the	discourse	to	warrant	its	
own	 theme	 bubble	 (far	 left	 in	 green)	 –	 and	 the	 anti-dams	 concepts	 connected	 to	
‘impacto’	 (impact)	 of	 the	 ‘megacentrales’	 (megadams)	 and	 ‘alternativas’	 (alternatives)	
does	feature	in	the	discourse.	Finally,	the	theme	of	climate	change	‘cambio	climatico’	is	
rendered	only	peripherally	in	this	concept	map	but	still	appears	as	one	of	the	features	of	
the	 discourse	 –	 along	with	 ‘ahorrar’	 (to	 save)	 and	 even	 the	 ‘nuclear’	 option	 that	 was	
contemplated	up	until	2010.	
	
Overall,	 then,	 the	overview	provided	by	computer-assisted	 text	analysis,	 together	with	
the	 close	 reading	 elaborated	 above,	 do	 seem	 to	 confirm	 that	 most	 media	 coverage	
lauded	 HidroAysén	 for	 its	 climate	 change-mitigating	 potential:	 certainly	 an	
advantageous	position	for	the	developing	company.	The	voice	of	Patagonia	sin	Represas	
and	 those	 calling	 for	 alternative	 solutions	 like	 further	 development	 of	 Chile’s	 rich	
reserve	of	ERNCs	was	not	central	to	the	discourse.		However,	with	the	cost	and	viability	
of	 ERNCs	 falling,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 knew	 it	 had	 a	 long-term	 advantage	 in	 this	
regard.	 Every	 delay	 it	 could	 cause	 to	 the	 project	 through	 its	 long-haul	 campaign	 of	
symbolic	communication,	the	more	viable	alternative	energy	solutions	for	Chile	became.		
	
6.7	Conclusion		
	
From	 2008	 to	 2009	 and	 into	 early	 2010,	 the	 mediatized	 discourse	 surrounding	
HidroAysén,	 then,	 underwent	 several	 moments	 of	 evolution.	 Around	 the	 first	 critical	
																																																						
60	 ‘No’	 (meaning	 ‘no’,	 ‘not’	 and	 ‘non’	 in	 Spanish)	does	not	 appear	 in	 the	 concept	map	as	 it	 is	 one	of	 the	
Spanish	 ‘stopwords’.	Stopwords	are	words	 like	 ‘and’	 in	English	with	 low	semantic	content	(meaning).	 In	
content	analysis	with	Leximancer,	these	are	removed	from	the	text	data	using	a	predefined	stopword	list	
specific	to	each	language.		
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discourse	moment	in	the	debate,	the	submission	of	the	EIS,	HidroAysén	was	reported	in	
technical	 terms,	 and	 the	 bureaucratic	 processes	 leading	 to	 its	 approval	 were	
emphasised.	As	shown	here,	discourse	around	HidroAysén	rapidly	changed	by	mid-to-
late	2009	so	that	it	came	to	be	described	in	media	coverage	increasingly	as	a	“political	
project”.	 New	 concepts	 in	 the	 discourse	 then	 came	 in	 quick	 succession.	 With	
HidroAysén’s	 first	 foray	 into	 a	 national-scale	 communications	 effort	 came	 the	 key	
symbolic	concepts	that	the	project	was	“clean,	renewable	and	Chilean”.	This	last	claim	–	
the	project’s	“native-ness”	–	was	echoed	in	much	of	media	coverage	in	the	corpus	here.	
The	 protest	 group’s	 insistence	 that	 this	was	 a	 “foreign”	 project	was	 able	 to	 get	 some	
media	attention,	however,	and	this	 fed	 into	notions	of	neo-colonialism	and	distrust	 for	
business,	and	ultimately	inequality,	that	already	existed	in	Chile.	At	the	same	time,	key	
media	now	 labelled	 the	protest	movement	 as	 foreign,	 and	 this	notion	would	become	a	
symbolic	attribute	that	the	anti-dams	side	would	retain	throughout	the	debate.	Finally,	
climate	change	entered	 the	debate.	As	demonstrated	above,	 the	corpus	media	seem	to	
have	aligned	mostly	with	the	pro-dams	frame	on	climate	change	–	though	some	aspects	
of	 the	 anti-dams	argument	do	 seem	 to	have	been	able	 to	 access	 the	media	 to	 a	 lesser	
degree.		
	
In	May	2010,	though,	there	came	a	significant,	decisive	change	in	the	ongoing	discursive	
sparring.	 HidroAysén’s	 shareholders	 appointed	 a	 new	 CEO	 after	 a	 surprise	 ousting	 of	
Hernán	Salazar.	The	new	HidroAysén	chief,	Daniel	Fernández,	came	to	the	megaproject	
from	 the	 top	 post	 at	 TVN,	 Chile’s	 national	 broadcaster.	 A	 key	 objective	 of	 Fernández’	
appointment	was	quickly	labelled	in	La	Tercera	as	being	“communicational”	and	to	find	
a	solution	to	“key	challenges”	that	the	project	was	facing	“in	relation	to	the	community”	
(Marticorena,	 La	 Tercera	 02/04/2010).	 In	 truth,	 public	 opinion	 on	 HidroAysén	 had	
barely	shifted	in	the	timeframe	outlined	in	this	chapter.	In	November	2008,	a	survey	by	
Adimark	 had	 found	 51%	 support	 for	 the	 project	 nationally,	 and	 by	 October	 2009,	 an	
IPSOS	 national	 opinion	 survey	 found	 50.6%	 of	 respondents	 objected	 to	 HidroAysén.	
However,	 a	 few	 months	 after	 the	 arrival	 of	 Daniel	 Fernandéz,	 and	 the	 start	 of	 an	
aggressive	 new	 public	 relations	 campaign,	 these	 figures	 would	 change	 significantly	 –	
and	not	to	the	advantage	of	the	project	developers.			
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Chapter	7:	HidroAysén	reacts	
	
7.1	Introduction	
	
	
This	chapter	examines	discourse	on	HidroAysén	in	key	Chilean	media	during	the	most	
polemical	 months	 of	 the	 project.	 This	 period	 extends	 from	 mid-2010	 when	 the	
megaproject	 came	 under	 new	 leadership,	 through	 mid-2011	 when	 it	 was	 initially	
approved,	until	late	2011	as	nationwide	anti-dams	protests	unfolded.	This	phase	begins	
with	an	aggressive	new	program	of	reactive	communications	by	the	project	developer.	I	
argue	that	in	engaging	in	this	new	phase	of	symbolic	communication,	HidroAysén	now	
attempted	to	influence	public	opinion	by	gaining	symbolic	power	(Thompson	2005),	or	
as	Bourdieu	puts	it,	engaging	in	“symbolic	violence”	(Bourdieu	2004).	I	also	examine	in	
this	 chapter	 (and	 the	 one	 that	 follows)	 the	 discursive	 representation	 of	 the	 protest	
movement	 against	 HidroAysén,	 because	 favourable	 media	 representation	 of	 protest	
organisations	Alexander	 (2006)	 tells	us,	 is	crucial	 in	successful	protests.	 In	addition,	 I	
investigate	in	this	chapter	the	kinds	of	“strategic	interventions”	(Lester	2010a)	that	the	
anti-dams	 protest	 campaign	was	 able	 to	make	 against	 the	megaproject’s	 attempts	 at	
wielding	 symbolic	 power.	 This	 chapter	 and	 the	 final	 research	 chapter	 Chapter	 8,	
continue	 to	 address	 the	 research	 question	 concerning	 mediatized	 discourse	 in	 the	
HidroAysén	debate	2008-2014.	They	also	respond	to	the	research	question	concerning	
HidroAysén’s	 becoming	 emblematic,	 that	 is,	 constructed	 with	 different	 layers	 of	
symbolic	attributes,	which	made	it	more	than	a	conflict	over	the	environment.	
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 continue	 to	 analyse	both	with	 close	 reading	 and	more	 “distant”	 text	
analysis,	media	coverage	in	the	corpus	assembled	for	this	study.	I	additionally	examine	
further	 key	 advertising	 outputs	 from	 the	 developing	 company,	 and	 likewise	
communications	material	 from	the	protest	movement.	 I	also	discuss	how	social	media	
platforms	 first	 came	 to	 be	 widely	 used	 in	 the	 mediatized	 debate	 over	 HidroAysén,	
especially	 from	 around	 2010.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 advent	 of	 “mass	 self-communication”	
(Castells	2007)	in	Chile	did	offer	opportunities	for	alternative	discourse	on	HidroAysén	
to	 develop,	 but	 that	 attracting	 the	 attention	 of	 mainstream	 media,	 and	 therefore	
reaching	elite	decision-makers,	was	still	 the	goal	of	social	media	use.	 I	demonstrate	 in	
this	chapter	that	social	media	content	was	able	occasionally	to	enter	mainstream	media	
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discourse.	This	kind	of	“switching”	between	networks,	as	conceptualised	by	Arsenault	&	
Castells	(2008)	and	Castells	(2009),	and	adapted	by	Hutchins	and	Lester	(2015)	to	the	
context	 of	 environmental	 conflicts,	 is	 therefore	 also	 examined	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
HidroAysén	debate	here.	
	
In	period	covered	in	this	chapter,	the	HidroAysén	debate	became	increasingly	polarised.	
The	 discursive	 positions	 of	 the	 two	 opposing	 sides	 were	 now	 seemingly	 irreversibly	
entrenched,	so	that	each	had	a	corresponding	set	of	symbolic	meanings	associated	with	
it.	This	is	a	period,	then,	when	opposing	sides	become	emblematic	of	two	fundamentally	
opposing	worldviews.	Of	 interest	here	 is	how	–	and	how	much	–	both	sides	and	 their	
worldviews	 were	 represented	 in	 the	 corpus	media,	 and	 how	 this	 may	 have	 changed	
over	time.	There	is	some	evidence	to	indicate	that	the	anti-dams	movement	was	now	at	
last	 able	 to	 have	 its	 voices	 and	 its	 arguments	 heard	more	 comprehensively	 in	media	
discourse	than	it	had	earlier.	I	therefore	examine	in	this	chapter	which	position	seems	
most	 to	 have	 influenced	 the	 course	 of	 the	 mediatized	 debate	 in	 this	 period,	 and	 in	
framing	 the	debate	after	 its	own	arguments	 in	 the	public	 sphere,	may	have	had	some	
influence	 over	 the	 real-world	 outcomes	 in	 the	 case	 of	 this	megaproject.	 The	 greatest	
communicational	advantage,	 I	argue	 in	 this	chapter,	however,	seems	not	 to	have	been	
created	 by	 the	 anti-dams	 movement	 itself,	 but	 was	 rather	 ceded	 to	 it	 by	 the	
communication	strategy	of	its	opponents.		
	
7.2	Social	media,	trust,	protest	and	the	HidroAysén	debate	
	
Social	 media	 use	 in	 Chile	 increased	 exponentially	 from	 2008,	 when	 the	 Spanish	
language	 version	 of	 the	 social	 media	 platform	 first	 appeared.	 There	 were	 107,000	
Facebook	users	in	Chile	in	February	of	2008,	and	over	4	million	users	by	February	2009.	
These	figures	made	Chile	the	second-highest	ranking	Latin	American	country	for	social	
media	uptake	by	2009	(Baeza	Yates	2009).	 In	 the	wake	of	 the	Chilean	earthquakes	of	
2010,	 social	 media	 use	 became	 more	 widespread	 with	 a	 rise	 both	 in	 Facebook	 use	
(peaking	at	81%	of	 the	 total	population)	and	Twitter	 (at	22%)	 immediately	 following	
the	 earthquake,	 as	 new	 social	 media	 users	 found	 the	 platforms	 a	 means	 of	
communication	 in	 the	 post-quake	 chaos.	 Facebook	 remained	 the	 key	 social	 media	
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platform	with	usage	 in	 the	HidroAysén	 timeframe	averaging	around	70%	and	Twitter	
usage	around	8%	(StatCounter	2018)	of	the	population.		
	
Importantly	for	this	study,	in	2010,	social	media	use	seems	not	only	to	have	risen,	but	
the	 nature	 of	 its	 contents	 seems	 also	 to	 have	 changed.	 I	 interviewed	 the	 chief	 social	
media	 strategist	 for	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas,	 Pablo	 Hubner,	 in	 2013	 (18/10/2013).	
Hubner	explained	that	prior	to	2010,	social	media	in	Chile	had	been	used	primarily	for	
social	contact.	But	after	the	February	2010	earthquake:	
	
…there	was	a	 lot	of	anxiety	to	know	what	was	going	on.	Social	networks,	 in	
one	 way	 or	 another,	 became	 a	 powerful	 alternative	 way	 to	 find	 out	
information…find	 what	 had	 happened	 to	 one’s	 family	 and	 friends,	 with	
people	that	hadn’t	yet	been	able	to	make	contact	in	any	other	way.	Or	to	get	
information	 from	 regions	 from	 which	 there	 hadn’t	 yet	 been	 any	 official	
information	reported.		
	
Hubner	also	said	of	the	weeks	and	months	of	earthquake	recovery	in	mid-2010:	
	
…..suddenly	there	was	this	collaborative	interest…another	meaning	for	using	
social	media...You	see	people	had	the	feeling	that	with	all	 the	establishment	
and	the	institutions	that	existed,	somehow	this	was	not	working	as	it	should.	
And	 this	 gave	 a	 feeling	 of	 credibility	 of	 participation	 and	 collaboration	 to	
people	who	were	using	social	media….When	this	happened,	many	of	us	who	
were	 journalists	decided	 to	 get	 into	 the	world	of	 social	media	 to	 try	 to	 see	
how	this	might	be	used	in	many	other	ways.	
	
This	new	use	of	 social	media	networks	 for	 informational	 purposes,	 and	 their	 growing	
credibility,	Hubner	explained,	had	an	impact	on	mainstream	media,	and	also	important	
implications	for	social	movements	like	Patagonia	sin	Represas:	
	
It	wasn’t	that	[the	media]	had	lost	relevance,	it	was	simply	that	they	now	had	
to	 adapt	 to	 this	 new	 reality	 of	 the	 digital	 world	 that	 sometimes	 had	more	
credibility	than	the	establishment.	It	broke	the	paradigm	of	the	direct,	single	
message	 of	 conventional	 media.	 In	 the	 social	 networks,	 there	 was	 citizen	
participation	 in	 debates…a	 feeling	 of	 citizen	 scrutiny	 of	 political	 parties,	 of	
the	 conventional	 media,	 and	 these	 all	 had	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 new	 reality.	
Campaigns	 like	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 could	 have	 a	 greater	 role	 in	 this	
landscape,	 because	 the	 [conventional]	media	 had	 always	 been	 ignoring	 us.	
Now	because	of	 our	prominence	 in	 social	media	networks,	 the	media	were	
obliged	to	put	this	theme	on	their	agendas…So	in	terms	of	the	campaign,	the	
social	networks	opened	a	new	space	for	the	debate.		
	 	 	 	 	 				
										(Hubner,	interviewed	18/10/2013)	
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The	anti-dams	protest	movement	had	taken	advantage	of	digital	opportunities	early	on,	
first	 with	 an	 extensive	 website	 and	 blog	 from	 2007,	 and	 then	 with	 the	 use	 of	 social	
media	 in	 its	 communications.	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 had	 been	 using	 Facebook	 since	
mid-2008,	 and	 Twitter	 since	 April	 2009.	 HidroAysén	 was	 not	 so	 quick	 to	 engage	 in	
social	media	use.	It	never	had	a	Facebook	page,	and	began	to	use	Twitter	only	in	2011.	
Director	of	Communications	María	Irene	Soto	commented	in	interview	23/20/13	that:		
	
The	shareholders	were	always	against	it.	They	felt	that	if	we	used	Facebook	
or	Twitter,	it	would	mean	that	we	were	showing	we	felt	we	had	to	respond	to	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 and	 all	 its	 claims	 on	 social	 media.	 And	 they	 were	
afraid	to	 lose	control	of	 information	 in	this	debate.	So	we	held	back.	Finally	
our	agency	 [Burston-Marsteller]	was	able	 to	convince	 the	directors	 that	we	
should	have	a	social	media	presence.	So	we	were	able	to	start	using	Twitter,	
at	least.		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 							(Soto,	interviewed	23/20/13)	
	
Current	 (2018)	 figures	 for	 social	 media	 engagement	 with	 followers	 suggest	 that	 the	
anti-dams	 side	 was	 much	 more	 active	 and	 had	 a	 much	 larger	 following	 than	 the	
megaproject	had	for	its	social	media	presence.	On	Facebook,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	has	
179,313	 likes	 and	 169,924	 followers,	 on	 Twitter	 it	 has	 posted	 28,400	 times	 and	 has	
95,000	followers.	HidroAysén	had	9970	tweets	and	a	following	of	8,298	people	until	its	
last	post	 in	2014.	Both	sides	 in	the	debate	now	used	social	media	as	a	motivating	and	
organising	platform.	Along	with	dissemination	of	 their	own	discourse,	with	 their	own	
frames,	 and	 at	 low	 cost,	 social	 media’s	 motivating	 capabilities	 were	 also	 vital,	
particularly	for	the	anti-dams	campaign.	
	
Valenzuela	et	al.	(2015)	have	researched	the	connection	between	social	media	use	and	
participation	in	the	student	and	environmental	protests	that	erupted	in	Chile	with	such	
vehemence	 in	 2011.	 They	 conclude	 that	 in	 the	 Chilean	 context,	 as	 in	 other	 national	
contexts	(notably	the	Arab	Spring	protests	of	that	year)	social	media	use	to	discuss	and	
share	 issue-related	 protest	 material	 amongst	 young	 people	 (18-29	 years	 old)	 was	
positively	 correlated	 with	 participating	 in	 street	 protests	 –	 in	 this	 case	 the	 mass	
protests	against	HidroAysén	in	2011.	This	finding	underscores	the	mobilising	potential	
that	 social	 media	 can	 exert.	 In	 comparison	 with	 online	 social	 network	 use	 to	 share	
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information	about	an	 issue,	 consumption	of	news	via	 traditional	media	 showed	a	 low	
association	with	mobilisation	 to	 protest	 in	 Valenzuela	 et	 al.’s	 study.	 Importantly,	 this	
study	also	 shows	 that	precisely	 these	young	people	 (18-29	years	olds)	were	 the	 least	
likely	 population	 segment	 to	 exercise	 political	 participation	 by	 voting61,	 and	 that	 the	
rejection	of	political	activity	by	this	segment	was	because	of	lack	of	trust	in	institutions.	
Research	 has	 long	 shown	 that	 mistrust	 triggers	 extra-institutional	 forms	 of	 political	
participation,	and	when	such	mistrust	is	paired	with	the	perception	of	having	a	capacity	
to	influence	public	policy	decisions,	unconventional	participation	–	like	street	protests	–	
becomes	more	likely	(Gamson	1968,	Johnson	et	al.	2010,	Mannarini	et	al.	2008).	
	
The	 key	 point	 here	 in	 relation	 to	 HidroAysén,	 is	 that	 Chileans’	 already	 had	 bountiful	
mistrust	 in	 the	 institutions	 of	 their	 neoliberal	 system.	 They	 mistrusted	 elites	 and	
authority	 because	 of	 persistent	 inequality.	 They	 mistrusted	 foreign	 companies	
operating	in	Chile	for	profit	because	of	their	experiences	of	environmental	degradation	
for	little	economic	gain.	And	now	especially,	they	also	mistrusted	authorities	because	of	
perceived	 inaction	 post-2010	 earthquake.	 Now	 that	 a	 new	 online	 space	 had	 become	
available	 for	 information	 and	 debate,	 (if	 not	 entirely	 an	 alternative	 public	 sphere,	 as	
acknowledged	 in	 Chapter	 2)	 this	 was	 a	 place	 where	 solidarity	 could	 be	 fostered,	
mistrust	 of	 authority	 amplified	 and	 people	 could	 be	 motivated	 and	 organised	 to	
participate	 in	 highly	 visible	 protest	 actions.	 Creating	 and	maintaining	 a	 strong,	 active	
social	media	presence	was	therefore	essential	for	Patagonia	sin	Represas.	If	HidroAysén	
had	 been	 able	 to	 dominate	 mainstream	 print	 media	 discourse	 on	 the	 project,	 as	
discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 company	 (precisely	 one	 of	 the	 institutions	 for	
which	 many	 Chileans	 felt	 mistrust)	 was	 at	 a	 communicational	 disadvantage	 in	 the	
networks	 of	 mass	 self-communication.	 In	 this	 phase	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	 debate,	 then,	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 able	 to	 use	 social	 media	 networks	 to	
motivate	 and	 mobilise,	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 to	 gain	 visibility	 in	 the	 traditional	 media	
networks	 also	 –	 as	 further	 discussed	 below.	 Perhaps	 partly	 because	 it	 was	 largely	
unable	 to	 respond	 effectively	 to	 growing	 claims	 against	 it	 in	 peer-produced	 media,	
																																																						
61	According	 to	Valenzuela	 et	 al.	 (p	152)	between	1988	 to	2009,	 the	 levels	of	 electoral	participation	of	
youth	between	18	and	29	years	old	diminished	from	35	to	9	per	cent.		
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HidroAysén	 embarked	 in	 late	 2010	 on	 a	 new,	 strident	 advertising	 campaign	 in	 the	
mainstream	media.			
	
7.3	HidroAysén’s	“campaign	of	terror”	
	
As	noted	at	the	end	of	Chapter	6,	May	2010	marked	the	“signing”	(Mladinic,		La	Tercera	
09/04/2010)	of	Daniel	 Fernández	 as	 the	new	head	of	HidroAysén.	The	 civil	 engineer	
had	 successfully	 led	 several	 government	 corporations,	 and	was	 a	PPD	 (Partido	por	 la	
Democracia,	 the	 centre-left	 Party	 for	 Democracy,	 part	 of	 the	 Concertación	 coalition)	
militant.	 Observers	 of	 HidroAysén	 understood	 immediately	 what	 Fernández’	 arrival	
signified:		
	
The	 arrival	 of	 Daniel	 Fernández	 to	 the	 post	 of	 executive	 vicepresident	 of	
HidroAysén	marks	the	end	of	a	technical	phase	where	the	company	could	not	
overcome	 obstacles	 that	 presented	 themselves,	 and	 a	 strategic	 turn	 to	 the	
more	 political	 and	 communicational…This	 new	 “signing”	 by	 the	 Endesa-
Colbún	consortium	demonstrates	that	the	communication	channels	between	
the	worlds	 of	 business	 and	 of	 politics	 are	much	more	 subtle	 than	 they	 are	
evident,	but	despite	this,	no	less	real	or	effective.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 																								(Mladinic,	La	Tercera	09/04/2010)			
	
The	writer	also	noted	that	although	the	PPD	seemed	to	have	signalled	its	rejection	of	
the	 project	 (through	 the	 2008	 comments	 of	 the	 then-environment	minister	 Ana	 Lya	
Uriarte),	“this	situation	did	not	seem	to	inconvenience	Fernández	ideologically.”	
	
Interviewed	 for	 this	 study	 in	 Santiago	 in	 2013	 (19/12/2013),	 Fernández	 explained:	
“the	 shareholders	 of	 the	 company	 called	 on	 me	 three	 years	 ago…May	 2010.	 They	
wanted	 to	 relaunch	 the	 project	 with	 a	 different	 structure,	 different	 leadership.”	
Fernández	said	he	believed	“monumental	errors”	had	been	made	in	the	communication	
of	the	megaproject.	“I	don’t	think	the	shareholders	fully	understood	the	level	of	conflict	
that	had	been	generated,	 and	 I	 think	 that	 they	underestimated	 the	 campaign	against	
the	project.”		
	
Fernández	now	harnessed	in	earnest	the	services	of	companies	 like	PR	giant	Burson-
Marsteller	 which	 had	 already	 been	 working	 with	 the	 megaproject	 since	 2007	 (and	
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which	 specialises	 in	 crisis	 communication)62.	 With	 ad	 agency	 180	 Degrees,	 the	
company	created	a	large	new	campaign	of	newspaper,	radio,	television,	billboard	and	
online	ads	which	focused	on	energy	scarcity	and	the	consequences	for	Chile	if	it	did	not	
expand	its	energy	portfolio.	The	TV	advertisement,	like	the	online	ad	below,	presented	
the	idea	that:	“If	Chile	does	not	duplicate	its	energy	[capacity]	from	today,	in	10	years,	
it	 will	 only	 half	 function.	 No	 one	 source	 of	 energy	 alone	 is	 sufficient.”	 It	 used	 the	
anchorage	“A	favour	de	la	corriente”	–	“In	favour	of	the	current”.	“Corriente”	in	Spanish	
means	a	water	or	electricity	‘current’,	and	‘of	the	current	time’	as	in	English,	but	it	also	
means	 ‘popular’	and,	of	particular	 interest	here,	 ‘usual’	or	 ‘normal’,	perhaps	referring	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 hydroelectricity	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 conventional	 energy	 source,	 unlike	
unconventional	ERNCs.	
	
	
Figure	 28:	 One	 of	 HidroAysén’s	 web-based	 advertisements	 from	 the	 2010	
campaign.	
	
	
The	 idea	 that	 “Chile	 would	 only	 half	 function”	 was	 also	 now	 depicted	 in	 radio	 and	
television	ads	on	national	broadcasters	from	late	November	2010,	in	the	lead-up	to	the	
deadline	for	the	end	of	the	dams’	environmental	approvals	process.	These	illustrated	a	
near-future	energy	crisis	 in	Chile.	One	 television	ad	divided	the	screen	 in	half	 to	show	
the	 lights	 going	 out	 in	 an	 operating	 theatre	 when	 a	 pizza	 deliverer	 rings	 a	 doorbell.	
																																																						
62	 In	a	2009	newspaper	advertisement,	Patagonia	 sin	Represas	had	pointed	out	 that	Burson-Marsteller	
specialised	in	“both	raising	and	cleaning	the	corporate	image	of	companies,	and	also	harming	the	image	of	
adversaries	of	 their	 clients”.	 In	1979	 it	 represented	Babcock	&	Wilson,	 owner	of	 the	Three	Mile	 Island	
nuclear	reactor,	following	the	nuclear	accident	there.	In	1984	it	was	advisor	to	Union	Carbide	Corporation	
to	clean	its	image	following	the	death	of	2000	people	in	the	Bhopal	Disaster.	And	in	2007,	it	represented	
US	 company	Blackwater	 that	 had	been	 accused	of	 assassinating	 Iraqi	 civilians	 (Patagonia	 sin	Represas	
2009).	 In	another	ad,	Patagonia	 sin	Represas	pointed	out	Burson-Marsteller’s	work	with	 the	Argentine	
dictatorship	between	1976	and	1983	to	create	a	campaign	against	human	rights	organsations	(Patagonia	
sin	Represas	2010).		
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Another	depicted	a	soccer	stadium	plunged	into	darkness	when	a	woman	begins	to	blow	
dry	 her	 hair.	 The	 ads	were	 accompanied	 by	 a	 voiceover	 that	 stated	 “If	 Chile	 does	 not	
double	its	energy	[capacity]	in	the	next	10	years,	it	will	only	half	function…”.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	29:	(Double	click	to	play).	The	voiceover	is:	“(Doorbell	rings.	Electricity	cut	
–	lights	go	out).	Hello.	Your	pizza.	No,	you’ve	got	the	wrong	number.	Oh,	
sorry…(Doorbell	rings.	Electricity	cut	–	lights	go	out).	If	Chile	does	not	duplicate	its	
energy	[capacity]	from	today,	in	10	years,	it	will	only	half	function.	No	one	source	
of	energy	alone	is	sufficient.	In	favour	of	the	current.	HidroAysén,	Chile	with	
energy.	(Can	be	viewed	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPcpyUjlLkE)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	30:	(Double	click	to	play)	The	second	ad	in	the	campaign	that	became	
known	as	HidroAysén’s	“campaign	of	terror”.			
(Can	be	viewed	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2dGxVq_3j8)		
	
	
Soon	after	the	ads	began	to	be	played	on	channels	including	TVN	and	Channel	13,	there	
was	a	strong	reaction	in	social	media	networks.		The	term	“campaign	of	terror”	quickly	
emerged	to	describe	the	advertising	campaign	for	the	megaproject.	This	has	particular	
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historical	resonance	 in	Chile,	 in	relation	to	 the	 fear	campaign	run	by	Pinochet	prior	 to	
the	1988	yes/no	plebiscite	that	ended	his	dictatorship.		The	campaign	for	the	‘Yes’	vote	
(to	 keep	 Pinochet	 in	 power)	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 in	 Chile	 as	 “the	 campaign	 of	 terror”	
(Gonzáles	 2006).	 The	 term	 “campaign	 of	 terror”	 to	 describe	 the	 HidroAysén	 ads	 first	
emerged	on	Twitter.	Director	of	Radio	Santa	María	in	Coyhaique	tweeted:		
“HidroAysén’s	ads	show	a	trace	of	the	“Yes”	campaign,	campaign	of	terror.”	
	
Then,	 Rodrigo	 Miranda,	 head	 of	 Chile’s	 College	 of	 Journalists	 tweeted:	 “I	 think	 that	
HidroAysén	made	 an	 error	 in	 calculation.	 Campaign	 of	 terror	 doesn’t	 lead	 anywhere.	
Remember	the	‘yes’	campaign”:	
	
Asked	 about	 this	 tweet	 in	 interview	 in	 2013	 (16/12/2013),	 Miranda	 described	 his	
memories	of	Pinochet’s	‘Yes’	campaign,	that	he’d	seen	as	a	teenager:		
The	‘Yes’	campaign	showed	all	sorts	of	terrifying	things:	that	there	would	be	
food	 shortages,	 unemployment.	 And	 I	 remembered	 this	 clearly	 when	 they	
showed	a	person	drying	her	hair	with	a	hairdryer	and	the	electricity	cuts	out	
because	there’s	no	HidroAysén….It	was	too	extreme.	
“Campaign	of	terror”	quickly	became	a	social	media	meme	and	then	also	made	its	way	
into	mainstream	media	discourse.	Some	of	the	tweets	that	 followed	included	one	from	
journalist	Franscisco	Aravena	who	wrote:	“HidroAysén’s	advertising	spots	are	an	insult.	
Even	campaigns	of	terror	should	have	some	limit.”	
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Political	 scientist	 and	 activist	 Diego	 Benavente	 wrote:	 “Campaign	 of	 terror	 by	
#hidroaysen,	symbolic	violence.	And	the	strange	thing	is	that	the	first	channel	I	see	it	on	
is	#tvn.”	This	was	referring	to	the	fact	that	the	ad	appeared	on	the	national	broadcaster	
TVN	(as	well	as	other	channels).	
	
And	 actor	 Jaime	 Mondría	 wrote:	 “#Hidroaysen	 is	 applying	 a	 campaign	 of	 terror	 to	
convince	 me	 of	 something	 on	 which	 I	 already	 have	 an	 opinion	 formed	
#patagoniasinrepresas.”	
	
And	 if	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 had	 been	 accused	 of	 lying	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 image	 of	
power	lines	in	front	of	the	Torres	del	Paine,	HidroAysén	was	now	accused	of	the	same.	A	
tweet	by	@ginniasa	said:	“HidroAysén	and	campaign	of	terror	to	convince	that	we	will	
be	in	the	dark.	LIE,	just	good	business	for	them,	which	we	Chileans	will	pay	for.”		
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By	 December	 2010,	 #campanadelterror	 had	 become	 a	 Twitter	 hashtag,	 with	 which	
hundreds	of	tweets	parodied	the	HidroAysén	campaign,	listing	all	the	absurd	things	that	
might	happen	in	Chile	if	the	megaproject	was	not	approved	(“planes	will	fall	out	of	the	
sky”,	 “we’ll	 swap	 light	 bulbs	 for	 candles”,	 “we’ll	 only	 be	 able	 to	 buy	 one	 of	 a	 pair	 of	
shoes”.)	On	a	semiotic	level,	the	“campaign	of	terror”	ads	present	signs	that	are	in	polar	
opposition,	with	 the	 screen	 divided	 into	 two	 sections	 one	 black,	 one	white	 (the	 dark,	
colourless	 future	 a	 signifier	 of	 Chile	 left	 “in	 the	 dark”	without	HidroAysén,	 versus	 the	
bright,	 colourful	 future	 of	 a	 Chile	 with	 the	 project).	 This	 (false)	 dichotomy	 is	 again	
reminiscent	of	McGaurr	and	Lester’s	(2009)	“complementary	problems”	concept,	where	
there	 is	 a	 black	 and	 white,	 mutually	 exclusive	 divide	 between	 “competing	 risks”.	
However,	 the	 company’s	 “HidroAysén	 or	 disaster”	 paradigm	 was	 now	 called	 into	
question	as	the	“campaign	of	terror”	notion	became	part	of	wider	media	discourse.		
In	December	2010,	El	Mostrador	(21/12/2010)	wrote	of	the	“aggressive	style”	of	Daniel	
Fernández,	using	the	phrase	“campaign	of	terror”	to	describe	the	new	advertising	push.	
There	was	also	an	exchange	of	 letters	 to	 the	editor	about	 the	campaign	 in	La	Tercera.	
One	 letter	wrote	 of	 a	 “dirty	 campaign	 of	 discrediting	 opponents	 and	 of	 energy	 terror,	
that	 insults	 Chileans’	 intelligence”	 (Sandoval,	 La	 Tercera	 21/01/2011).	 El	 Mercurio	
published	a	Letter	to	the	Editor	by	Douglas	Tompkins	which	read:	
I	 can’t	 remember	a	private	 initiative	of	 such	dimensions,	 trying	 to	convince	
the	public	of	the	benefits	of	an	investment	project,	and	this	is	a	clear	indicator	
of	 the	project’s	 inability	 to	persuade	and	to	sustain	 itself	on	 its	own	merits.	
But	what	seems	worrying	to	me	is	not	so	much	the	breadth	of	their	campaign,	
but	rather	its	threats,	that	is,	if	this	project	isn’t	completed,	Chile	will	be	left	
in	the	dark,	or	only	half	functioning,	as	the	slogan	says.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Tompkins,	La	Tercera	11/12/2010)	
Matías	Asún,	head	of	Greenpeace	Chile	was	also	published	 in	a	 letter	 in	La	Tercera,	 in	
which	he	stated	that:	
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We	are	 told	 that	 if	Chile	does	not	produce	more	energy,	 it	 simply	won’t	be	
able	to	complete	the	development	challenges	that	it	has	set	itself,	and	that	the	
“lights	will	go	out”,	suggesting	that,	apart	from	this	project,	there	are	no	other	
alternatives…It’s	 incredible	 that	 the	 government	 does	 not	 make	 any	
pronouncement	 in	 the	 face	 of	 this	 campaign	 of	 terror	 that	HidroAysén	 has	
taken	up.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				(Asún,	La	Tercera	16/12/2010)	
El	 Mostrador	 also	 noted	 that	 the	 government	 seemed	 to	 be	 largely	 complicit	 in	 the	
“terror”	messages	that	HidroAysén	was	conveying.	It	wrote:	“In	the	last	few	months,	we	
have	 been	 witness	 to	 how	 the	 government	 has	 joined	 with	 enthusiasm	 the	 terror	
campaign	conducted	by	big	business	 in	the	electric	sector”	generating	“serious	doubts	
in	relation	to	 its	 independence,	 in	respect	to	big	business,	both	domestic	and	foreign.”	
(Liberona,	El	 Mostrador	 20/03/2011).	 Even	 after	 the	 project’s	 approval	 in	 2011,	 the	
media	 were	 still	 talking	 of	 a	 “campaign	 of	 terror”.	 For	 example,	 even	 in	 the	 more	
conservative	El	Mercurio,	a	journalist	used	the	expression	in	an	interview	with	Energy	
and	 Mining	 minister	 Laurence	 Golborne,	 questioning	 him	 about	 HidroAysén’s	
“campaign	of	terror”	(Pardo,	El	Mercurio	14/05/2011).		
Now	aware	that	“campaign	of	terror”	had	become	a	meme	that	had	moved	beyond	its	
social	 media	 beginnings	 into	 mainstream	 media	 discourse,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	
quickly	 created	 its	 own	 response.	 Its	 arguments	 against	 HidroAysén’s	 publicity	
campaign	 first	 appeared	 on	 Facebook	 and	 were	 then	 published	 in	 news	 outlets	
including	El	Mostrador	and	La	Tercera.	Costs	of	advertising	and	the	requirement	to	edit	
its	 advertising	 messages	 meant	 that	 by	 this	 time,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 could	 no	
longer	advertise	 in	El	Mercurio.	All	 three	corpus	newspapers	also	published	ads	from	
HidroAysén’s	new	campaign	–	which	was	itself,	not	without	controversy,	especially	in	
El	 Mostrador	 (Markari,	 El	 Mostrador	 22/12/2010).	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 new	
advertising	material	depicted	Daniel	Fernández	as	Pinocchio	and	wrote:	“HidroAysén’s	
campaign	of	terror	is	a	desperate	answer	in	the	face	of	great	public	opposition	to	a	bad	
project…”.		
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Figure	31:	Patagonia	sin	Represas	Facebook	post,	showing	their	“Campaign	of	Terror”	
advertisement.		
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It	wrote	of	HidroAysén’s	new	publicity	campaign:		
the	company’s	most	recent	publicity	initiative,	which	has	been	repudiated	by	
the	public	 in	 the	print	media	and	 in	social	media	networks,	both	engenders	
terror	 and	 is	 misleading.	 This	 is	 a	 campaign	 of	 terror	 that	 threatens	 the	
public	with	an	imminent	energy	scarcity,	which	doesn’t	exist.		
It	added:		
HidroAysén’s	 publicity	 campaign	 constitutes	 unacceptable	 bribery	 of	 the	
public	 and	 the	 government.	 It	 threatens	 that	 the	 country	will	 be	 left	 in	 the	
dark,	if,	and	only	if,	its	project	does	not	materialise.	This	threat,	coming	from	
the	largest	energy	utility	in	the	Chilean	market,	is	clearly	a	demonstration	of	
its	monopolistic	power,	which	seeks	to	impose	its	corporate	interests	above	
the	common	good.		
	 	 	 	 	 																			(Patagonia	sin	Represas	17/12/2010)	
HidroAysén’s	 new	 campaign,	 and	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 response,	were	 topical	 and	
polemical	enough	to	warrant	a	feature	in	El	Mercurio	(17/12/2010)	in	which	strategic	
communications	 experts	 opined	 on	 the	 communicational	 sparring.	 The	 article	 noted:	
“the	 two	 sides	 are	 in	 a	 defensive	 dynamic,	which	 doesn’t	 lead	 to	 rapprochement.	 On	
both	sides,	their	attacks	are	exaggerated.	In	this	sense,	neither	can	advance	in	any	way.”	
It	also	said:		
	
When	running	campaigns	in	which	either	fictitious	or	probable	scenarios	are	
depicted	 –	which	 both	 sides	 have	done	 –	 it	 is	 very	 important	 to	 be	 able	 to	
substantiate	them	with	solid	facts.	If	not,	one	runs	the	risk	of	one’s	campaign	
becoming	a	fear	campaign,	and	this	is	never	well	received.	
	
Speaking	of	the	2010/2011	campaign	in	interview,	Daniel	Fernández	said:		
Today	I	am	a	critic	of	our	campaign.	I	believe	that	we	also	committed	errors.	
Because	 what	 the	 campaign	 intended	 to	 show	 was	 that	 if	 we	 don’t	 make	
decisions	today,	in	the	future	Chile	will	barely	function…We	made	this	kind	of	
play	on	the	idea	that	electricity	is	one	single	thing,	and	that	its	different	parts	
are	connected,	 so	 that	 if	 someone	uses	electricity	here…it	goes	out	 there.	 It	
was	a	bit	of	a	play	on	this	idea,	the	campaign.	No	one	could	believe	this	was	
real.	The	idea	was	a	bit	in	jest.	But	I	think	that	we	were	wrong	on	this	point.	
People	didn’t	take	it	 in	 jest…They	took	it	very	seriously.	And	in	this	sense,	I	
think	we	got	it	wrong…	
				(Fernández,	interviewed	19/12/2013)	
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By	 early	 2011,	 then,	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign	 seems	 to	 have	 scored	 an	 important	
communicational	victory.	Not	only	were	national	media	evaluating	its	campaign	side	by	
side	with	the	megaproject’s,	but	the	discourse	anti-dams	supporters	were	using	in	social	
networks	 was	 now	 appearing	 in	 mainstream	 media.	 It	 seemed	 that	 Patagonia	 sin	
Represas	activists	and	citizens	who	supported	their	campaign	had	been	able	to	activate	
“switching	points”	 (Arsenault	&	Castells	2008;	Castells	2009;	Hutchins	&	Lester	2015)	
between	 activism	 in	 the	 social	 networks	 and	 journalism	 in	 the	 mainstream	 media,	
despite	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	 indicated	 in	 discussion	 up	 to	 this	 point,	 mainstream	 media,	
especially	La	Tercera	and	El	Mercurio,	usually	took	a	pro-HidroAysén	stance.		
During	this	period,	the	quantity	of	coverage	of	the	protest	campaign	also	began	to	rise.		
In	 Chapter	 6,	 I	 showed	 how	 the	 three	 corpus	media	 outlets	 published	 quite	 different	
proportions	of	 content	orientated	 towards	 the	megaproject,	 versus	 content	on	protest	
against	the	project.	Megaproject-orientated	content	was	dominant	in	both	conservative	
newspapers	in	the	corpus,	while	in	El	Mostrador,	pro-dam	content	dominated	slightly.	If	
the	 same	 articles	 are	 evaluated	 in	 terms	 of	 change	 over	 time	 for	 each	 year	 over	 the	
corpus	timeframe,	it	is	clear	that	mentions	of	Patagonia	sin	Represas	begin	to	increase,	
proportional	to	mentions	of	HidroAysén,	in	2010,	as	shown	below.		
	
Figure	32:	Comparison	of	coverage	of	key	search	terms	across	the	whole	corpus,	2008-
2014,	showing	change	in	coverage	over	time.	
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I	drilled	down	further	into	the	data	for	2010,	and	noted	that	the	most	prominent	rise	in	
mentions	of	the	protest	movement	was	right	at	the	end	of	2010,	around	the	time	of	the	
“campaign	of	terror”	(the	protest	movement	was	mentioned	41	times	between	January	
and	September	2010,	but	35	times	from	October	to	December	across	the	whole	corpus).		
If	the	first	instance	in	which	Patagonia	sin	Represas	had	achieved	symbolic	power	in	the	
megaproject	debate	had	been	when	 it	 controversially	depicted	power	 lines	 running	 in	
front	of	the	(in	actuality,	distant)	Torres	del	Paine,	now,	around	the	“campaign	of	terror”	
the	protest	movement	again	arguably	exercised	symbolic	power.	As	Thompson	(2005,	p.	
50)	 tell	 us,	 symbolic	 power	 is	 “the	 capacity	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 course	 of	 events	 and	
influence	the	actions	of	others	by	means	of	the	production	and	transmission	of	symbolic	
forms”.	 The	 anti-dams	 symbolic	 construct	 that	 HidroAysén’s	 new,	 reactive	
communications	campaign	was	a	“campaign	of	terror”	prompted	much	discourse	on	the	
dams,	 from	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 debate,	 and	 may	 have	 allowed	 coverage	 of	 the	 protest	
movement	 to	 become	more	 prominent	 in	 the	media	 corpus.	 Seemingly	 as	 a	 result	 of	
negative	public	discourse,	 the	 “terror”	 campaign	was	withdrawn	by	HidroAysén	early,	
and	only	ran	for	eight	weeks,	from	the	end	of	November	2010	to	February	2011.			
Change	 in	 public	 opinion	 around	 this	 time	 seems	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	 “campaign	 of	
terror”	 and	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	 it,	 were	 having	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 campaign’s	
desired	effect		–	a	tendency	that	is	known	in	social	psychology	as	a	“boomerang	effect”63.	
Various	 polling	 services	 had	 been	 monitoring	 public	 opinion	 on	 HidroAysén	 closely	
since	 the	project	began.	As	noted	 in	Chapter	5,	 the	earliest	polls	 in	2007	had	reported	
36%	of	Chileans	were	against	the	dams.	If	in	the	intervening	years,	public	assessments	
of	 HidroAysén	 had	 not	 changed	 greatly,	 negativity	 towards	 the	megaproject	had	 now	
increased.		While	an	October	2009	Ipsos	survey	showed	50.6%	of	respondents	objected	
to	HidroAysén	(Ipsos	2009),	an	 Ipsos	survey	at	 the	end	of	November	2010	 found	 that	
57.8%	of	those	questioned	were	against	the	dams	(Ipsos	2010).	By	April	of	the	following	
year,	 61.8%	 (Ipsos	 2011)	 opposed	 the	 megaproject.	 In	 the	 following	 months,	 there	
																																																						
63	 The	 term	was	 first	 used	 by	 psychologists	Hovland,	 Janis	&	Kelly	 (1953)	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 reaction	 by	 an	
audience	that	is	opposite	 to	the	intended	response	of	a	persuasive	message.	The	effect	has	been	studied	
particularly	 in	public	 responses	 to	health	messages	 that	 engender	 fear	 to	attempt	 to	 change	behaviour	
(Cho	&	Salmon	2007).	
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would	be	further	change	of	public	opinion	–	increasingly	against	the	megaproject.		
7.4	Discrediting	the	opposition,	polarising	the	debate	
	
Daniel	Fernández	commented	 in	 interview	 for	 this	 study	 that	HidroAysén	had	made	a	
“monumental	error”	when	it	 failed	to	confront	Patagonia	sin	Represas	on	the	 image	of	
the	Torres	del	Paine	crossed	by	power	lines.	He	also	said:	
	
I	think	this	was	a	turning	point,	because	in	that	moment,	the	shareholders	
should	 have	 come	 out,	 should	 have	 brought	 a	 charge	 of	 misleading	
advertising	 before	 the	 Media	 Ethics	 Committee,	 and	 should	 have	
unmasked	this	unethical	act.	They	didn’t	do	that.	They	let	it	go	and	go	and	
go.		
	
	(Fernández,	interviewed	19/12/2013)	
	
Following	 this	 experience,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 Fernández,	 HidroAysén,	 and	 its	 owners,	
would	 not	 now	 let	 the	 anti-dams	 movement	 get	 away	 with	 any	 communicational	
advantage	they	may	have	gained	over	the	“campaign	of	terror.”	The	months	immediately	
before	the	polemical	approval	of	HidroAysén	in	May	2011,	then,	were	a	time	in	which	it	
seemed	 the	 developing	 company,	 and	 in	 some	 cases,	 government	 voices,	 focused	 on	
discrediting	 the	opposition	 to	 the	megaproject.	This	 is	 a	 time	 in	which	 the	mediatized	
debate	seems	to	have	become	more	polarised	than	ever.		
	
The	 dams	 developers’	 own	 commentary	 now	 became	 scathing	 about	 the	 project’s	
“detractores”	 (detractors)	or	 “opositores”	 (opponents).	La	Tercera	 interviewed	Ignacio	
Antoñazas,	the	head	of	Endesa	España	in	Latin	America	in	December	2010.	In	this	long	
feature	piece,	Antonãzas	was	quoted	as	saying	that:	
	
There	are	a	 few	groups	with	a	strong	backing	of	overseas	entities,	which	
do	 not	 understand	 the	 true	 energy	 situation	 in	 the	 country,	 and	 which	
have	taken	on	the	task	of	confusing	public	opinion	communicationally.	
	
Antonãzas	 also	 referred	 to	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 campaign	 as	 “deceiving,	
treacherous.”	 (Viancos,	 La	 Tercera	 5/12/2010).	 Fernández	 also	 pointed	 out	 in	 an	
editorial	 in	 El	 Mercurio	 that	 his	 project	 “was	 working	 for	 the	 social	 and	 economic	
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development	 of	 the	 Aysén	 region”	 while	 those	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 project,	 like	
Tompkins,	 sought	 to	 “convert	 Chilean	 Patagonia	 into	 a	 place	 of	 contemplation	 and	
privilege,	not	for	the	wellbeing	of	its	inhabitants”	(Fernández,	El	Mercurio	16/12/2010).		
There	was	then	an	acrimonious	exchange	of	Letters	to	the	Editor	in	La	Tercera,	in	which	
Fernández	called	the	anti-dams	campaign	a	group	that,	 “financed	by	sources	unknown	
and	 with	 objectives	 unknown,	 dedicates	 itself	 to	 transmitting	 myths	 and	 falsehoods”	
(Fernández,	 La	 Tercera	 30/12/2010).64	 The	 newspaper	 also	 published	 Douglas	
Tompkins’	 equally	 acerbic	 reply,	 in	 which	 he	 accused	 Fernández	 of	 “resorting	 to	
rhetorical	 pirouettes	 to	 justify	 a	 lucrative	 project”,	 and	 for	 “discrediting	 with	 absurd	
statements	 anyone	 who	 stood	 in	 his	 way”.	 He	 also	 accused	 Fernández	 of	 being	
committed	 to	 a	 vision	 of	 “developmentalism	 to	 the	 death,	 which	 has	 submitted	 our	
civilisation	 to	a	global	 environmental	 crisis”	 (Tompkins,	La	Tercera	 01/04/2011).	The	
anti-dams	senator	for	Aysén,	Antonio	Horvath,	was	also	published	in	this	exchange	in	La	
Tercera,	writing	that	Fernández’	campaign	“seeks	disgracefully,	and	wrongly	to	polarise	
the	 community.”	 (Horvath,	La	Tercera	 09/01/2011).	And,	 still	 in	 letters	 to	La	Tercera,	
Fernández	continued	to	criticise	the	anti-dams	opposition,	writing	that:		
NGOs	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 project,	 financed	 from	 overseas,	 and	 under	 a	
mantle	 of	 conservationism,	 lay	 down	 a	 vision	 of	 a	 Patagonia	 almost	
without	inhabitants,	designed	only	for	contemplation	and	for	the	benefit	of	
a	privileged	few.		
	(Fernández,	La	Tercera	14/01/2011)		
If	 Tompkins	 had	 accused	 the	 megaproject’s	 developers	 of	 “developmentalism	 to	 the	
death”,	 right-wing	 commentator	 and	 HidroAysén	 supporter	 Carlos	 Martínez	 now	
accused	 the	 anti-dams	 opposition	 of	 “ecólatra”.	 Though	 difficult	 to	 translate	 into	
English,	 this	neologism	can	be	rendered	as	“excessive	veneration	of	all	 things	 ‘green’”,	
or	more	colloquially	 “tree	hugging”.	Martínez	also	stated	 in	his	Letter	 to	 the	Editor	 in	
this	 exchange	 that:	 “criticism	 of	 the	 dams	 is,	 for	 better	 or	 for	 worse,	 an	 ideological	
position”	(Martínez,	La	Tercera	2011/01/08).	
																																																						
64	The	idea	that	the	Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign	was	“financed	by	sources	unknown”	is	erroneous.	El	
Mercurio	 had	 just	 published	 an	 article	 (clearly	 critical	 of	 the	 anti-dams	 position)	 which	 examined	
Patagonia	sin	Represas’	 funding	sources	by	bringing	together	 information	which	was	already	publically	
available	(El	Mercurio	8/11/2010).	
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Interviewed	 in	 El	 Mostrador	 (09/05/2011)	 just	 before	 the	 project’s	 approval,	
Fernández	 cited	 again	 “these	 organised	 groups,	 that	 receive	 finance	 from	 overseas,	
[which]	 have	 been	 trying	 for	 more	 than	 three	 years	 to	 put	 obstacles	 in	 way	 of	 the	
project,	 to	paralyse	 it.”	Government	voices	and	media	coverage	then	seemed	to	 follow	
suit.	In	an	interview	in	La	Tercera	 in	the	days	before	the	EIS	decision,	Energy	Minister	
Laurence	 Golborne	 spoke	 of	 “quite	 extreme	 groups”	 that	 “defend	 their	 visions	 to	 the	
death”	 (La	 Tercera	 04/05/2011).	 Media	 now	 depicted	 these	 polarised	 positions	 on	
HidroAysén	as	a	“battle”	(Bellolio,	El	Mostrador	20/06/2011;	El	Mercurio	21/03/2011)	
or	 a	 “struggle”,	 (Zannotti,	 El	 Mercurio	 05/06/2011)	 or	 both	 (López,	 El	 Mostrador	
06/06/2011;	El	Mercurio	17/12/2010;	Zannotti,	El	Mercurio	04/03/2011).	El	Mercurio	
(28/06/2011)	even	reported	the	communicational	conflict	as	“a	mediatized	struggle”	in	
which	both	sides	were	producing	“propaganda”.		
Also,	at	this	time,	the	media	seems	often	to	use	the	word	“conflictivo”	in	Spanish,	which	
can	be	translated	as	“conflict-generating”,	for	example,	in	several	articles	in	La	Tercera	
right	 on	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 project’s	 approval	 (03/05/2011;	 Yaikin,	 La	 Tercera	
03/05/2011).	 The	 anti-dams	 movement	 were	 now	 also	 called	 “eco-terrorists”	 (La	
Tercera	 11/05/2011a),	 and	 just	 before	 the	 dams	 received	 environmental	 approval,	
there	was	discourse	on	how	the	debate	had	become	polarised,	for	example,	El	Mercurio	
reported	“voices	for	and	against	Endesa	and	Colbún’s	megaproject	have	polarised	in	the	
last	few	weeks”	(Herrera	&	Olivares,	El	Mercurio	05/05/2011).	A	day	later,	El	Mercurio	
again	reported	on	the	“polarised	situation”	in	respect	of	the	megaproject	and	opposition	
to	 it	 (05/06/2011).	 This,	 then,	was	 the	 situation	 in	 terms	 of	media	 discourse	 on	 the	
project	on	the	eve	of	the	deadline	for	the	vote	on	HidroAysén	by	the	regional	Comisión	
de	Evaluación	Ambiental	(CEA-Environmental	Assessment	Committee)65	in	Coyhaique.	
	
7.5	HidroAysén	is	approved	
On	 the	 ground	 in	 Aysén,	 tensions	 were	 also	 mounting.	 Ten	 days	 before	 the	
approval/rejection	 deadline,	 El	 Mercurio	 reported	 a	 fire	 bomb	 attack	 at	 the	 home	 of	
HidroAysén’s	 head	 of	 staff	 in	 the	 project	 area	 (04/09/2011).	 In	 Coyhaique,	 signs	
appeared	 in	 the	 town	 centre	 showing	 photographs	 of	 the	 personnel	 responsible	 for	
																																																						
65	The	assessing	authority	had	changed	 from	Corema	to	 the	CEA	due	to	a	restructuring	of	environment	
authorities	in	2010.	
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ruling	on	the	project’s	EIS,	together	with	their	contact	details	and	home	addresses,	and	
bearing	 appeal	 to	 the	 committee	 not	 to	 “sell	 out	 Patagonia”.	 Two	 weeks	 before	 the	
decision,	the	local	head	of	the	CEA	resigned:	La	Tercera	cited	“personal	reasons,	in	the	
context	 of	 pressure	 by	 environmental	 groups	 over	 the	 vote	 on	HidroAysén”	 (Álvarez	
Parra,	La	 Tercera	 27/02/2011).	 The	 regional	 head	 of	 government,	 Pilar	 Cuevas,	who	
would	 vote	 with	 the	 committee,	 reportedly	 received	 anonymous	 telephone	 death	
threats,	 and	La	Tercera	 reported	 three	days	before	 the	 vote	 that	police	 special	 forces	
had	been	mobilised	in	Coyhaique	in	anticipation	of	protest	(06/05/2011).	
	
On	the	other	hand,	government	voices	in	Santiago	were	clearly	calling	for	the	project’s	
approval.	 The	 day	 before	 the	 vote,	 the	 Interior	 Minister	 was	 reported	 as	 saying:	 “It	
would	be	good	for	 the	country	 if	 it	were	approved”	and	this	was	reported	 in	all	 three	
corpus	 media	 (La	 Tercera,	 09/05/2011a;	 El	 Mostrador	 09/05/2011a;	 El	 Mercurio,	
09/05/2011).	El	 Mercurio	 additionally	 quoted	 the	minister	 as	 saying:	 “if	 it	 had	 been	
approved	a	decade	ago,	it	would	have	allowed	us	to	be	less	polluted,	and	to	have	much	
cheaper	 energy	 costs.”	 Condemnation	 of	 the	minister’s	 declaration	 was	 swift.	 All	 the	
corpus	 media	 also	 quoted	 the	 words	 of	 Socialist	 Party	 Lower	 House	 representative,	
Alfonso	de	Uresti,	La	Tercera	as	follows:	
	
This	seems	to	me	a	very	serious	intervention	by	the	Minister	of	the	Interior,	
Rodrigo	Hinzpeter,	who	is	very	clearly	exercising	 improper	pressure	on	the	
decision-making	of	those	that	have	the	responsibility	to	decide	the	project’s	
future.	
	
Uresti	 also	 said	 that,	 as	 the	 moment	 of	 the	 environmental	 decision	 approached,	
“pressures	of	all	types	have	increased”	and	that,	with	comments	such	as	Hinzpeter’s,	the	
government	was	“creating	a	suit	made	to	measure	for	the	electrical	companies	that	wish	
to	 install	 this	 megaproject	 in	 the	 region”	 	 (La	 Tercera,	 09/05/2011b).	 Christian	
Democrat	Party	deputy	Patricio	Vallespín	was	quoted	in	La	Tercera,	calling	the	situation	
“shameful”	and	saying	that:	“the	instruction	by	the	Minister	of	the	Interior	was	like	[the	
instruction	of]	a	country	estate	boss,	and	then	his	regional	functionaries	just	fulfil	it”	(La	
Tercera,	10/05/2011a).	
	
On	10	May	2011,	 in	 a	 vote	of	11	 in	 favour	 and	one	abstention,	 the	CEA	 in	Coyhaique	
approved	the	megaproject,	granting	it	a	Resolución	de	Calificación	Ambiental	(RCA	–	an	
	 241	
Environmental	Qualification	Resolution).	The	project’s	only	remaining	approval	hurdle	
was	for	it	to	be	ticked	off	by	the	Committee	of	Ministers	on	the	Environment,	which	was	
considered	a	formality66.	So	newsworthy	was	the	decision	that	El	Mercurio	published	a	
minute-by-minute	account	of	the	proceedings	of	the	meeting	and	voting	(09/05/2011).	
Public	reaction	to	the	outcome	was	swift.	There	were	street	demonstrations	that	day	in	
Coyhaique,	Santiago,	Osorno	and	Concepción	as	well	as	in	other	cities.	In	Santiago,	7000	
people	 answered	 a	 social	 media	 call	 to	 demonstrate,	 including	 several	 opposition	
parliamentarians	 and	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Senate,	 Guido	 Girardi.	 The	 police-authorised	
protests	 were	 met	 with	 tear	 gas	 and	 water	 canon:	 68	 people	 were	 arrested.	
Parliamentarian	 Vallespín	who	 took	 part	 in	 the	march,	was	 quoted	 in	El	Mercurio	 as	
saying:	 “the	 police	 intervened	 with	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 force,	 without	 justification”	 (El	
Mercurio	 10/05/2011),	 an	 act	 that	was	 soon	 ruled	 illegal	 (La	Tercera	 11/05/11a).	 In	
Coyhaique,	street	protests	continued	for	a	week,	followed	by	school	sit-ins	in	protest	at	
the	project’s	approval.		
This	 unrest	was	 simply	 a	 prelude	 for	 almost	 two	months	 of	 anti-dams	 protest	 –	 and	
intense	 mediatized	 debate.	 After	 the	New	 York	 Times	 (Barrionuevo,	New	 York	 Times	
05/08/2011)	compared	this	period	of	intense	protest	with	the	Arab	Spring,	the	period	
of	 roughly	 May-August	 2011	 became	 known	 as	 The	 Chilean	 Winter	 (Villalobos-
Ruminott	 2012,	 Valenzuela	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Following	 the	 initial	 spontaneous	 anti-dams	
protests,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	organised	demonstrations	at	least	weekly,	throughout	
May	and	into	June,	both	in	the	capital	and	across	the	country,	many	attracting	15,000	–	
20,000	marchers.	The	protest	on	Fri	13th	May	was	reported	to	have	attracted	80,00067	
people	 (Mendoza,	El	Mostrador,	 21/05/11).	 Another	 large	 protest	 was	 scheduled	 for	
May	21st,	the	day	President	Piñera	was	due	to	deliver	his	State	of	the	Nation	address	to	
the	Chilean	parliament.	
																																																						
66	A	RCA	was	valid	for	5	years.	The	EIS	process	for	the	transmission	line	would	also	have	to	be	completed	
in	 this	 time.	 In	actuality,	 the	series	of	 legal	actions,	 investigations,	and	 the	 resolution	of	 comments	and	
questions	related	to	the	RCA	(both	from	the	company’s	side,	and	from	opponents)	repeatedly	delayed	the	
Committee	 of	Ministers’	 vote.	 Though	 this	 should	 have	 taken	 place	within	 30	 days	 after	 the	 RCA	was	
granted	 in	 2011,	 the	 Committee	 did	 not	 make	 any	 resolution	 until	 January	 2014,	 in	 the	 last	 days	 of	
Piñera’s	government.	That	ruling	was	invalidated	by	the	new	Committee	of	Ministers	once	Bachelet	took	
power	in	March	2014.		
67	Newspapers’	figures	on	the	numbers	of	protesters	at	each	march	varied:	El	Mercurio	tended	to	opt	for	
lower	figures,	El	Mostrador,	higher	ones.	One	ex-employee	of	HidroAysén	(a	former	chief	of	operations	in	
Aysén	who	wished	to	remain	anonymous)	reported	in	interview	for	this	study	(21/05/2013)	that	he	had	
spoken	with	police	special	 forces	after	the	 largest	march	and	they	had	confirmed	some	200,000	people	
were	present,	a	figure	not	reported	in	the	media	at	the	time.		
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Figure	33:	List	showing	protest	locations	in	24	cities	across	Chile	for	21	May	2011.	The	
header	reads:	“This	Saturday,	21	May,	we	will	get	together	once	more	along	the	whole	
length	of	Chile	to	demonstrate	for	what	is	just:	Patagonia	sin	Represas.”	
	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas/the	 CDP	 organised	marches	 in	 24	 cities	 throughout	 Chile	 for	
that	day.	This	Patagonia	sin	Represas	blog	page	recorded	over	82,000	views,	while	the	
organisation’s	Facebook	and	Twitter	presences	ran	a	contest	for	the	best	slogans	under	
which	to	march,	or	provided	advice	on	preparing	placards.	The	evening	before	the	21	
May	march,	 there	were	also	protests	 in	Concepción,	Valparaíso,	Viña	del	Mar,	Chillán,	
Valdivia	 and	 Osorno,	 and	 40,000	 people	 were	 reported	 in	 an	 anti-dams	 protest	 in	
central	Santiago.	On	21	May,	as	Piñera	made	his	State	of	the	Nation	speech	in	Santiago,	
	 243	
opposition	 parliamentarians	 unfurled	 an	 anti-dams	 banner	 in	 Congress	 bearing	 the	
words:	 “Patagonia	 without	 Dams:	 No	 to	 HidroAysén”.	 Later	 that	 day,	 60,000	 people	
again	marched	 in	 the	 streets	 of	 Santiago.	 These	were	 the	 biggest	 demonstrations	 the	
country	had	seen	since	its	return	to	democracy.		
	
The	 transnational	 nature	 of	 the	 protest	 became	 more	 palpable	 when	 El	 Mercurio	
(20/05/2011)	 reported	 that	 demonstrations	 against	 the	 megaproject	 had	 been	 also	
conducted	 on	 20	 May	 in	 Los	 Angeles,	 San	 Francisco,	 New	 York,	 Marseille,	 Paris,	
Valencia,	 Toledo,	 Bacelona,	Madrid,	 La	Rioja,	Hamburg,	 Rome,	Buenos	Aires,	 Lima,	 La	
Paz,	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 London,	 Montreal,	 Vancouver	 and	 Melbourne.	 That	 the	 anti-
HidroAysén	 protest	 was	 supported	 by	 transnational	 environmental	 and	 media	
networks	 also	 became	 clear	 when	 the	 New	 York	 Times	 dedicated	 an	 editorial	 to	
HidroAysén,	 in	 which	 it	 beseeched	 Chile	 to	 “keep	 Patagonia	 wild”	 and	 criticised	 the	
project	 as	 “potentially	 disastrous”	 (The	 New	 York	 Times	 11/05/2011).	 This	 editorial	
was	 reported	 in	 all	 three	 corpus	 media,	 and	 was	 notably	 criticized	 by	 Mining	 and	
Energy	 Minister	 Laurence	 Golborne	 in	 an	 interview	 in	 El	 Mercurio	 (25/05/2011)	 in	
which	 he	 characterised	 the	 intervention	 as	 hypocritical,	 pointing	 out	 that	 only	 3%	of	
energy	in	the	US	was	from	renewable	sources68.	
	
As	noted	here	and	 in	Chapter	3,	 the	Chilean	Winter	was	also	a	time	of	 frequent	mass-
protests,	 sit-ins	 and	 hunger	 strikes	 by	 university	 and	 secondary	 school	 students,	 in	
protest	 at	 the	 quality	 of	 public	 school	 education,	 and	 the	 cost	 of	 private	 university	
education.	The	students’	protest	was	directed	in	part	towards	business	elites	that	they	
accused	of	profiteering	 from	education.	 It	must	have	seemed	 in	 the	Chilean	Winter	of	
2011,	 particularly	 in	 the	 capital,	 that	 barely	 a	 day	 went	 by	 without	 new	 reports	 of	
protest	and	shutdowns	of	streets	in	the	city	centre.	The	student	cause:	fundamentally	a	
protest	against	persistent	inequality	and	lack	of	tangible	action	by	government	to	show	
																																																						
68	There	had	also	been	an	editorial	in	the	New	York	Times	(01/04/2008)	in	which	it	said	that	HidroAysén	
would	 “damage	 one	 of	 the	 wildest	 and	 most	 beautiful	 places	 on	 earth”	 and	 that	 “building	 large-scale	
hydroelectric	 dams	 is	 an	 old-world	 way	 of	 obtaining	 energy”.	 It	 continued:	 “It	 is	 too	 late	 in	 the	
environmental	life	of	this	planet	to	accept	such	ecologically	destructive	energy	solutions	or	the	model	of	
unfettered	growth	they	are	meant	to	 fuel”.	This	editorial	was	roundly	criticised	in	the	Chilean	media	as	
being	“tutelage	from	the	exterior”	(El	Mercurio,	04/05/2008).	The	newspaper	stated	that	“the	necessities	
of	our	country,	of	the	region,	is	a	theme	exclusively	for	Chileans.”	This	comment	from	the	New	York	Times	
certainly	 played	 into	 criticisms	 about	 the	 anti-dams	 movement	 being	 composed	 of	 “foreigners”	 and	
“elites”.		
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that	 students’	 voices	 were	 being	 heard,	 could	 easily	 be	 conflated	 with	 the	 cause	 of	
protesting	HidroAysén.	In	fact,	it	seems	that,	with	many	schools	and	universities	closed,	
many	that	attended	the	student	protests	also	 took	part	 in	 the	anti-dams	protests.	The	
sentiments	 and	 demands	 of	 each	 seemed	 to	 become	 intermingled,	 so	 that	 even	 in	
reporting	 the	 protests,	 the	 media	 began	 to	 report	 them	 as	 one	 set	 of	 protests	 (La	
Tercera,	 20/10/2011).	 This	 point	 is	 important	 because	 the	 student	 protests	 and	 the	
anti-dams	 marches	 certainly	 did	 have	 aspects	 in	 common:	 chief	 among	 them,	 as	
discussed,	 the	 sense	 that	 Chileans	were	 being	 taken	 advantage	 of	 for	 profiteering	 by	
social	 and	 economic	 elites,	 and	 that	 the	 neoliberal	model	 of	 Chile’s	 post-dictatorship	
development	 must	 now	 change.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 social	 unfairness	 and	
inequality	 seem	 to	have	been	 the	 roots	of	both	protests,	 and	 in	 the	Chilean	Winter	of	
2011,	this	feeling	now	seems	to	have	become	strongly	associated	with	HidroAysén,	both	
in	 the	 social	media	 networks,	 and	 to	 some	degree	 in	 the	 traditional	media.	 This	 post	
from	Patagonia	sin	Represas’	Facebook	page	during	the	Chilean	Winter	protests	shows,	
for	example,	how	the	 issue	of	 inequality	was	highlighted	by	 the	anti-dams	movement,	
alongside	 environmental	 concerns.	 Here,	 the	 wealth	 of	 the	 Matte	 family,	 owners	 of	
Colbún,	is	emphasised.		
	
	
Figure	 34:	 The	 post	 links	 to	 an	 article	 by	 Radio	 Bío	 Bío,	 which	 is	 titled:	 “Researcher	
analyses	 inequality	 in	 Chile:	 “the	 country’s	wealth	 is	 concentrated	 among	 4	 families.”	
The	quote	above	 this	 reads:	 “among	 them,	 the	Matte	brothers,	one	of	 the	HidroAysén	
partners,	with	$10,4	billion.”	
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However,	the	media	in	the	corpus	compiled	for	this	study	appear	to	have	reported	the	
approval	 of	 and	 the	 protests	 against	 HidroAysén	 very	 differently.	 The	 next	 section	
examines	 discourse	 in	 the	 avalanche	 of	 media	 coverage	 surrounding	 HidroAysén’s	
approval	and	shows	how	the	themes	of	HidroAysén	and	inequality	clearly	now	travelled	
together	 in	 some	media	 reporting	on	 the	megaproject	–	while	other	media	seemed	 to	
take	a	more	pro-institutional,	anti-protester	stance.		
	
7.6	Media	report	HidroAysén’s	approval	
	
While	this	study	does	not	seek	to	analyse	broadcast	media	coverage	of	the	dams	debate,	
the	ubiquity	of	coverage	of	the	megaproject	across	all	media	in	the	days	leading	up	to	
and	the	weeks	immediately	after	the	vote	should	be	acknowledged.	The	protests	against	
HidroAysén	were	a	staple	of	nightly	news	for	weeks,	but	in	short	news	segments,	there	
was	little	room	for	analysis	of	the	reasons	behind	the	protests.	Some	broadcasters	did	
take	 a	 more	 in-depth	 look.	 For	 example,	 the	 night	 before	 the	 EIS	 vote	 HidroAysén’s	
Daniel	 Fernández	 was	 interviewed	 on	 the	 project	 by	 prominent	 journalist	 Fernando	
Paulsen	 on	 the	 popular	 current	 affairs	 program	 Última	 Mirada	 (Last	 Look)	 on	
Chilevisión.	 A	 week	 after	 the	 project	 was	 approved,	 Fernández	 engaged	 in	 a	 heated	
televised	debate	with	environmentalist,	 former	presidential	candidate	and	head	of	the	
NGO	 Chile	 Sustentable	 (Sustainable	 Chile)	 Sara	 Larraín,	 on	 the	 high-impact	 political	
program	Tolerancia	Cero	(Zero	Tolerance)	also	on	Chilevisión.	The	debate	was	reported	
in	 La	 Tercera	 as	 being	 “intense”:	 Fernández	 accused	 the	 anti-dams	 position	 of	 being	
“intolerable”	and	“violent”	(16/05/2011).			Prominent	radio	journalist	Tomás	Mosciatti,	
a	host	on	national	Radio	Bío	Bío,	also	spoke	frequently	on	HidroAysén	on	both	radio	and	
television	around	this	time,	consistently	from	an	anti-dams	standpoint.	For	example,	he	
was	 interviewed	by	CNN	Chile	 (a	 broadcaster	which	 tended	 to	 cover	more	 anti-dams	
viewpoints)	 on	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 EIS	 vote,	 and	 recounted	 the	 “reasons	 to	 reject	
HidroAysén”	(CNN	Chile	8/05/2011).	He	stated	“who	do	you	believe?	I	don’t	believe	the	
authorities.”		
	
The	differences	between	media	reporting	 in	 the	 three	corpus	media	outlets	 in	 the	 ten	
days	 prior	 to,	 and	 the	 two	 months	 after	 the	 approval	 are	 starkly	 evident.	 In	 the	
following,	I	analyse	discourse	in	all	three	corpus	media	outlets	output	over	this	period	
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separately,	 at	 first	 with	 a	 close	 reading	 to	 identify	 instances	 where	 their	 discursive	
positions	 are	 clear.	 Then,	 using	 Leximancer’s	 textual	 analysis,	 I	 compare	 discourse	
across	the	three	media.	
	
7.6.1	El	Mercurio		
	
El	 Mercurio	 published	 much	 coverage	 of	 the	 protests:	 there	 were	 28	 articles	 on	 the	
protests	in	the	month	following	the	approval:	none	undertook	any	in-depth	analysis	of	
the	anti-dams	arguments.	 	The	anti-HidroAysén	marches	and	the	student	marches	had	
both	seen	violent	incidents,	perpetrated	by	‘encapuchados’	who	attended	most	protests	
in	Chile	between	2011-2013,	covering	their	heads	and	faces	before	perpetrating	violent	
acts.	Thought	to	be	young	people,	some	anarchists,	the	encapuchados	were	not	aligned	
with	 any	 cause	 in	 particular.	 Their	 key	 objective	 seemed	 to	 be	 violence,	 particularly	
against	 the	 police.69	El	Mercurio	 typically	 reported	 violent	 incidents	 at	 the	 anti-dams	
marches,	 the	 number	 of	 people	 arrested	 and	 police	 officers	 injured,	 with	 little	 space	
dedicated	 to	 analysing	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 protests.	 Though	 most	 Chileans	 were	
aware	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 encapuchados,	 and	 understood	 that	 these	were	 not	
typical	anti-dams	protestors,	El	Mercurio’s	(22/05/2011)	coverage	seemed	adamant	on	
holding	the	“environmentalists”	(as	it	typically	called	them)	to	account	for	the	violence.	
The	newspaper	reported	President	Piñera	as	saying:		
	
I	ask	those	that	convene	these	marches	to	take	responsibility,	because	when	
these	 marches	 end	 in	 violence,	 the	 organisers	 also	 have	 a	 quota	 of	
responsibility.	
	
El	Mercurio	(21/05/2011)	also	reported	a	Santiago	Police	chief	as	saying:	
	
We	were	promised	a	peaceful	march	and	we	ended	up	with	22	police	injured,	
two	seriously,	and	with	damage	to	public	and	private	property…We	believe	
there	are	people	[here]	that	are	trying	to	impose	their	ideas	though	violence.	
																																																						
69	 The	 BBC’s	 Latin	 American	 service	 covered	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 encapuchados	 (Long	 29/05/2013)	
concluding	that	due	to	encapuchado	violence	at	protests,	media	coverage	tended	to	concentrate	on	such	
incidents.	As	a	result,	the	BBC	said:	“the	issues	concerned	–	the	environment,	gender	equality,	indigenous	
rights	and	above	all,	education	–	are	often	overlooked.	Instead,	the	coverage	centres	on	police	tactics	and	
public	 order.”	This	 can	 certainly	be	 said	of	El	Mercurio’s	 coverage	of	 the	protests,	 in	 concordance	with	
Gitlin	(1980)	and	Murdock	(1981).		
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For	 these	 people	 institutionality	 [meaning	 the	 environmental	 approvals	
process]	is	not	sufficient.		
	
El	Mercurio’s	coverage	tended	to	prioritise	government	sources	that	spoke	in	defence	of	
the	 project,	 and	 the	 bureaucratic	 processes	 it	 had	 passed	 through.	 The	 day	 after	 the	
project	 was	 approved,	 for	 example,	 the	 newspaper	 quoted	 the	 Minister	 for	 the	
Environment,	 María	 Ignacia	 Benítez,	 as	 saying:	 “everything	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	
environmental	 legislation…everything	conforms	to	the	applicable	environmental	rules.	
It’s	 by	 far	 the	 most	 evaluated	 project	 [ever]”	 (El	 Mercurio	 10/05/2011b).	 The	
newspaper	 also	 quoted	 the	 Minister	 of	 Energy	 and	 Mining,	 Laurence	 Golborne,	 who	
defended	 the	 project	 and	 the	 country’s	 “institutional	 processes”,	 saying	 that:	 “The	
country	needs	 energy	 that	 is	 clean,	 cheap	 and	 secure.	Any	project	 that	 complies	with	
environmental	 regulations	 is	 a	 good	 project	 for	 Chile”	 (El	 Mercurio	 11/05/2011).	 El	
Mercurio	 wrote	 that	 the	 Secretary	 General	 of	 the	 Presidency,	 Cristián	 Larroulet	 also	
“defended	the	megaproject	and	stated	that	thanks	to	its	approval,	‘the	Chilean	electricity	
grid	 will	 be	 much	 less	 polluting’”	 (14/05/2011).	 The	 newspaper	 quoted	 former	
President	 Ricardo	 Lagos	 as	 saying	 HidroAysén	 was	 “necessary,	 because	 Chile	 needs	
more	 energy”	 (El	 Mercurio	 15/05/2011)	 and	 Golborne	 echoed	 this	 sentiment,	 also	
saying	 the	project	was	 “necessary”.	He	said:	 “it’s	not	about	whether	we	want	or	don’t	
want	 a	power	 station.	 It’s	 about	what	 options	we	have	 to	 generate	 cheap	energy	 and	
achieve	 development”	 (El	 Mercurio	 16/05/2011).	 El	 Mercurio	 (11/05/2011)	 also	
quoted	Piñera	as	saying,	(with	discourse	reminiscent	of	HidroAysén’s)	that:		
	
If	we	don’t	take	decisions	today,	we	are	condemning	our	country	to	a	power	
blackout	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 decade…Sometimes	 governments	 have	 to	
make	difficult	decisions,	but	avoiding	or	delaying	making	decisions	 isn’t	 the	
way	we	understand	serious	and	responsible	public	service.	
	
El	 Mercurio’s	 coverage	 also	 included	 critiques	 by	 government	 actors	 of	 the	 project’s	
opponents,	 for	example,	 it	 reported	Golborne	as	 saying:	 “The	citizenry	 is	empowered,	
but	it	is	not	well	informed”.	The	newspaper	also	noted	that	Piñera	“criticised	those	that	
‘believe	 that	 by	 opposing	 everything,	 and	 every	 type	 of	 energy,	 they	 are	 doing	
something	 for	 their	country’”.	Of	 these	protesters,	 the	president	said:	 “I	want	 them	to	
know	that	they	are	profoundly	wrong”		(El	Mercurio	11/05/2011a).	
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During	 this	 time,	 HidroAysén	 seemed	 to	 remain	 largely	 quiet.	 There	 were	 just	 four	
articles	 in	El	Mercurio	 (13/05/2011;	 15/05/2011;	 26/05/2011;	 02/06/2011)	 during	
the	two	months	after	the	approval	 that	 included	any	source	from	HidroAysén	(always	
Fernández)	and	all	of	these	seemed	to	be	in	relation	to	technical	aspects	of	the	project	
and	 processes	 related	 to	 it:	 that	 is,	 there	 was	 no	 public	 declaration	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	
company	 about	 the	 protests,	 public	 opinion,	 or	 the	 company’s	 likely	 future	 course	 of	
action.	 This	 apparent	 retreat	 from	 communication	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 company	 is	
discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	8.	One	feature	piece,	published	in	El	Mercurio	(Ibarra,	El	
Mercurio	 29/05/2011)	 is	 of	 particular	 interest	 in	 relation	 to	 communication	 from	
HidroAysén’s	 shareholders,	 though.	 It	 refers	 to	 “damage	 control”	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	
protests	by	the	Matte	group	(Colbún’s	owners).	The	article	said:	
		
Both	 Colbún	 and	 Endesa	 are	 experiencing	 a	 ‘tense	 calm’	 in	 these	 days	 of	
protest.	 Although	 they	 expected	 protest,	 they	 have	 been	 surprised	 by	 their	
size.		
	
A	member	of	the	Matte	 family	 is	quoted	here	as	saying	that	“the	prestige	of	 the	Matte	
family	 is	 suffering”…“What	 to	do	now?	 ‘Wait	out	 the	 storm,	what	 else?’”.	 Importantly,	
the	 unnamed	 executive	 from	 the	Matte	 group	 also	 added	 a	 comment	 acknowledging	
that	 HidroAysén	 had	 now	 come	 to	 represent	 more	 than	 a	 debate	 about	 dams	 in	
Patagonia.	 He	 said	 “in	 the	 protests	 there	 is	 an	 element	 of	 discontent	 with	 the	
government…and	others	protest	for	emotional	reasons.”		
	
In	addition	to	the	kind	of	discourse	noted	above,	most	telling	about	El	Mercurio’s	stance	
in	the	megaproject	debate	is	perhaps	the	following	editorial	from	two	days	after	the	EIS	
approval	where	 the	 publication	 sums	 up	 its	 position	 on	 the	 dams.	El	Mercurio	 stated	
that,	 despite	 all	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 protest	 movement	 against	 the	 project,	 the	
administrative	process	of	environmental	approvals	was	sound:		
	
The	 environmental	 impact	 assessments	 have	 norms	 established	 in	
institutional	 processes	 that	 the	 country	 has	 set	 itself.	 These	 have	 the	
objective	of	guaranteeing	measures	to	mitigate	the	impact	of	said	projects,	in	
order	that	they	comply	with	established	standards.		
	
It	continued,	seemingly	stating	its	rationale	for	its	support	of	the	project:	
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In	this	case,	the	government	did	not	hide	its	interest	in	bringing	the	project	to	
fruition…because	it	considered	that	in	the	current	energy	scenario	in	Chile,	it	
was	 a	 priority	 to	 have	 clean	 and	 renewable	 energy,	 to	 lower	 future	 energy	
costs,	 and	 allow	 [Chile]	 to	 advance	 towards	 achieving	 developed	 country	
status,	during	this	decade.	Ultimately,	this	meant	taking	the	difficult	decision	
to	prioritise,	in	this	stage	of	the	country’s	development,	the	provision	of	clean	
and	cheap	energy	over	keeping	the	Patagonian	forests	untouched.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											(El	Mercurio	11/05/2011b)		
	
7.6.2	La	Tercera	
	
La	Tercera	produced	the	most	extensive	amount	of	coverage	over	this	period	(purely	in	
terms	of	the	number	of	pieces	published)	surpassing	the	coverage	of	El	Mercurio,	which	
had	produced	more	coverage	on	the	dams	debate	throughout	its	whole	trajectory.	For	
example,	on	the	day	after	the	EIS	approval,	10	May	2011	alone,	La	Tercera	published	22	
HidroAysén-related	 articles.	 Like	 El	Mercurio,	 La	 Tercera	 too	 reported	 extensively	 on	
violence	 and	 arrests	 at	 anti-dams	marches.	 However,	 this	 newspaper’s	 coverage	was	
subtly	 different	 to	 El	 Mercurio’s.	 	 For	 example,	 La	 Tercera’s	 first	 article	 about	 the	
protests	dealt	with	abuses	by	police,	Chile’s	Carabineros,	at	the	planned	march,	calling	
their	 actions	 “unacceptable”	 and	 “excessive”,	 and	 saying	 that	 the	 protesters	 were	
expressing	 themselves	 “legitimately”	 (La	Tercera	 10/05/2011b).	 In	another	article	on	
the	 protests,	 La	 Tercera	 quoted	 environmentalist	 Sara	 Larraín	 saying	 that	 she	 had	
witnessed	 “an	abusive	 situation	by	 the	authorities,	because	 there	had	been	a	planned	
march,	with	 the	 route	defined	by	 the	authorities,	but	 the	Carabineros	 impeded	 it”	 (La	
Tercera	10/05/2011c).	La	Tercera	continued	with	coverage	that	seemed	to	sympathise	
with	 the	protesters,	 for	example,	 it	quoted	 the	President	of	 the	Committee	on	Human	
Rights	of	Chile’s	lower	house,	Sergio	Ojeda,	as	saying:	“we	want	to	know	where	orders	
for	 such	 violent,	 brutal	 and	 unheard-of	 repression	 come	 from”	 (Yaikin,	 La	 Tercera	
11/05/11b).	
	
La	Tercera	also	reported	many	of	the	same	government	voices	as	El	Mercurio	in	defence	
of	the	project	and	the	corresponding	approvals	process	–	 including	Piñera	and	Mining	
and	Energy	Minster	Golborne.	Environment	Minister	Benítez	was	interviewed	just	after	
the	vote	and	was	quoted	as	saying:	
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I	am	very	satisfied	with	the	whole	process…Chileans	can	be	clear,	and	proud	
of	 the	 fact	 that	 we	 have	 an	 efficient	 and	 committed	 environmental	
institutionality.	
	(La	Tercera	09/05/2011c)	 		
In	discourse	reminiscent	of	the	definition	of	Murray	Li’s	(2011)	“rendering	technical”,	in	
another	La	Tercera	article,	the	minister	was	said	to	have:		
emphasized	 the	 technical	work	 there	 had	 been	 behind	 the	 approval	 of	 the	
megaproject,	 saying	 that	 from	 the	 “environmental	 point	 of	 view,	 there	 has	
been	perhaps	the	longest	ever	approval	process…[carried	out]	to	a	very	high	
and	 demanding	 standard	 with	 more	 that	 200	 professionals	 working	 in	 a	
technical	way,	who	gave	their	responses….This	separates	things	of	a	technical	
nature	from	those	of	a	political	nature.”	
					(La	Tercera	10/05/11d)		
In	 the	 days	 after	 the	 approval,	 La	 Tercera	 also	 interviewed	 the	 head	 of	 the	 National	
Energy	 Commission	 in	 support	 of	 the	megaproject,	who	 said	 that	 the	 contribution	 of	
HidroAysén	 to	 the	 energy	 grid	 would	 “stabilise	 prices”	 and	 help	 “avoid	 blackouts”	
(10/05/2011).		
Despite	 these	 evidently	 pro-project	 institutional	 voices,	 La	 Tercera	 also	 reported	
opposition	 for	 the	 project	 from	 those	 in	 government,	 significantly	 more	 than	 El	
Mercurio.	For	example,	La	Tercera	quoted	anti-dams	Aysén	senator,	Antonio	Horvath,	in	
several	 articles.	 Horvath	 was	 quoted	 as	 saying	 that	 approving	 HidroAysén	 was	 “a	
‘blunder’	for	the	government”	and	that,	given	the	controversies	around	the	EIS	process,	
“environmental	 institutionality”	 had	been	 “assaulted”	 (La	Tercera	 11/05/2011b).	 The	
newspaper	also	 followed	 the	declarations	of	 the	head	of	Chile’s	Senate,	Guido	Girardi,	
against	the	project.	In	one	article,	Girardi	was	quoted	as	saying:	
The	entity	who	decides	what	will	occur	in	relation	to	energy	is	no	longer	the	
President	 of	 the	 Republic,	 but	 rather	 commercial	 organisations.	 Today,	 the	
president	 is	 proposing	 more	 coal,	 more	 megadams,	 and	 this	 is	 a	 strategic	
error.	It’s	being	hostage	to	corporate	interests.	
					(La	Tercera	11/05/2011b)		
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Likewise,	 La	 Tercera	 printed	 a	 statement	 by	 lower	 house	 deputy	 Vallespín	 and	 the	
heads	 of	 two	 environmental	 NGOs	 involved	 in	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 that	
“environmental	 institutionality”	 was	 being	 “manipulated”.	 Environmentalist	 Sara	
Larraín	was	quoted	as	saying	that	the	president	had:		
“again	 deceived	 public	 opinion,	 signalling	 that	 if	 HidroAysén	was	 not	 built,	
that	the	country	would	enter	into	an	absolute	energy	crisis.”	In	addition,	she	
said	 that	 the	 government	 had	 benefitted	 “its	 personal	 friends”	 with	 the	
approval	of	initiatives	like	HidroAysén.					
								(La	Tercera	12/05/2011)		
The	newspaper	also	now	began	to	use	the	word	“irregularidades”	(‘irregularities’,	also	
translated	 as	 ‘anomalies’,	 ‘malfeasance’	 or	 ‘wrongdoing’)	 –	 this	 in	 reference	 to	 the	
brewing	 legal	cases	against	 the	conduct	of	 the	EIS	process.	The	newspaper	had	rarely	
used	the	 term	in	relation	to	HidroAysén	before	2011,	but	 in	 the	 two	months	after	 the	
project	was	approved,	the	word	was	used	12	times.		
Statements	like	those	above	(just	a	few	examples	of	many	such	instances)	printed	in	a	
newspaper	 that	 is	 conservative	and	pro-business	orientated	are	notable,	 especially	as	
La	 Tercera	 had	 previously	 been	 quite	 strongly	 supportive	 of	 the	 megaproject.	 I	
interviewed	 the	 newspaper’s	 deputy	 editor,	 Felipe	 Contreras	 (16/07/2013)	 for	 this	
study,	 and	he	 reported	 that	 there	was	 indeed	 some	 shift	 in	 the	newspaper’s	 editorial	
position	 on	 the	 dams	 around	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Chilean	Winter	 protests,	 as	 the	 case	 of	
HidroAysén	 became	 more	 emblematic:	 as	 he	 put	 it,	 “an	 emblem,	 an	 icon	 of	 the	
neoliberal	market	model”.	He	said:	
In	Chile	–	and	we	are	talking	about	a	country	where	for	20	years	the	media	
was	kept	under	 control	by	 the	dictatorship	–	 I	believe	often	 the	position	of	
the	media	 is	not	 to	generate	 conflict.	And	 in	 this	 sense,	 the	media,	 and	 this	
newspaper	in	particular,	try	to	put	forward	the	different	positions	that	exist	
in	relation	to	the	megaproject.	A	group	of	large	corporations,	that	come	and	
present	a	project	and	its	benefits…and	on	the	other	hand…the	people	who	are	
opposed	 to	 HidroAysén	 and	we	 have	 given	 space	 in	 the	 newspaper	 to	 the	
arguments	of	those	who	think	that	HidroAysén	is	not	the	best	solution	to	the	
energy	problem.	
He	also	said:	
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I	 would	 say	 that	 until	 2011	 there	 had	 not	 been	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 difference	
between	 us	 and	 El	 Mercurio.	 These	 two	 newspapers	 have	 declared	
themselves	in	favour	of	the	free	market	economy,	and	identify	with	the	right	
or	the	centre-right.		
But	he	added	that:	
In	 its	 opinion	 pages,	 the	 newspaper	 has	 shown	 itself	 inclined	 towards	
HidroAysén…However,	I’d	emphasize	that	although	in	the	beginning	we	were	
careful	to	cover	both	sides,	later,	as	we	saw	the	extent	of	the	opposition	to	the	
project,	we	lowered	the	decibels	of	our	exposure	of	HidroAysén	a	great	deal.	
In	response	to	 public	 opinion	 on	 the	 dams,	 then,	the	 newspaper	 had	 both	lowered	 the	
“decibels”	of	its	coverage	of	the	megaproject,	and	as	the	dams	came	to	represent	a	world	
view	 that	was	 rejected	 by	many	Chileans,	 the	 newspaper	 seems	 to	 have	 increased	 its	
coverage	of	the	opposite	view	–	as	is	evident	from	the	close	reading	above,	and	the	text	
analysis	work	that	follows	below.	The	way	the	HidroAysén	case	played	out,	then,	seems	
to	 have	 had	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 position	 of	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 country’s	 influential	
conservative	news	outlets.		
	
7.6.3	El	Mostrador	
	
Like	La	Tercera,	El	Mostrador	also	produced	a	great	spike	in	coverage	around	the	time	of	
the	 dams’	 approval	 (see	 Figure	 13	 in	 Chapter	 6).	 As	 a	 smaller	 news	 institution,	 this	
online	news	outlet	had	consistently	produced	less	coverage	overall	 than	the	other	two	
corpus	media.	Now,	 the	number	of	megaproject-related	 articles	 in	El	Mostrador	 easily	
surpassed	the	number	in	El	Mercurio.	
On	 the	day	of	 the	 approval,	El	Mostrador	wrote	 that	 there	was	 “no	 surprise”	 that	 the	
project	had	been	approved,	and	laid	out	the	hurdles	that	it	still	had	to	pass	through	to	
become	reality	(05/09/2011b).	It	also	began	to	report	the	anti-dams	marches	and	legal	
appeals	as	ways	 to	 “delay”	or	 “put	a	break	on”	 the	project	given	 that	 the	government	
“had	come	out	in	support”	of	it	(10/05/2011a).	
Like	La	Tercera,	El	Mostrador	emphasized	police	violence	against	protesters,	rather	than	
attributing	violence	to	the	protesters	themselves,	as	El	Mercurio	did.	Like	La	Tercera,	El	
Mostrador	 quoted	 Ojeda,	 saying	 that	 “the	 repressive	 attitude	 of	 the	 police	 was	
absolutely	 unfounded”	 (10/05/2011b).	 Later	 when	 suspension	 of	 approvals	 for	 the	
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marches	 was	 threatened,	 Ojeda	 was	 again	 quoted	 as	 saying	 that	 the	 marches	 were	
“legitimate”	and	could	“not	be	prohibited”	(23/05/2011).	Of	note	is	also	the	fact	that	El	
Mostrador	reported	different	figures	for	the	number	of	people	at	protests	to	the	other	
two	 corpus	 papers,	 for	 example,	 it	 reported	 that	 90-100,000	 people	 had	 attended	 a	
march	on	27	May,	while	the	other	newspapers	had	reported	this	figure	as	40,000,	and	
police	 said	 that	 only	 15,000	 people	 attended	 (28/05/2011a).	 As	 figures	 are	 almost	
always	 lower	 in	 conservative	 El	 Mercurio,	 and	 higher	 in	El	 Mostrador,	 and	 given	 the	
admission	of	a	Santiago	police	chief	mentioned	in	footnote	67	in	this	chapter,	it	seems	
likely	that	number	of	protesters	quoted	has	an	ideological	bias.	
In	 terms	 of	 reporting	 government	 or	 institutional	 voices,	 El	 Mostrador	 also	 quoted	
Horvath,	 the	 anti-dams	 senator	 for	 Aysén,	 saying	 that	 the	 country’s	 “environmental	
institutionality”	had	been	“assaulted”	(09/05/2011c).	El	Mostrador	also	used	the	same	
quote	 from	Girardi	 as	La	Tercera	 did,	 cited	 in	 the	 section	 above	 –	 a	 statement	 highly	
critical	of	the	government	stance	on	the	dams	(El	Mostrador,	11/05/2011).		
However,	 true	 to	 its	 pluralist	 position,	 the	 newspaper	 also	 quoted	 pro-dams,	 anti-
protester	voices	and	attitudes.	For	example,	it	quoted	Golborne	just	as	El	Mercurio	did,	
saying	that	“The	citizenry	is	empowered,	but	it	 is	not	well	 informed”	(13/05/2011).	It	
also	 published	 pieces	 by	 commentators	 who	 pointed	 out	 “contradictions	 in	 the	
environmental	 cause”	 (28/05/2011b)	 and	 asked	 where	 the	 “green	 	 fury”	 	 had	 been	
when	 all	 of	 the	 coal	 burning	 power	 stations	 of	 the	 previous	 20	 years	 had	 been	
constructed	(Hödar,	El	Mostrador	26/05/2011).	There	was	a	feature	article	by	engineer	
José	 Maldifassi	 (Maldifassi,	 El	 Mostrador	 22/05/2011)	 whose	 stance	 unequivocally	
underscored	 the	 benefits	 HidroAysén	 would	 have	 for	 the	 country	 in	 terms	 of	 jobs,	
energy	and	the	development	of	new	technologies.	And	a	vehement	piece	by	right	wing	
Renovación	 Nacional	 party	 militant,	 Renato	 Gazmuri	 railed	 against	 the	 anti-dams	
protest	 of	 a	 “very	 good	 project”,	 calling	 it	 “extreme	 environmentalism”	 (Gazmuri,	 El	
Mostrador	24/05/2011).	El	Mostrador,	 then,	 clearly	 published	 arguments	 from	actors	
on	both	sides	of	the	debate.	
Perhaps	 the	most	 important	 aspect	 of	 discourse	 in	El	Mostrador	 at	 this	 time	was	 the	
notion	of	citizen	discontent	at	inequality	and	wealth	concentration,	and	the	association	
of	 HidroAysén	 with	 elites	 that	 appeared	 often	 in	 the	 media	 outlet’s	 coverage	 of	 the	
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dams.	The	newspaper	also	discussed	HidroAysén	 in	relation	 to	Chile’s	democracy	and	
its	deficiencies,	that	the	HidroAysén	case	had	highlighted,	and	the	model	of	growth	that	
the	 country	 had	 followed,	with	 its	 roots	 in	 the	 dictatorship.	El	Mostrador	made	 clear	
now	that	the	debate	over	HidroAysén	was	much	more	than	an	environmental	one.	For	
example,	commentator	Teresa	Marinovic	wrote:	
The	 wound	 that	 has	 been	 opened	 is	 not	 to	 do	 with	 energy,	 but	 rather	
society…HidroAysén	 has	 just	 been	 an	 excuse	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 wealth	
concentration	which	keeps	Chile	at	 the	very	bottom	of	 the	OECD	and	keeps	
Chileans	expressing	a	profound	social	discontent…this	is	a	fight	between	the	
business	 class	 and	 the	 “proletariat”	 not	 between	 those	 that	 have	 an	
environmental	conscience	and	those	who	don’t.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 			(Marinovic,	El	Mostrador	18/05/2011)			
And	sociologist	Marcelo	Mendoza	added:	
HidroAysén…represents	 much	 more	 than	 the	 construction	 of	 dams	 in	
Patagonia.	 Somehow,	 it	 symbolises	 the	disgust	of	 the	majority	precisely	 for	
this	 fantasy	 of	 unbridled	 “growth”	 and	 the	 abstraction	 known	 as	 “the	
market”…	
The	small	group	of	elites	that	incestuously	moves	from	business	to	politics,	or	
doesn’t	 even	move	 between	 the	 two,	 has	 forgotten	 about	 ordinary	 people.	
Gross	inequality	in	incomes…has	formed	a	society	that	is	antidemocratic…		
He	added:		
This	rebellion	symbolises	the	stellar	distance	which	exists	between	power	
and	the	interests	of	the	business-political	class,	and	ordinary	people.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 					(Mendoza,	El	Mostrador	21/05/2011)			
In	relation	to	growth,	equality	and	HidroAysén,	Director	of	pollster	Centro	de	Estudios	
de	 la	Realidad	Contemporanea	(Centre	 for	 the	Study	of	Contemporary	Reality),	Carlos	
Huneeus	 wrote	 in	 El	 Mostrador	 that	 when	 the	 dictatorship	 ended,	 growth	 had	 been	
defined	as:	
“growth	with	 equity”,	 but	 then	 this	 transformed	 into	 “growth	 at	 all	 costs”,	
without	taking	into	account	“scandalous	inequalities”.	But	alleviating	poverty	
has	 not	 led	 to	more	 social	 or	 economic	 justice…Many	 people	 are	 now	 less	
concerned	with	obtaining	material	goods,	as	they	have	them,	but	instead	with	
things	 that	 are	 immaterial,	 “postmaterialist”…The	 authorities	 should	 take	
seriously	the	importance	of	the	environmental	demands	of	the	majority,	and	
	 255	
fit	 the	 country’s	 strategy	 for	 growth	 to	 these.	 The	 protests	 against	
HidroAysén	are	much	more	significant	for	this	country	than	just	a	question	of	
energy.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 						(Huneeus,	El	Mostrador	20/05/2011)		
The	 same	 commentator	 wrote	 in	 a	 subsequent	 article	 exploring	 the	 cause	 of	 the	
protests	against	the	megaproject	that	“the	concentration	of	wealth”	was	a	chief	cause	of	
the	“citizens’	discontent”,	so	that:		
although	 people	 live	 better	 than	 before,	 it’s	 insufficient,	 because	 a	 small	
minority	 has	 benefitted	 much	 more	 than	 the	 majority.	 The	 perception	 of	
inequality	in	society	is	overwhelming.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 						(Huneeus,	El	Mostrador	07/06/2011)	
In	addition,	 the	case	of	HidroAysén	was	discussed	 in	El	Mostrador	as	 indicative	of	 the	
state	of	Chile’s	democracy.	Commentator	 José	Aylwin,	Co-director	of	 the	Observatorio	
Cuidadano	(Citizens’	Observatory)	wrote	that	the	project:	
…makes	clear	the	multiple	limitations	of	the	ability	of	Chilean	institutionality	
to	guarantee	citizens’	basic	rights,	to	protect	the	environment,	and	ultimately	
to	legitimise	a	political	system	that	can	be	defined	as	a	democracy.		
He	also	said	that	systems	put	in	place	under	the	dictatorship	had	permitted	the	case	of	
HidroAysén	to	unfold	as	it	had:	
HidroAysén	 would	 not	 be	 possible	 without	 the	 institutional	 processes	
created	by	the	dictatorship,	which	despite	reforms,	continue	to	exist	without	
being	greatly	modified;	depriving	citizens	of	any	power	 in	 the	 face	of	 these	
kinds	of	projects.			
	 	 	 	 	 	 									(Aylwin,	El	Mostrador	17/05/2011)		
Discourse	 over	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 discontent	 over	 HidroAysén	 was	 therefore	 quite	
explicit	in	El	Mostrador,	and	this	set	the	media	outlet’s	coverage	of	the	megaproject	case	
fundamentally	apart	 from	that	of	El	Mercurio’s	and	La	Tercera’s.	But	 this	discourse	on	
inequality	in	relation	to	the	project	was	also	new	–	and	it	came	to	be	associated	with	the	
project	from	this	time.	This	coincides	with	Chilton’s	(1987)	concept	of	critical	discourse	
moments	as	moments	when	discourse	can	change.	It	appears	that	in	El	Mostrador,	and	
even	 in	 conservative	 publication	La	Tercera,	 there	was	 indeed	 a	 change	 in	 discourse.	
HidroAysén’s	 approval,	 then,	 certainly	 became	 a	 “moment	 of	 inflection”	 (Mendoza,	El	
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Mostrador	 21/05/2011)	 in	 the	 debate	 over	 HidroAysén:	 a	 key	moment	 in	which	 the	
megaproject	 became	 emblematic	 of	 profiteering	 by	 elites,	 entrenched	 inequality	 and	
incomplete	democratisation.	
7.6.4	Comparing	the	coverage	with	text	analysis	
Having	 made	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 some	 of	 the	 key	 discourse	 across	 the	 three	 corpus	
publications,	 I	 now	examine	 the	articles	 in	 the	 corpus	publications	at	 the	 time	of	 this	
critical	 discourse	moment	 using	 the	 Leximancer	 text	 analysis	 software.	 I	 present	 the	
concept	 maps	 created	 for	 each	 publication,	 and	 compare	 differences	 between	
publications.	 I	 do	 not	 make	 an	 exhaustive	 analysis	 of	 every	 theme	 and	 concept	
identified	by	Leximancer	here	–	rather	I	discuss	the	themes	and	concepts	most	related	
to	 trends	 already	 identified	 in	 the	 discussion	 above,	 to	 show	 how	 the	 same	 types	 of	
discourse	can	clearly	be	identified	on	both	micro	and	macro	level.		
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Figure	35:	Leximancer	concept	map	for	El	Mercurio,	1	May-15	July	2011	
In	 the	 concept	 map	 for	 El	 Mercurio,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 key	 theme	 is	 the	 ‘proyecto’	
(project)	 which	 is	 now	 associated	 with	 the	 concepts,	 ‘autoridades’	 (authorities),	
‘aprobación’	 (approval)	 and	 also	 words	 that	 relate	 to	 the	 approvals	 process,	 like	
Evaluación	Ambiental	(environmental	evaluation),	decision	(decision)	and	tramitación	
(procedure/processing/paperwork).	 There	 are	 also	 some	 concepts	 that	 relate	 to	 the	
conflict	around	the	project	–	for	example	‘rechazo’	(rejection),	‘polémico’	(polemic)	and	
críticas	(criticisms).	The	next	theme	in	order	of	importance	is	‘país’	(country):	related	to	
this	 theme	 are	 the	 concepts	 ‘construcción’	 (construction),	 ‘represas’	 (dams),	
‘megaproyecto’	(megaproject)	and	energético	(energy	as	adjective).		
Under	the	theme	‘Personas’	(people),	of	interest	is	the	apparent	emphasis	in	El	Mercurio	
on	violence	 and	protest	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘people’:	 the	 terms	 ‘manifestaciones’	 (protests),	
‘violencia’	 (violence),	 ‘disturbios’	 (disturbances),	 ‘desórdenes’	 (disorder)	 and	 even	
‘gases’	 (gasses)	which	 relates	 to	 tear	 gas	used	 against	 protesters	 at	 the	marches.	The	
‘marchas’	 (marches)	 also	 have	 enough	 significance	 in	 the	 corpus	 for	El	Mercurio	 that	
Leximancer	treats	them	as	a	theme	of	themselves.	Under	this	theme	‘enfrentamientos’	
(confrontations)	 and	 ‘Carabineros’	 (police)	 –	 referring	 to	 the	 violent	 confrontations	
with	police	which	were	carried	out,	it	seemed,	by	encapuchados.	The	concept	‘gobierno’	
(government)	is	closely	associated	with	‘institucionalidad’	(institutionality):	El	Mercurio	
certainly	emphasised	 the	validity	of	 the	 institutional	processes	of	government,	 clearly	
the	 reason	 this	 connection	 is	 made	 here.	 More	 peripheral	 are	 the	 themes	 ‘energía’/	
‘energética’	 (energy	as	noun	and	adjective)	 for	 ‘desarollo’	 (development):	El	Mercurio	
was	 clearly	 still	 purveying	 a	 message	 of	 energy	 for	 development.	 Of	 note	 is	 that	 El	
Mercurio	associates	the	word	‘apagón’	(blackout)	with	energy	development,	and	it	used	
this	word	in	relationship	to	the	argument	for	HidroAysén,	with	this	newspaper	arguing	
that	the	country	faced	blackouts	in	the	absence	of	the	megaproject.	It	is	quite	clear,	then,	
from	 this	 “distant	 reading”	 that	 El	 Mercurio’s	 discourse	 was	 pro-project	 and	 anti-
demonstrator,	with	 little	apparent	exploration	of	 the	 reasons	behind	 the	protests	and	
the	public’s	rejection	of	the	HidroAysén	megaproject.	
Leximancer’s	 concept	 map	 for	 La	 Tercera’s	 coverage	 over	 this	 period	 looks	 quite	
different.	 The	 key	 theme	 here	 is	 the	 project	 HidroAysén.	 Of	 interest	 is	 that	
	 258	
‘ambientalistas’	(environmentalists)	and	‘rechazo’	(rejection)	are	some	of	the	concepts	
most	closely	associated	with	HidroAysén	in	the	La	Tercera	corpus	articles.	Also	closely	
associated	 with	 HidroAysén	 itself	 are	 ‘investigación’	 (investigation,	 referring	 to	 the	
investigation	 into	 the	 approval	 that	 was	 called	 for	 by	 opposition	 parliamentarians).	
Under	 the	 theme	 ‘ministros’	 (ministers	 –	 this	 relating	 to	 the	 Committee	 of	 Ministers	
who	 would	 have	 the	 final	 say	 on	 the	 project)	 importantly,	 ‘irregularidades’	
(irregularities)	appears	as	a	concept,	this	in	relation	to	the	charges	of	irregularities	(also	
translated	 as	 ‘anomalies’,	 ‘malfeasance’	 or	 ‘wrongdoing’)	 	 within	 the	 project	 that	 La	
Tercera	reported	on.	This	concept	does	not	appear	at	all	in	the	graphic	for	El	Mercurio’s	
coverage.	
	
Figure	36:	La	Tercera’s	coverage	1	May-15	July	2011	
The	anti-megaproject	protests	were	reported	prominently	enough	 to	be	depicted	as	a	
theme	 of	 La	 Tercera’s	 coverage.	 However,	 protests	 are	 also	 shown	 closely	 related	 to	
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HidroAysén	 itself:	 the	 concepts	 ‘marcha’	 (march)	 and	 ‘manifestaciones’	 (protest).	 Of	
interest	 is	 that	 the	concept	 ‘marcha’	 (march)	 in	La	Tercera	 is	closely	connected	to	 the	
concept	‘pacífica’	(peaceful),	in	constrast	with	El	Mercurio’s	coverage	which	emphasises	
the	violence.	Under	the	theme	‘Carabineros’	(police),	it	seems	police	are	associated	with	
‘agresión’	(aggression)	and	‘violencia’	(violence)	which	is	certainly	how	a	close	reading	
of	the	corpus	shows	that	La	Tercera	reported	police	response	to	the	anti-dam	protests.	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 concepts	 ‘cuidadanía’	 (citizens	 or	 citizenry)and	 ‘democracía’	
(democracy)	 appear	 at	 all	 demonstrates	 something	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 La	 Tercera’s	
discourse	from	that	of	El	Mercurio’s.	Also	of	interest	is	that,	under	the	theme	‘Chile’	La	
Tercera	 uses	 the	 concepts	 ‘energía’	 (energy)	 and	 ‘renovables’	 (renewables).	 As	
discussed	 previously,	 ‘renewable’	 energy	 in	 Chile	 is	 ERNCs	 (not	 large	 hydro)	 which	
means	 in	 La	 Tercera’s	 discourse,	 ERNCs	 are	 prominent.	 They	 are	 not	 a	 concept	
identified	in	El	Mercurio’s	coverage	at	all.	
Finally,	 of	 interest	 in	 relation	 to	 La	 Tercera	 is	 that	 there	 is	 recognition	 of	
occurrences/processes	 in	 Santiago,	 versus	 on	 a	 national	 level:	 the	 themes	 of	
Santiago/Patagonia	 are	 directly	 linked.	 Under	 the	 theme	 ‘nacional’	 (national)	 appear	
the	 concepts	 ‘movimiento’	 (movement)	 and	 ‘organizaciones’	 (organisations).	
Leximancer	allows	the	user	to	drill	down	into	the	line	locations	of	words,	and	I	did	this	
for	 the	 concepts	 ‘organisations’	 and	 ‘movement’.	A	 close	 reading	 of	 the	 line	 locations	
where	these	words	appear	in	La	Tercera’s	discourse	do	show	that	the	movement	against	
HidroAysén	appeared	to	be	discussed	as	a	national	issue,	protested	nationally	–	not	just	
as	an	issue	for	the	region,	or	one	decided	in	Santiago	alone.		
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Figure	37:	El	Mostrador	coverage	1	May-15	July	2011	
Most	 notable	 in	 Leximancer’s	 concept	 map	 for	 coverage	 of	 this	 critical	 discourse	
moment	in	El	Mostrador	is	the	finding	that	‘personas’	(people)	is	the	key	theme,	rather	
than	in	the	case	of	the	other	two	media	outlets,	‘project’	and	‘HidroAysén’;	this	reflecting	
the	 more	 human-orientated	 coverage	 in	 this	 media	 outlet,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	
business/project	 orientated	 coverage	 of	El	Mercurio,	 at	 least.	 The	 theme	 ‘personas’	 is	
directly	 connected	 to	 HidroAysén,	 and	 key	 concepts	 under	 ‘personas’	 are	 ‘protestas’,	
‘manifestaciones’	 and	 ‘marchas’	 (protests,	 demonstrations,	 marches).	 The	 marches	
seem	 to	 have	 been	 reported	 as	 ‘pacífica’	 (peaceful).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 ‘Carabineros’	
(police)	is	closely	associated	with	‘violencia’	(violence).		Of	interest	also,	is	the	fact	that	
‘proyecto’	 (project)	 and	 ‘política’	 (politics)	 make	 up	 the	 next	 two	 leading	 themes.	 El	
Mostrador,	 it	 seems,	 reported	 the	 project	 –	 which	 here	 also	 had	 ‘irregularidades’	
(irregularities,	 see	 also	 other	 translations	 above),	 ‘impactos’	 (impacts)	 and	 ‘críticas’	
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(critics)	 –	 as	 a	political	 project.	 Under	 the	 theme	 ‘politics’,	 however,	 key	 concepts	 are	
‘cambio’	(change),	 ‘jóvenes’	(young	people),	and	other	concepts	seemingly	not	present	
in	 the	 other	 two	 publications:	 ‘futuro’	 (future),	 ‘verdad’	 (truth)	 and	 ‘naturaleza’	
(nature).	 	 ‘Educación’	(education)	also	appears	here:	making	it	clear	that	El	Mostrador	
did	indeed	align	its	coverage	of	the	dams	issue	with	the	protests	of	young	people	about	
education.	 Interestingly,	 ‘gobierno’	 (government),	 ‘cuidadanía’	 (citizens,	citizenry)	and	
‘conflictos’	(conflicts)	appear	closely	linked,	reflecting	the	way	that	El	Mostrador	seems	
to	have	framed	people’s	discontent	with	government.	Other	concepts	discovered	in	the	
text	 analysis	 add	 to	 this	 understanding.	 For	 example,	 under	 the	 theme	 ‘Chile’	
‘indignación’	(outrage)	appears,	and	under	the	theme	‘sociales’	(social	as	adjective)	the	
concepts	 ‘profundo,	 malestar,	 descontento’	 (deep,	 unrest/upset,	 discontent)	 are	 also	
mapped,	 suggesting	 deep	 social	 discontent.	 The	 concepts	 ‘redes’	 and	 ‘sociales’	 (social	
networks/social	media)	and	also	appear	close	together:	El	Mostrador	analysed	how	the	
anti-dams	and	education	movement	operated	and	organised	through	social	media.	
Perhaps	 of	 most	 interest	 here	 is	 the	 theme	 ‘crecimiento’	 (growth),	 showing	 that	
discourse	in	El	Mostrador	was	concerned	with	Chile’s	model	of	growth	and,	most	closely	
linked	to	this	theme	‘desigualdades’	inequalities.	There	seems	to	be	a	binary	opposition	
drawn	here	between	‘empresas’	(companies)	and	the	‘mayoría’	(majority),	and	the	issue	
of	 ‘pobreza’	 (poverty)	 is	 also	 present.	El	Mostrador,	 then,	 discussed	 the	 difficulties	 of	
growth,	poverty	and	 inequality	–	which	neither	of	 the	other	two	corpus	media	outlets	
did.	There	is	even	some	hint	that	the	discontent	over	education	and	dams	was	reported	
as	a	class	issue	in	El	Mostrador:	the	theme	‘clase’	(class)	is	closely	co-located	here	with	
the	word	‘revolución’	(revolution).	El	Mostrador	then,	clearly	reported	the	HidroAysén	
debate	as	much	more	than	an	environmental	conflict,	going	to	the	very	root	of	citizen	
discontent	over	both	education	and	the	dams,	and	analysing	the	vehement	rejection	of	
the	dams	as	an	artefact	of	the	prevailing	social	landscape.	
Overall,	then,	it	is	clear	that	the	three	corpus	media	took	quite	different	positions	at	this	
time	on	HidroAysén.	While	El	Mercurio’s	approach	was	“business	as	usual”,	La	Tercera	
made	a	departure	now	for	the	first	time	from	its	rival	conservative	outlet’s	position,	in	
the	 words	 of	 its	 Deputy	 Editor	 “lowering	 the	 decibels”	 of	 its	 support	 for	 the	
megaproject,	and	increasing	its	exploration	of	alternative	views	of	the	Patagonia	dams	
situation.	El	Mostrador	now	explicitly	attributed	the	roots	of	discontent	over	the	dams	
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to	 the	 social	 inequality	 that	 the	 project	 had	 become	 emblematic	 of.	 The	 May	 2011	
approval	of	the	dams	was	therefore	a	turning	point	in	the	discourse	on	the	megaproject.	
HidroAysén	found	itself	with	less	media	support,	and	the	opposition	to	the	project	with	
more	 mainstream	 media	 coverage	 of	 its	 positions,	 during	 the	 conflict-filled	 Chilean	
Winter	of	2011.		
7.7	Conclusion	
As	 Alexander	 (2006,	 p.	 233-234)	 tells	 us,	 in	 “power	 conflicts”	 such	 as	 the	 symbolic	
conflict	 between	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 and	 HidroAysén,	 “representation	 is	 critical”.	
The	protest	campaign	had	 fought	since	2007	to	 influence	media	representation	of	 the	
HidroAysén	megaproject,	to	sway	public	opinion,	and	to	influence	government	decision-
making	on	the	megaproject.	Now,	in	the	conflict	and	chaos	that	surrounded	the	project’s	
approval,	it	seemed	that	anti-dams	voice	had	finally	been	able	to	make	some	degree	of	
“strategic	 intervention”	 (Lester	 2010a)	 in	 discourse	 on	 the	megaproject.	 Social	media	
“switching”	(Arsenault	&	Castells	2008,	Castells	2009)	with	mainstream	media	was	one	
avenue	for	this.	Street	protests	against	 the	dams	also	now	generated	vast	mainstream	
media	 attention	 for	 months	 during	 2011,	 and	 protest	 becoming	 active	 in	 one	 public	
arena	–	that	of	the	streets	–	produced	discourse	in	other	public	arenas	(Hilgartner	and	
Bosk	 1988),	 the	 media	 arena	 and	 the	 political	 one.	 These	 are	 also	 sites	 Lester	 &	
Hutchins’	 (2015)	 identify	 as	 switching	 points	 in	 the	 enactment	 of	 mediatized	
environmental	 conflicts.	 	 	 	 Aided	 by	 the	 negative	 public	 reaction	 to	 HidroAysén’s	
“campaign	of	terror”,	and	by	an	angry	citizenry	for	which	the	megaproject	was	just	one	
aspect	 of	 a	 wider	 discontent,	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign	 seems	 to	 have	 succeeded	 in	
shaping	 public	 discourse	more	 now	 than	 at	 any	 other	 time	 in	 the	 debate	 timeframe.	
Cottle	 tells	us	 that	media	 themselves	 can	become	actors	 in	mediatized	 conflicts	while	
“disseminating	images	or	ideas	about	them”	(2006	p.	9).	While	we	see	in	this	period	that	
the	conservative	position	of	El	Mercurio	had	not	greatly	changed,	discourse	on	the	dams	
in	La	Tercera	and	in	El	Mostrador	does	seem	to	have	altered,	making	both	media	outlets	
influential	actors	in	the	dams	debate	in	this	period.		
Following	HidroAysén’s	approval,	public	opinion	on	the	project	was	more	negative	than	
ever.	In	May	2011,	polling	found	74%	of	Chileans	disapproved	of	the	megaproject:	87%	
of	those	who	defined	themselves	as	politically	left-leaning,	as	well	as	59%	of	those	who	
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regarded	themselves	as	politically	of	the	right.	Disapproval	of	the	project	rose	to	81%	
amongst	 all	 18-34	 year-olds.	 However,	 perhaps	most	 indicative	 of	 Chileans’	 sense	 of	
distrust	 in	 government	was	 the	 fact	 that,	 asked	whether	 they	 believed	 that	 the	 dams	
would	be	built	anyway,	72%	of	Chileans	said	they	believed	that	they	would	(according	
to	 a	 Centro	 de	Estudios	La	Tercera	 poll,	 reported	 in	El	Mostrador	 15/05/2011).	Now	
that	HidroAysén	had	become	(as	Contreras	put	it)	“an	emblem,	an	icon	of	the	neoliberal	
market	 model”,	 there	 seemed	 little	 way	 the	 project	 could	 shift	 this	 discursive	
representation.	 The	 next	 chapter	 outlines	 some	 of	 the	 ways	 the	 beleaguered	
megaproject	appeared	to	try	to	do	that.		
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Chapter	8:	Invisible	once	again	
8.1	Introduction	
This	 last	 research	 chapter	 traces	 the	 attempted	withdrawal	 from	national	mediatized	
discourse	by	 the	developing	 company,	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	protests	 of	May/June	2011.	
Now	 that	 HidroAysén	 had	 become	 a	 symbolic	 construct,	 associated	 with	 layers	 of	
meaning,	many	of	which	were	negative	for	the	megaproject,	the	project’s	management	
opted	out	of	national	public	discourse	as	far	as	possible	for	a	second	time.	It	seems	the	
decision	to	go	“low-profile”	again	was	also	part	of	the	company’s	crisis	communication	
strategy.	 In	 this	 final	 phase	 of	 communication	 analysed	 here,	 the	 company	 again	
attempted	to	achieve	relative	invisibility	on	a	national	level,	and	instead	to	concentrate	
its	communication	efforts	in	the	communities	close	to	the	dams.	In	Chapter	5,	I	argued	
that	in	the	Chilean	context,	a	megaproject	developer	such	as	HidroAysén	could	opt	not	
to	 conduct	 national-level	 communications	 and	 stay	 “low-profile”	 (Fernández,	
interviewed	 19/12/2013)	 because	 in	 this	 particular	 national	 setting	 (up	 to	 that	
moment,	at	least)	negotiations	with	key	government	decision	makers	and	cultivation	of	
relations	 with	 communities	 in	 the	 project	 zone	 had	 been	more	 crucial	 to	 a	 project’s	
success	than	conducting	national-level	strategic	communications.		
	
I	show	in	this	chapter,	however,	that	the	furore	over	HidroAysén	in	2011	seems	to	have	
marked	a	turning	point	in	the	previously	accepted	way	of	negotiating	projects	such	as	
this	one.	HidroAysén’s	owners	may	have	hoped	for	continuing	lines	of	communication	
with	 government,	 so	 that	 behind-the-scenes	 negotiations	 could	 continue	 out	 of	 the	
public	 eye:	 “invisibility”	 with	 the	 kind	 of	 “strategic	 utility”	 that	 Lester	 and	 Hutchins	
(2012b)	 have	 identified	 in	 sensitive	 environmental	 debates,	 so	 that	 talks	 can	 unfold	
“free	of	media	interference”	(2012a,	p.	22).	However,	evidence	analysed	in	this	chapter	
indicates	 that,	as	 the	as	 the	 tide	of	national	public	opinion	 turned	against	HidroAysén	
and	 all	 that	 it	 symbolised,	 the	 willingness	 of	 government	 to	 hear	 HidroAysén’s	
arguments,	and	to	make	conditions	suitable	for	the	advancement	of	the	project,	seems	
to	have	waned.	So	although	in	2011	when	it	withdrew	from	national	communications,	
the	 megaproject	 may	 still	 have	 expected,	 and	 may	 indeed	 have	 exercised,	 some	
“invisible”	negotiating	capacity,	by	2013,	this	was	clearly	not	the	case.	
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HidroAysén	 and	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 had	 now	 been	 waging	 communicational	
sparring	 over	 the	 megaproject	 for	 five	 years.	 In	 the	 period	 analysed	 in	 this	 chapter,	
however,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 to	 engage	 with	 HidroAysén	 in	 the	
media,	simply	because	the	megaproject	sought	to	be	out	of	the	national	media	as	far	as	
possible.	Local	communications	are	therefore	addressed	in	this	chapter,	and	I	ask	what	
HidroAysén’s	 deliberate	 withdrawal	 from	 national-level	 discourse	 means	 for	 our	
understanding	of	the	communication	of	megaprojects	that	are	of	national	significance.	I	
also	 discuss	 here	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign	 endeavoured	 to	 keep	
HidroAysén	 on	media	 agendas	 –	 including	 through	 events,	making	 the	megaproject	 a	
key	election	issue,	and	through	public	interest	environmental	litigation	(McGrath	2008)	
against	the	project.		
	
In	examining	this	final	phase	in	the	communication	of	this	lengthy	discursive	battle,	this	
chapter	completes	this	study’s	survey	of	mediatized	discourse	in	the	HidroAysén	debate	
2008-2014,	as	set	out	in	the	research	questions.	In	addition,	I	expand	on	my	response	to	
the	research	question	concerning	this	debate	becoming	emblematic,	exploring	here	how	
the	 anti-dams	 movement	 also	 became	 emblematic	 to	 some	 degree,	 through	 its	
opponents’	 discursive	 construction.	 Although	 the	 bulk	 of	 media	 discourse	 on	 the	
megaproject	 ends	 shortly	 after	 the	 Committee	 of	 Ministers	 withdrew	 environmental	
approvals	and	rejected	the	project	in	June	2014,	discussion	of	HidroAysén	in	the	media	
did	not	stop	there.	In	the	last	section	of	this	chapter,	therefore,	I	show	how	HidroAysén	
remained	a	feature	of	media	discourse	right	up	until	the	end	of	2017	when	the	company	
was	dissolved.	 I	 argue	here,	and	 in	 this	 study’s	 conclusion,	 that	even	after	 the	project	
had	ended,	HidroAysén	had	taken	a	seemingly	permanent	position	in	ongoing	discourse	
over	energy	and	development,	as	a	symbol	 for	 the	kind	of	development	Chile	rejected	
when	it	rejected	HidroAysén.	
8.2	Retreat	to	the	region:	HidroAysén	ends	national-scale	communications	
HidroAysén	itself	had	been	largely	silent	in	terms	of	its	own	strategic	communications	
since	 it	 had	 received	 the	 green	 light	 of	 environmental	 approval.	 The	 day	 after	 the	
project	 was	 approved,	 it	 had	 issued	 just	 one	 media	 release,	 praising	 the	 country’s	
“rigorous	 environmental	 institutionality”	 and	 again	 presenting	 the	 project	 as	 “clean,	
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renewable	 and	 Chilean”	 and	 as	 being	 “for	 the	 country’s	 development”	 (HidroAysén	
10/05/2011).	 In	 the	month	 after	 the	 approval,	 there	had	been	 a	 few	 interviews	with	
Fernández	 in	 all	 three	 corpus	 media,	 and	 also	 as	 discussed	 above,	 in	 the	 broadcast	
media.	 Other	 than	 granting	 these	 interviews,	 HidroAysén	 appeared	 to	 make	 little	
response	 to	 the	 furore	 that	 its	 approval	 had	 garnered.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter,	 the	 company	 appeared	 to	 believe	 it	 could	 do	 little	 in	 this	 “damage	 control”	
mode	 other	 than	 “wait	 out	 the	 storm.”	 (Ibarra,	 El	 Mercurio	 29/05/2011)	 There	 was	
seemingly	little	attempt	at	crisis	communications	in	terms	of	media	relations	strategies,	
or	in	terms	of	stakeholder	communications	on	a	national	level.	
Then,	a	month	after	the	approval,	HidroAysén	began	a	new	advertising	campaign	in	the	
main	regional	newspaper	in	Aysén,	apparently	directly	in	response	to	the	mass	protests,	
particularly	in	the	capital.	In	June	2011,	the	company	published	the	first	of	its	full-page	
advertisements	 in	El	Diario	 de	Aysén	 (The	Newspaper	 of	Aysén),	 based	 in	 Coyhaique,	
and	distributed	throughout	the	region.	The	advertisement	read:				
Do	 you	 think	 that	 the	 people	 of	 Santiago	 care	 about	 health	 in	 the	 Aysén	
region?	At	HidroAysén,	our	commitment	is	with	you,	who	lives	in	the	region.	
In	 terms	 of	 health,	 the	 HidroAysén	 project	 is	 contemplating	 setting	 up	 a	
Medical	 Centre,	 the	 equipping	 of	 the	 Cochrane	 Hospital,	 and	 the	
modernisation	 of	 the	 health	 posts	 at	 Caleta	 Tortel	 and	 Villa	 O’Higgins.	 Our	
commitment	is	to	you.		HidroAysén.	Chile	with	energy.	
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Figure	38:	Example	of	HidroAysén’s	2011	advertising	campaign	in	the	Aysén	region		
Similar	ads	run	in	regional	publications	asked:	“Do	you	think	that	in	Santiago	there	are	
problems	with	 transport	 connectivity?...HidroAysén	 contemplates	 construction,	 repair	
or	improvement	of	237	kilometres	of	roads…”	Another	ad	posed	the	question:	“Do	you	
think	that	in	Santiago	there	is	a	lack	of	educational	opportunities	or	establishments?”	–	
and	then	listed	the	benefits	that	the	company	said	it	would	bring	to	the	region	in	terms	
of	education.	These	claims	were	backed	up	on	the	company’s	Twitter	page:	
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This	 tweet	 reads:	 “#hidroaysen	will	 bring	 equipment	 to	Cochrane	Hospital	 and	 to	 the	
[health]	posts	at	Caleta	Tortel	and	Villa	O’Higgins.”	And	also:	
	
Here,	the	company	substantiates	its	claims	of	improvements	in	the	field	of	education.	It	
says	“Our	scholarship	plan	for	the	Lord	Cochrane	College	is	considering	25	scholarships	
annually	for	a	period	of	10	years	from	the	start	of	the	project’s	construction.”	
HidroAysén	 had	 seemingly	 identified	 an	 important	 point	 of	 difference	 for	
communicating	 the	 project	 in	 the	 region,	 versus	 in	 the	 capital.	 The	 company’s	
Communications	and	Community	Relations	director	Maria	Irene	Soto	noted	in	interview	
that	people	in	Aysén	ask:	
‘Why	do	they	have	to	tell	us	from	Santiago	how	we	should	live?’...People	say:	
‘why	in	Santiago	are	they	marching	and	protesting	against	the	project	if	they	
don’t	even	know	where	Patagonia	is.	If	they	don’t	know	where	Cochrane	is.	If	
they	don’t	live	like	we	do	here?’	To	get	from	one	place	to	another	here,	people	
drive	six	or	seven	hours	on	dirt	roads.	Sometimes	they	don’t	have	access	to	a	
doctor.	 In	 Santiago,	 if	 you	 get	 sick,	 you	 go	 to	 the	 doctor.	 Here,	 you	 don’t.	
There,	everything	is	easily	accessible.	Here,	people	feel	passed	over.	They	feel	
somehow	 that	 they	 have	 not	 been	 thought	 of	 for	 many	 years…They	 feel	
isolated	and	they	 feel	discriminated	against.	The	project	allows	them	to	see	
that	 perhaps	 they	 can	win	 something	with	 this.	 They	 think:	 ‘at	 least	 at	 last	
now	we	are	being	seen.’	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		(Soto,	interviewed	14/11/2013)	
The	campaign	was	immediately	criticised	by	commentators	in	the	national	media,	who	
characterised	 the	 discursive	 opposition	 of	 Santiago	 with	 the	 region	 in	 the	 ads	 as	
retribution	by	HidroAysén	for	the	protests	in	Santiago.	La	Tercera	quoted	Luis	Mariano	
Rendón,	 head	 of	 one	 of	 the	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	NGOs,	 Acción	 Ecológica,	 as	 saying	
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that:	“this	 is	a	highly	unscrupulous	campaign	that	 is	trying	to	divide	Chileans”.	He	said	
the	 campaign	 intended	 to	 “attack	 people	 from	 Santiago	 and	 set	 them	 against	 the	
inhabitants	of	Aysén”	and	was	trying	to	make	the	project	“seem	like	the	solution	to	all	
the	 region’s	 problems.”	He	 also	 said	 that	 the	 campaign	 seemed	 “particularly	 odious	 if	
one	takes	into	account	that	we	are	talking	about	a	company	that	that	is	foreign	majority	
controlled”.	(Yaikin,	La	Tercera	15/06/2011).	
This	short-lived	campaign	(it	ran	only	June-August	2011)	demarcated	an	important	shift	
in	 HidroAysén’s	 communications.	 This	 seemed	 to	 be	 informed	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
project	was	now	more	opposed	in	the	capital	and	other	parts	of	Chile	than	it	was	on	the	
ground	 in	Aysén:	 in	May	2011	74%	were	against	HidroAysén	nationally	 (El	Mostrador	
15/05/2011)	while	60%	opposed	it	in	Aysén,	and	66%	said	they	would	vote	against	the	
project	in	a	plebiscite	(López,	El	Mercurio	14/05/2011).	Now	seemingly	unable	to	make	
any	 communicational	 headway	 against	 the	 tide	 of	 protest	 across	 the	 country,	 the	
developing	company	prioritised	its	communication	efforts	in	the	region.	In	interview	for	
this	study,	HidroAysén	head	Fernández	explained	the	strategy	for	communications	after	
mid-2011	as	follows:		
Low	profile,	 let’s	call	 it…Not	just	because	of	the	protests,	but	because	of	the	
feeling	 that	 the	 company	 wasn’t	 the	 one	 that	 needed	 to	 be	
communicating…In	 the	 surveys	 that	 we	 did,	 we	 didn’t	 have	 sufficient	
credibility.	People	said	“no,	we	don’t	believe	the	company”.		
Fernández	added	that	public	opinion	on	a	local	level	was	more	valuable	to	the	company	
that	that	on	a	national	 level.	From	this	point	on,	 this	therefore	meant	 for	the	company	
being:	
…more	low	profile	at	a	national	level,	and	we	concentrated	on	relations	with	
the	 local	 community,	 that	 is,	 in	 the	 region.	Relations	with	 the	 community,	
conversations,	generation	of	confidence,	horizontality.		
	 	 	 	 	 				(Fernández,	interviewed	19/12/2013)	
HidroAysén’s	communications	in	the	region	now	meant,	until	mid-2014,	the	publication	
of	a	 tabloid-like	newspaper	 four	 times	a	year,	 the	continuation	of	 the	company’s	radio	
programs	 “Conversemos	 con	HidroAysén”	 (discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5)	 and	 an	 open-door	
policy	in	regional	offices	where	people	could	come	and	learn	about	the	project.	Between	
2012	and	2014,	the	company	also	ran	a	program	of	house-to-house	visits	several	times	a	
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year.	These	were	door-knocks	in	the	towns	and	villages	of	the	region.	Two	HidroAysén	
personnel	visited	each	house,	and	if	welcomed	in,	sat	down	for	a	conversation	with	the	
inhabitants.	 Quotes	 from	 project	 supporters	 were	 often	 posted	 on	 the	 company’s	
Twitter	page.	
	
Figure	39:	A	Twitter	post	 showing	a	HidroAysén	home	visit.	The	 text	 reads:	 “Door-to-
door.	Marisol	Vera	isn’t	 in	favour	of,	or	against,	she	believes	that	the	project	will	bring	
better	work.”	
Importantly,	 these	 visits	 also	 involved,	 from	 2013,	 showing	 a	 5-minute	 video	 on	 the	
dams	with	an	energetic,	documentary-like	voiceover.	Soto	reported	that	previously,	the	
company	had	been	loath	to	depict	the	dam	walls.	
This	was	also	a	lesson	for	us.	We	had	never	dared	to	show	a	real	image.	But	
then	we	said	 ‘let’s	make	real	 images,	show	it	 just	 like	 it	 is,	with	real	videos,	
just	like	they	are’.	And	when	people	see	these,	they	change	their	perception.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		(Soto,	interviewed	14/11/2013)	
The	 “real	 images”	were	an	animated	video	of	dam	walls	neatly	appearing	without	any	
machinery	 and	 ice-blue	 reservoirs	 quickly	 filling:	 an	 undoubtedly	 much-sanitised	
version	of	the	messy	10-year	process	of	dam	building.		
Part	 of	 the	 communications	 strategy	 at	 these	 home	 visits	 was	 also	 to	 give	 a	 DVD	
recording	of	a	Discovery	Channel	documentary	that	had	been	made	about	the	Patagonia	
dams	project,	and	released	on	the	user-pay	Discovery	Channel	with	several	showings	in	
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November	 2012.	 The	 documentary,	 Desafios	 Futuros:	 HidroAysén	 (Future	 Challenges:	
HidroAysén)	had	been	much	criticised	by	the	anti-dams	movement	which	had	called	it	an	
“infomercial”	(Leal,	Radio	Bío	Bío	25/11/2012).	There	had	been	an	uproar	in	the	social	
networks	about	the	documentary	as	soon	as	it	screened,	for	example:	
	
	
	
Fig	38:	Writer	and	political	 commentator	Patricio	Herman	wrote:	 “Unfortunate,	not	 to	
say	 shameful,	 the	 public	 relations	 support	 that	 Discovery	 Channel	 Latin	 America	 is	
giving	 HidroAysén.”	 Environmental	 governance	 specialist	 Sam	 Leiva	 wrote:	 [now]	
“Discovery	Channel	defending	#hidroaysen:	because	they	haven’t	been	able	to	convince	
us	 with	 their	 terror	 campaigns,	 now	 [they	 try	 to	 convince	 us]	 with	 reporting.”	 And	
Sebastián	 Soto	 wrote:	 “Image	 washing	 of	 the	 highest	 order.	 Documentary	 about	
HidroAysén	on	Discovery	Channel.”	
The	 44-minute	 documentary,	which	 is	 still	 available	 as	 a	HidroAysén	 video	 on	 Vimeo	
(Discovery	 Channel	 2012)	 is	 certainly	 favourable	 towards	 HidroAysén	 and	 seems	 to	
echo	 many	 of	 the	 company’s	 key	 messages	 about	 the	 dams,	 without	 any	 alternative	
viewpoints.	Though	it	is	not	clear	on	what	basis	the	documentary	was	made	(whether	as	
a	paid	commercial	arrangement	between	HidroAysén	and	the	film	makers	or	otherwise)	
it	 seems	 that	 HidroAysén	 subsequently	 acquired	 the	 rights	 to	 distribute	 this	
documentary.	When	I	was	conducting	interviews	with	the	company,	I	was	given	a	copy.	
In	the	homes	and	guesthouses	in	which	I	stayed	when	interviewing	in	the	Aysén	region	
in	 2013,	 I	 also	 observed	 copies	 of	 the	 documentary.	When	 I	 asked	where	 people	 had	
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obtained	 this	 the	answer	was	always	 that	 it	had	been	given	 to	 them	by	HidroAysén.70	
These	 two	powerful	 audiovisual	 outputs	 therefore	 seemed	 also	 to	 be	 key	parts	 of	 the	
strategy	to	convince	the	region	to	accept	the	megaproject.	
At	 the	 time	 that	HidroAysén	had	 retreated	 from	national	 communications,	 it	was	 also	
investing	in	community	acceptance	in	the	region	by	providing	a	range	of	programs	that	
it	considered	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	initiatives.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	
some	 of	 these	 initiatives	 had	 already	 been	 banned	 by	 the	 regional	 representative	
Comptroller	General	in	2010,	on	grounds	of	conflict	of	interests	while	the	project	was	in	
the	 approvals	 process.	 However,	 some	 initiatives,	 including	 those	 the	 megaproject	
developer	 cited	 in	 its	 advertising	 campaign	 discussed	 above,	 were	 still	 active.	 The	
controversial	program	of	competitive	grants	for	private	projects	in	the	region	continued	
until	2012,	and	 the	HidroAysén	scholarships	program	continued	past	 this	date	so	 that	
the	scholarship	holders	could	complete	their	studies.		
Interviewed	 in	 Coyhaique	 2013,	 Soto	 explained	 the	 company’s	 change	 in	
communications	from	late	2011/early	2012,	and	the	ongoing	CSR	effort,	as	follows:	
We	 changed	 our	 way	 of	 doing	 things	 completely.	 We	 opted	 to	 stop	
communicating	on	a	national	level.	And	now	when	we	are	working	here,	we	
don’t	go	in	and	tell	people:	 ‘it’s	like	this.’	Instead,	we	go	and	say,	 ‘you	know,	
we’ve	made	some	errors,	we	were	wrong	about	this,	we	were	wrong	in	doing	
that.’…First	we	were	wrong	in	not	listening	to	you.	We	were	wrong	to	bring	
in	the	competitive	grants,	because	you,	who	got	the	money	were	happy,	but	
your	neighbour,	who	didn’t,	was	 angry.	We	made	mistakes,	 perhaps,	 in	 the	
distribution	of	 the	scholarships,	because	some	people	benefitted	and	others	
didn’t.	What	 we	 should	 have	 done	was	we	 should	 have	worked	with	 local	
organisations,	 built	 the	 social	 fabric,	 been	 able	 to	 co-construct	 the	 project.	
We’ve	changed	now	from:	‘this	is	the	project,	see	if	you	can	understand	it,	and	
if	you	like	it,	good,	and	if	not,	let	me	explain	it	to	you’,	to:	‘let’s	talk’,	let’s	build	
this	together.	How	does	this	seem	to	you?	How	do	you	feel	about	this?	What’s	
happening	for	you?’	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		(Soto,	interviewed	14/11/2013)	
	
																																																						
70CDP	Executive	secretary	and	Patagonia	sin	Represas	representative	Patricio	Rodrigo	wrote	on	behalf	of	
the	campaign	organisations	 to	Discovery	Channel,	 calling	 the	documentary	a	 “publicity	 report	 that	was	
favourable	to	an	initiative	that	had	been	highly	questioned	both	nationally	and	internationally”	(Rodrigo	
26/11/2012).	 In	 this	 letter,	 Rodrigo	 suggested	 that	 a	 documentary	 from	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign	
viewpoint	 be	 broadcast	 by	 Discovery	 Channel.	 The	 anti-dams	 documentary	 Patagonia	 se	
Levanta/Patagonia	Rising	was	indeed	broadcast	by	Discovery	Channel	four	times	in	September	2013.		
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This	 seeming	 attempt	 at	 a	 corporate	 apologia	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 company’s	 crisis	
communication	appeared	to	be	an	effort	to	retrieve	and	build	reputation	in	the	region	in	
the	 wake	 of	 the	 local	 and	 national	 protests.	 As	 Coombs	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 tell	 us,	 “crisis	
communication	 can	 be	 used	 to	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 negative	 emotions	 experienced	 by	
stakeholders”	(p.338),	and	corporate	apologia,	as	an	aspect	of	crisis	communication,	is	a	
rhetoric	of	self-defence	that	corporations	can	employ,	if	considered	sufficiently	credible,	
to	restore	reputation.		
From	 HidroAysén’s	 viewpoint,	 this	 “retreat”	 to	 the	 dam-building	 region,	 a	 change	 in	
communications	strategy,	and	some	degree	of	continuing	CSR	initiatives	seemingly	did	
bear	 fruit.	 Soto	 reported	 in	 interview	 in	 2013	 that,	 according	 to	 the	 company’s	 own	
surveys,	support	for	the	project	in	some	parts	of	the	potentially-affected	region	was	“up	
around	70%”.	However,	she	also	reported	that	by	this	date,	in	the	region	overall,	support	
was	“almost	even,	around	41.7	in	favour,	and	41.6	against”	the	project.	Of	interest	is	that	
surveys	not	 conducted	 by	HidroAysén	 found	 quite	 different	 levels	 of	 support	 in	 some	
areas.	 For	 example,	Bernardo	López,	 the	mayor	of	 Caleta	Tortel,	 the	 settlement	 at	 the	
mouth	of	the	River	Baker,	reported	in	an	interview	for	this	study	(28/10/2013)	that	a	
survey	conducted	in	his	municipality	(in	2013)	recorded	68%	against	the	project,	some	
20%	pro-project	and	some	9%	undecided.	
HidroAysén’s	communicational	retreat	to	the	Aysén	region,	and	its	“low	profile”	period	
directly	after	the	project’s	approval	can	be	understood	as	an	attempt	to	become	invisible	
once	again	–	or	at	least	visible	only	in	the	region	of	Aysén	which,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	
5,	meant	communicating	with	just	0.5%	of	the	country’s	population.	Lester	and	Hutchins	
(2012b)	have	asked	“why	some	actors	choose	not	to	be	seen”	and	under	what	conditions	
it	is	“possible	to	remain	unseen”	(p.	850)	in	the	context	of	an	Australian	forestry	conflict.	
In	 Chile,	 as	 noted	 above,	 this	 megaproject	 developer’s	 attempts	 to	 exit	 the	 national	
media	 spotlight	 from	mid-2011	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 informed	 by	 the	 notion	 that	more	
could	be	achieved	through	persuading	those	sectors	that	really	mattered	to	the	project’s	
development:	populations	on	the	ground	in	Aysén	and	decision-makers	in	the	capital.	As	
discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 HidroAysén’s	 ex-PR	 account	 executive	 at	 Burson-Marsteller	
(interviewed	16/12/2013)	had	spoken	of	a	“strong	lobby”	on	the	part	of	the	company’s	
shareholders	 “directly	 to	 the	 source	 of	 power”,	 and	 the	 senator	 for	 Aysén	 Antonio	
Horvath	(interviewed	26/11/2013)	had	mentioned	“subterranean	negotiations”,	secret	
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negotiations	between	the	megaproject	developers	and	decision	makers.	It	was	also	clear	
that,	as	discussed	 in	Chapter	5,	due	to	the	nature	of	social	structures	 in	Chile,	 those	at	
the	helm	of	HidroAysén	had	had	direct	access	to	government	decision	makers	for	much	
of	the	trajectory	of	the	project.		
However,	 the	 potential	 for	 this	 kind	 of	 influence	 depended	 on	 the	 prevailing	 political	
landscape,	the	election	cycle,	and	certainly	from	the	point	of	view	of	decision-makers,	on	
public	opinion.	Though	Piñera’s	government	had	been	largely	supportive	of	the	project,	
opposition	 voices	 were	 not,	 and	 with	 majority	 public	 opinion	 now	 against	 the	
megaproject,	there	was	clearly	political	capital	to	be	lost	in	maintaining	overt	support	of	
it.	 Piñera’s	 popularity	 had	 already	 fallen	 dramatically	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	
approval,	 from	 63%	 in	 October	 2010	 to	 36%	 by	 May	 2011	 (Canales,	 La	 Tercera	
02/06/2011).	It	was	evident	that	by	late	2013,	as	the	company	still	waited	for	the	final	
decision	of	 the	Committee	of	Ministers,	with	 a	 change	of	 government	predicted,	 there	
was	little	political	will	to	take	responsibility	for	decision-making	on	the	project	right	at	
the	end	of	Piñera’s	term.	Government	support	for	the	project	was	in	now	in	doubt.	Asked	
in	late	2013	if	lobbying	of	decision-makers	in	the	capital	remained	active	on	the	part	of	
the	megaproject,	the	company’s	ex-account	executive	at	Burson-Marsteller	commented:		
I	don’t	 think	so.	 I’m	really	out	of	 this	now,	but	 I	don’t	 think	 there’s	much,	 I	
don’t	 think	 there’s	 much.	 That	 is,	 HidroAysén	 used	 to	 have	 direct	 lines	 of	
information	 to	 the	 Committee	 of	Ministers.	 Now,	 they	 don’t	 even	 have	 any	
idea	when	they’re	going	to	meet.	
							(Burson-Marsteller	account	executive,	interviewed	16/12/2013)	
It	was	clear,	then,	that	between	late	2011	and	2013	as	the	megaproject’s	influence	in	the	
corridors	 of	 power	 may	 have	 been	 waning,	 and	 national	 media	 coverage	 was	 not	
deemed	useful	for	the	project,	the	only	key	communications	avenue	that	remained	was	
the	one	on	the	ground	in	Aysén.	As	the	Burson-Marsteller	executive	said,	 in	explaining	
the	company’s	comunicational	retreat	to	the	region:	
What	couldn’t	happen,	if	people	were	against	the	project	on	a	national	level,	
was	to	lose	the	region.	If	we	had	the	region	against	us,	the	project	wouldn’t	be	
viable.	I	mean,	close	the	curtains	and	we	go.	
However,	 the	 fact	 that	 HidroAysen	 withdrew	 from	 national	 communications	 post-
protests	 in	2011,	did	not	mean	 the	 company	 remained	 invisible	on	a	national	 level:	 it	
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was	not	entirely	possible	for	it	“to	remain	unseen”	(Lester	&	Hutchins	2012b,	p.	850).	As	
shown	in	Chapter	6,	there	were	several	external	events,	some	created	by	Patagonia	sin	
Represas,	 in	which	 the	megaproject	 was	made	more	 visible	 in	 the	 national	media.	 In	
addition,	the	project	developers	continued	to	use	the	company’s	website	and	Twitter	to	
broadcast	 the	benefits	 of	 the	project,	 on	Twitter,	 often	 cycling	 repeatedly	 through	 the	
same	affirmations	 about	 the	benefits	 of	 the	project,	 often	with	 images	 of	Aysén	 locals	
and	quoting	their	reasons	for	supporting	the	project.	 	Daniel	Fernández	also	continued	
to	 “present	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 project”	 (El	 Mercurio	 01/08/2011)	 to	 select,	 elite	
audiences,	particularly	in	the	capital.	
What	 is	 important	 here	 is	 that	 the	 developing	 company	 of	 the	 largest	 infrastructure	
project	 in	 Chile’s	 history	 was	 declining,	 once	 again,	 to	 communicate	 its	 project	 on	 a	
national	level.	Its	communication	efforts	now	sought	to	bypass	national	media	and	evade	
national	public	opinion.	That	HidroAysén	intended	to	maintain	low	profile	in	the	latter	
part	of	the	megaproject	debate	signifies	a	rejection	of	traditional	media	as	a	key	sphere	
for	 information	 and	 debate.	 This	 new	 kind	 of	 “invisibility”	 in	 favour	 of	 targeted	
conversations	 with	 limited	 stakeholder	 groups	 has	 obvious	 implications	 for	 public	
debate	 on	 an	 issue	 of	 national	 significance.	 	 Avoiding	 a	 media	 presence	 is	 clearly	 an	
effective	way	 to	 evade	 scrutiny,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 a	way	 to	 attempt	 to	exclude	 groups	 that	
would	rather	engage	their	opponents	publically	through	mediatized	debate.	If	only	one	
side	 is	 present	 in	 the	media,	 there	 can	be	 little	 effective	debate.	 Likewise,	 if	 the	more	
powerful	partner	in	mediatized	sparring	–	the	partner	which	has	always	attracted	more	
media	 attention,	 as	 HidroAysén	 did	 –	 withdraws	 from	 mediatized	 visibility,	 then	 the	
issue	 at	 stake	 seems	more	 likely	 to	 drop	 off	 media	 agendas.	 Apart	 from	moments	 in	
which	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 was	 able	 to	 attract	 media	 attention	 to	 HidroAysén	
between	 late	 2011	 and	 2014,	 and	 apart	 from	 events	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 dams’	
development	 which	 were	 newsworthy	 for	 a	 period,	 this	 was	 precisely	 what	 now	
occurred	in	the	mediatized	debate	over	this	megaproject.	
8.3	Keeping	HidroAysén	visible	
The	task	for	Patagonia	sin	Represas	after	the	outrage	surrounding	the	approval	and	the	
protests	of	2011,	then,	was	to	keep	the	megaproject	in	the	news.	Between	late	2011	and	
2014	when	the	project	was	finally	rejected,	there	were	several	events	–	some	related	to	
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legal	 proceedings	 in	which	 the	 project	 had	become	 involved,	 some	 spontaneous	news	
events,	some	publicity	events	created	by	the	anti-dams	campaign	–	that	garnered	media	
coverage.	
In	 the	year	after	 the	2011	approval	alone	 the	project	was	subject	 to	15	separate	 legal	
actions	and	was	briefly	“paralysed”	(Moya,	El	Mercurio	20/06/2011)	by	a	ruling	of	the	
Court	 of	 Appeals	 in	 the	 southern	 city	 of	 Puerto	Montt	 in	 a	 case	 brought	 by	 Horvath,	
Girardi	 and	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign.	 By	 the	 middle	 of	 2012,	 some	 appeals	 had	 been	
dismissed	 in	 favour	 of	 HidroAysén,	 but	 others	 remained	 active.	 The	megaproject	was	
also	 now	 under	 investigation	 by	 a	 committee	 of	 the	 Lower	 House	 for	 possible	
“irregularities”	 in	 its	approvals	process.	As	well	 as	 its	 intent	 to	 “delay”	and	 “overturn”	
the	 project,	 according	 to	 environmentalist	 Juan	 Pablo	 Orrego,	 this	 public	 interest	
environmental	 litigation	 (McGrath	2008)	was	one	of	 Patagonia	 sin	Represas’	 publicity	
strategies.	Orrego	said:	
We	made	 sure	 to	 get	 all	 possible	media	 attention	 out	 of	 each	 round	 in	 the	
courts,	whether	we	were	successful	or	not.	As	long	as	it	stayed	in	the	courts,	
HidroAysén	also	stayed	in	the	news.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 											(Orrego,	interviewed	12/06/2013)	
Reporting	 on	 the	 project	 did	 increase	 when	 announcements	 on	 the	 legal	 actions’	
outcomes	 were	 made.	 Reports	 on	 the	 legal	 actions	 made	 up	 so	 much	 of	 the	 media	
discourse	 from	 late	 2011	 that	 legal	 terms	 fill	 the	 corpus:	 “investigations”	 “legal	
proceedings”,	 “appeals”,	 “judicial	 rulings”	 “remedies	 of	 protection”	 and	 “constitutional	
protection	lawsuits”	are	regularly	associated	in	media	discourse	with	the	dams.	In	April	
2012,	 the	Supreme	Court	rejected	a	key	case	brought	against	 the	megaproject	by	anti-
dams	 politicians	 and	 activists.	 This	 event	 was	 widely	 reported.	 Alejandro	 Navarro,	
vicepresident	 of	 the	 Senate	 was	 quoted	 in	 La	 Tercera	 (04/04/2012)	 as	 saying:	
“HidroAysén	has	won	the	battle,	but	not	the	war”.	El	Mercurio,	however	editorialised	in	
an	 article	 headlined	 “Green	 light	 for	 HidroAysén”	 that	 “the	 decision	 of	 the	 Supreme	
Court	 is	 positive	 for	 the	 country”	 (El	Mercurio	07/04/2012).	A	 series	of	 legal	 appeals	
continued	right	up	until	2017,	periodically	gaining	media	visibility.	
In	February	and	March	2012,	protests	erupted	in	Aysén.	Blockades	of	roads	and	bridges	
brought	the	region	to	a	halt	and	onto	the	national	news	again.	The	Aysén	Uprising	was	
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not	specifically	about	the	dams	project,	though	Patagonia	sin	Represas	was	one	of	the	24	
organisations	represented	in	the	protests.	People	in	Aysén	were	calling	for	attention	to	
their	plight	of	being	isolated	and	ignored,	suffering	high	prices	of	food	and	fuel,	with	few	
work	 and	 educational	 opportunities,	 poor	 transport	 connectivity,	 all	 the	 while	 being	
managed	from	distant	Santiago,	where	projects	like	HidroAysén,	which	would	have	such	
significant	impact	on	the	region,	were	negotiated.	The	protests	had	the	support	of	80%	
of	Ayseninos	(as	people	from	this	part	of	Chile	are	known).	One	of	a	list	of	demands	that	
that	 the	 protestors	 had	 was	 for	 binding	 regional	 plebicites	 on	 megaprojects	 like	
HidroAysén,	for	greater	regional	control	over	planning,	and	for	Santiago	to	cede	control	
over	 resources,	 like	 fish	 and	 water,	 to	 the	 region.	 The	 protests	 made	 Aysén	 visible	
nationally	 (McAllister	2012)	and	 though	 they	were	dealt	with	brutally	by	3000	 troops	
shipped	to	the	region	(six	people	lost	eyes	to	police	bullets),	they	must	have	served	as	a	
warning	 both	 to	 government	 and	 to	 the	 megaproject’s	 developers	 about	 the	 kind	 of	
protest	that	was	possible	in	Aysén	if	the	megaproject	were	to	be	forced	on	the	region.		
During	 2012	 and	 2013,	 the	 anti-dams	 movement	 also	 organised	 various	 events	 in	
Santiago	 to	keep	HidroAysén	visible.	 	To	commemorate	 International	Earth	Day	on	22	
April	 2012,	 the	 campaign	 organised	 a	music	 event	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 Santiago,	which	 it	
titled,	seemingly	in	response	to	the	media’s	heralding	of	a	“green	light”	for	the	project,	
“Luz	Roja	a	HidroAysén”	(Red	Light	for	HidroAysén).		
	
Figure	40:	One	of	Patagonia	sin	Represas’	tweets	about	the	22	April	event.	
Some	 of	 Chile’s	 best	 known	 musicians	 donated	 their	 time,	 and	 the	 event,	 which	 La	
Tercera	noted	went	ahead	“peacefully”	(La	Tercera	22/04/2012),	was	widely	covered	in	
the	broadcast	media,	 including	 in	a	special	report	by	CNN	Chile.	 In	December	of	2012,	
anti-dams	organisations	followed	the	same	format	and	held	a	concert	 it	called:	“Juntos	
Desenchufemos	 HidroAysén”	 (Together	 Let’s	 Unplug	 HidroAysén).	 This	 was	 another	
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happening	which	seemed	to	be	both	organised	and	discussed	after	 the	event	on	social	
media,	more	than	in	traditional	media:	
	
Figure	41:	Facebook	post	and	YouTube	link	for	“Juntos	Desenchufemos	HidroAysén”.	
Though	 the	event	was	reported	 in	 the	corpus	media,	 the	articles	mainly	discussed	 the	
musicians	who	would	be	playing	and	offered	 little	analysis	 surrounding	 the	anti-dams	
protest,	 though	 El	 Mercurio	 (09/12/2012)	 did	 note	 that	 the	 event	 was	 intended	 to	
highlight	anti-megaproject	positions	 in	advance	of	the	Committee	of	Ministers’	vote	on	
the	project,	now	expected	in	January	2013.		
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 most	 successful	 initiative	 in	 this	 period	 in	 terms	 of	 public	
visibility	 and	 political	 adhesion	 was	 a	 campaign	 it	 called	 “Vota	 sin	 Represas”	 (Vote	
without	Dams)	which	was	launched	in	a	televised	event	at	the	National	Congress	in	July	
2013	in	the	run	up	to	presidential	elections	in	2013/14.	Its	aim	was	to	make	HidroAysén	
a	 key	 election	 issue	 as	 it	 had	 been	 in	 the	 2009/10	 election.	 Vota	 sin	 Represas	 asked	
candidates	running	for	election	at	any	level	of	government	to	declare	their	position	on	
the	dams,	and	to	make	a	signed	commitment	to	work	towards	a	Patagonia	free	of	dam	
megaprojects.	 This	 publicity	 strategy	 included	 social	 media	 content,	 letter	 box	 drops,	
advertisements	in	print	media	and	posters	on	public	transport	routes.	Though	the	Vota	
sin	Represas	 initiative	 is	 not	 named	 frequently	 in	 the	 corpus	media,	 apart	 from	 some	
publicity	 surrounding	 its	 launch	 (for	 example,	 El	 Mercurio	 09/06/2013)	 the	 dams	
certainly	became	a	crucial	issue	in	the	election	from	this	time.	Vota	sin	Represas’	social	
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media	sites	were	active,	with	over	9000	followers	on	Facebook,	nearly	4000	on	Twitter,	
and	Vota	sin	Represas	videos	on	YouTube.	On	Twitter,	Vota	sin	Represas	kept	a	rolling	
tally	of	candidates	who	declared	their	positions	on	the	dams:		
						
		
Figure	42:	A	tweet	showing	Senator	Horvath’s	“reaffirmation”	of	his	committment	to	a	
Patagonia	without	Dams,	and	a	Vota	sin	Represas’	 tally	of	presidential	candidates	who	
had	declared	themselves	“without	dams”.	
On	 Facebook	 also,	 Vota	 sin	 Represas	 urged	 Chileans	 to	 vote	 for	 candidates	 that	 had	
declared	their	opposition	to	dam	projects	for	Patagonia:	
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Figure	 43:	 “There	 are	 thousands	 of	 us	who	want	 a	 Patagonia	Without	Dams.	 In	 these	
elections,	vote	for	the	candidates	who	commit	to	a	Patagonia	free	of…”	
It	seemed	that	the	public	pressure	for	candidates	to	declare	a	position	on	the	dams	had	
indeed	borne	fruit	for	the	anti-dams	movement,	when	in	a	debate	on	TVN	in	late-2013,	
leading	 candidate	 Bachelet	 stated	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 megaproject:	 “I	 don’t	 think	 it	 is	
viable.	 I	 am	 not	 in	 favour	 of	 it”	 –	 a	 move	 interpreted	 in	 all	 the	 corpus	 media,	 as	 La	
Tercera	put	it,	“increasing	the	difficulty”	for	the	project	(La	Tercera	26/11/2013).	
8.4	“Uncertainty	threatens	the	project”	
	
During	 this	period,	 there	was	one	other	key	news	event	 that	kept	HidroAysén	visible.	
Since	early	2011,	Piñera’s	government	had	been	promising	 legislation	on	a	 “Careterra	
Eléctrica”	 (“Electricity	 Highway”),	 a	 publically	 financed	 project	 to	 connect	 all	 Chile’s	
electricity	 grids71.	 For	 HidroAysén,	 this	would	 have	meant	 a	 900km	 reduction	 in	 the	
length	 of	 its	 proposed	 transmission	 line,	 with	 consequent	 savings.	 By	 mid-2012,	
however,	this	project	had	not	advanced,	or	been	defined	with	any	clarity	by	the	Piñera	
government.	 Also,	 the	 Committee	 of	 Ministers	 charged	 with	 giving	 HidroAysén	 final	
approval,	which	had	initially	had	30	days	from	May	2011	to	make	its	ruling,	had	still	not	
delivered	an	outcome,	partly	due	to	ongoing	litigation	(see	Chapter	7,	footnote	66).		
	
At	 the	end	of	May	2012,	Colbún	delivered	a	bombshell.	The	 company	declared	 that	 it	
would	 be	 withdrawing	 from	 and	 suspending	 indefinitely	 its	 participation	 in	 the	 EIS	
process	 for	HidroAysén’s	 2300km	 transmission	 line	 because	 of	 lack	 of	 a	 clear	 energy	
policy	 in	 Chile.	 Fernández	 had	 foreshadowed	 the	 decision	 in	 a	 speech	 at	 a	 Reuters	
forum	in	 the	capital.	El	Mercurio	 (29/05/2012)	reported	him	as	criticizing	both	“legal	
action	 to	 delay	 and	 stop	projects”,	 and	 also	 government	 actions	 that	 had	 engendered	
“uncertainty”	on	the	project.	He	said	that	potential	investors	were	reluctant	to	invest	in	
such	an	atmosphere.	The	following	day,	a	Colbún	media	release,	quoted	in	El	Mercurio	
(30/05/2012)	read:		
																																																						
71	Some	of	those	opposing	HidroAysén	called	the	project	the	“Careterra	Hidroeléctrica”,	arguing	that	it	
would	be	an	initiative	made	to	measure	for	HidroAysén	and	other	hydroelectric	dams	intending	to	export	
their	energy	from	Patagonia:	effectively	a	government	subsidy	of	private	energy	projects	(Cuadra	2013).	
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While	there	is	no	energy	policy	with	national	consensus	to	define	the	energy	
matrix	 that	 the	 country	 requires,	 Colbún	 considers	 that	 the	 conditions	 for	
developing	energy	projects	of	this	magnitude	and	complexity	do	not	exist.		
The	announcement	seemed	to	constitute	an	indefinite	suspension	of	HidroAysén.	There	
was	a	flurry	of	media	coverage,	evident	in	the	corpus	media.	El	Mercurio	(01/06/2012)	
described	 the	 news	 as	 a	 “violent	 upset”.	 El	 Mostrador	 characterised	 this	 as	 a	 protest	
against	perceived	government	inaction	to	facilitate	the	project,	saying	that	this	was	“an	
act	of	pressurising	the	government”,	that	“the	Mattes	are	banging	their	fists	on	the	table”	
(El	 Mostrador	 31/05/2012).	 Another	 article	 in	 El	 Mostrador	 (01/06/2012)	 said	 that	
metaphorically:	“the	Matte	family	felt	it	had	no	other	option	than	to	go	out	on	the	street	
and	burn	tyres”.	El	Mostrador	(02/06/2012)	also	reported	that	this	was	an	“ultimatum”	
by	the	Mattes	to	force	the	government’s	hand,	and	reported	Horvath	as	saying	that	there	
was	 “something	 akin	 to	 bribery”	 in	 this	 move	 (30/08/2012).	 La	 Tercera	 likewise	
reported	 the	 move	 as	 the	 company	 exerting	 pressure	 on	 the	 government.	 It	 quoted	
parliamentarian	Alfonso	de	Uresti	as	saying:	“this	is	a	signal	of	pressure	on	the	executive	
so	 that	 it	 finally	 makes	 a	 determination	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 project”	 (La	 Tercera	
31/05/2012).	 Piñera	 blamed	 both	 the	 environmental	 movement	 and	 developing	
companies	 themselves	 for	 the	 situation,	 but	 promised	 action	 from	 government.	 El	
Mercurio	(Concha	&	Tapia,	El	Mercurio	2/06/2012)	quoted	him	saying	that:	
Various	energy	projects	are	being	confronted	with	a	ferocious	opposition	by	
environmentalists	 and	 other	 groups	 that	 try	 to	 impede	 their	 construction,	
while	 the	companies	complain	 that	 they	still	don’t	have	clear	rules	 to	move	
forward	 with	 their	 investments…The	 state	 must	 establish	 mechanisms	 to	
expedite	 both	 generation	 and	 transmission	 projects	 so	 that	 that	 they	 don’t	
have	obstacles	put	in	their	way	by	bureaucracy	or	legal	actions…	
In	its	editorials	around	this	time,	El	Mercurio	reiterated	its	support	for	the	project	and	
criticisms	 of	 the	 anti-dams	 movement,	 calling	 it	 a	 “serious	 blunder”	 for	 the	 Chilean	
economy	“that	must	be	resolved	immediately”	(El	Mercurio	3/06/2012).	It	said:	
Since	the	project	began,	the	HidroAysén	project	(with	2750MW	of	power	and	
with	 the	possibility	of	bringing	 the	country	an	enormous	amount	of	energy	
for	 its	 development,	 by	means	 of	 five	 dams	 that	would	 flood	 in	 total	 5900	
hectares	which	would	correspond	to	0,00054	of	 the	area	of	Aysén,	108,494	
km2,	–	waters	which	if	not	used	for	generation	of	electricity	are	lost	into	the	
sea	–	and	a	continuous	current	transmission	line,	with	just	one	cable	and	not	
like	 the	 transmission	 towers	 that	we	see	 in	 the	central	part	of	 the	country)	
the	 merciless	 attacks	 by	 “progressives”,	 “greens”,	 “environmentalists”	 and	
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“foreigners”	have	intensified.	These	fail	to	recognise	that	if	this	project	is	not	
built,	we	will	 have	 to	 recourse	urgently	 to	 options	 that	 are	more	polluting,	
and	that	energy	will	get	more	expensive.	
Of	Colbún’s	position	El	Mercurio	said:	
Hopefully	 this	 decision	 will	 not	 be	 final,	 and	 that	 the	 problems	 that	 affect	
hydro	and	thermoelectric	projects	will	be	resolved,	because	 there	 is	always	
the	danger	 that	 the	 investor,	who	 sees	himself	 harassed	 and	denigrated	by	
“environmentalists”	 “greens”	 “progressives”	 and	 other	 “foreigners”,	 will	
decide	not	to	invest	in	the	country…	
(El	Mercurio	04/06/2012)		
From	 this	point,	 discourse	 in	 the	 corpus	media	 in	 relation	 to	 the	megaproject	 is	 filled	
with	the	word	“incertidumbre”	(uncertainty).	Between	2008	and	April	2012,	the	word	is	
mentioned	in	12	articles	in	the	corpus	media.	After	April	2012,	until	the	final	decision	on	
the	 project	 was	 made	 in	 2014,	 49	 articles	 used	 the	 word	 at	 least	 once.	 The	 word	
“indefinición”	(lack	of	clarity,	or	vagueness)	in	relation	to	government	policy	on	energy	
also	appears	in	the	discourse	from	2012.	Also,	after	the	decision	by	Colbún	in	May	2012,	
the	word	“inviable”	(unviable)	is	frequently	used.	For	example,	Horvath	is	quoted	in	El	
Mercurio	 in	 May	 2012	 as	 saying	 “HidroAysén	 is	 increasingly	 unviable”	 (El	 Mercurio	
30/05/2012)	 and	 La	 Tercera	 quoted	 Greenpeace	 head,	 Asún,	 as	 saying	 that	 Colbún’s	
withdrawal	was	a	sign	that	the	project	was	“not	only	finished,	but	completely	unviable”	
(La	Tercera	 30/05/2012).	The	word	 “unviable”	 appears	18	 times	 in	 the	 corpus	media	
before	April	2012,	but	39	times	between	that	date	and	the	end	of	the	corpus	in	2014.	It	
seems	 HidroAysén	 was	 therefore	 surrounded	 by	 uncertainty,	 lack	 of	 government	
support	 and	an	 increasing	discourse	on	 its	unviability,	 from	mid-2012.	By	early	2013,	
the	 megaproject	 had	 been	 withdrawn	 from	 Endesa's	 portfolio	 of	 projects	 in	 Chile,	
however,	 the	 company	 continued	 to	 work	 on	 the	 technical	 and	 legal	 aspects	 of	 the	
project,	 on	 attracting	 investors,	 and	 of	 course,	 on	 relations	 with	 communities	 on	 the	
ground.		
8.5	Patagonia	sin	Tompkins		
During	 the	 time	 that	HidroAysén	was	working,	 “low-profile”	 in	 the	 region	 to	 generate	
more	 local	 approval	 for	 the	 project,	 there	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 new	 initiative	 afoot:	 to	
demonise	 Douglas	 Tompkins.	 As	 a	 key	 funder	 and	 communications	 mastermind	 of	
	 283	
Patagonia	sin	Represas,	Tompkins	had	long	been	a	thorn	in	the	side	of	the	company.	The	
company	had	never	spared	its	words	in	is	public	criticism	of	the	environmentalist,	nor	
he	of	the	company.	From	HidroAysén’s	point	of	view,	the	American	owner	of	vast	tracts	
of	Patagonia	was	 the	chief	obstacle	 to	 the	megaproject’s	progress.	Conservative	media	
had	 largely	 concurred	 with	 this	 position.	 For	 example,	 amongst	 many	 other	 negative	
assessments	of	Tompkins	in	the	corpus	media	for	this	study,	El	Mercurio	had	published	a	
scathing	op-ed	in	late	2011	(by	the	director	of	a	right-libertarian	American	think	tank)	
in	which	it	accused	Tompkins	of	“green	neoimperialism”:	
Developing	countries	continue	to	be	vulnerable	to	imperialism,	now	based	in	
ideologies	 like	 environmentalism.	 The	 green	 “missionaries”	 of	 these	
ideologies	 propose	 to	 save	 the	 world	 from	 environmental	
degradation…Convinced	of	 their	moral	 superiority,	 these	green	 imperialists	
use	 their	 persuasive	 rhetoric	 and	 indirect	 methods	 to	 paralyse	 economic	
development…An	example:	Douglas	Tompkins.	Tompkins	is	a	typical	“green”	
missionary,	 a	 very	 rich	 gringo	 who	 made	 his	 fortune	 with	 his	 companies,	
Esprit,	 and	 The	 North	 Face…They	 dress	 up	 the	 rich	 of	 the	 world	 with	
ecological	elegance,	and	then	they	invest	part	of	the	profits	in	supressing	the	
economic	hopes	of	the	poor…The	Tompkins	of	this	world	are	arrogant…It	is	
immoral	and	absurd	to	try	to	make	Chile	and	other	countries	into	museums	
of	 ecology,	 where	 man	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 intruder.	 But	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 the	
objective	of	many	“greens”.	The	new	heavy	cross	of	the	poor	is	a	cross	that	is	
coloured	green.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Smith,	El	Mercurio	24/11/2011)	
Tompkins	had	previously	been	described	in	El	Mercurio	(by	local	parliamentarian	René	
Alinco)	 as	 “a	 gringo	 invader”	 (11/05/2011c)	 and	Fernández,	 as	noted	 in	 the	previous	
chapter,	 had	 accused	 Tompkins	 of	 trying	 to	 turn	 Patagonia	 into	 a	 place	 of	
“contemplation	and	privilege”	(El	Mercurio	16/12/2010).	
Tompkins	was	certainly	a	controversial	 figure	 in	Patagonia.	As	discussed	 in	Chapter	5,	
Tompkins	had	bought	hundreds	of	thousands	of	hectares	of	Chile	for	conservation	since	
the	1980s.	His	Parque	Pumalín	stretched	from	the	Argentine	border	to	the	fjords	on	the	
Pacific	Ocean	at	one	point,	and	there	had	been	some	difficult	negotiations	about	building	
road	access	for	the	Carretera	Austral	–	the	only	road	connecting	Aysén	with	the	rest	of	
Chile	 –	 through	 Pumalín.	 Some	 local	 people	 around	 his	 Estancia	 Chacabuco,	 further	
south,	complained	that	he	had	bought	up	their	land	which	had	been	used	for	grazing	and	
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animal	breeding,	and	populated	it	with	native	animals72.	This	position	against	Tompkins	
was	 underscored	 when	 in	 August	 2013,	 a	 new	 organisation	 appeared	 in	 the	 Aysén	
region,	calling	itself	“La	Voz	de	la	Patagonia”	(The	Voice	of	Patagonia).	
	
Figure	 44:	 Voice	 of	 Patagonia.	 Welcome	 to	 the	 Twiter	 (sic)	 of	 the	 social	 movement,	
“Voice	 of	 Patagonia”	 from	 Cochrane,	 and	 formed	 by	 people	 who	 live	 in	 Captain	 Prat	
Province.	
La	Voz	de	 la	Patagonia	 clearly	aimed	 to	build	on	 the	controversy	around	Tompkins.	A	
few	 days	 after	 the	 organisation	was	 launched,	 during	 the	 lead	 up	 to	 the	 election	 that	
would	effectively	decide	HidroAysén’s	future,	La	Tercera	published	a	letter	to	the	editor	
by	the	organisation’s	leader,	Carlos	Olivares.	In	relation	to	the	Carretera	Austral	it	said:		
Tompkins	can	lead	the	life	he	wants,	but	the	people	of	Aysén	can’t.	He	doesn’t	
suffer	 from	 isolation…he	 can	 just	 catch	 a	 helicopter;	 for	 Patagonians,	 the	
endless	wait,	 isolation	and	the	sensation	of	abandonment	and	 inequality.	 In	
Patagonia	we	think	that	now	it’s	time	to	change	this.		
																																																																																		(Olivares,	La	Tercera	07/09/2013)		
It	soon	became	clear	that	the	La	Voz	de	 la	Patagonia’s	key	objectives	were	to	promote	
hydroelectricity	 and	 to	 discredit	 Tompkins,	 as	 it	 did	 abundantly	 on	 its	 Twitter	 and	
Facebook	pages	–	where	it	had	687	‘Friends’	and	265	(Twitter)	followers	(as	of	October	
2018).	It	also	printed	a	bumper	sticker	saying	“Patagonia	without	Tompkins”,	which	in	I	
observed	 in	 late	 2013	 appearing	 frequently,	 especially	 around	 Cochrane	 where	 the	
organisation	was	based.	
																																																						
72	 In	2018,	405,000	hectares	of	 conservation	 lands	were	donated	 to	 the	Chilean	state	as	Tompkins	had	
promised,	 to	 be	 national	 parks	 in	 perpetuity	 (BBC	 30/01/18).	 This	 is	 thought	 to	 be	 the	 largest	 land	
donation	in	history	by	a	private	owner	to	a	state.			
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Figure	45:	“Patagonia	without	Tompkins”	bumper	sticker.	
	
Figure	 46:	 Voice	 of	 Patagonia	 poster:	 “Hidroelectricity,	 development	 for	 Aysén,	
Contribution	to	Chile,	with	respect	we	can	[do	this].”	
Like	HidroAysén,	the	organisation	also	carried	out	house-to-house	visits	in	some	parts	of	
Aysén,	 and	 it	 also	 had	 a	 weekly	 radio	 show	 (“in	 which	 we	 torpedoed	 Tompkins	 a	
lot…attacked	him	a	 lot”,	Olivares	explained).	When	 I	 interviewed	Olivares	 in	Cochrane	
for	 this	study,	he	spoke	much	about	 the	sentiments	of	some	of	 the	organisation’s	 local	
members	 who	 felt	 they	 had	 been	 “displaced”	 from	 their	 lands	 by	 Tompkins.	 He	 was	
incensed	about	“foreigners”	buying	 land	 in	Patagonia.	However,	he	also	revealed	some	
disturbing	beliefs	about	Tompkins’	motives:	“This	compadre	wants	to	invade	Patagonia.	
Because	 Tompkins	 has	 a	 façade	 of	 environmentalism,	 but	 his	 objectives…don’t	 forget	
also,	 that	 Tompkins	 is	 a	 Jew…”	 When	 asked	 what	 significance	 this	 had,	 Olivares	
answered:		
Don’t	 forget	 that	 the	 Jews	 have	 a	 Promised	 Land…and	 it	 is	 speculated	 that	
this	could	be	Patagonia….Tompkins	is	buying…In	Argentina	he	has	1	million	
hectares	and	 in	Chile	400,000.	His	motive	 is	 to	create	an	 independent	state	
within	 the	 two	 nations…And	 in	 the	 hypothetical	 situation	 that	 there	 is	 a	
nuclear	 war,	 who	 do	 you	 think	 would	 come	 to	 the	 Chacabuco	 Valley?	
Tompkins	 and	 all	 his	 donors….the	 Rockefellers…do	 you	 know	 who	
Rockefeller	is?	So	you	see,	the	motive	of	Tompkins	is	not	environmentalism,	
it’s	real	estate…or	setting	up	a	state	inside	a	state.	
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	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Olivares,	interviewed	16/10/18)	
He	also	added	that:	“Tompkins	has	transformed	himself	 into	a	regional	cause…and	the	
primary	 obstacle	 for	 development.”	 La	 Voz	 de	 La	 Patagonia’s	 Facebook	 page	 makes	
liberal	 use	 of	 terms	 such	 as	 “extremist”,	 “fundamentalist”	 “usurper”	 “criminal”	 and	
“Zionist”	 to	describe	Tompkins73.	 It	also	began	to	make	use	of	culture-jamming	hybrid	
images	on	Facebook,	echoing	those	in	the	anti-dams	ads,	to	denote	the	malign	influence	
Voz	de	la	Patagonia	felt	Tompkins	to	be:	
	
Figure	47:	Composite	image	of	Tompkins	from	Voz	de	la	Patagonia’s	Facebook	account.	
The	text	calls	him	a	“pseudo-environmentalist”.		
It	 also	 discusses	 the	 so-called	 “Plan	 Andinia”,	 an	 anti-semitic	 conspiracy	 theory	 that	
originated	 in	Argentina	 in	 the	1970s	concerning	the	establishment	of	a	 Jewish	state	 in	
Chile	and	Argentina,	and	has	been	used	by	the	far	right	in	both	countries	(Bohoslavsky	
2008).		
																																																						
73	 Tompkins,	 who	 was	 not	 Jewish,	 was	 little	 perturbed	 by	 these	 attacks.	 Asked	 about	 La	 Voz	 de	 La	
Patagonia	 in	 interview,	he	 said:	 “Well,	 you	always	have	 some	nutcases	out	 there,	OK?	You	 just	have	 to	
know	that	beforehand.	You	have	 to	be	comfortable	with	 that.	You	 just	 let	 it	play	out.	You	have	 to	have	
some	self-confidence	about	that.”	
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But	there	existed	another	theory	in	relation	to	La	Voz	de	la	Patagonia	at	the	time	I	was	
interviewing	for	this	study	in	Aysén	in	2013.	Several	interviewees,	including	the	mayor	
of	 Caleta	 Tortel,	 Bernardo	 López,	 said	 that	 La	 Voz	 de	 la	 Patagonia	 was	 a	 lobby	
organisation	created	by	HidroAysén.	López,	the	most	adamant	on	this,	said:	
It’s	 not	 that	 it	 could	 be…it’s	 a	 fact.	 They,	 HidroAysén,	 established	 this	
organisation,	 they	 finance	 this	 organisation…just	 like	 Patagonia	 sin	
Represas…they	 finance	 this	 organisation,	 and	 the	 people	 that	work	 on	 this	
campaign	have	received	jobs	and	benefits	from	HidroAysén.	
(López,	interviewed	28/10/2013)	
If	 this	 is	 correct,	 it	 constitutes	 an	 important,	 and	 to	 most	 observers,	 hidden	 part	 of	
HidroAysén’s	communicational	modus	operandi	at	the	time	when	it	had	retreated	from	a	
national	 debate.	 This	 study	 does	 not	 offer	 any	 proof	 of	 the	 Voz	 de	 la	
Patagonia/HidroAysén	 connection,	 or	 evaluate	 this	 claim’s	 veracity,	 but	 what	 is	
significant	 here	 is	 that	 there	 clearly	 existed	 some	 significant	 anti-Tompkins,	 anti-
foreigner	sentiment	 in	Aysén,	and	opportunities	were	clearly	seized	 to	amplify	 this,	 to	
spread	 disinformation74,	 and	 to	 connect	 Tompkins	 and	 the	 megaproject	 as	 visibly	 as	
possible	in	the	region.	Aspects	of	this	clearly	seemed	to	be	a	manifestation	of	the	kind	of	
fake	news	that	can	proliferate	in	the	echo	chambers	of	the	internet	(Allcott	&	Gentzkow	
2017;	McNair	2017).	 	What	is	also	significant	here	is	that	any	opposition	to	the	project	
was	being	aligned	with	elitism	and	“rich	nation	environmentalism”	(Nixon	2011,	p.	2)	in	
the	 anti-Tompkins	 discourse.	 Patagonia	 sin	 Tompkins	 was	 therefore	 a	 means	 of	
strengthening	 the	 representational	 connection	 with	 some	 of	 the	 things	 that	 the	 anti-
dams	 campaign	 had	 already	 inadvertently	 become	 symbolic	 of:	 elitism,	 foreignness,	
hindering	development,	and	extending	the	control	of	“afuerinos”	(outsiders)	in	deciding	
the	future	of	Patagonia.	
8.6	“The	slow	death	of	HidroAysén”75	
In	 December	 2013,	 Michele	 Bachelet	 won	 a	 second	 presidential	 term,	 defeating	
Sebastián	Piñera.	It	became	clear	in	January	2014	that	the	outgoing	government	would	
																																																						
74	Fernández	himself	had	been	quoted	in	El	Mostrador	as	saying	that	the	anti-dams	campaign	had	spread	
“false	myths”	 (Urquieta,	El	Mostrador	 4/10/2010)	 so	 La	 Voz	 de	 la	 Patagonia	may	 have	 been	 a	 kind	 of	
communicational	retribution	in	kind.	
75(López,	El	Mostrador	20/03/14)	
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not	be	delivering	the	Committee	of	Ministers’	verdict	on	the	project,	and	that	this	would	
now	be	 the	 key	 task	 for	 the	 start	 of	 Bachelet’s	 second	presidency.	 Sworn	 in	 in	March	
2014,	Bachelet	appointed	economist	Máximo	Pacheco	as	energy	minister.	Interviewed	in	
El	Mostrador,	Pacheco	immediately	presented	a	more	conciliatory	tone	on	Chile’s	energy	
future.	 He	 was	 quoted	 as	 saying:	 “there	 are	 all	 sorts	 of	 new	 things	 happening	 in	 the	
world	in	terms	of	energy	that	one	has	to	pay	close	attention	to”,	and	as	emphasising	the	
necessity	 for	 energy	 projects	 “to	 listen	 to	 communities	 and	 to	 public	 opinion”	 and	 to	
“look	 after	 the	 environment”	 (El	 Mostrador	 24/01/2014).	 Less	 than	 a	 week	 after	
Bachelet	 was	 sworn	 in,	 her	 government	 announced	 that	 she	 had	 convened	 a	 new	
Committee	of	Ministers	to	resolve	the	HidroAysén	issue.	The	Committee’s	first	act	was	to	
invalidate	 the	 resolution	 brought	 by	 its	 counterpart	 committee	 under	 Piñera’s	
government,	which	had	 called	 for	 a	new	EIS	 addendum	 from	 the	 company	on	 aspects	
that	had	been	lacking	in	the	EIS	responses	since	2008	(El	Mercurio	19/05/2014).	Now	
the	remaining	questions	and	complaints	related	to	the	EIS	would	be	assessed	as	a	final	
version:	the	company	would	have	no	right	of	reply	by	adding	further	studies,	though	it	
would	still	have	a	30-day	right	of	appeal	in	the	Environmental	Tribunals	(El	Mostrador	
19/03/2014).	
In	the	lead	up	to	the	meeting,	Environment	Minister	Pablo	Badenier	met	with	Patagonia	
sin	 Represas	 representatives,	 and	 anti-dams	 parliamentarians	 Urresti	 and	 Girardi.	 El	
Mercurio	quoted	environmentalist	Patricio	Rodrigo	as	saying	after	the	meeting	that	the	
project	“would	soon	no	longer	be	a	national	 issue”	(El	Mercurio	20/05/2014).	The	day	
before	the	Committee’s	meeting,	Badenier	also	met	Voz	de	la	Patagonia	representatives,	
including	 Olivares,	 to	 appeal	 for	 the	 megaproject’s	 future.	 El	 Mercurio	 quoted	 their	
expressions	of	support	for	the	megaproject	–	though,	interestingly,	it	also	reported	that	
they	 denied	 their	 trip	 to	 the	 capital	 had	 been	 funded	 by	 the	 developing	 company	 (El	
Mercurio	 09/04/2014).	 Shortly	 before	 the	 meeting,	 Douglas	 Tompkins	 was	 also	
interviewed	in	La	Tercera	making	the	announcement	that	his	Parque	Pumalín	would	be	
donated	 to	 the	 Chilean	 government,	 on	 condition	 it	 became	 a	 national	 park.	 In	 the	
interview,	 he	 said	 of	 HidroAysén:	 “it	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 dead	 project”	 (La	 Tercera	
20/04/2014).	The	night	before	the	committee’s	meeting,	candlelight	vigils	were	held	by	
the	anti-dams	movement.	
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The	Committee	of	Ministers	(of	Environment,	Energy,	Mining,	Agriculture,	Economy	and	
Health)	convened	on	10	June	2014,	and	after	three	hours	of	deliberations,	unanimously	
rejected	 the	project,	 cancelling	 the	RCA	granted	 in	2011.	The	 resolution	was	made	on	
technical	aspects	of	the	EIS	–		that	the	project	had	not	complied	with	environmental	law	
in	 three	key	aspects.	The	much-anticipated	decision	was	widely	 covered	 in	 the	media.	
The	following	day,	La	Tercera	published	a	piece	by	Energy	Minister	Pacheco	in	which	he	
wrote	of	taking	decisions	only	“with	the	necessary	social	legitimacy”.	
We	 now	 need	 to	 undertake	 some	 collective	 learning.	 New	 projects	 will	 be	
required	 to	 be	 conducted	 well	 right	 from	 the	 beginning…with	 an	 early	
engagement	of	 the	communities,	 listening	 to	 legitimate	questions	about	 the	
impact	 of	 projects	 on	 the	 life	 of	 families	 and	 their	 environments…The	
resolution	 of	 the	 Committee	 of	 Ministers	 is	 symbolic.	 It	 closes	 a	 cycle	 of	
controversy	for	Aysén	and	also	for	the	national	discussion	on	energy.	I	have	
underscored	the	necessity	to	“dehidroaysén-ise”	the	debate	over	our	energy	
future,	 because	 it	 is	 not	 reasonable	 that	 the	 country	 stakes	 its	 future	
gambling	on	just	one	project	in	the	long	term.		
			 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Pacheco,	La	Tercera	11/06/2014)		
	
However,	La	Tercera	also	published	an	editorial	in	which	it	lamented	“the	long	chain	of	
errors	 and	 lapses	 in	 judgement	 that	 had	 ended	 in	 prolonged	 vacillation”	 and	 the	
“discrediting	 of	 institutional	 processes”	 (La	 Tercera	 11/06/2014).	 An	 editorial	 in	 El	
Mercurio	 immediately	 following	 the	 decision	 stated	 that	 “the	 reasons	 cited	 by	 the	
Committee	of	Ministers	are	not	convincing”.	It	noted	“the	political	factor”	and	said	“it’s	
impossible	not	to	see	the	colour	of	this	decision”.	It	said	of	the	megaproject:	
	
Its	 rejection,	 rather	 than	 being	 due	 to	 a	 determined	 environmental	 impact,	
seems	 to	 have	 deferred	 to	 a	 popular	 veto	 by	 organised	 groups	 that	 have	
dominated	the	voice	of	the	citizenry.			
	
However,	 the	same	editorial	also	acknowledged:	“the	complacency	of	 the	shareholding	
companies	in	terms	of	the	necessary	communication	of	the	project”	as	one	of	the	reasons	
for	the	project’s	failure	(El	Mercurio	12/06/2014).	El	Mostrador	published	an	interview	
with	 Piñera’s	 environment	 minister	 Benítez,	 underscoring	 the	 political	 nature	 of	 the	
decision:	
	
The	 whole	 discussion	 of	 the	 motives	 for	 rejecting	 the	 project	 is	 just	 pure	
fabrication.	Bachelet	said	in	the	presidential	campaign	that	it	was	inviable,	so	
it	is	in	fact	the	chronicle	of	a	death	foretold.	
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The	article	continued:		
	
Bachelet	knew	that	approving	the	project	was	politically	unapproachable	–	if	
she	had	 taken	a	decision	different	 from	 the	one	 that	has	been	adopted,	 the	
costs	 would	 have	 been	 incalculable…The	 government	 has	 ceded	 to	 the	
“demand	of	the	streets”.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 									(Cárcamo,	El	Mercurio	11/06/2014)	
	
El	Mostrador,	however,	also	made	a	deeper	analysis	of	the	situation	in	an	editorial.	It	
said:		
	
HidroAysén’s	 administrative	 certification	 process	 had	 too	many	 challenges.	
These	 came	not	only	 from	 the	 size	of	 the	environmental	 impacts	 that	were	
insufficiently	 addressed	 by	 the	 project,	 but	 also	 from	 the	 climate	 of	 citizen	
protest	 that	 surrounded	 it,	 originating	 in	 the	 perception	 that	 there	was	 an	
illegitimate	 pairing	 between	 politics	 and	 business	which	 infringed	 people’s	
rights...	
	
It	added:		
	
	 The	perception	that	the	judicialisation	of	environmental	questions	is	the	
product	only	of	an	anti-development	social	activism	is	a	simplistic	vision	
of	 the	problem…The	fundamental	 issue	here	 is	 the	real	sustainability	of	
projects,	without	hidden	environmental	liabilities.	It	is	also	an	issue	of	a	
good	 government	 ecology,	 and	 strict	 compliance	 with	 the	 law.	 The	
cancellation	of	HidroAysén	is	a	positive	signal.		
	
			(El	Mostrador	13/06/2014a)		
	
	
The	 response	 from	 the	 anti-dams	movement	 to	 the	 Committee’s	 ruling	was	 exultant.	
Anti-dams	actors	characterised	the	decision	as	a	citizens’	victory	over	the	political	and	
economic	system	that	had	supported	the	megaproject.	El	Mostrador	quoted	Greenpeace	
Chile’s	head,	Matías	Asún	as	saying:	
This	is	a	citizens’	triumph	for	the	thousands	of	people	who	came	out	onto	the	
streets	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 opposition	 to	 the	 project.	 The	 death	 of	
HidroAysén	is	a	victory	of	an	empowered	civil	society	which	raised	its	voice	
for	over	10	years,	and	finally	managed	to	bury	the	project.			
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									(El	Mostrador	13/06/2014b)		
	
El	Mostrador	also	characterised	the	event	as	a	victory	for	social	movements,	and	for	
democracy.	It	said,	“Patagonia	sin	Represas	has	achieved	a	historic	triumph”…adding:		
	
Here,	as	in	the	education	debate,	we	have	for	a	long	time	been	victims	of	the	
use	and	abuse	of	a	way	of	understanding	reality	based	on	 the	 fallacy	of	 the	
market,	 which	 also	 adulates	 the	 technical	 and	 underestimates	 the	 value	 of	
dialogue.	
	
	(Sáez,	El	Mostrador	15/06/2014)	
	
In	the	social	networks,	the	decision	was	celebrated	with	a	new	hashtag:	
#chaohidroaysen	(Goodbye	HidroAysén)	
	
Figure	48:	 Patagonia	 sin	Represas	 tweet,	 saying:	 “We	did	 it.	We	won!	 Long	 live	 Chile!	
#goodbyehidroaysen”	
The	 company,	 however,	 remained	 quiet,	 apart	 from	 a	 brief	 four-line	media	 release	 in	
which	it	would	“wait	for	formal	notification”	of	the	Committee’s	decision,	and	“define	the	
course	of	action	to	continue”	(HidroAysén	11/06/2014).		
8.7	After	HidroAysén	
HidroAysén	did	 continue	with	appeals	and	 litigation	against	 the	Committee’s	decision,	
between	2014	and	October	2017.	Appeals	were	heard	 the	Environmental	Tribunals	of	
Valdivia	and	Santiago,	as	well	as	in	the	Supreme	Court.	In	January	2015,	HidroAysén	was	
denied	additional	water	rights	by	the	DGA,	a	move	that	El	Mercurio	reported	as	“putting	
the	 tombstone”	 on	 the	 case	 of	 HidroAysén	 (22/01/2015).	 Later	 that	 month,	 Endesa	
confirmed	 that	 it	was	 pulling	 out	 of	HidroAysén	 (and	 one	 of	 its	 planned	 coal	 burning	
power	stations,	Punta	Alcalde),	 saying	 that	 it	was	working	on	new	projects	 that	 “used	
the	 best	 technology	 available	 and	which	 are	more	 friendly	 to	 the	 environment	 and	 to	
society”	 (El	 Mercurio	 29/01/2015).	 However,	 even	 in	 early	 2016,	 Colbún	 was	 still	
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reaffirming	its	interest	in	completing	the	project.	Its	general	manager	was	reported	in	El	
Mercurio	as	saying	that:	“HidroAysén	will	definitely	be	built,	but	perhaps	in	a	different	
way	from	the	project	as	it	was	originally	conceived”	(07/01/2016).	
Just	a	few	months	later,	though,	the	discursive	representation	of	the	megaproject	–	and	
the	practical	 likelihood	of	 it	 being	built	 –	 seem	 to	have	 changed	entirely.	The	price	of	
photovoltaic	 power	 had	 fallen	 75%	 in	 the	 seven	 years	 to	 2017	 (Vargas,	 El	 Mercurio	
20/04/2017)	and	Chile,	with	its	near-cloudless	skies	in	the	arid	north,	can	now	produce	
the	cheapest	solar	power	in	the	world	at	US$29.10	per	megawatt	hour.	Energy	from	coal	
fired	 power	 stations	 now	 costs	 over	 twice	 as	 much	 (Puiu	 11/10/2018).	 	 In	 2017,	 El	
Mercurio	 reported	 as	 front-page	 news	 that	 by	 2024,	 ERNCs	 (primarily	 solar	 energy)	
would	 be	 supplying	 58%	 of	 the	 energy	 that	 HidroAysén	 would	 have	 generated,	 and	
quoted	the	president	of	Enel	in	Chile,	Herman	Chadwick,	as	saying	that	it	would	now	be	
“a	monumental	 error	 to	 invest	 in	 ‘traditional’	 power	 generation	 projects	 in	 Chile”	 (El	
Mercurio	 26/04/2017).	 El	 Mercurio	 also	 interviewed	 general	 manager	 of	 energy	
consultants	 Energética,	 María	 Isabel	 González,	 on	 the	 changed	 energy	 landscape.	 She	
said:		
A	 few	 years	 ago,	when	HidroAysén	was	 stopped,	 there	was	 talk	 of	 “energy	
blackouts”	in	Chile.	But	scenarios	change.	The	“blackout”	idea,	which	wasn’t	a	
good	way	 to	 promote	 a	 project,	 did	 have	 some	 logic,	 because	Chile	 needed	
energy	to	keep	growing…There	has	[now]	been	a	major	unexpected	change	in	
the	industry….HidroAysén	seemed	the	best	option	that	this	country	had	three	
years	ago.	Today	other	options	fit	the	current	scenario	better.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 												(Vargas,	El	Mercurio	20/04/2017)	
The	now	outgoing	government	of	Bachelet	was	quick	to	take	credit	for	Chile’s	response	
to	 the	 changed	 energy	 landscape.	 El	 Mercurio	 quoted	 Minister	 of	 Energy,	 Andrés	
Rebolledo	as	saying	that:	 “we	have	proven	that	 it	 is	possible	to	 implement	energy	 in	a	
different	way”	(El	Mercurio	17/11/2017a)	and	Environment	Minister	Marcelo	Mena	was	
quoted	saying	that:	“since	we	closed	the	door	on	HidroAysén,	investment	in	energy	has	
doubled,	 ERNCs	 have	 increased	 five-fold	 and	 prices	 have	 fallen	 75%”	 (El	 Mercurio	
05/11/2017a).	
During	2017,	HidroAysén	was	 still	 fighting	 legal	battles	against	 the	2014	 ruling	of	 the	
Committee	 of	Ministers.	However,	 in	October	 2017,	 Santiago’s	 environmental	 tribunal	
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rejected	 the	 company’s	 appeals.	 By	 early	 November,	 El	 Mercurio	 was	 reporting	 that	
Endesa	 and	 Colbún	 planned	 to	 return	 water	 rights	 that	 they	 held	 in	 relation	 to	
HidroAysén	to	the	government,	given	that	non-use	of	non-consumptive	water	rights	 in	
Chile	 attracted	 annual	 payments	 to	 government	 (El	 Mercurio	 05/11/2017b).	 An	
extraordinary	 meeting	 of	 shareholders	 was	 called	 for	 22	 December	 2017,	 which	 El	
Mercurio	reported	as	being	for	conducting	a	vote	on	the	“dissolution	and	liquidation	of	
the	 company”	 and	 the	 return	 of	 water	 rights	 (El	 Mercurio	 17/11/2017b).	 La	 Tercera	
reported	a	Colbún	spokesperson	as	saying	that	the	project	“is	not	feasible	 in	economic	
terms,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 current	 situation	 in	 the	 electricity	market”.	 The	 company	
also	said	 that	 it	would	only	develop	projects	 that	were	 “accepted	by	communities	and	
stakeholders	 in	 the	 areas	 where	 these	 projects	 are	 developed”	 (La	 Tercera	
17/11/2017).	 In	 a	marked	 change	 from	 its	 usual	 position	on	HidroAysén,	El	Mercurio	
also	published	an	editorial	on	the	day	that	the	company	was	dissolved,	saying	that:		
In	practical	terms,	the	suspension	of	HidroAysén	has	been	beneficial	for	the	
country,	 because	 it	 opened	 the	possibility	 to	 further	develop	ERNCs,	which	
have	 experienced	 a	 spectacular	 growth,	 especially	 wind	 and	 solar,	 with	 a	
reduction	in	tariffs…	
It	 also	 published	 an	 article	 about	 the	 anti-dams	 campaign	 in	 which	 the	 end	 of	
HidroAysén	 was	 described	 as	 “a	 citizens’	 achievement”,	 and	 in	 which	 Patagonia	 sin	
Represas	activists	were	quoted,	saying:	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 has	 been	 the	 most	 important	 socio-environmental	
cause	 in	 Chile’s	 recent	 history.	 It	 has	 strongly	 influenced	 public	 policy	 in	
relation	 to	water,	 social	participation,	and	of	 course,	energy…it’s	 something	
to	be	happy	about,	proud	of,	and	grateful	 for,	 that	 the	work	of	so	many	has	
achieved	 what	 seemed	 impossible	 on	 so	 many	 fronts.	 Now	 is	 the	 time	 to	
celebrate.	
		(El	Mercurio	18/12/2017)		
	
A	week	after	the	megaproject	developing	company	was	finally	dissolved,	Patagonia	sin	
Represas	posted	 this	 image	of	 some	of	 its	key	activists	on	 its	Facebook	page,	with	 the	
following	accompanying	message:	
		
On	10	June	of	2014,	the	Committee	of	Ministers	ruled	unanimously	to	revoke	
HidroAysen’s	Environmental	Qualification	Resolution	(RCA),	granted	in	May	
2011.	The	ministers’	vote	was	followed	by	the	whole	country.	This	is	how	El	
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Mostrador	 reported	 the	 news	 https://goo.gl/WsHBC5	 This	 photo	 captures	
the	very	moment	in	which	the	result	of	the	vote	was	made	known.	#WEWON	
#THANK	YOU	#PATAGONIA	SIN	REPRESAS	
	
Figure	49:	Facebook	post	by	Patagonia	sin	Represas	to	mark	the	end	of	HidroAysén.	
8.8	Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	discussed	media	discourse	in	the	final	phase	of	the	HidroAysén	debate,	
when	the	megaproject	attempted	a	withdrawal	from	the	media	once	again,	in	favour	of	a	
“low	 profile”	 stance	 on	 a	 national	 level,	 and	 close	work	with	 the	 communities	 on	 the	
ground.	 The	 anti-dams	 movement	 was	 now	 tasked	 once	 again	 with	 keeping	 the	
megaproject	visible.	It	did	so	by	organising	cultural	and	political	events	which	were	also	
“image	 events”	 (DeLuca	 2006),	 and	 which	 were	 intended	 to	 be	 shared	 across	 “wild	
public	screens”	(Brunner	&	DeLuca	2016).	Such	events	indeed	made	more	impact	in	the	
social	media	networks	than	in	lecacy	media.	But	Patagonia	sin	Represas	now	also	had	to	
contend	 with	 some	 of	 the	 negative	 qualities	 it	 had	 become	 emblematic	 of,	 through	
extended	 negative	 discourse	 in	 conservative	 media,	 and	 now	 though	 a	 new	 anti-
Tompkins,	 pro-dams	 lobby	 organisation.	 This	 lobby	 now	 employed	 some	 of	 the	 same	
media	 tactics	as	 the	anti-dams	movement	 itself,	notably	 in	 the	use	of	 culture-jamming	
images.	 It	 also	 seems	 to	 have	used	 a	 strategy	 of	 online	mis-information,	which	 recent	
scholarship	 indiucates	 is	 a	 new	practice,	 and	 tactic,	 to	 arise	 out	 of	 the	 user-produced	
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media	landscape	(for	example,	McNair	2017)	.	If	the	prevailing	energy	landscape	had	not	
changed,	 as	 it	 did,	 in	 a	 way	 that	 made	 HidroAysén	 inviable,	 HidroAysén	 might	 have	
benefitted	more	from	this	attempt	at	reducing	the	anti-dams	movement’s	credibility.	
Perhaps	 of	most	 interest	 in	 the	media	 coverage	 of	HidroAysén	 right	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	
HidroAysén	 debate	 is	 the	 apparent	 concession	 of	 El	 Mercurio,	 which	 had	 always	
supported	 the	 megaproject	 so	 adamantly,	 that	 the	 demise	 of	 HidroAysén	 had	 been	
positive	for	the	country.	It	seems	extraordinary	that	El	Mercurio	–	previously	always	so	
staunchly	critical	of	 the	anti-dams	movement	–	would	allow	space	 for	commentary	on	
the	 fact	 that	 it	 had	 been	 demonstrated	 possible	 to	 “implement	 energy	 in	 a	 different	
way”,	 and	 which	 called	 the	 defeat	 of	 HidroAysén	 something	 to	 be	 “proud	 of”	 and	
“celebrate”.	This	apparent	change	in	stance	at	this	moment	on	the	issue	of	HidroAysén	
perhaps	 best	 reflects	 the	 profound	 change	 that	 the	 debate	 over	 the	 megaproject	
wrought	 in	 Chile	 between	 2007	 and	 2017.	 The	 final	 chapter,	 and	 conclusion	 to	 this	
thesis,	 turns	 to	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 effects	 on	 Chile	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	 debate,	 and	
outlines	 some	 of	 the	 lessons	 that	 can	 be	 learned	 from	 the	 mediatized	 case	 of	 this	
emblematic	megaproject.	
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Chapter	9:	Conclusion	
	
9.1	Introduction	
	
My	aim	in	this	thesis	has	been	to	delineate	the	discursive	characteristics	of	the	11-year	
mediatized	 debate	 over	 a	 hydroelectric	 megaproject	 planned	 for	 Chilean	 Patagonia,	
with	particular	attention	to	media	discourse	from	2008-2014.	The	study	was	conceived	
in	 response	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 megaprojects	 inherently	 depend	 on	 representation	
(Flyvbjerg,	 Rothengatter	 &	 Bruzelius	 2003;	 Flyvbjerg	 2005)	 and	 often	
“misrepresentation”	(Kain	1990)	or	“strategic	deception”	(Flyvbjerg,	Garbuio	&	Lovallo	
2009)	 to	be	approved	and	built.	 	 In	early	research	 for	 this	study,	 it	was	clear	 that	 the	
HidroAysén	megaproject	 had	 symbolic	 dimensions,	 so	 I	 resolved	 to	 examine	 the	way	
symbolism	formed	around	HidroAysén,	to	better	understand	what	I	perceived	to	be	the	
particular	 capacity	 of	 megaprojects	 like	 this	 one	 to	 become	 symbolic.	 	 Though	 the	
literature	on	megaproject	management	has	begun	to	recognise	the	symbolic	dimensions	
of	such	projects	(Klein	&	Aubry	2017;	Lopez	Rego,	Reis	 Irigaray	&	Lago	Chaves	2017;	
Syn	&	Ramaprasad	2018;	van	Marrewijk	2017)	few	studies	have	recognised	the	media	
as	 a	 crucial	 site	 for	 the	 discursive	 representation	 and	 symbolic	 construction	 of	 large	
infrastructure	projects	(Fischhendler	et	al.	2015;	Waisbord	&	Peruzzotti	2009,	2013a),	
and	 no	 studies	 have	 traced	 mediatized	 discourse	 over	 the	 whole	 trajectory	 of	 a	
megaproject,	 	 to	 learn	more	about	how	such	projects	play	out	 in	 the	media.	Though	a	
handful	 of	 studies	 on	 various	 facets	 of	 the	 HidroAysén	 case	 exist	 (Latta	 2010,	 2011;	
Cuadra	 2013;	 Merino	 &	 Bello	 2014;	 Romero	 2014;	 Schaeffer	 2015),	 none	 examine	
mediatized	discourse	in	detail,	or	over	the	whole	project	trajectory.	Given	that	both	the	
scale	of	megaprojects	and	the	rate	of	their	development	is	 increasing	(Flyvbjerg	2014,	
2017)	 a	 study	 that	 addresses	 these	 gaps	 in	 the	 research	 on	 megaprojects	 is	 both	
necessary	 and	 timely.	 This	 case	 study	 of	 the	 “paradigmatic”	 (Flyvbjerg	 2011)	 case	 of	
HidroAysén	has	aimed	to	address	these	silences,	and	enable	a	better	understanding	of	
the	 communication	 and	 mediatized	 contestation	 (Wolfsfeld	 1997;	 Cottle	 2006)	 of	
megaprojects.		
	
This	 thesis	 has	 therefore	 asked	 how	 the	 HidroAysén	 debate	 was	 articulated	 in	 key	
Chilean	media	over	 the	period	2008-2014,	and	has	addressed	 this	with	detailed	 thick	
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description	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	mediatized	 discourse	 surrounding	 the	megaproject	 in	
Chapters	5,	6,	7	and	8.	I	have	also	asked	why,	and	when,	the	developing	company	sought	
invisibility,	showing	that	the	company	sought	to	keep	the	megaproject	as	low	profile	as	
possible	 both	 from	 the	 time	 the	 project	was	 established,	 and	 then	 again	 after	 it	 was	
widely	contested	with	a	series	of	vehement	street	protests.	I	additionally	asked	how	the	
protest	 campaign	made	HidroAysén	 visible,	 and	 in	 examining	 the	ways	 in	which	 this	
occurred,	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 HidroAysén	 came	 to	 represent	 much	 more	 than	 an	
environmental	 conflict	 over	 a	 megaproject.	 I	 asked,	 too,	 how	 HidroAysén	 became	
emblematic	 and	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 layered	 composite	 of	 symbolic	meanings	 that	
became	 attached	 to	 the	 project	 (which	 I	 summarise	 below)	 made	 HidroAysén	 an	
emblem.	 In	 sections	 9.3,	 and	 particularly	 9.4	 below,	 I	 address	 the	 final	 research	
question,	by	outlining	some	of	the	lessons	that	can	be	drawn	from	the	emblematic	case	
of	HidroAysén	about	the	communication	of	conflicts	over	megaprojects.	
	
Theoretically,	 this	 thesis	 has	 drawn	 on	 some	 aspects	 of	 a	 media	 political	 economy	
paradigm,	 acknowledging	 that	 while	 the	 earlier	 radical	 (Herman	 &	 Chomsky	 1988)	
“manufacturing	consent”	model	is	largely	inappropriate	in	a	deeply	mediatized	(Hepp	&	
Couldry	 2018)	 world,	 more	 recent	 scholarship	 on	 media	 political	 economy	 (Hardy	
2014,	2017)	is	certainly	relevant	where	“elite	closure”	(Núñez	&	Miranda	2011;	Torche	
2005)	means	that	the	interests	of	media	owners	and	of	business	are	particularly	closely	
related.	 I	 have	 used	 Castells’	 (2007)	 theories	 on	 mass	 self-communication	 and	 the	
network	society	(Castells	1996c,	2000,	2004a,	2007,	2008,	2009)	to	explain	the	advent	
of	digital	media	in	Chile.	I	also	draw	on	aspects	of	Cottle’s	(2006)	“media	contest”	model	
–	where	elite	agendas	are	contestable,	and	the	media	can	be	a	forum	for	diverse	voices	–	
to	conceptualise	the	lengthy	mediatized	sparring	over	HidroAysén.	I	draw	too	on	parts	
of	 a	 “media	 culture”	 (Kellner	1995,	2003)	paradigm,	particularly	 for	 semiotic	 enquiry	
into	 some	 of	 the	 image-based	 texts	 (DeLuca	 2006;	 DeLuca	 &	 Peeples	 2002;	 DeLuca,	
Lawson	&	Sun	2012)	I	analyse	in	this	thesis.	I	have	additionally	been	interested	in	risk,	
especially	 in	 Beck’s	 (2009b)	 “relations	 of	 definition”	 of	 risk,	 where	 holding	 greater	
power	 of	 risk	 definition	 may	 eventually	 confer	 greater	 influence	 over	 real-world	
outcomes	 in	 debates	 around	 megaprojects.	 Castells’	 (2009)	 grand	 theory	 of	
“communication	 power”	 also	 fundamentally	 underpins	 this	 study,	 and,	 following	
Arsenault	and	Castells	 (2008),	Castells	 (2009,	2012)	and	 latterly,	Lester	and	Hutchins	
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(2015),	 I	 have	 identified	 some	 of	 the	 “switching	 points”	 that	 were	 activated	 in	 the	
HidroAysén	debate	in	order	to	achieve	communication	power.	Theories	on	mediatized	
visibility	 (Thompson	 2005)	 and	 its	 inverse,	 strategic	 invisibility	 (Lester	 &	 Hutchins	
2012;	 Thompson,	 J	 1995,	 2000,	 2005,	 2011)	 have	 also	 been	 drawn	 on	 in	 this	 thesis.	
Finally,	the	formation	of	symbolic	power	(Bourdieu	1977,	1991,	1998)	and	the	power	of	
symbolic	 discourse	 to	 construct	 reality	 (Bourdieu	 1991,	 Couldry	 2000,	 2003)	 also	
underpin	 my	 arguments	 on	 HidroAysén’s	 becoming	 a	 symbolic	 construct,	 and	
eventually,	becoming	emblematic.	
	
This	 study	 has	 used	 a	 multifaced,	 mainly	 constructivist,	 methodology	 to	 examine	
strategic	 communication	by	 the	megaproject	 developer,	 as	well	 as	 by	 protest	 against	
the	project.	I	have	analysed	both	with	macro	and	micro	lenses,	using	thick	description	
(Geertz	1973)	and	Leximancer’s	computer	assisted	text	analysis	(Smith	2000a;	2000b;	
2003;	Smith	&	Humphreys	2006)	to	examine	the	discourse	across	a	large	mainstream	
media	corpus,	and	in	social	media	networks.	I	have	also	analysed	some	examples	of	the	
image-based	and	audiovisual	material	that	proliferated	during	the	HidroAysén	debate.	I	
have	 additionally	 triangulated	 mainstream	 media	 and	 social	 media	 content	 with	
material	collected	in	the	38	interviews	I	conducted	with	key	actors	in	the	debate.	Using	
insights	 from	 all	 these	 sources,	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 a	 series	 of	 symbolic	 meanings	
accumulated	in	the	discursive	sparring	over	the	megaproject,	so	that	over	time,	it	came	
to	represent	very	much	more	than	a	conflict	over	dams.	
The	discussion	here	on	HidroAysén	contributes	fine	empirical	detail	to	the	literature	on	
globalisation	and	mediatization	(Couldry	&	Hepp	2018,	Hepp	2013)	in	relation	to	Latin	
America	 particularly	 (Waisbord	 2013b,	 2013d),	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 enactment	 of	
struggles	over	 extractivism	and	megaprojects	 (Waisbord	2013a).	 It	 also	 contributes	 a	
new	empirical	illustration	to	the	broader	literature	on	mediatization,	and	the	enactment	
of	mediatized	environmental	conflicts	(Hutchins	&	Lester	2015).	The	detailed	survey	of	
the	mediatized	activism	around	HidroAysén	here	also	contributes	to	work	on	media	and	
activism	 both	 in	 a	 Latin	 American	 context	 (Coryat	 2015;	 Valenzuela,	 Arriagada	 &	
Scherman	 2012;	 Valenzuela,	 Scherman,	 &	 Arriagada	 2015),	 and	 more	 generally	
(Boutyline	&	Willer	2017;	Cammaerts	2012,	2013,	2015;	Downing	2008;	Rucht	2013).	
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With	 its	 focus	 on	 the	 communicational	 and	 the	 symbolic	 in	 relation	 to	megaprojects,	
this		
study	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 megaprojects	 –	 specifically,	 to	 the	
conceptualisation	of	megaprojects	 as	 symbols	 (Klein	&	Aubry	2017;	 Lopez	Rego,	Reis	
Irigaray	&	Lago	Chaves	2017;	Syn	&	Ramaprasad	2018;	van	Marrewijk	2017).	The	study	
proposes	two	new	concepts	in	relation	to	mediatization	and	megaprojects,	describing	a	
process	of	“becoming	emblematic”	(see	summary	in	section	9.2	below)	and	arguing	for	a	
new	 concept	 of	 the	 “communicational	 sublime”	 to	 be	 added	 to	 Flyvbjerg’s	 four	
megaproject	 sublimes	 (see	 section	 9.4	 below).	 Finally,	 by	 conducting	 cross-language	
research,	 this	 study	 aims	 to	 further	 cosmopolitanism	 in	 communications	 studies,	 as	
Waisbord	(2016)	prescribes.			
	
In	 this	 conclusion	 to	 this	 thesis,	 I	 first	 summarise	 the	 constructed	 symbolic	meanings	
which	made	HidroAysén	emblematic,	then	progress	to	a	discussion	of	the	significance	of	
the	HidroAysén	debate	 for	Chile.	 I	also	discuss	some	lessons	that	can	be	derived	from	
studying	 the	 discursive	 construction	 of	 HidroAysén.	 Finally,	 I	 make	 suggestions	 for	
further	research	in	this	field.		
	
9.2	Becoming	emblematic	
	
Could	 an	 engineering	 project	 constituting	 five	 dams	 on	 distant	 southern	 rivers	 and	 a	
corresponding	power	 line,	 become	 synonymous	with	 social	 tensions	bred	by	unequal	
development,	 incomplete	 democratisation,	 an	 intransigent	 social	 hierarchy,	 and	 the	
fraught	dichotomy	of	the	local	versus	the	global?	I	have	shown	here	that	incrementally,	
over	the	course	of	an	11-year	conflict,	these	things	are	indeed	what	HidroAysén	came	to	
represent.	 I	 consider	HidroAysén’s	 construction	 to	 have	 been	 partially	 intentional	 on	
the	 part	 of	 the	 anti-dams	 social	 movement	 and	 the	 megaproject	 developers,	 part	
product	of	the	prevailing	social	context,	and	partly	the	unintentional	result	of	the	project	
developers’	 organisational	 culture	 and	 communications	 strategies.	 	 HidroAysén’s	
construction	also	crucially	depended	on	its	framing	in	key	agenda-setting	media	–	these	
with	their	own	ideological	positions,	often	dependent	on	media	ownership	structures	–	
and	also	on	journalistic	and	PR	practices,	some	of	which	were	particular	to	the	Chilean	
context.	The	megaproject’s	construction	was	also	a	product	of	macro-sociological	space	
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shrinking	 (Bauman	 1998;	 O’Brien	 1992)	 tendencies	 that	 brought	 transnational	
companies	 to	 develop	 a	 project	 in	 the	 remote	 southern	 reaches	 of	 Chile,	while	 at	 the	
same	 time	allowing	 local	protest	against	 the	project	 to	be	nationally	visible,	and	even	
enter	the	transnational	arena	of	cosmopolitan	environmental	concern.	
	
The	table	below	shows	the	dominant	discursive	representations	that	became	attached	
to	 HidroAysén	 over	 time	 between	 2006	 and	 2017,	 and	 serves	 to	 summarise	 the	
different	 layers	 of	 symbolic	 meaning	 of	 the	 megaproject,	 none	 of	 which	 necessarily	
obscured	the	previous	layer	(except,	perhaps,	the	first	meaning,	which	was	largely	lost	
over	time).	I	define	here	the	period	in	which	the	megaproject	first	came	to	be	associated	
with	 each	 symbolic	 meaning,	 and	 show	 where	 possible,	 where	 the	 origins	 of	 each	
meaning	lie:	
	
Period	 Symbolic	meaning	 Symbol’s	origin	
2007	 Innovative	 engineering	 project,	 nation-
building	 project,	 progress	 towards	
development	
HidroAysén,	 corpus	
media	
2007		 Destruction	 of	 environment,	 of	 Chile’s	
heritage	
Patagonia	sin	Represas		
2007-2014	 Project	to	benefit	elites	 Patagonia	sin	Represas	
2008		
	
Technical	and	bureaucratic	behemoth	 HidroAysén,	media	
Late	 2009-
early	2010	
Political	project		 Corpus	media	
2009-2010	 Foreign-ness,	neo-imperialism	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas,	
corpus	media	
2009		 Clean	energy	for	development,	necessary	to	
combat	climate	change,	better	than	ERNCs	
HidroAysén,	 corpus	
media	
Late	 2010-
early	2011	
“energy	terror”	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas,	
social	 media,	 corpus	
media		
2011	 Inequality,	 incomplete	 democracy,	 elite	
profiteering,	 the	 neoliberal	 status	 quo,	 a	
wrong	mode	of	development	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas,	
El	 Mostrador,	 to	 some	
extent	La	Tercera	
2012-14	 Irregularities,	malfeasance	 Corpus	media,	Patagonia	
sin	Represas	
2014	 Lost	opportunity	 El	Mercurio	
2014-2017	 Citizens’	 victory,	 return	 to	 democracy,	
important	 learning	 opportunity,	
opportunity	 for	change,	chance	to	move	to	
ERNCs		
Corpus	 media,	 social	
media,	 Patagonia	 sin	
Represas	
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Figure	 50:	 Table	 showing	 cumulative	 symbolic	meanings	 of	 HidroAysén,	which	made	
the	project	emblematic.		
	
	
It	is	clear,	then,	that	over	time,	the	megaproject	became	layered	with	meanings,	so	that	
it	became	a	composite	of	symbols.	If	we	understand	symbols	here,	to	recap	Geertz	(1973	
p.	 91)	 as	 “tangible	 formulations	 of	 notions”	 and	 “concrete	 embodiments	 of	 ideas,	
attitudes,	judgements”,	then	HidroAysén	did	indeed	become	an	embodiment	of	different	
ideas,	attitudes,	and	 judgements.	As	 I	have	argued,	 the	roots	of	many	of	 these	did	not	
necessarily	 lie	 within	 the	 megaproject	 itself,	 or	 indeed	 in	 environmental	 conflict	
specifically.	 What	 HidroAysén	 became	 emblematic	 of,	 over	 time,	 as	 this	 thesis	
demonstrates,	was	a	wider,	more	deep-seated	discontent.	 In	this	way,	 the	HidroAysén	
debate	 became	 a	 mediatized	 contest	 of	 two	 opposing	 worldviews,	 in	 which	 the	
megaproject	 represented	 the	maintenance	of	 elite	 closure	by	Chile’s	post-dictatorship	
neoliberal	 mode	 of	 development,	 and	 the	 anti-dams	 movement	 represented	
postmaterialist	values,	democratisation	and	challenge	to	social	unfairness.	Chile’s	very	
model	of	development	was	being	contested	here.	As	HidroAysén’s	Daniel	Fernández	put	
it,	in	hindsight:	“It	is	a	conflict	between	paradigms	which	are	reactive	to	each	other”	and	
a	“clash	of	ways	of	thinking”.	He	continued:	
	
The	 world	 of	 business	 has	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 that	 is	 rational,	 cartesian,	
scientific,	structured,	interested	in	development,	and	economic	growth….and	
society	has	benefitted	 from	these.	But	a	moment	has	come	 in	which	people	
want	different	things.	So	a	reactive	paradigm	has	emerged,	and	this	is	one	of	
equality,	 cooperation,	 solidarity,	 consensus,	 and	 also	 environmental	
protections.	One	opposes	the	other.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 				(Fernández,	interviewed	19/12/2013)	
	
Or,	as	Douglas	Tompkins	put	it:		
	
This	isn’t	just	a	campaign	to	stop	a	dam.	This	is	a	campaign	that	comes	from	a	
worldview	of	stable	state	economics	versus	the	economics	of	endless	growth.	
The	 worldviews	 of	 the	 myth	 of	 progress	 and	 growth	 forever…which	 is	
undermining	 the	 very	 process	 which	 makes	 life	 itself	 possible.	 We	 are	
working	from	two	opposite	poles.		
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Tompkins,	interviewed	05/12/2013)	
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In	Chile,	by	 the	end	of	 the	HidroAysén	debate,	 it	 seems	 that,	despite	 the	odds	against	
this,	 the	 anti-dams	 side’s	 worldview	 triumphed.	 That	 the	 megaproject	 became	
emblematic	 of	 all	 this	worldview	 opposed	made	 it	 vehemently	 contested,	 and	 finally,	
politically	 untouchable.	 Over	 time,	 because	 of	 the	 cost	 of	 delays	 to	 the	 project,	 and	
ultimately,	 change	 in	 the	 energy	 market,	 HidroAysén	 also	 became	 economically	
unviable.76	However,	HidroAysén	did	not	fail	only	on	its	fiscal	bottom	line.	This	research	
suggests	that	in	the	absence	of	the	anti-dams	movement’s	channelling	and	amplification	
of	the	pre-existing	discontent	with	Chile’s	post-dictatorship	mode	of	development,	and	
without	 the	 communicational	 ability	 to	 couple	 this	 discontent	 to	 HidroAysén;	 the	
building	 of	 the	megaproject	would	 (by	 2018)	 already	 have	 been	well	 advanced.	 Like	
Ralco,	 it	would	have	been	a	fait	accompli.	Aysén,	 in	Chilean	Patagonia,	with	its	unique,	
precious	 landscapes,	 its	 close-knit	 small	 communities	 and	 its	 strong	 regional	 identity,	
would	have	been	irrevocably	changed.	Instead,	HidroAysén	changed	Chile.		
	
9.3	“Chile	cambió”	
	
The	HidroAysén	case	was	set	 just	on	 the	cusp	of	a	 time	when	the	neoliberal	model	of	
development	 was	 being	 questioned.	 During	 the	 HidroAysén	 debate,	 the	 rise	 in	 post-
materialist	 values	 that	 drove	 environmental	 concern	 also	 coincided	 with	 a	 surge	 in	
internet	 access	 and	 social	 media	 use	 in	 Chile.	 This	 was	 a	 landscape	 in	 which	 social	
discontent	 could	 now	 for	 the	 first	 time	 be	 widely	 communicated.	 As	 HidroAysén’s	
communications	 chief	 pointed	 out	 in	 retrospect	 in	 an	 interview	 for	 this	 study,	 “Chile	
cambió”	 –	 Chile	 changed	 (Soto,	 interviewed	 14/11/2013).	 In	 this	 changed	 Chile,	
activists	 could	 not	 only	 make	 a	 powerful	 multinational	 company’s	 proposed	
megaproject	 visible,	 they	 also	 sometimes	 obtained	 the	 power	 of	 risk	 definition	 (Beck	
2009b)	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 project.	 And	 they	 could	 occasionally	 operate	 the	 “switches”	
(Arsenault	 &	 Castells	 2008;	 Castells	 2009,	 2012)	 which	 gave	 them	 “communication	
power”	(Castells	2009).	
	
																																																						
76	 As	 discussed	 through	 this	 thesis,	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 also	 came	 to	 represent	 some	 constructed	
meanings:	 defence	 of	 natural	 and	 social	 heritage	 from	 outside	 interests,	 rejection	 of	 neoliberalism,	
democratisation;	but	paradoxically,	at	the	same	time,	elitism,	foreign-ness,	dictation	of	Patagonia’s	future	
by	outsiders.	
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The	 effects	 of	 the	 demise	 of	 the	megaproject	 on	 the	 country	 have	 been	 profound.	 In	
terms	 of	 energy	 development,	 the	 huge	 growth	 in	 ERNCs	 in	 Chile	 after	 HidroAysén	
meant	that	the	country	has	become	what	the	New	York	Times	has	described	as	“a	global	
leader	 in	 countering	 climate	 change”	 (10/03/2018).	 Without	 HidroAysén,	 Chile	 is	
moving	towards	a	more	diverse,	less	centralised,	more	“democratic”	and	lower	carbon	
model	 of	 energy	 generation77.	 This	 change	 may	 not	 have	 been	 as	 complete	 had	 the	
energy	 from	HidroAysén	been	 available.	Also,	 because	 the	power	 line	 for	HidroAysén	
was	never	built,	other	dam	projects	for	Patagonia	which	had	planned	to	share	that	line	
to	 export	 their	 energy	 have	 found	 it	 harder	 to	 justify	 their	 business	 cases.	 When	
HidroAysén	fell,	other	socio-environmentally	damaging,	foreign-owned	dam	projects	in	
Patagonia	fell	also78.		
	
In	 terms	 of	 environmental	 attitudes	 and	 protections,	 Chile	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 have	
become	 increasingly	 environmentally	 concerned	 during	 the	 HidroAysén	 timeframe	
(Franzen	&	Vogl	2013).		This	heightened	concern	seems	to	have	been	in	response	to	the	
many,	very	tangible,	assaults	on	Chile’s	environment	by	 its	mode	of	development,	and	
by	 many	 planned	 and	 protested	 megaprojects,	 of	 which	 HidroAysén	 was	 the	 most	
visible.	 	 The	 anti-dams	 movement’s	 critique,	 and	 broader	 public	 questioning	 of	 the	
country’s	 institutional	 processes	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 environment	 (which	 effectively	
revealed	 the	 politically	 contestable	 nature	 of	 supposedly	 objective,	 bureaucratic	
processes)	 has	 also	 resulted	 in	 change.	 Underway	 in	 2018,	 a	 reform	of	 EIS	 rules	will	
mandate	 meaningful	 early	 stakeholder	 participation,	 including	 allowing	 potentially-
affected	 communities	 to	 work	 with	 project	 developers	 on	 the	 terms	 and	 scope	 of	
projects	(Ibarra	Maldonado,	El	Mercurio	3/06/2018).	And	barely	two	months	after	the	
end	 of	 HidroAysén,	 in	 January	 2018,	 Chile	 officially	 designated	 as	 a	 vast	 network	 of	
national	 parks	 the	 405,000	 hectares	 of	 Patagonian	 land	 that	 Douglas	 Tompkins	 had	
donated	 to	 the	 state.	 Much	 of	 this	 land	 would	 have	 been	 crossed	 by	 the	 dams’	
transmission	line,	but	is	now	protected	by	the	state	in	perpetuity.	
	
																																																						
77	It	should	be	borne	in	mind	that	hydroelectricity	is	not	necessarily	a	“low-carbon”	energy	form,	despite	
dams	developers’	claims	to	the	contrary.	See	discussion	in	Chapter	6.	
78	For	example,	the	Río	Cuervo	Project,	involving	two	large	dams,	planned	by	Australian/Swiss	
consortium	Energía	Austral.	The	project	folded	in	August	2017.	
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During	the	HidroAysén	debate,	Chile’s	democracy	had	also	been	deepened.	HidroAysén	
represented	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 neoliberal	 consensus,	 and	 other	 legacies	 of	 the	
dictatorship79,	 including	depoliticisation.	 	 I	argue	that	HidroAysén	acted	as	an	impulse	
to	 re-politicisation:	 for	 Cuadra	 (2013)	 a	 “radical	 expression	 of	 a	 democratizing	
citizenry”	 (p.	 1170).	 The	 HidroAysén	 case	 therefore	 supports	 Anselm	 and	 Haikola’s	
recent	(2018)	contention	that	issues	related	to	the	environment	may	serve	to	“politicize	
a	political	area	 that	has	previously	been	depoliticized”,	 this	 in	contradiction	 to	earlier	
contentions	 that	 environmental	 politics	 in	 the	 postpolitical	 era	 may	 diminish	 the	
potential	for	political	antagonism	(Swyngedouw	2010,	2011a,	2013a	2013b,	2014a).	As	
Beck	put	it:	“history	is	back”	(2015,	p.	77).	The	HidroAysén	case	can	also	be	regarded	as	
an	 empirical	 example	 of	 Beck’s	 “emancipatory	 catastrophism”,	 in	which	 the	 “bads”	 of	
modernisation	 can	 allow	 for	 “social	 catharsis”	 and	 ultimately	 better	 social	 and	
environmental	 justice,	 if	 actors	 in	 struggles	 of	 this	 nature	 are	 able	 to	 “connect	 things	
which	 had	 not	 been	 thought	 of	 as	 being	 connected”	 (p.	 80),	 as	 the	 sparring	 actors	
connected	a	megaproject	with	inequality	in	the	debate	over	HidroAysén.		
	
Additionally,	running	parallel	to	the	discourse	on	the	dams,	and	intensifying	from	2011	
when	the	dams	became	so	strongly	contested,	there	had	been	much	public	discussion	of	
the	 need	 for	 a	 new	 constitution	 in	 Chile80.	 This	 call	 had	 occasionally	 been	 heard	 in	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 discourse	 on	 HidroAysén,	 and	 was	 mentioned	 by	 several	
interviewees	for	this	study.	As	one	of	her	last	acts	before	leaving	office	in	March	2018,	
Michelle	Bachelet	initiated	a	legislative	project	to	create	a	new	constitution	with	better	
human	rights	and	social	provisions,	which	she	described	as	promoting	“dignity,	liberty,	
equality,	 solidarity,	 and	 respect	 of	 fundamental	 rights”	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 “creating	 the	
necessary	 conditions	 for	 holistic	 and	 sustainable	 development”	 (Caras	 6/03/2018).	
Though	it	is	not	clear	how	this	last	initiative	will	proceed	under	the	current	government	
of	Piñera81,	it	appears,	in	summary,	that	many	of	the	anti-dams’	insurgents’	claims	have	
																																																						
79	Some	scholars	(Fukuyama	1992;	Mouffe	2000;	Rancière	1998;	Swyngedouw	2011;	Žižek	1999)	argue	
that	 depoliticisation	 is	 now	 a	 global	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 era	 of	 postpolitics,	 in	 which	 a	 hegemonically	
imposed	consensus	on	principles	such	as	(neo)liberalism,	capitalism	and	free	movement	of	capital	have	
displaced	conflict	and	antagonism,	even	in	environmental	politics.		
80	Chile’s	current	constitution	dates	from	1980	when	it	was	written	under	Pinochet’s	dictatorship.	
81	 In	 the	 2017	 Chilean	 presidential	 elections,	 Chile	 paradoxically	 swung	 back	 to	 the	 right,	with	 the	 re-
election	 of	 Sebastián	 Piñera,	 reflecting	 a	 wider	 Latin	 American	 move	 towards	 the	 right,	 in	 countries	
including	Argentina,	Paraguay,	and	most	recently	Brazil.	This	election	saw	only	48.5%	(BBC	18/12/2017)	
voter	turnout,	perhaps	a	marker	of	low	trust	in	political	institutions	in	Chile.	Piñera	is	pro-business,	and	
	 305	
now	been	reinforced	by	their	realisation	in	law,	thus	turning	environmental	protest	into	
institutional	 change,	 or,	 as	 Anselm	 puts	 it,	 “transforming	 the	 temporary	 energy	 of	
inaugural	political	events	into	the	enduring	success	of	the	political”	(Anselm	&	Haikola	
2018	p.	583).82	These	things	can	be	seen	as	HidroAysén’s	lasting	legacy	for	Chile.		
	
9.4	Lessons	from	the	case	of	HidroAysén	
	
HidroAysén	 was	 a	 victory.	 It	 represented	 a	 win	 for	 those	 who	 seek	 environmental	
justice,	 affirming	 the	 “value	 of	 life,	 of	 all	 forms	of	 life,	 against	 the	 interests	 of	wealth,	
power	and	technology”	(Castells	2004b	p.	190),	and	for	those	that	observe	an	“ethical	
duty”	 (Cox	 2007)	 in	 communication	 on	 the	 environment.	 It	 was	 a	 win	 also	 for	 civil	
society	over	existing	hegemonic	structures.	However,	for	those	who	seek	environmental	
and	social	justice,	this	is	no	time	for	celebration.	As	discussed,	the	rate	of	megaproject	
development	 is	 increasing,	 projects	 themselves	 are	 becoming	 larger	 and	 more	
environmentally	and	socially	damaging,	and	they	are	correspondingly	more	contested.	
In	Latin	America	alone,	in	terms	of	dam	megaprojects	alone,	hundreds	of	projects,	many	
much	 larger	 than	 HidroAysén,	 are	 currently	 being	 planned	 and	 built.	 Immediate,	
irrevocable	 damage	 to	 ecosystems	 aside,	 many	 of	 these	 will	 be	 net	 emitters	 of	
greenhouse	gasses	for	decades,	despite	the	construct	of	hydroelectricity	being	“clean”.	
In	response,	social	 justice	movements	have	formed	in	defence	of	 territory	and	natural	
resources.	 Because	 of	 these	 kinds	 of	 projects,	 and	 protests	 against	 them,	 as	 Murphy	
(2017)	tells	us,	“Latin	America	has	resurfaced	as	a	site	of	intense	debate	and	important	
critical	 thought	 regarding	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 earth”	 (Murphy	 2017,	 p.	 154).	 The	
controversy	 over	 HidroAysén	 can	 be	 considered	 part	 of	 this	 “eco-territorial	 shift”	
(Svampa	 2012)	 of	 contestation	 in	 Latin	 America,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 varied	 forms	 of	
extractivism	 spawned	 by	 the	 particular	 mode	 of	 neoliberal	 development	 on	 this	
continent.		
	
																																																																																																																																																																								
has	 promised	 to	 reduce	 obstacles	 to	 investment,	 but	 he	 has	 also	 shown	 himself	 to	 be	 open	 to	
environmental	 positions,	 for	 example,	 in	 2010,	when	 he	 effectively	 cancelled	 the	 planned	Barrancones	
coal-burning	power	plant	near	the	Punta	de	Choros	marine	reserve.			
82	Theorists	 like	 Swyngedouw	 suggest	 that	 in	 order	 to	 effect	 an	 opening	 up	 of	 political	 procedures	 as	
discussed	here,	contested	issues	need	to	achieve	the	kind	of	symbolic	meaning	that	HidroAysén	did.	See	
Swyngedouw	(2011b	&	2014a).	
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Not	all	megaprojects	will	be	stopped	by	protest	–	but	most	megaprojects	can	likely	be	
better	 managed.	 Having	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 sociological	 phenomenon	 of	
megaprojects	is	therefore	essential	for	those	who	protest	megaprojects,	as	well	indeed,	
for	 project	 developers	 themselves.	 The	 long-lived	 case	 of	 HidroAysén,	 a	megaproject	
that	never	materialised,	is	a	rich	empirical	source	for	the	formulation	of	such	insights.	In	
answer	to	this	thesis’	 final	research	question,	then,	I	offer	some	practical	 lessons	from	
the	 emblematic	 case	 of	 HidroAysén	 about	 the	 communication	 of	 conflicts	 over	
megaprojects.	
	
Subject	 as	 they	 are	 to	 the	 “megaprojects	 paradox”	 (Flyvbjerg	2013	pp.	 1-10)	 of	 over-
promising	 and	 under-delivering,	 megaprojects	 inherently	 rely	 on	 favourable	
communicational	construction	in	order	to	be	approved	and	built.	Flyvbjerg	has	told	us	
that	 if	 it	were	 revealed,	 such	 lack	of	 transparency	and	 “deliberate	misrepresentation”	
would	typically	“not	be	defensible	in	liberal	democracies”	(2014,	p.	18)	but	it	seems	in	
Chile	at	the	start	of	the	HidroAysén	case,	historical	antecedents	meant	that	this	was	the	
expected	way	of	doing	business.	HidroAysén’s	shareholders	had	not	entirely	considered	
the	emerging	new	social	and	communications	environment,	or	if	they	had,	they	resolved	
despite	 this	 to	 take	 a	 business-as-usual,	 clientelistic	 (García	 2015;	 Hallin	 &	
Papathanassopoulos	 2002)	 approach.	 It	 is	 clear	 that,	 in	 the	 changed	 social	 landscape	
and	 the	 translocal	 media	 landscape	 of	 which	 Chile	 is	 now	 part,	 that	 approach	 is	 no	
longer	 effective.	 Projects	 cannot	 be	 imposed	 on	 citizens,	 nor	 can	 they	 be	 kept	 “low	
profile”,	 or	 invisible,	 in	 a	 deeply	 mediatized	 world.	 Standards	 of	 consultation	 and	
communication	 that	 would	 be	 applied	 by	 multinational	 corporations	 in	 a	 developed	
country	context	need	to	be	applied	likewise	to	projects	in	countries	of	the	Global	South.	
83	 	 This	 first	 lesson	 seems	 an	 elementary	 one,	 but	 it	 should	 be	 borne	 in	 mind	 in	
considering	the	communication	of	other	Latin	American	megaprojects,	which	may	share	
comparable	political	and	media	landscapes,	and	business	environments.	
	
																																																						
83	 This	 as	 a	 communicational	 dimension	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 double	 standards	 frequently	 seen	 in	 extractive	
industry	projects	by	multinational	companies	from	developed	countries	in	the	Global	South.	Due	to	weak	
environmental	 regulations	 and	 poor	 enforcement	 of	 laws,	 foreign	 companies	 are	 able	 to	 develop	
extractive	projects	 in	Latin	America	using	environmentally	damaging	practices	 that	are	banned	 in	 their	
own	countries.	
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For	megaproject	planners,	it	is	clear	that	communication	strategies	that	rely	on	reactive	
communication	 and	 scare	 campaigns	 do	 not	 generate	 social	 license,	 even	 in	
environments	where	 these	 previously	might	 have	 been	 routine.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	
largest	 increase	 in	 public	 rejection	 of	 HidroAysén	 coincided	 with	 the	 company’s	
“campaign	 of	 terror”	 strategy.	 Aggressive,	 reactive	 communication	 clearly	 heightens	
public	rejection.	This	trend	has	been	observed	in	the	science	communications	literature	
in	 relation	 to	 climate	 change,	 for	 example,	 where	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 “fear	 is	
generally	an	ineffective	tool	for	attracting	people’s	attention	to	climate	change”	(O’Neil	
&	Nicholson-Cole	 2009,	 p.	 355).	 In	HidroAysén’s	 case,	 its	 fear	 campaign	 ceded	 to	 the	
anti-dams	movement	its	greatest	communicational	advantage.	Likewise,	CSR	initiatives	
and	CSR	communication	by	megaproject	developers	need	to	be	treated	with	care.	If	not	
received	as	genuine,	as	distinct	 from	being	a	strategy	 to	smooth	 the	path	of	a	project,	
CSR	initiatives	can	decrease	public	acceptance	of	a	project.		
	
The	more	visible,	contested	and	emblematic	HidroAysén	became,	the	more	the	debate	
around	the	megaproject	became	highly	polarised	and	politicised.	It	seems	clear	from	the	
HidroAysén	case	that	polarisation	makes	for	intransigent	positions	on	opposing	sides	of	
a	struggle,	which	may	never	be	able	to	be	reconciled.	Given	that	more	megaprojects	are	
being	 built,	 and	will	 continue	 to	 be	 built,	 the	 need	 for	negotiation	 over	 such	 projects	
may	ultimately	deliver	better	outcomes	 for	communities	and	environments.	However,	
becoming	 emblematic	 in	 the	 way	 that	 HidroAysén	 did	 may	 preclude	 negotiation:	
indeed,	 interviewees	 for	 this	 study	 reported	 that	 representatives	 from	 the	 opposing	
sides	never	met.	The	kind	of	“peace	talks”	that	Lester	&	Hutchins	(2012b)	describe	in	a	
protracted	 environmental	 conflict	 in	 Australia	 may	 therefore	 not	 be	 possible.	 In	 this	
way,	 if	becoming	emblematic	does	not	halt	a	project,	 it	may	 indeed	result	 in	a	project	
going	 ahead	 with	 less	 negotiation,	 less	 social	 license	 and	 less	 concession	 to	 socio-
environmental	 concerns	 –	 particularly	 if	 the	 protest	 movement	 is	 represented	
negatively	 in	 the	media.	Given	 the	precedents	 for	extractivism	 (Waisbord	2013a)	and	
megaproject	 development	 in	 Latin	 America,	 this	 may	 be	 particularly	 so	 in	 a	 Latin	
American	context.		
	
In	addition,	the	potential	for	the	conflict	over	an	emblematic	project	to	obscure	concerns	
around	 other	 projects	 is	 real.	 As	 discussed,	 for	 example,	 several	 other	 large	
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hydroelectric	 dams	were	 being	 planned	 in	 precious	 natural	 environments	 in	 Chilean	
Patagonia	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 HidroAysén.	 Only	 HidroAysén	 became	 emblematic.	
Though	 ultimately	 these	 projects	 also	 became	 unviable,	 and	 failed	when	 HidroAysén	
failed,	 they	 were	 certainly	 proceeding	 with	 planning	 ‘under	 the	 radar’	 for	 the	 whole	
time	 that	 HidroAysén	 was	 being	 debated.	 	 In	 fact,	 in	 Argentine	 Patagonia,	 on	 the	
opposite	 side	 of	 the	 Andes,	 the	 larger	 (in	 terms	 of	 flooded	 area)	 Condor	 Cliff-La	
Barrancosa	 dam	 complex	 was	 approved	 and	 began	 to	 be	 built	 in	 the	 HidroAysén	
timeframe,	 with	 much	 of	 the	 same	 official	 discourse	 around	 the	 need	 for	 dams,	 and	
much	 less	protest.	When	one	conflict	becomes	emblematic	but	obscures	other	 similar	
and	 concurrent	 environmental	 issues,	 this	poses	difficult	 ethical	 questions	 about	how	
the	 environment	 movement	 chooses,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 multiple	 assaults	 on	 the	
environment,	which	landscapes	and	ecosystems	should	be	“saved”.	This	is	an	aspect	of	
the	 mediatized	 enactment	 of	 environmental	 conflict	 (Hutchins	 &	 Lester	 2015)	 that	
deserves	further	investigation.	
	
Another	lesson	from	the	case	of	HidroAysén	appear	to	be	that	for	protest,	being	able	to	
communicate	 first,	 and	 across	 digital	 platforms,	 on	 a	 contested	 issue	 seems	 to	 confer	
concerted	advantage.	Patagonia	sin	Represas	was	able	to	communicate	its	definition	of	
risk	 (Beck	 2009)	 surrounding	 HidroAysén	 before	 the	 project	 developer	 had	 even	
presented	 its	 project	 locally.	 Having	 a	 strong	 social	 media	 presence	 also	 gave	 the	
protest	 movement	 an	 advantage	 in	 the	 communicational	 sparring	 over	 the	 project.	
HidroAysén’s	reluctance	to	engage	early	and	fully	in	a	kind	of	communication	in	which	
its	stakeholders	could	“speak	back”	because	of	initial	fear	of	negative	publicity,	cost	it	an	
important	arena	for	debate	on	the	project.		
	
Patagonia	 sin	 Represas’	 use	 of	 image-based	 strategic	 communication	 on	 “public	
screens”	 (DeLuca	 &	 Peeples	 2002;	 DeLuca,	 Lawson	 &	 Sun	 2012),	 showing	 gorgeous	
natural	 landscapes,	and	 later,	culture-jamming	composite	 images,	was	also	significant.	
As	the	campaign’s	art	director	Douglas	Tompkins	explained,	the	Patagonia	sin	Represas	
“brand”	 had	 to	 be	 instantly	 recognisable.	 The	 campaign’s	 composite	 landscape	 and	
power	 line	 images,	 especially	 the	 image	 of	 the	 Torres	 del	 Paine	 which	 became	 so	
infamous,	were	powerful.	They	came	to	stand	in	metonymically	for	the	project,	and	for	
the	 national	 heritage	 it	 would	 destroy,	 even	 without	 naming	 the	 megaproject.	
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HidroAysén	was	unable	to	counter	the	anti-dams	campaign	with	image	use:	there	are	no	
memorable	“pro-HidroAysén”	images.	Image-making	and	meaning	creation	through	the	
cumulative,	intertextual	use	of	images	therefore	also	serves	as	an	important	site	for	the	
communication	of	a	protest	campaign	–	one	in	which	the	environment	movement	may	
always	have	an	advantage.	As	DeLuca	 tells	us,	 such	 “image	politics”	are	now	a	crucial	
part	of	the	rhetoric	of	environmental	activism	(DeLuca	2012).	This	study	confirms	that	
they	 remain	 the	 environmental	 movement’s	 key	 advantage,	 and	 offer	 important	
political	opportunities	in	a	mediatized	age.		
	
It	 seems	 above	 all,	 though,	 that	 the	 protest	 campaign’s	 greatest	 advantage,	 and	 the	
greatest	disadvantage	for	HidroAysén,	lay	in	the	prevailing	social	conditions	in	Chile	at	
the	 time	 when	 HidroAysén	 was	 being	 planned.	 Patagonia	 sin	 Represas	 understood	
Chileans’	 indignation	 at	 the	 neoliberal	 system	 and	 elite	 closure,	 and	 it	 was	 able	 to	
couple	its	anti-dams	narrative	to	the	strong	current	of	pre-existing	social	discontent	on	
these	 issues.	As	Waisbord	and	Peruzotti	(2009)	and	Waisbord	(2013a)	have	shown	in	
relation	to	the	asambleísmo	movement	in	Argentina,	and	Beck	now	proposes	in	relation	
to	emancipatory	catastrophism	(2015),	the	ability	to	transform	what	at	first	seemed	like	
an	environmental	issue	into	a	strong	political	challenge	from	civil	society	relies	on	being	
able	to	make	such	a	discursive	connection.	Ultimately,	as	Waisbord	and	Peruzotti	also	
show,	 such	 coupling	 of	 environmental	 imperatives	 with	 political	 demands	 means	
projects	 like	 these	 become	 political.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 HidroAysén,	 becoming	 a	 “political	
project”	meant	 ultimately	 becoming	 politically	 untouchable,	 and	 finally,	 unviable.	 For	
protesters	this	is	a	the	most	desirable	outcome;	for	megaproject	developers,	a	situation	
to	be	avoided	at	all	costs.	But	both	are	ultimately	discursively	constructed	positions.		
	
As	 a	 final	 lesson	 from	 the	 case	 of	 HidroAysén,	 then,	 we	 might	 turn	 again	 to	 the	
megaproject	 literature,	 particularly	 to	 Flyvbjerg	 and	 his	 four	 “megaproject	 sublimes”	
(2012,	 2014,	 2017).	 As	 noted	 (see	 Chapter	 1,	 footnote	 5),	 what	 Flyvbjerg	 has	
conceptualised	 as	 the	 political,	 technological,	 economic,	 and	 aesthetic	 “sublimes”	
together	help	harness	 the	 conviction	of	megaproject	developers,	 funders,	 government	
decision-makers,	 the	media	 and	 the	public	 to	 accept,	 support,	 and	 even	be	 in	 awe	of,	
megaprojects.	 These	 sublimes,	 now	 a	 prominent	 concept	 in	 scholarship	 on	
megaprojects,	 are	 considered	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 the	 scale	 and	 frequency	 of	
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megaprojects.	As	a	result	of	the	research	presented	here,	I	suggest	that	a	fifth	sublime,	a	
communicational	 sublime,	 be	 added	 to	 the	 theorisation	 on	 megaprojects.	 Clearly,	 a	
communicational	sublime	would	mean	very	different	things	from	the	protest	versus	the	
project	 developer’s	 position.	 In	 the	 best	 scenario,	 this	 would	 be	 a	 place	 for	 the	
negotiation	of	 social	 license,	 for	 a	 shared	 construction	of	 the	parameters	of	 a	project.	
Less	positively,	the	concept	of	a	communicational	sublime	might	also	be	a	recognition,	
and	a	warning,	about	the	tendencies	of	megaproject	developers	towards	communicating	
the	 superlatives	 of	 their	 projects,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 sufficiently	 communicating	 risk	
(Flyvbjerg	 2005,	 2014).	 Noting	 a	 communicational	 sublime	 as	 a	 driver	 of	 decision-
making	 on	megaprojects	 could	 serve	 as	 a	 cautionary	mechanism	 for	 those	who	 plan,	
fund	 and	 support	 megaprojects.	 Such	 stakeholders	 might	 ask	 whether	 “facts”	 on	 a	
megaproject’s	 benefits	 are	 indeed	 facts,	 or	 instead	 products	 of	 an	 obfuscating	
communicational	 sublime.	 A	 communicational	 sublime	might	 also	 be	 considered	 as	 a	
site	 of	 contestation	 of	 megaprojects	 by	 stakeholders,	 a	 location	 where	 the	
“communication	 power”	 of	 less	 powerful	 actors	 can	 sometimes	 triumph	 over	 the	
powerful	 in	 a	 mediatized	 world.	 Finally,	 a	 communicational	 sublime	 would	 be	 a	
recognition	 that	 megaprojects	 today	 stand	 or	 fall	 on	 their	 communication,	 and	 are	
therefore,	ultimately,	contestable.	
	
9.5	Suggestions	for	future	research	
	
The	mediatized	 construction	 of	megaprojects	 in	 the	 developing	 world	 as	 a	means	 of	
“generating	 consent”	 (Latta	2010),	 as	well	 as	 for	contesting	 such	projects,	has	not	yet	
been	adequately	studied.	Given	the	megaproject	boom,	there	is	currently	vast	scope	for	
collecting	 empirical	 data	 around	 new	 megaprojects	 and	 their	 mediatized	
communication,	 to	 examine	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 some	 become	 contested,	
symbolic	and	emblematic,	and	the	ways	others	evade	protest	and	are	quietly	completed.		
	
The	 discursive	 construction	 of	 HidroAysén	 and	 other	 hydroelectric	 megaprojects	 in	
particular	 as	 a	 “clean”	 form	 of	 energy	 in	 the	 face	 of	 climate	 change	 (when	 they	 can	
indeed	be	significant	greenhouse	gas	emitters)	also	warrants	further	research	attention.	
This	is	particularly	so	where,	as	initially	in	the	case	of	HidroAysén,	such	constructions	
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serve	to	displace	other	smaller-scale,	less	environmentally	damaging,	renewable	energy	
forms	from	consideration.	
	
Finally,	mediatized	conflicts	over	megaprojects	 like	 the	HidroAysén	case	also	warrant	
further	research	attention	for	their	political	dimension.	Cross-national	research	on	how	
the	 communication	 of	 conflicts	 over	 such	 projects	 may	 transform	 them	 into	
“untouchable”	 political	 projects	 would	 be	 fruitful,	 as	 would	 testing	 of	 Beck’s	 (2015)	
emancipatory	 catastrophism	 thesis	 in	 relation	 to	megaprojects.	 Studying	megaproject	
conflicts	 in	 a	 variety	of	national,	 and	 transnational,	 contexts	may	also	 reveal	whether	
such	 conflicts	 do	 indeed	 serve	 to	 repoliticise	 societies	 that	 have	 previously	 been	
depoliticised.	 If	 this	 were	 the	 case,	 it	 would	 support	 Alselm	 and	 Haikola’s	 (2018)	
contention	that	environmental	conflicts,	and	perhaps	even	conflicts	over	megaprojects	
in	particular,	can	lead	a	return	to	the	political	in	an	increasingly	postpolitical	world.	
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Appendix	
	
Timeline	of	the	case	of	HidroAysén	
1940s:	The	Chilean	government	and	Endesa	carried	out	the	first	explorations	in	Aysén	
with	the	intention	of	mapping	and	quantifying	the	extent	of	hydroelectric	resources	in	
the	region.	
1970s:	New	studies	were	undertaken	in	the	region	and	a	study	was	published	in	
December	1975	of	possible	hydroelectric	development	of	the	River	Baker.	In	1976,	a	
study	of	the	hydroelectric	potential	of	the	River	Pascua	was	published.		
1998:	Both	studies	were	updated	with	new	fieldwork.	The	Rivers	Baker	and	Pascua	
were	deemed	to	have	hydroelectric	potential	of	2800MW	which	could	be	developed	
with	a	series	of	hydroelectric	dams	and	generation	plants.	
2004:	Endesa	Chile	began	initial	studies	for	the	environmental	baseline	study,	which	
would	become	the	HidroAysén	project’s	Environmental	Impact	Study.	Endesa	
announces	studies	will	continue	until	2008.		
2006:	January:	The	Aysén	Life	Reserve	Citizen’s	Coalition	established	in	Coyhaique.		
April:	Groups	opposing	hydroelectric	projects	in	Patagonia	established	their	citizens’	
education	campaign.			
4	September	2006:	Endesa	(51%)	and	Colbún	(49%)	established	Centrales	
Hidroelectricas	de	Aysén	S.	A.,	a	company	to	be	known	as	HidroAysén.	The	executive	
director	was	Hernán	Salazar.		
2007:		March:	The	Council	for	the	Defence	of	Patagonia	was	founded,	and	began	its	
campaign,	Patagonia	sin	Represas.		
May:	36%	of	respondents	to	an	opinion	survey	said	that	they	were	against	the	dams.		
August:	The	HidroAysén	project	was	changed	from	four	to	five	dams,	but	due	to	
improved	engineering	at	the	dam	walls,	the	planned	area	of	the	dams	was	reduced	from	
9,300	to	5910	hectares.		
October:	HidroAysén	was	examined	in	the	Tribunal	de	la	Defense	de	Libre	Competencia	
(Chilean	Competition	Tribunal)	because	of	fears	of	a	monopoly	in	Chile’s	energy	sector.	
The	project	passed	this	tribunal,	but	with	certain	restrictions,	including	having	to	find	
outside	partners	for	involvement	in	the	project’s	transmission	line.	
2008:	August:	HidroAysén	submited	its	environmental	impact	study	to	Corema	in	
Coyhaique.		
November:	A	survey	by	Adimark	revealed	that	51%	of	respondents	supported	the	
construction	of	dams	in	Aysén.	
2009:	February:	Endesa	(a	mainly	Spanish-owned	transnational	company	which	owned	
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the	once	national	Chilean	energy	entity)	was	taken	over	by	Enel	(Italy).	Enel	bought	out	
Acciona	(Spain)	and	Endesa	(Spain)	to	take	control	of	92%	of	Endesa.		
July:	Legal	appeal	by	lawyers	for	the	CDP	against	HidroAysén’s	admissibility	to	the	
environmental	approval	process	rejected	by	Chile’s	Supreme	Court.		
September:	A	referendum	held	in	the	community	of	Caleta	Tortel	at	the	mouth	of	the	
River	Baker	showed	that	78%	of	voters	objected	to	the	HidroAysén	project.	
	
October:	An	IPSOS	national	opinion	survey	showed	that	50.6%	of	respondents	objected	
to	the	construction	of	dams	in	Aysén.		
2009/2010:	Two	rounds	of	presidential	elections	(December/January).	The	main	
candidates	(conservative-right	Sebastian	Piñera	and	centre-left	Eduardo	Frei	Ruiz-
Tagle)	vocally	supported	the	project.		
January	2010:	Piñera	was	elected	president,	the	first	time	since	the	end	of	the	Pinochet	
dictatorship	that	a	candidate	of	the	right	was	elected	in	Chile.	
2010:	May:	Daniel	Fernández	became	the	new	CEO	of	HidroAysén,	and	began	a	new	
more	aggressive	communication	strategy.	
October:	Environmental	institutions	in	Chile	were	overhauled.	Conama	was	replaced	by	
the	Ministry	for	the	Environment,	regional	and	national	Environmental	Assessment	
Services	and	dedicated	Environmental	Tribunals.	The	Servicio	de	Evaluación	Ambiental	
(SEA,	Environmental	Assessment	Service)	in	Coyhaique	would	now	be	responsible	for	
assessing	HidroAysén’s	EIS.	
November:	HidroAysén	begins	television	advertising	campaign,	which	would	become	
known	as	the	‘Campaign	of	Terror’.	
End	November:	57.8%	of	respondents	to	an	IPSOS	survey	said	that	they	were	against	
dam	construction	in	Aysén.	
2011:	April:	61.8	%	or	respondents	in	an	IPSOS	survey	were	against	dam	construction	
in	Aysén.	
9	May:	The	SEA	in	Coyhaique	approved	HidroAysén	in	an	11-1	vote	despite	the	
reviewing	authorities	citing	outstanding	flaws	and	omission	of	critical	data.	
Environmental	qualification	permits	were	granted	to	the	megaproject.	Local	protests	in	
Coyhaique	and	large	street	demonstrations	in	Santiago	immediately	follow	the	ruling.	
May/June:	Massive	street	protests	against	HidroAysén	in	Santiago	and	other	cities	
around	Chile	intermittently	for	six	weeks	after	the	approval.	The	largest	of	these	was	
thought	to	number	100,000	people	in	the	streets	of	Santiago.	Conservative	media	
emphasise	disorderly	behavior,	despite	the	protests	being	mainly	peaceful.	There	are	67	
arrests	at	one	protest	on	13	May.	
15	May:	La	Tercera	published	the	results	of	its	own	survey	which	showed	74%	of	those	
questioned	in	Santiago	rejected	the	building	of	the	HidroAysén	project.	Another	study,	
conducted	by	the	Fundación	Aysén	Futuro	and	reported	in	La	Tercera	on	14	May	
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showed	that	in	a	hypothetical	plebiscite	in	Aysén,	66%	of	people	would	reject	the	
project,	and	34%	would	approve	it.		
September:	A	national	survey	by	the	Universidad	Diego	Portales	reported	that	66%	of	
respondents	were	against	the	HidroAysén	project,	and	72%	were	in	agreement	with	the	
protests	against	the	project.		
October:	The	Court	of	Appeal	rejected	appeals	of	the	anti-dams	movement	against	the	
project.	As	a	last	administrative	hurdle	for	HidroAysén,	a	Committee	of	Ministers	from	
the	Piñera	government	was	established	to	review	the	megaproject.	The	committee’s	
timeline	for	reporting	its	findings	(and	giving	the	project	the	final	“green	light”)	was	to	
be	the	end	of	2012.		
December:	The	developing	company	HidroAysén	revealed	the	planned	route	for	the	
southern	section	of	its	2300km	power	line,	necessitating	the	building	of	up	to	1700	
transmission	towers.	HidroAysén	was	negotiating	with	Canadian	company	Transelec.	
2012:	4	April:	In	a	divided	sentence,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Chile	rejected	CDP’s	appeals	
against	HidroAysén.	
9	April:	Pedro	Pierry,	one	of	the	judges	who	had	voted	in	favour	of	HidroAysén	in	the	
2011	ruling	is	revealed	in	the	media	to	have	a	large	amount	of	shares	in	Endesa.	
12	April:	Chile’s	House	of	Representatives	approved	a	report	by	the	Commission	for	
Human	Rights	which	had	been	set	up	to	review	the	approval	of	the	megaproject.	This	
report	stated	that	the	project	should	not	have	been	approved	on	human	rights,	
environmental	and	legal	grounds.	
22	April:	Patagonia	sin	Represas	stages	a	free	concert	in	Santiago:	Luz	Roja	a	HidroAysén	
(Red	light	for	HidroAysén)	as	a	strategy	to	keep	HidroAysén	in	the	news.	Musicians	
donate	their	time	and	speak	out	against	the	megaproject.	
May:	Colbún,	49%	owner	of	HidroAysén,	announced	that	it	had	indefinitely	suspended	
the	process	to	seek	environmental	permissions	for	the	transmission	line	for	the	
HidroAysén	project.	It	cited	lack	of	political	agreement	on	energy	development	policy	in	
Chile	as	grounds	for	its	decision.	This	move	is	regarded	as	posturing	to	put	political	
pressure	on	the	government.	
August:	With	a	bill	presented	to	the	senate,	Piñera	announced	the	start	of	the	building	of	
a	Careterra	Electrica	(an	‘Electricity	Highway’)	which	would	connect	the	electric	grid	
around	Santiago	(the	Sistema	Interconectado	Central	or	SIC)	with	the	Sistema	
Interconectado	del	Norte	Grande	(SING).	This	would	mean	that	any	power	from	
HidroAysén	that	was	fed	into	the	SIC	could	then	allow	additional	energy	to	be	used	in	
the	SING,	which	mainly	used	power	for	mining.	HidroAysén	could	therefore	be	
associated	with	power	for	mining.	The	same	bill	would	also	subsidise	the	construction	
of	an	‘Electricity	Highway’	to	the	south	–	effectively	amounting	to	government	subsidy	
of	HidroAysén’s	transmission	line.	
December:	Patagonia	sin	Represas	staged	another	concert	in	Santiago,	which	it	called:	
Juntos	Desenchufemos	HidroAysén	(Together	let’s	unplug	HidroAysén).	
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2013:	The	final	decision	of	the	Committee	of	Ministers	reviewing	HidroAysén	was	
expected	all	year.	With	presidential	and	lower/upper	house	elections	this	year,	it	was	
not	clear	whether	the	committee	would	report	its	findings	under	Piñera’s	
administration,	or	whether	the	politically	unpalatable	decision	would	be	passed	on	to	
the	next	administration.	The	decision	did	not	come	in	2013.	
July-November:	HidroAysén	became	a	key	election	issue.	The	CPD/Patagonia	sin	
Represas	established	Vota	sin	Represas	(Vote	Without	Dams)	a	campaign	to	encourage	
election	candidates	to	sign	a	declaration	stating	their	intention	to	protect	Patagonia	
from	large-scale	energy	infrastructure	projects	like	HidroAysén.	Seven	out	of	nine	
presidential	candidates	signed,	with	the	exception	of	(centre-left)	Michelle	Bachelet	and	
(conservative-right)	Evelyn	Matthei.	Some	75	lower	house	and	candidates	and	six	
Senate	candidates	also	signed	to	Vote	Without	Dams.	
November:	Before	the	second	round	runoff	between	Bachelet	and	Matthei,	Bachelet	
stated	that	she	would	not	support	HidroAysén	if	elected.	First	round	of	elections	held	on	
17	November.	
15	December:	Second	round	of	elections.	Bachelet	won	the	presidency.		
2014:	Bachelet	appointed	a	new	Minister	of	Energy,	Máximo	Pacheco.	Pacheco	
foreshadowed	an	overhaul	of	energy	policy	in	Chile,	suggesting	change	to	the	role	of	the	
state	and	the	participation	of	citizens	in	defining	Chile’s	energy	future.		
10	June:	The	Committee	of	Ministers	considering	the	HidroAysén	approval	rejected	the	
project	and	its	licences	were	revoked.	HidroAysén	declared	its	intention	to	continue	
working	on	the	project.	
2014-2017:	HidroAysén	brought	a	series	of	legal	appeals	against	the	decision	of	
Committee	of	Ministers.	
2015:	HidroAysén’s	appeal	for	new	water	rights	to	re-initiate	the	project,	but	was	
rejected	by	the	Direccion	General	de	Aguas	(DGA),	the	General	Water	Authority.	
2017:	April:	Other	renewable	energy	sources	(solar/wind)	now	generated	58%	of	the	
power	that	HidroAysén	would	have	produced	by	2022.	
15	May:	Santiago’s	Court	of	Appeals	ruled	in	favour	of	the	CDP/Patagonia	sin	Represas	
which	had	brought	a	case	against	HidroAysén	for	failure	to	use	its	water	rights	(as	
stipulated	by	law).		
1	November:	Santiago’s	Environmental	Tribunal	made	a	final	rejection	of	the	series	of	
appeals	by	HidroAysén	against	decision	of	Committee	of	Ministers.	
	
5	November:	Enel	and	Colbún	announced	their	intention	to	return	the	water	rights	from	
the	Rivers	Baker	and	Pascua	to	the	state.		
17	November:	In	an	extraordinary	meeting	of	HidroAysén	shareholders,	dissolution	and	
liquidation	of	the	company	is	voted	on	and	approved.		
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List	of	interviewees	
	
Rene	Alinco,	parliamentary	representative	for	Aysén	2006-2014	
	
Matías	Asun,	Director	of	Greenpeace,	Chile	
	
Carlos	Briso,	Technical	Manager,	HidroAysén	
	
Rodrigo	Castillo,	Executive	Director,	Asociación	de	Empresas	Eléctricas		
	
Felipe	Contreras,	deputy	editor,	La	Tercera	
	
Lucio	Cuenco,	engineer	and	director	of	NGO	Observatorio	Latinoamericano	de	
Conflictos	Ambientales	
	
Obispo	Luis	Infanti	de	la	Mora,	Bishop	of	Aysén	
	
José	Miguel	de	Pulgada,	Editor,	El	Diario	de	Aysén	
	
Nikolas	Espinoza,	former	HidroAysén	employee,	public	engagement	in	the	
Environmental	Management	Plan	for	the	transmission	line	
	
Daniel	Fernández,	CEO,	HidroAysén	2010-2014	
	
Andrés	Gillmore,	sociologist,	spokesman	for	Costa	Carrera,	an	association	of	tourist	
operators	in	the	Rio	Baker	catchment	
	
María	Paz	Hargreaves,	tourism	operator,	Caleta	Tortel	
	
Peter	Hartmann,	activist,	Aysén	Reserva	de	Vida/Patagonia	sin	Represas	
	
Eduardo	Hidalgo,	Rodolfo	Aedo,	Xaviera	Carvajal	
representatives	of	Chonke,	an	environmental	and	socio-cultural	group	in	Aysén		
	
Antonio	Horvath,	Senator	for	Aysén	
	
Pablo	Hubner,	journalist	and	social	media	strategist,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	
	
Sara	Larraín,	Director,	Chile	Sustentable	
	
Flavia	Liberona,	Director,	Terram	
	
Bernardo	López,	Mayor	of	Caleta	Tortel	
	
Carlos	Martínez,	independent	political	strategist	
	
Marcelo	Mena,	Director,	Centre	for	Sustainability,	Andrés	Bello	University,	Environment	
Minister,	second	Bachelet	presidency	
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Rodrigo	Miranda,	journalist,	Director	of	the	Chilean	College	of	Journalists	
	
Carolina	Morgado,	Head	of	Communications,	Fundación	Tompkins,	Parque	Pumalín	and	
Patagonia	sin	Represas	
	
Carlos	Olivares,	President,	Voz	de	la	Patagonia	social	movement	
	
Juan	Pablo	Orrego,	Director,	Ecosistemas.	Chile’s	most	well-known	environmentalist	
	
Roberto	Reyes,	Local	Community	Engagement,	HidroAysén	
	
Patricio	Rodrigo,	Executive	Director,	Corporación	Chile	Ambiente	
	
Hugh	Rudnick,	energy	analyst,	Universidad	Católica	de	Chile	
	
Hernán	Salazar,	CEO,	HidroAysén	2006-2010	
	
Patricio	Segura,	journalist/activist,	Patagonia	sin	Represas	
	
María	Irene	Soto,	Director	of	Communications,	HidroAysén	
	
Jorge	Taboada,	Manager,	Administration	and	Development,	HidroAysén.	
	
Douglas	Tompkins,	conservationist,	philanthropist,	media	strategist	and	funder	of	
Patagonia	sin	Represas	campaign	
	
Claudia	Torres,	Aysén	radio	host	and	parliamentary	candidate	for	Aysén	(2013)	
	
Ana	Lya	Uriarte,	Environment	Minister	during	first	Bachelet	presidency	
	
Mitzi	Urtubia,	journalist/PR	writer,	Ecosistemas	and	Patagonia	sin	Represas	
	
Former	PR	account	executive	for	HidroAysén,	Burson-Marsteller	(anonymous)	
	
Former	HidroAysén	stakeholder	participation	manager	in	Aysén	(anonymous)	
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